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Summary
MODERNISATION AND CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE
IN KOREA
Hyun-Seob CHANG
The thesis comprises three major parts and 8 chapters. First of all Part I consists of
two chapters: a discussion on the theoretical frame of reference and a brief review of the
social changes that have been both causes and consequence of the family changes of the
modernisation process of the last few decades.
Part II comprising four chapters examines the result of the socio-economic change
or modernisation of the last four decades in the family field : a review of the traditional
family as an analytical framework; a discussion of the changes in the kinship network and
marriage customs; and lastly a discussion on the relationship among family members.
Part III comprising of two chapters, sets out the conclusions to be drawn. It
examines first dissolution of the family and changing attitudes and values concerning
family life next discusses what sort of family policies should be arranged to meet the huge
variation and diversity of family life in which conventional values relating to the family no
longer appear to work properly.
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Romanisation of Korean Language
The Romanisation of Korean words in the thesis follows the government-
approved McCune-Reischauer (Mc-R) system.
Korean names are written with the given name first as the Western,
however, in the case of historical figures, their family name comes first. In some
cases, two spellings of a name are given: the Mc-R spelling and the person's
preffered spelling.
For a sake of clarity, there also is some repetition or redundancy in the
English rendition of some Korean terms. For example, do can mean island or
province.
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Preface
The last half century of Korean history has been a history of triumph and
suffering. The conquest of the suffering and the foundation of the subsequent
achievement was caused neither by a charismatic individual leader nor the
government but by the Korean family.
When Korea, The Hermit Country opened her doors to the world, the
world's powers were expanding their aggressive policy and soon she was invaded
by Japanese colonialism subjugating the nation economically, politically,
culturally, and in individual life as well, for over three decades until 1945. With
Independence, other trials of history were waiting. The country was reduced to a
patch of scorched earth by the Civil War (1950-53) resulting from the ideological
conflict with the communism of the North. After the war followed a deep-rooted
corruption in every area of the nation, politically, economically, socially. The
reason Korean economic development was acknowledged 'a miracle' was that the
nation established the economy under this devastating handicap. The pace of
development has been remarkable even by the standards of the East Asian newly
industrialised countries. However, the miracle would definitely have been quite
impossible if there was no solidarity among family members. Family
consciousness was the only hope and base of trust in the time of pains and trials.
The Korean family was rooted in the principles of 12th century Neo-
Confucianism. Of course Korea was not the only heir. China and Japan also shared
the same Confucian tradition, however the manifestation of Confucian morality
was in practice greatly different in each culture. Between the two pillars of
Confucian ideology of obedience to the ruler and filial piety to parents, Japan
adopted the former and Korea the latter. In China where it had its origin, Neo-
Confucianism was accommodated as a pragmatic behavioural morality. In Korea
however it was the philosophy, morality and religion of the nation. Family
principle stood as the core idea of social structure and, in R. Bellah's term, fused
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deeply into other realms of the society. So family ties were the most important
guide to individual behaviour both in family life and socially and the only driving
force to mobilise the society as a whole. So study of the family was the alpha and
omega to understand traditional Korean society.
The family with these deep roots in the tradition was at the forefront of the
development of the nation but has lost much in the development process of the last
few decades. Of course some still remain relatively strong but in a modified form.
Filial piety to parents, the supreme virtue of the past, was notably weakened in the
process of economic development, which has seriously damaged parents' status and
the status of both women and children was also, in some sense, worsened.
Diversity and variation in family life has emerged in the process of modernisation
to shake up the once strong consensus on the family. The society appears to be
suffering from a generational gap derived from the break up of a common set of
family values. Further social and foreseeable developments are likely to make the
family suffer more in the future. The re-unification of the nation and an unbalanced
sex ratio in particular could be urgent sources of conflict affecting the family.
It is now time to make a balance of what has been gained and lost in the
process of modernisation during the last half century. It is time to examine if the
family is still a suitable mechanism to secure the stabilisation and mobilisation of
society. It is time to discuss whether there is anything still left to the family to cure
the social problems of present day Korea and to achieve the second take-off of the
nation. And it is time to examine the role of the state both in relation to individuals
and to individual families. This thesis sets out to address these questions.
The thesis comprises three major parts and 8 chapters. First of all Part I
consists of two chapters: a discussion on the theoretical frame of reference and a
brief review of the social changes that have been both causes and consequence of
the family changes of the modernisation process of the last few decades.
Concretely Chapter .1 briefly reviews existing theories and examines their
applicability to this thesis. Chapter 2 introduces the social changes that have swept
everyday life in Korea most profoundly, in width and depth for the last couple of
decades. They include modernisation, demographic changes and economic
development.
Part II comprising four chapters examines the result of the socio-economic
change or modernisation of the last four decades in the family field. First Chapter 3
as an analytical framework, reviews the traditional family: family structure, family
demography, marriage customs, the inheritance system, and the clan group, which
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uniquely formulated traditional society. Chapter 4 examines changes in family size
and pattern, and analyses what sort of social problems the changes provoked.
Chapter 5 examines, from the perspective of system approaches, how the
traditional clan groups have adapted themselves to a new form in response to
modernisation, and what has changed and what has not changed- in traditional
marriage customs and the result of the changes for the family life cycle of
individuals. Lastly Chapter 6 examines how the relationships among family
members, particularly between husband and wife, have changed, what are the new
roles allocated to each family member, how traditional role differentiation adapted
to the demands of industrialisation, what sort of conflicts sprung out of the
changes, and lastly, the changing distribution of power in the husband-wife
relationship.
Part III comprising of two chapters sets out the conclusions to be drawn.
Chapter 7, first, discusses how far the family has weakened or dissolved under the
profound influence of modernisation and how it may development in the near
future. Next it examines how attitudes and values relating to family life have
changed in the process of general social change. It examines changing attitudes and
values relating to matrimony, to Neo-familism, in the form of the Saemaul
movement which emerged in response to the changing environment, and lastly to
the outcome of the reconciliation in family law of traditional Confucianism and
newly emerging feminism. Finally Chapter 8, concluding the whole thesis, reviews
how the society reacted, through social policies or family policies, to the changing
environment. It discusses what sort of family policies which should be arranged to
meet the huge variation and diversity of family life in which conventional values
relating to the family no longer appear to work properly.
PART I
INTRODUCTORY
2Part I consists of two chapters: a discussion of the theoretical frame of
reference and a brief review of the social changes that have been both cause and
consequence of the family changes of the modernisation process of the last few
decades. Chapter 1 briefly reviews existing theories from both positivist
approaches and critical perspectives on the family as well as the newly emerged
academic trend under the title of postmodemism, and examines their applicability
to this thesis to formulate methodological framework. Chapter 2 introduces the
modernisation that has swept Korea most profoundly for the last couple of decades.
The astonishingly rapid and profound social change has exerted its influence on
every realm of society. Economic growth and demographic change however are
two of the most notable achievements of the last few decades. Family change was a
natural consequence of social change and at the same time such achievement would
hardly have been possible if Korean families had not changed themselves to adapt
to the demands of society. Social change was the outcome of an interaction
between family and the nation, culminating in the Saemaul movement of the 1 970s
on.
CHAPTER ONE
THE THEORETICAL
FRAME OF REFERENCE
This chapter sets out to establish an analytic framework for the thesis. First
of all, a brief history of family studies, from which both positivist and critical
traditions have derived will be introduced. Second, various frameworks and
perspectives, rooted in those traditions will be critically examined. This critical
review includes the postmodernist perspective in the family realm. And third,
methodological issues concerning the normative and empirical dimensions of the
principal perspectives and a discussion of appropriate levels of analysis relating to
endogenous and exogenous change so as to set out the analytic position adopted in
this study. Finally sources of data used for analysis in the thesis will be briefly
introduced, including the field survey data of 1986 and 1989 by KIHASA (Korea
Institute for Health and Social Affairs : former body of KIPH, Korea Instituite for
Population and Health Affairs).
1.1. FRAMEWORKS FOR FAMILY STUDIES
1.1.1. Brief History of Family Study
As was the case with almost all modern sciences, the study of the family
was also stirred by the impact made by the work of C. Darwin. In other words, it
was after the Social Darwinists applied the concept of evolution to the society of
human beings that discussion of marriage and the family was opened for the first
time. Of course, the importance of the family was mentioned already a long time
ago in the Bible, in Confucian Scripture, or The Republic of Plato. Nevertheless it
is appropriate to point out Social Evolutionism as the starting line of family study
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as a modern science. 1 A substantial quantity of books and articles about the origin
and evolution of the family and marriage was produced from then on.
Several works presented during this period, which have had a profound
influence on latter scholars of the family, and which are still being quoted as an
important corner-stone of debate, should be noted. F. LePlay comes first as a
forerunner of later attempts at scientific study. Through his monumental works like
Les Ouvriers Europeans (1855), Les Ouvriers de deux mondes (1857), Le Reforme
Social (1872), L'Organization de la famille (1875), interview method and the
participant observations were applied, for the first time, to collect data. Next, in
1870, L. H. Morgan presented "Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the
Human Family" which has been widely quoted by Marxists and simultaneously
created a sensation in American social science in the 19th century. The History of
Matrimonial Institutions (G. E. Howard, 1904), The Origin of Family, Private
Property and the State (F. Engels, 1910), and History of Human Marriage (F. A.
Westermark, 1921) etc. followed soonafter.2
During this period, most discussions concentrated on the origins of the
family, with the cross-cultural aspect accompanied by macroscopic approaches but
the studies ended with, more or less, unscientific conclusions. Those became a
cause of ramification in the field of family studies as the general trend of social
sciences was polemically dichotomised by politico-economic ideology. In other
words, the embryo both of the critical and the positivist traditions of family
sociology started to grow up from this period.
First of all, from the critical tradition, based on the ambiguous evolutionary
anthropology of Morgan, F. Engels, through The Origin of the Family, gave a
materialistic account of different family forms characteristic of different classes. In
spite of his monumental effort, Engels failed to notice the division of labour in the
family, neglected the male domination definite in the proletarian family and
overlooked the fact that women from the proletarian family were bearing double
suffering both from child-care and household duties and from their wage labour
outside the home. Due to these shortcomings, family study was ramified, at an
early stage, into anarchism, feminism, and utopian socialism etc., which are more
radical, in some extent, than the original Marxist approaches. Nevertheless, family
study peaked in the Frankfurt School established by T. Adorno, E. Fromm. M.
Horkheimer, H. Marcuse, and J. Habermas developing the influence from Marx,
Lucacs, and Gramsci, etc. These critical theorists in 1 920s, emphasized the family
as an 'institution', and they highlighted its ideological characteristics. After 1 950s,
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the discussions were continued on its attributes: whether it belongs to the private
domain or the public domain.
On the other hand, American family study though influenced by the same
social evolutionism as the critical tradition was, developed in a different direction
passing through the European scholars like H. Spencer, and A. Comte, and was
given the name, positivism. Borrowing from G. Kinloch (1977), theorising in
American sociology represented "the application of the European philosophical
ideas to materialistic, pragmatic, and utilitarian society in which idealism has given
way to empiricism and utilitarianism". In a word, social surveys, and their
methodology to deliver, and statistics to analyse the result of them, attracted strong
attention from both social reformers and sociologists who were facing up to urgent
social problems sprung out of industrialisation and urbanisation. The American
Journal of Sociology founded by the Chicago school in 1894, is an exemplary
effort to reflect the above situation. The concurrent development of statistical
techniques accelerated, coming into the era of W. I. Thomas and C. H. Cooley
under the leadership of E. Burgess from 1920 to 1950. In conclusion, " a body of
scientific facts about the family" (B. N. Adams) were moulded and accumulated
under the American sociological hemisphere, the positivist tradition.
Nevertheless, it was only from 195 Os3 that theories and frameworks had
begun to be regarded as a significant tool by which the result of studies of the
family icould be judged. Thus the so called 'the period of systematic theory
building'4 , accompanied by the acceleration of research activity continued since the
1920s, was opened from then on. To borrow from, B. N. Adams, it was "the period
of summarisation of findings, of conceptual frameworks, of complaint about the
lack of comprehensive theory, of tentative theoretical attempts" 5 to go beyond mere
description. Thereafter, dozens of frameworks and theories borrowing mainly from
sociology, partly from anthropology, psychology, uncommonly even from
philosophical concepts for family studies, were introduced. Among them, some had
already faded away after a short period of fashion, but still a large number of
theories or frameworks remained waiting for deeper experimentation.
It is not easy to examine all theories of both traditions in order, for several
reasons. First, because of the complexity of the family itself.' 6 Concretely speaking,
the family is so complicatedly structured not only internally e.g., the biological or
psychological characteristics of the individuals who are its members but also in
terms of its external attributes, economic, political, cultural, environmental etc. so
that approaches to the family can not but be diversified. Furthermore, the fact that
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the family is not exempt from socio-historical change adds to the complexity and
delicacy of the family. Last but not least, from an epistemological point of view,
the different interests of various scholars, have further added to the complexity of
those approaches.
Nevertheless, reviewing the reasons for the variety of frameworks in the
field, they can be divided into two big groups of theories along to two axes:
differences of perception of the role of theory and differences concerning the object
of study. As with the history of the social sciences in general, family study, could
not have escaped from the maelstrom of debate on the role of theory, between the
two camps. Theory can be viewed as a science or method from the perspective of
one group of family scholars, while by another it is viewed as critique or praxis.
The author classifies them as the positivist tradition and the critical one 7
 for
convenience.8
The two terminologies, positivism and critical tradition are used in a
relatively broad sense in this thesis. For example, positivism in family study
connotes the methodology of constructing general, verifiable, and as a result,
predictive theories, which, in principle, is not different from that of the natural
sciences. On the other hand, the critical tradition in this field, following the Marxist
one, emphasises the importance of praxis, which is to say the denial of the
dichotomy between the subjective and the objective. That is to say, in this
discussion the term is not narrowly defined to reflect to the critical theory of the
Frankfurt school.
Needless to say, the contrast of the positivist and critical traditions is not
the only possible categorisation of the various approaches in the study of the
family. For instance, it can be dichotomised by contrasting an historical approach
with the comparative perspective according to the time span, longitudinal or cross-
cultural. Otherwise, four categories can be produced along the axes of ontology and
epistemology: the cri,tical, the radical, the interpretative, and the functional as J.
Sprey did in 1988. All these efforts reflect the authors' personal interest. Likewise,
the author has adopted the framework of positivism and the critical tradition, in
consideration of the significance of debates about the subjective and the objective,
which has notably emerged in the current discussion of the family.9
On the other hand, the latter axis, differences about the object of study, is
the abstraction of various facets of the family, into three scales according to targets
on which a researcher wants to focus his/her study; the family as individuals, as a
group, or as an institution. 10 For instance, family researchers who are oriented to
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the psychological perspective can not but to concentrate main focus on individual
attributes of the members of the family like the development of children in a
family, while a scholar with the macroscopic approach highlights culturally
institutionalised attributes of the family like what T. Parsons called 'the
integrational function of the family to a society'."
To conclude, having pursued 'the scientific' or 'the objective', the
positivists, represented classically by B. Burgess and T. Parsons, believed that "the
attitude of science is that of value-free truth-seeking: the method is that of
objective analysis of empirical data and the aim is that of predictive theory".' 2 The
Handbook of Marriage and the Family edited by H. T. Christensen in 1964, and
Contemporary Theories about the Family Vol.1, II edited by W. R. Burr et al in
1979 would be good examples of the effort to construct an all-compassing general
theory, based on the positivism.
Contrary to the positivist tradition, the critical tradition including critical
theory, and feminist thought criticises this positivist approach despite its statistical
and methodological sophistication. Thus "the symbolic meaning and substantive
experience of housework is lost in quantitative researches" 3, consequently, the
critical tradition challenges the dichotomy between the objective and the
subjective, and stresses the importance of praxis, the "revisionism and
transformation of the institution of the family and the larger social system."4
1.1.2. The Positivist Tradition
Positivist study of the family frequently called 'mainstream family
sociology' or sometimes identified with 'functionalism'(C. C. Ha1Ti, D. B. Targ),
has become wide spread with varied frameworks or methodological approaches to
the family, especially since Merton's advocacy of middle-range theory instead of
Parsonian grand theory. Despite its diversity it can be roughly divided into four
subcategories according to the object of research; the institutional approach, the
system approach, the interactional approach, and the developmental approach.'5
Of course, this is not the only possible categorisation of the manifold types
of approach in the family area. For example, Hill, Katz, and Simpson in 1957
suggested seven conceptual approaches.' 6 These were condensed into five types by
Hill and Hansen in the 1960s and reorganised into four categories in the 1970s by
Broderic. Coming into 1980s, Holman and Burr distinguished as many as
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seventeen kinds of framework, while Thomas and Wilcox have identified twelve in
1987)
Most of the above-mentioned family sociologists categorised theories into
different schools of thought. This however is conceptually and analytically unclear.
Instead, logical validity or empirical verification should be the first thing to which
scholars give their attention. It is not difficult to find a series of neglected theories
or frameworks, to be revived and at the same time, no one believes the validity of
theories currently in fashionis so fully established that no others could be
entertained. To escape from this dilemma the author has combined several
frameworks or theories according to their logical similarities regardless of their
specific claims to produce the following four groupings: <a> the institutional
approach which deals with institutional aspects of the family, <b> the systems
approaches which deals with the family in terms of its functional interrelationships
with other micro and macro social systems, <c> the interactionist approach which
focusses on the individual level within the family, and <d> the developmental
approach which encompasses cyclical aspects of the family.
1.1.2.1. The institutional approach
This approach derives from the work of E. Durkheim who saw the family as
a social institution. According to him, the family is formulated and maintained by
other social institutions which are "all the beliefs and all the modes of conduct
instituted by the collectivity". As a consequence, neither is cohabitation a
necessary condition, nor consanguinity alone a sufficient condition for the
existence of the family to be socially recognised but external constraints exerted by
society on the rights and obligations of each member are prerequisite. The family
was analysed as coterminous with family custom, morals, norms, and law etc. In a
word, he took the view that the family was sustained and limited by social
processes, which reflect the social atmosphere of the European bourgeois family in
19th century.'8
This Durkheimian view of the family, was developed at the same
concomitant In L. H. Morgan's Ancient Society, the development of the concept of
the family is discussed, is an important example of academic thought at that time.
Against the prevalent conception about the family of those days, i.e. that
monogamy family has always existed dominantly and polygamy appeared only
scarcely, Morgan argued that monogamy is the last established pattern of family
life which had progressed originally from promiscuous sexual relations and passed,
sequentially, through five developmental stages of family pattern. In other words,
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the institution of the family has advanced unilinially from the barbarian stage to the
civilised one. The institutional approach however declined due to its orientation to
unilineality, the moral conotation of the concept of progress, and the unreliability
of data used to justify its evolutionary arguement.
However, after World War II, breaking away from unilineal evolutionism
of the early period and adopting a more strict approach to data collection and
handling, the institutional approach was resurrected by means of a cross-cultural
comparative methodology. Together with the original perspective viewing the
family as a cultural pattern, i.e. a social institution, the revisionist approach has a
distinctive methodological strength, in historical comparision within a given
society and the international comparison of one society with others. As a result,
this framework can clarify the relation between the family and other socio-cultural
institutions in a society, and to specify the sequence of development and change in
family patterns over a long range of history. G. P. Murdock's Social
Structure(1949) described data on family, kinship, and marriage, collected mostly
from preliterate countries, and World Revolution and Family Pattern( 1963) written
by W. J. Goode discussing, based on the comparison of family patterns of several
civilised countries, about general trend of convergence towards the conjugal family
are exemplary cases of this approach.'9
As reviewed above, the institutional approach offers an explanation not
only of the predominant pattern of the family in a given society, like the traditional
'institution family' as E. W. Burgess called it but also of the enormous changes in
the pattern throughout history. Of course, it has been criticised as having, on the
one hand, a grave weakness in grasping the concrete relationships of human beings
inside the family, and on the other hand, serious limitations in establishing
generalisations based on theoretical concepts, as a result of its basic orientation to
concrete description. The author has no intention to deny the weak points of the
institutional approach in the analysis of the family in the dramatic transition of
value systems or its limitation in the analysis of change per Se. But considering the
diversity of norms and patterns of conduct by which family life is regulated,
ranging from the macro social effects of societal scale for example to the micro
social pressures applied to a particular family in its relationships with other
families, it is hardly possible to argue that potentialities both for generalisation and
understanding individual human relationships are limited in the institutional
approach.
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Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the strong points of this approach, which
come from its orientation to the cross-cultural, historical comparison, and its
emphasis on social constraints imposed on individuals through social institutions
should not be missed. For example, without the approach, it is scarcely possible to
analyse the unique family values of traditional Korea and their modification in the
family patterns prevalent in modern Korea. There will furthermore be little
significance in an analysis if the author does not examine the impact on family
values of the unbalanced development between rural and urban areas, accompanied
with the migration of rural families during the 1 970s. For this the institutional
approach, together with systems approach, seems to offer a useful point of view.
1.1.2.2. The systems approach
The systems approach like the structural-functional approach focusses on
the family as a social system unlike the institutional approach which views the
family from the perspective of culture. Both the systems approach and the
structural-functional perspective share their intellectual tradition very closely with
each other rooted in the structuralism of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and the
functionalism of B. Malinowski. 2° Of course there are some scholars like
Bertalanffy or Broderic 2 ' who have sharply differentiated the systems approach
from the structural-functional approach, arguing "systems theory may be the wave
of the future, providing generalisations useful for understanding not only the
family system but also other systems as well." There has been considerable
progress in this direction by Kantor and Lehr, Satir, and Watzlawick et al.22
Nevertheless it is difficult to deal with these approaches separately. First, because
systems theory in family studies has not matured as they themselves have
recognised and secondly but more importantly because, both approaches share 'the
family as a system' as their main unit of analysis.23
In overviewing the premises of the early functionalists like, Radcliffe-
Brown, and Malinowski, Turner writes "the social world was viewed in systemic
terms. ... And when viewed as a system, society was seen as composed of mutually
interrelated parts; the analysis of these interrelated parts focused on how they
fulfilled requisites of systemic wholes and, hence, maintained system normality or
equilibrium." 24
 These basic hypothesis were moulded into the structural-functional
approach in the family field by T. Parsons, K. Davis, R. K. Merton, G. C. Homans,
and afterward, highlighted with M. J. Levy's The Family Revolution in Modern
China(1949) explaining the traditional family structure and its transition in relation
to five subsystems; role differentiation, solidarity, economic distribution, political
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distribution, and integration, and Family, Socialisation, and Interaction Process
co-written by Parsons and R. F. Bales in 1956, analysing the socialisation of
children and role differentiation, and A Modern Introduction to The Family edited
by Bell and Vogel. After then, coming into the 1970s, it was developed into
systems theory by D. Kantor and W. Lehr of Inside the Family(1975), by Satir of
Peoplemaking(1972), and by P. Waltzlawick, J. H. Weakiand, R. Fish of Change in
1974. Having passed through a long process of change in research foci, still there
has been no significant alteration to the assumption viewing society as a complex
system of interrelated parts, each with possible connections to the others, and each
performing certain functions for a society as a whole. The family is one social
system among them, structured through the interaction and interdependence among
its members.25
By virtue of its theoretical assumptions, the systems approach can be used
both at the macro and at micro levels. It may concentrate on social structures and
their consequences for an entire society, or on much smaller systems such as the
family itself. In concrete, it is available for the analysis of mutual reciprocity
between the family and other equivalent social systems such as the school, public
agencies, or the market on the one hand, and the analysis of relation of the family
with its subsystems: the dyad of husband and wife, parents and children, or
brothers and sisters or the personality system of individuals on the other hand. But
in spite of its dual availability, both levels of analysis pay common attention to 'the
relationship between particular structural arrangements of roles, norms, and status,
and the consequences of those arrangements"26
There has been some criticism of emphasis of the systems approach on the
harmoniously integrated aspect of the social system. For example, some social
problems like inadequate child support caused by divorce, or conflict in the dyad of
husband and wife, or housing problems resulting from the transition of family
structure itself, were offered as evidence of the optimistic aspects of the
approach. 27 But it developed and was more widely opened theoretically, by the
concepts of dysfunction or latent function introduced by Merton recognising social
structure having dysfunctional impacts on the system or parts of it. However, some
conceptually weak points are inherent in other perspectives of the approach. First,
instead of viewing each member of the family as a subject actively reacting to
environments, it assumes members of the family are nothing but a bundle of status
and roles passively reacting to stimulus from outside. Next, as the same token, it
does not regard the family itself as an independent but as an inactive unit adapting
to external social changes. As a result, even though this approach valuable insights
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to offer in the analysis of change in the family system influenced by
industrialisation, it does not seem to explain properly how conversely the family
can affect social change, or how sometimes, non-orderly change can happen.
Despite of these limitations, there are enough reasons we can not discard
this approach. For example, even if it is weak in explaining concrete and marginal
cases, it, still, offers a useful analysis of recurrently occurring social phenomena.
Microscopically speaking, the system approach can give a good explanation, from
the aspect of role structure, of some sub-systems like the role of income
acquisition, the role of housework, and the representative role, and from emotional
aspect, about the dyads of husband and wife, parents and children, and brothers and
sisters. On the other hand, from the macroscopic viewpoint, it can explain the
reciprocal relationship between the family system and the economic system or
political system or the value system in a society, or the functional relationship to
the maintenance of the larger system, society itself. In conclusion, the systems
approach can be useful in explanation of how the family can contribute for the
maintenance of social structure on the one hand, and how individuals, in their
various roles and statuses can deliver the maintenance of the family. In this
context, this approach will be available for the investigation, at least at the surface
level of common sense, of the function, inner structure of the family, and their
transition in Korea undergoing rapid and far reaching change arising from
modernisation.
1.1.2.3. The interactionist approach
The interactionist framework, concentrating its focus on the family as a
"unity of interacting personalities"28 (emphasis added), was originally cultivated by
Mead from the school of symbolic interactionism, and was quoted and developed
by E. W. Burgess. The Family: From Institution to Companionship (1945) by
Burgess and H. J. Locke and in Husbands and Wives: The Dynamics of Married
Living (1960) of R. Q. Blood and D. M. Wolfe can be regarded as monumental
works in the interactionist field.29
This approach has been the most frequently used and, accordingly, the most
influential framework in family studies. 3° And, like the systems approach,
boundaries of this framework have come to be loose and difficult to define due to
its popularity.3 ' That is to say, exchange theory, the situational framework, and role
theory etc. are said to have shared their theoretical backgrounds with that of
symbolic interactionism. 32 For example the situational approach is the same as the
interactionist approach, in the sense that it assumes the family as a unity of
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interacting individuals, it emphasises the process of interaction, it views the family
as a situation which evokes interaction, and it focuses on the manifest behaviour of
individuals reacting to that situation. Nevertheless, it is different in the context that
it takes its research object not only of the stimuli from family itself but also of the
stimuli the family receives from its external environment. The Large Family
System written by J. H. S. Bossard and E. S. Boll in 1956 can be introduced as
exemplary. 33
 On the other hand, in the case of both interactionism and exchange
theory, the basic assumption is that the family is a unity of interacting
personalities, and humans are actors as well as reactors. But they separate with
each other at the method of study and the content of interactions. If the former
emphasises the importance of symbolicity, the latter accents more realistic
exchange through rationalistic costs and rewards, disregarding the irrational ones
like, love, social norms, commitment etc. And lastly, role theory developed as by
R. H. Turner34, is almost identical with the interactionist framework in its foci on
two processes: the development of self-concept and socialisation. However, they
are different with their accentuation: interactionism stresses the process of
communication, exchange theory concentrates on the distribution of authority and
role. Besides, even the psychoanalytic approach, the phenomenological framework,
and ethnomethodological approaches can be regarded as sharing common basic
premises with the interactionist framework.
In spite of its complexity, all agree that the family is a unity of complex
interconnections among the members in terms of roles, and that humans live in a
symbolic environment as well as a physical environment, make value judgements,
develop a sense of self, and are actors as well as reactors. 35 In a word, they are
concentrating on the development of the self-concept through the interactions
among family members on the one hand, and their socialisation on the other.
Accordingly, this framework can be used for analysis when mate selection or
family formation is discussed. For example, an increase in the divorce rate can be
analysed as caused by the dissolution of the existing role relations in the family,
and adolescent problems as an improper procedure of socialisation or eother as the
outcome of divergent interactive relationships.
However, one of the notable limitations of this approach is its relatively
closed approach to the family as a group. To put it concretely, both in spite of, and
paradoxically due to its distinguished ability to explain the inner mechanisms of
the family, it is weak in its analysis of the relationship between the family and
other social groups. Furthermore, as in its lack of consideration of the time concept,
it finds it difficult to deal with process. In other words, the results of family study
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based on the interactionist framework can hardly be connected to the further
explanations of the family institution itself. Moreover, it has some limitation if the
interactionist approach is applied to a society under despotic atmosphere, like
Japan up to the period of military government in 1945 or Korea from the
Colonisation up to 1 970s, because of its basic assumption that each individual
should be conceived of as an independent actor and autonomous unit composing
either family and society. In a society where the group stands clearly superior to
the individual, and where the interest of individuals is depressed into that of the
group, there is no theoretical ground for the interactionist approach. Additionally,
in a society where there is no concern about the opinion of others or where silence
or immediate obedience is more highly regarded, the concept of communication
through word symbols loses its brightness in application.
Despite of these shortcomings, they cannot be regarded as reason enough
for the interaction framework to be discarded. Although it is not suitable for an
analysis of the Korean family in the past, it still has outstanding potentialif we are
to search for the inner mechanism of the current Korean family, particularly, the
dynamics of the relations between husband and wife, parents and children, brothers
and family.
1.1.2.4. The developmental approach
There is debate about the distinctiveness of the research object of the
developmental approach. As with the above-mentioned approaches, the
developmental approach also shows some complexity in its theoretical
development. Sometimes it is said to be in debt to psychology. U. Bronfenbrenner's
"Ecology of the Family as a Context of Human Development: Research
Perspectives" 36
 belongs to this category. On the other hand, there is a group of
scholars insisting their independent background and separation from other
disciplines on which most of the previous family studies have relied. On this
argument, they theniselves call it a famological perspective (Burr and Nye),
familiological approach (Davis), or familogical approach (Beutler et al.), with their
unique conceptual object of research, the family realm. 37 According to them, the
term family realm is narrower than concepts such as clan, kin, tribe which do not
fit post-industrial conditions, but broader than the usual use of the term family
which ignores inter-generational and alternative family forms. In a word, family
realm encompasses life processes and the establishment of ties across generations.
The most decisive weakness of this approach in its aspiration to establish itself as
an independent framework, is not that it has been established very recently, but that
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it has not been fully examined yet. In spite of the problematic conditions of the
developmental approach, the author has allocated it a place because of its intricate
compound of perspectives that offers much to family study (Kirkpatric,
Broderick).38 It directs researchers to the analysis of the orderly sequential changes
in growth, development, and dissolution or decline throughout the whole family
cycle. Moreover, recognising the unbroken flow from generation to generation, it
enables authors to see family life cycles overlapping one another in inter-
generational interaction in predictable ways throughout the full life span.39
The developmental approach has set out to overcome the shortcomings of
both the interaction framework and systems approach. It is similar to symbolic
interactionism, in the sense that it views the family as a unity of interacting
individuals, but is different in that it focuses neither on the interaction nor on
behaviour influenced by situations. Instead, it thinks of how families accomplish
certain developmental tasks, and accordingly, studies the responses families and
family members make to the demands of life cycle changes: marriage, birth,
retirement, death, etc. On the other hand it is like the structure-functional
framework in assuming the family both semi-independent from external
environment and opento the larger society in interchanging influences with each
other, but dissimilar in that structural-functionalism conceptualises the family
system (kinship) as a structured set of positions, this framework regards it a flow of
social behaviour, "with emphasis on fluidity, change and transition." 40 The
developmental model emphasises "the constant interplay between social change,
the cycles of generational replacement in families, and the individual life cycle."41
Exemplary works based on this perspective include Family Development in Three
Generations written by R. Hill in 1970, and more recently, Aging and Life Course
Transition: An Interdisciplinary Perspective co-written by Hareven and K. 3.
Adams in 1982.42
Unlike other approaches previously mentioned, which limit the time period
in which family phenomena are specified the developmental model is characteristic
in its observation of the process from formation to dissolution of families for
several decades. As a result, it is very strong when one intends to analyse the
change and shift of family roles and role contents, as family members pass from
one stage in the life span to the next. For example, the role of a woman, transiting
to parenthood after her marriage and delivery and again to widowhood after her
husband's death can be explained properly only by this model.43
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Notwithstanding its applicability, the developmental model is not without
its limitations. To begin with there is a need of refinement to accommodate to other
family types. The model is a bit weak if it is applied to family development in the
traditional Korean context. The nuclear family presupposes in the developmental
model of the family, is characterised by a discrete and repetitive cycle from
formation, through a certain period of expansion, to the dissolution of family. The
stem family in Korea, instead of following a repetitive pattern of this kind
maintains a stable pattern endlessly. Thus the model would need to develop a way
of coping with a variety of patterns of family development across the historical
context, and across cultures. Furthermore, the developmental model has some
methodological problems such as the time-consuming and excessive expense
involoved in applying it to research. Of course several proposals such as a cross-
cutting method or retrospective interview, have been introduced as a substitute for
longitudinal approach, but these are suspect in terms of their accuracy and
appropriateness. 	 -
However, these limitations do not lessen the utility of the developmental
approach. Because, every perspective, or framework has to make a certain amount
of assumptions, untestable, and unquestionable. The developmental model with its
main strength in giving insights into the dynamism both of individuals and the
family itself, can be used as a tool for explaining a range of phenomena from the
socialisation process between parents and children, to social effects of the
gerontization of a demographic structure, and to fertility trends which are directly
connected with family changes, etc.
No approach is perfect, but nothing should be discarded due to merely
partial limitations. Having reviewed critically, each framework have their own
potential for explaining family phenomena, but each with its own weaknesses. For
example, three frameworks except the interactionist one, have notable ability to
analyse the family in the context of societal change. The institutional approach is
apt to explain a society in which the family is strongly regulated by the philosophy
of totalitarianism or despotism, but conversely, the interactionist and the
developmental frameworks are suitable for their application to societies where
individualism is more prevalent. No society is without diversity and it is hardly
possible to understand the family, complicated as it is internally and externally,
without an eclectic approach to theory so as to comprehend the diverse reality
which the different theoretical perspectives have each in their different ways
partially grasped.
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1.1.3. The Critical Tradition
Broadly speaking, there are two principal divergences between scholars
from the positivist tradition and those from the critical tradition. One is the role of
theory itself and the other the definition of the family they adopt. Firstly, the family
is viewed, in the positivist tradition, as "the primary institutional means of
achieving social stability" (Timascheff, 1957)44, and family life as a psychological
relief, and an egalitarian private area distinctively different from alienating life of
public sectors. Say, a sharp split is presupposed between the private and public
world. On the other hand, family scholars from the critical tradition have criticised
these views as false consciousness serving the interests of people who have
established their "ideological hegemony" (Gramsci) 45 . The family, in the critical
context, is a mere mechanism for delivering some kinds of function necessary for
the maintenance of the capitalist economy: reproducing labour power, schooling
youth for the alienating experience of work, maintaining women as a consuming
power etc. The private family is analysed as a social product and is seen as closely
interwined with the public sector. Next, if the positivists are concerned with the
question of "how scientific can theory be ?", family scholars in the critical tradition
challenges the intrinsic character of theory. They view theory as a belief system, as
praxis. Contrary to positivists, critical family sociologists do not accept the
dichotomy of theory and practice, or of the subjective and the objective. In other
words, if the positivist regards theory as science pursuing the goal of objectivity,
the critical theorist thinks of the objective intermingled with the subjective and, by
the same token, theory as a human effort per se in which unique and time-bound
socio-cultural settings are embedded. Accordingly, scholars from the critical
tradition do not take the social world as a given, instead, they question "What types
of social change are feasible and desirable, and how should we strive to achieve
them ?" (Giddens, 1987)46.
Due to its orientation toward the subjectivist role of social theory, there are
almost as many research frameworks as the number of critical scholars in this
tradition. Nevertheless, they commonly share an intellectual tradition deriving from
Marxism, and it can be grouped in the area of family study under two broad
headings according to their object of interest: critical theory, and the feminist
approach.
Of course, too simple generalisation can be a cause of misunderstanding.
For example, it is arguable whether the phenomenological approach should be
included in either the positivist tradition or in the critical one. It can be located
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within the interactionist group in the positivist tradition, since it studies 'human
consciousness as an object of intentionality,' and views the family as a
phenomenon of human consciousness. That is why W. R. Burr et al. treated the
phenomenological framework as a distinct model within the mainstream of family
sociology through the book, they edited Contemporary Theories about the Family
Vol.2.47 On the other hand, its derivation from the hermeneutic tradition
represented by A Schutz and E. Dilthey who emphasised interpretative
understanding, the phenomenological perspective can be categorised within the
critical camp too, in that it denies the dichotomy between the subjective and the
objective.48 In spite of its theoretical contribution to both sides, the author excludes
the phenomenological approach from theoretical discussion in this thesis for two
reasons. First, from the point of view of of logical lucidity on the one hand, main
concepts of phenomenology like "social world" are too vague to be applied in the
positivist field, and accordingly, it can hardly be called a model, a framework, or
theory in the concrete sense of positivism, and considering its reluctant attitude to
praxis on the other hand, it can scarcely be adopted by the critical camp. Secondly
and more practically, the area to which phenomenology can be applied, is so
limited to a specific family field like family therapy that the author has no mind to
allow it room, beside the risk of obscuring logical clarity which adopting the
approach it entails.
There is one more group of scholars with a distinct theoretical orientation
but omitted from the discussion for the moment. These are the radical structuralist,
or sometimes termed Marxist structuralist or Neo-Marxists. Radical structuralism
represented by Aithusser and Godelier, is identified with Marx's later work,
particularly Capital, while the critical theory the young Marx. Marx moved away
from philosophical interpretations to analyses of the political economy of
capitalism. His emphasis changed to a focus on "crisis, contradictions, and
structures" rather than the concept of "alienation, consciousness, and critique"
stressed in his early work. 49 In other words, his early interest in the ideological
characteristics of superstructures which was moulded into the main orientation of
the critical approach, has been abandoned by radical structuralists focusing their
analyses on the substructure, the economic basis of the society, providing a critique
of the societal status quo, and emphasising radical social change. In spite of these
contrasts between the two theories, the author has combined the two, laying stress
on critical theory, because of two grounds. Firstly, both theories have a common
vision of human liberation from the forms of domination seen as basic
characteristics of capitalist industrial society. Secondly and perhaps more
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decisively, if praxis is emphasised as one of two pillars of radicalism, theoretical
discussion is more respected under the atmosphere of critical theory.
1.1.3.1. Critical Theory
Critical Theory starts its debates against the empiricist tradition in the study
of the family by raising new questions about the intrinsic nature of marriage and
the fan-iily and their relation to society which can not be sufficiently answered even
by the most elaborate quantitative research skills. This new doubt was originated
by F. Engels and K. Marx, Lukacs, and Gramsci, accelerated through the Frankfurt
school, and more recently, deepened by M. Osmond, and E. Zaretsky, with a strong
orientation influenced by Freudian analysis.5°
Marxist analysis of the family was first developed in the work produced by
Engels. Engels's account of the family, even if it was based on dubious
evolutionism of L. H. Morgan, was distinctive in its materialistic explanation. In
Engels's thought, the bourgeois family rested on a material foundation of inequality
between husband and wife, the latter producing legitimate heirs for the
transmission of property in return for mere board and lodging. He described this
relation as a form of prostitution, contrasting mercenary bourgeois marriage with
the true sex love allowed to flourish in a proletariat where couples attained an
equality of exploitation through wage labour.5'
Marxist family sociology was deepened theoretically by G. Lukacs and A.
Gramsci reviving the subjectivist interpretation of the young Marx who had a
primary interest in the alienation of the individual, viewed capitalist society as
dominating human experience and reifying the individual's essential nature. Lukacs
thought all aspects of social life, which is "reified" by -political constraints, can not
be understood unlesS it is viewed through the "totality": the historical whole, the
social system conceived as a global entity. Most ideas were reified and alienated
from the true nature of social reality by the present capitalist social order. As a
result, the "natural" marital role has been reified and differentiated into
"instrumental" and "expressive" ones in contemporary family sociology. On the
other hand, emphasising praxis equated not with 'practical' or 'pragmatic' but with
emancipatory social change, Gramsci regarded "ideological hegemony" a key both
to social order and to social change. Accordingly, in his context of analysis, it is
first in the family and then in the schools and workplaces that capitalism develops
and increases the invisible power of the ruling class by infiltrating the
consciousness of the individual.
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Coming into the era of the Frankfurt school, represented by T. Adorno, M.
Horkheimer, E. Fromm, and L. Lowental, H. Marcuse, J. Habermas etc., Critical
Theory borrowed from the Freudian tradition on the base of young Marxism, and
focused its research interest on the internalisation procedures of societal constraints
to individuals. According to Horkheimer who saw capitalism as maintaining its
form through the process of "social reproduction", the family as was the agent of
capitalist society, which reproduces the pattern of social authority in the economic
area, through paternal power grasping economic position and physical strength
bestowed legitimately by the given society. It is reinforced by the submissive
familial role of women. On the other hand, linking the human personality and
society through the Freudian concepts of "the pleasure principle" and "the reality
principle", Marcuse, in One-Dimensional Man (1964), criticised the individual's
psychological domination by the modern system of production. Again, in
Habermas's work, "self reflection" was suggested as the means to emancipation
from "communicative distortion", the basis of human alienation , caused through
unequal power relations.52
Coming into modern era, criticisms, representedly by Osmond, and
Zaretsky etc., were concentrated on two points: whether the family belongs to the
public domain or the private one, and the epistemological claim of the theory.
Firstly, from the perspective of epistemology, critical theory makes an assumption
that the members of society are constrained by "false consciousness", which
inhibits true human fulfilment. This epistemological assumption is well explained
by Osmond,53
"the rhetoric of measurement and variables is predicated on the
assumption that human society can be analysed in terms of objective
facts and laws ... they actually justify existing social relations and
structures by making them appear "natural" ... these sociilogists
deny the possibility of alternative forms of relations and structures."
In other words, the goal of the true sociologist is firstly debunking what have
appeared natural and necessary and common sense, through revealing the fact that
these are produced socially, and as a result secondly, is "emancipating" the
alienated. In a word, instead of empirically based description of the family status
quo, the critical theorists attempt to develop analyses that are of practical and of
political relevance.
Next, instead of analysing relationships within families, critical theorists
explore how the family structure and its processes were influenced by political
economy. In other words, from an ideological-subjectivist point of view, the
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critical theorist views the family as a social product and accordingly, concentrates
on the mutual interpenetration with other social structures. For example, Zaretsky,
through his Capitalism, the Family, and Personal Life (1976),54 reviewing the
history of the development of the ideology of a public-private domain, concluded
that capitalism has placed the highest value on work and private property, thereby
producing in embryo the split between work and the family, and of the dichotomy
of male versus female worlds. That is, he explained the subordination of women to
have been caused by the division of labour derived mainly from economic factors.
To summarise, the family is thought of as in the public domain instead of the
private one which used to be presupposed in the interactionist and developmental
approaches.55
Critical Theory is able to reveal much that has been concealed beneath
everyday life through the routinization of exploitative relations. The housing
problem, regional differences, or some social policies concerned with family, is
illuminated by this approach. Furthermore, it also has potential in the analysis of
family dynamics including family crisis, conflicts, and change by confronting
family members who have never experienced different types of family structure
with how they feel about their own family system compared with that from other
societies. Unarticulated needs, frustration, or potentialities of a family member who
is routinized in everyday life, can hardly be as effectively revealed by ordinary
methods.
The limitations of this approach come from the characteristics immanent in
the theory. The problem is that of who judges the false consciousness, and what is
the criterion of true consciousness. Is the perspective of political economy the only
way for a person's true consciousness to be awakened ? As far as critical theory is
endowed with ethical and ontological purposes in itself, it can not but fall into the
pitfall of relativity. As was the case with "conventional family sociology", critical
theory can not be exempt from falling into routinization. The Kibutz having
denying conventional family concept in Israel would be a good example which
shows the fallacy of the critical tradition. Of course, the strength of critical theory
should not be forgotten, and naturally, will be applied to the discussion of some
family policies, unequal regional development which has disadvantaged families in
rural area, and the demographic situation caused by fertility behaviour etc.
1.1.3.2. The feminist approach
It is not easy to define the feminist approach in a word, because of its
divergent orientations, or sometimes, totally different philosophical backgrounds. It
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can be dichotomised, according to their strategy to challenge male hegemony and
epistemological attitude on the roles of theory, into 'women's study' with an
organised movement to attain women's right on a doctrine of equal rights, and so
called 'feminist studies' with an ideology of social transformation aiming to create a
world for women beyond simple social equality (G. Lerner) 56 . Sometimes, it is
ramified into Anarchist feminism, Marxist feminism, Socialist feminism, or Black
feminism etc. 57 But they are most similar in the sense that they are aiming to
"redress the absence of women in the history of social and political thought." 58 , and
to transform the institution of the family and the larger society, by emancipating
women from that family and society. At this point, the feminist approach and
critical theory come together in that they emphasise the term emancipation which
means more than the freeing of the mind only.
To meet their goal, feminists have suggested three premises: first, women
are in a disadvantaged position in all institutions in this society, and next,
sociologists should be advocates for change, and lastly, assumptions of mainstream
family sociology in the conceptualisation and methodology of research need to be
challenged.59 By these propositions, a wide area which has been regarded as merely
natural, can reviewed and reconceptualised. For example, the family can not be
regarded as a haven as T. Parsons had described, but is a mentally and physically
dangerous place for women and children because of male violence. And the family
is no more a monolithic institution as Burgess had treated it. Instead, it is necessary
to distinguish its different effects on men and women, particularly in imposing
excessively burdensome responsibilities on women together with unequal rewards
and costs. In a word, the symbolic meaning and subjective experience of women
which have long been forgotten in conventional approaches , can be vividly
brought alive through this approach.
Nevertheless, as with critical theory, the feminist approach has limitations
in its application to actual life. Methodologically, the qualitative methods they
want to use are so vague that it is "the subject of disagreement even among those
who consider themselves feminist family scholars." 6° Next, the dichotomy of men
and women may distort the nature of the family. The moment one perceives the
family, with Hobbesian perspectives, as a place from where women are alienated,
there is no longer any reason for the family and society to persist. Moreover, it is
more severely limited when it is applied, for example to Korean society, where the
relation between parents and adult children is still getting as strong attention as that
between wife and husband. There arises another kind of structural conflict even
between women, when feminist scholars are arguing about the suffering of women
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in general by restricting another important half of women, say, mothers-in-law
from the group of young women, that is, their daughters-in-law. This is analogous
to the point made by Black feminists in the United States that not all women have
the same disadvantages.
Despite restrictions of the feminist point of view, its qualification for
analyses of the experiences of women can not be neglected. It is particularly useful
for the explanation of traditional Korea under patriarchal authority and in drawing
attention to how the process is being distorted by a capitalist way of thinking. For
example the concubinage system in traditional society and excessive exchange of
marriage casts between families in present day Korea can not be properly explained
by the concept of class alienation or class exploitation.
1.1.4. Postmodernism
There is a group of family scholars who belong neither to the conventional
tradition nor to the critical tradition. They are called postmodern family scholars.
The discussion of postmodernism began from their consciousness of diversity and
variation in family life which does not seem to fit conventional modernisation
theory. They begin with discussions of the validity of "conventional family
theories" to the trend of current family life. For example, rejecting Burgess's
perspective on the family and his approach to family studies, David Cheal asserts
"orthodox consensus about the family is now complete," and he summarises the
situation;6'
Beginning in the 1960s, sociological attention was once again
drawn to changing forms of family relationships but with one
important difference. This time, new family forms are not seen only
as consisting of a master trend of positive development surrounded
by a penumbra of random and aimless variations. Family forms
today are also described in terms of such concepts as alternative
life-styles, social divisions, diversity, difference, and pluralism. It
has been argued that any model of the family that involves the
exclusive recognition of a "monolithic" form of family living is
inappropriate for today. Such models have tended to be replaced by
an openly pluralistic approach."
Similarly Jon Bernardes asserts "We must not define the family," and Rhona
Rapoport has proposed a "diversity model" to substitute for the conventional theory
of the family. There have been almost as many assertions and theoretical
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alternatives as the variation of families today. In spite of various disputes about
"orthodox family theories, the discussions converge on the point that the variation
and diversity of current family life can no longer be explained by the theories of B.
Burgess or T. Parsons and that families have moved into the era of postmodernity.
Except for a short period of 1920s through the 50s it is argued historical trends
have not followed the patterns as the classical family scholars predicted.62
However, in spite of these essential doubts about the classical
modernisation family theories and the argument of a fundamental reorientation for
present day families in the direction of postmodernity, no postmodern theories, it
seems, have yet been developed in the family field. Of course there have been a
few scholars who discussed postmodern family theory. For example Foucault
claimed sexual partnership in the family has shifted from a "deployment of
alliance" that is almost identical with Parsons' 63 role differentiated familiy division
of labour between instrumental and expressive roles to "deployment of sexuality"
which includes something of the move towards a less strictly differentiated role
relationship - akin to Bott's64 idea of joint conjugal role relations or Burgess'
companionship marriage. Foucault explains that the deployment of alliance and the
deployment of sexuality were closely interwoven within the classical nuclear
family. However due to the declining significance of biological reproduction in
advanced capitalist societies, and, when its economic and social functions were less
needed, the family as a consequence lost its function of deployment of alliance.
Instead the deployment of sexuality was strengthened as capitalist societies became
more affluent and internally more diverse. The underlying cause of this change was
the project of enhancing the subjective value of life, which has been a central
organising schema in the modern idea of progress. 65 Other sociologists including
Zygmunt Bauman seek to explain today's family life by consumerism, others by a
"diversity model."66
The absense of a specific theory of the family in post-modern theory is not
a sign of weakness but, on the contrary, one of its major strengths. It is worthwhile
to give particular attention to their methodological position. As P. Donati or J.
Bernardes in particular have argued, "we must not define the family," instead
"families need to be fully recognised as families." And the new family study
"should have real and direct practical consequences." Bernardes notes;67
"We must reject entirely the concept of "the family" as theoretically
adequate and as a consequence, recognise the enormous difficulty,
in principle, of studying what actors refer to as "family life" .....our
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theoretical work should reflect and express the enormously varied
and diverse complexity of family life."
The most important point that must not be missed from the postmodern discussion
on the family, is the emphasis on "the way people define family for themselves."68
For a researcher facing the diversity and variation of family life at this time, it is
important to measure what everyday families are actually like rather than forcing
them into the outmoded categories of normality and abnormality of conventional
ideology.
The way the researcher understands the nature and context of family life is
critical to the presentation of the nature and context of social and family problems,
and as consequence of family policy. For example, as far as other types of family
which do not conform to traditional stereotype patterns of the family are regarded
as atypical, then social problems they experience can be misinterpreted as separate,
idiosyncratic and distinct phenomena rather than as a natural consequence of social
change. Policy-makers have tended to make the primary aim of family policy the
reinforcement of "the family ideology" or at best to devote tiny remedial social
welfare resources for the needs of what is seen as a residual group of individuals.
That has been the way family policy was delivered in the past and that is why
family sociology has been neglected from the main stream of classical sociology.
However from the point of view of recognising the "needs of families" as a normal
consequence of social transformation no family problem is simply a matter of
individual families but both a cause and the result of social, political, economic,
and cultural changes. Naturally problems like divorce, single parenthood, ageing
families, violence, abuse, poor families, decreasing average family size, the trend
to individualistic values etc. should not be tackled as a simple deviation from
family norms but handled effectively and systematically in their societal context.
To conclude, to meet the needs of people in their family life and to tackle various
social problems springing out of postmodernity, families (rather than people, men,
or women, the old or children) should be placed at the centre and a start should be
made by addiessing their needs as families but with an awareness of the possible
diversity of structural relationships and cultural and personal meanings that may
need to be taken into account in doing so. Family policy in this more general sense
ought to be at core of most of social policies. 69 Policy should not prescribe and
impose a particular set of meanings and conventions upon the different, diverse and
changing reality of peoples 'family' relationships. That is the methodologically
significant implication of the postmodem discussion of today's family life.
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1.2. LEVELS OF ANALYSIS OF THE FAMILY
There arise two methodological issues from the above discussion of family
theories: the normative versus the empirical dimension approach to family changes
and the issue of endogenous versus exogenous change in family life as target of
analysis. The methodological issues arising from the normative versus the
empiricist approach has been an everlasting dispute between the positivist tradition
and the critical tradition. Since the 1960s when there was increasing emphasis on
the development of theory, many approaches and frameworks blossomed.
The theorists from the critical tradition were possibly outnumbered but their
arguement was ambitious enough to challenge the logical validity of the so called
mainstream family sociology, and was fresh enough to require a revision of the
ahistorical 'social world' which had been routinised. Contemporary Theories About
The Family70 was a good example of the reaction to the new impact, codifying the
phenomenological framework and relating it to the positivist tradition. Thomas and
Wilcox 7' declaration of'postpositivism' is another example. Despite this good start
however approaches from the perspectives of the critical tradition could not satisfy
the methodological requirements, sometimes showing theoretical weakness, and
sometimes too politico-economically oriented to be called a science. This was
because of its essentially normative approache to social phenomena. In other
words the critical tradition, since Marx's discussion on the contradiction between
theory and practice in his Theses on Feuerbach, The Holy Family, or The German
Ideology, etc. has focused primarily on the praxis aspect of theory and the "ought-
to-be" of social change rather than objective methodology as conventional
sociology did. The result was the risk of egoistic practice for a particular group
who shared the same ideological and methodological heritage, against other groups
than themselves: - "Consciousness" was a good example of this denoting a narrow
perspective of the group of the critical tradition only, attributing false
consciousness to all groups who did not agree with them. Ironically even "the true
consciousness" was represented in various divergent normative assertions so as to
cause a confusion about whose consciousness is really true. 72 Anyhow all these
ironies or contradictions were caused because the critical tradition adopted
theoretical praxis and a normative level of analysis as their methodological tools.
Naturally it is very difficult under such a tradition to formulate a basis for
consensus containing universalistic values since universalistic values appear to be
denied as representing merely the interests of the dominant class.
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The positivist tradition has basically adopted an empiricist level of analysis.
"Typically empiricists have assumed knowledge to be established by induction
from(or tested by) incorrigible, or at least uninferred, observation statements." 73
 As
a consequence, family sociologists from the positivist tradition, thanks to their
development of statistical and methodological sophistication, have accumulated
abundant knowledge and propositions progressively. There was even some aspiring
effort to construct grand general theory. Naturally, they have influenced other
approaches, the feminist approaches in particular. But the result was questioned
from both inside and outside mainstream sociology: " First J. Habermas criticised,
empiricist approaches, for their preoccupation with the observable and
manipulable, which reflected a form of technical-instrumental practice embodying
only one limited human interest. In spite of its strength in accumulating
universalistic consensus, empiricist analysis showed some relatively weakness in
asserting the distinctions of fact-value and theory-practice. The next criticism rose
from inside the positivist tradition itself. B. N. Adams asked, "Why ... family social
science continues to be relatively low in status? Despite the improvements in
scientific methodology . . That is, many such approaches and the sophisticated
methodology of this tradition could not properly deal with drastically increasing
family problems. In the realm of modernisation theory and family change, the
positivist tradition confronted post-modern phenomena which could not be
explained consistently by the empirically accumulated knowledge. Still nobody
knows if postmodernity can be explained by further development of the positivist
tradition, or the critical tradition, or only by a totally different analytic dimension.
The reason the two approaches appeared to contradict each other was
because the dimension of research they were analysing was different. If the
empiricist approach has been quite successful in dealing with observable
phenomena which is eaily nieasurable by objective devices, the normative
approach has addressed issues which are essentially unmeasurable and aspects of
social phenomena inaccessible except by insight. All in all, social phenomena can
be understood more deeply by combining the two dimensions of analysis. It is time
to harmonise both sides. In many cases of conflict between the two traditions, it
was not a matter of intrinsic contradiction, but the different object of interest. It is
natural to address different facets of the family moulded by all sorts of attributes.
Of course there are contradictory opinions about the role of the social scientist. But
even in that contradiction it may be reasonable that social scientists should make
heuristic use of the opposite canons to his/her own understanding of the family. A
synthetic approach is especially relevant for the study of the family in a time of
change.
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Such a synthesis, however is sometimes, apt to fall into mere meaningless
generalisation, if there is no clarification, in advance, of the limitations of the study
one wants to do, or the methodological implications of how one wants to measure.
To prevent a naive synthesis, it will be useful to define the limits of each analytic
tool to be applied in this thesis. As far as the normative approach has no agreeable
basis for objective observation and as a consequence for rational decision-making,
it must not be extended further to the analysis in which empiricism is more
applicable but should be limited to the normative discussion of conclusions, or
making an alternative measure, or debunking routinised understanding, etc.
Conversely the empiricist approach must allow some space for a critical
interpretation, in which normative discussion works more soundly.
The next methodological issue concerns the object of analysis: exogenous
versus endogenous changes in the family. The dispute is basically a debate about
the sources of family change. It is a question how much of the change in family life
is the result of changes in attitudes and aspirations arising out of the internal
relationships within families and how much can be directly attributed to external
changes like the economic, political and cultural environment etc. For example, if
the changes in childrearing, husband-wife relationships, patterns of parent-child
interaction, the treatment of older relatives etc., can be shown to be a direct
response to changes in economic circumstances or government policy etc., then the
change is exogenous. If, on the other hand, there is no such obvious external
influence which would account for the changed attitude or pattern of behaviour,
then it is fair to assume that it grows out of the internal dynamics of family living
and that change at least is endogenous. Endogenous processes are most easily
observed in those areas where change has not taken place or has been resisted.
Concretely tradition is such a case where the family can show little or very sloow
change. Tradition is not an external factor pushing the family into conformity but is
a descriptive term for the family's own persistence in practices which serve the
family well enough in given circumstances but which may no longer be relevant to
changed environments. The family can resist external change out of the needs of its
members being no longer met in the environment the family inhabits. Or it may
adapt new strategies for coping with its external environment out of the changed
needs or aspirations of its members. That is endogenous change.
The discussion of endogenous versus exogenous change, ultimately, is a
controversy about the attributes of the family: Is the family a dependent unit
merely reflecting external social changes or an independent agent generating
change with an influence on the wider society. That is whether the family or all
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aspects of family life always have the character of a dependent variable responding
to changes elsewhere, such as in economic circumstances as Marxists might argue,
or in response to system demands as Functionalists might suggest. Or whether the
family and family life, while of course always vulnerable to outside influences, is
nevertheless, as W. Goode asserts, itself a dynamic factor with consequences for
other aspects of society and playing a determining role in the social process in its
own right. 75 As a matter of fact most family scholars, from the critical tradition or
from the positivist tradition, focused on exogenous changes and explained, almost
stereotypically, the changes as consequences of modernisation. In spite of its
vulnerability to outside environment, the family has actively responded to society
sometimes by perpetuating tradition and sometimes by reconciling the tradition and
the new circumstances. Either in persistence or reconciliation, the family's reaction
to society has an influence on the society in various forms. The Saemaul movement
of the 1 970s which became a stepping-stone for economic development was just
one example of where the family responded to society actively. The Confucian
movement of the 1 980s is another example by which the family responded in
silence. To conclude, the analysis of the family and family life can be completed
through an understanding of both dimensions of family attributes. Naturally both
endogenous and exogenous changes will be analysed in the thesis.
1.3. DATA USED
Two largely different kinds of data are being used in this thesis: the primary
data and secondary one. The primary materials and simultaneously main data
sources to be used for thesis comprises of two field survey data delivered by the
KIHASA (Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs 76) under the title, "the
Family Transition in Korea" (abstract FAM86 from below) on August 1986, and
"the Changing Family Functions and Role Relations in Korea" (abstract FAM89
from below) on September 1989 each. On the other hand, the secondary data which
will be used as a supplementary one to the primary source, include both official
statistics given by government or government related institutes and the statistics
surveyed, analysed and published by other authors and but very rarely, the
secondary secondary one, i.e. the data quoted by other writers.
1.3.1. FAM89
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1.3.1.1. Survey size and target
Considering the moderate number of interviewer per survey supervisor and
the optimum amount of work of each interviewer per day, 3,000 households from
75 survey areas (average 40 households of each region), were set up as a
reasonable size of survey within the limits of the budget. On the process of
abstracting survey target areas, all of islands including Cheju-do 77, were not
included due to excessive expenditure and geographical (transpotational) hindrance
to access for a field survey. As a matter of fact, the number of households of these
islands does not exceed 1 percent of total number of household from all of the
nation, and as a result, it gives no significant influence on the result of the study.
On the other hand, the household as a survey target was defined as a living
unit composed of a person or two persons or/and over, sharing cooking, sleeping,
and a livelihood. From this operational definition, three sub-categories were given:
the ordinary household, living together two or two and over members in, as a
general rule, relationship by kin; the single household, cooking for her/himself; and
the non-kin household, living together more than one but less than ten persons
whether they share cooking or livelihood or not. To meet unexpected ambiguities
which frequently happened during the field survey, several instructions on the
target of survey, were pre-given: (1) the lodger is not regarded as composing a
independent household but as belonging to the owner's household. But
exceptionally, if a couples is lodging, they are regarded as an independent
household.; (2) The employees of a household, for example, a house maid or store
clerk and sleeping and cooking together with the owner belongs to members of
owner's household.; (3) if the number of the non-kin household member is more
than nine persons, the household is omitted from the target.; (4) the institutional
household like a boardIng house, an institution for the aged, a nunner', or a prison,
etc. are excluded from the target. But persons like, managers or employees living in
the institute with their families, regarded as the ordinary household, are included in
the target.; and (5) if householders are foreigners, they are excepted from the target.
1.3.1.2. Random sampling of the survey area
The survey region was randomised from those of "1985 Population and
Housing Census." And regions with new apartment houses, tenement houses, or
ordinary houses too much additionally built after '85 Census were categorised into
extra ones and randomised in a separate way to reduce sampling error to the
utmost, and to economise time and effort which would be consumed in re-adjusting
the size of each area.
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Table 1.1. Sample Size
layer	 I	 universe	 I	 sample
I	 region	 I	 Iaousetiolcl I	 region	 I	 nousenoia
total	 325	 9,669,330	 75	 3,232
Si	 211	 6,508,690	 50	 2,114
Gun	 104	 2,905,810	 23	 1,018
new a.p.t	 10	 255,830	 2	 100
Si: city, Gun: county,	 a.p.t.: apartment
Sampling was grounded on Census data delivered by National Bureau of
Statistics, Economic Planning Board on 1st November 1985. On the basis of
143,500 nation-wide ordinary regions excluding Cheju-do, all islands, and special
regions of the institutional houses as boarding houses, prison, or nursing homes,
etc., the number of household was adopted as the measure of size, and the
employment rate by industry (primary, secondary, and tertiary) and the type of
house (ordinary, apartment, row houses etc.), sorting criteria. As a result, sample
size was set up as Table 1.1 with average ratio of random sampling, 1/2,925
varying from 1/4,339 to 1/2,106 by sample area.
1.3.1.3. Field survey
The field survey was delivered for 31 days from 18th July 1989 to 17th
August 1989 by 8 groups of 24 interviewers and 8 supervisors who were trained
through instructions and practices, one of the main purpose of them aimed at
standardisation of the survey result, for eight days. And the survey was doubly
supervised by research fellows.
1.3.1.4. Result of survey
The real number of household from 75 sample areas was 3,372. Among
them, 61 households from a few regions, were just listed due to an excessively
increased number. As a result, 3,311 households were visited by interviewers.
Among them, a survey on 2,923 households was completed, while 388 households
were left uncompleted.(see Table 1.2) On the other hand, the number of women
with whom interview was completed was 2,838 among 3,022 from 3,311
Table 1.2. Number Of Household Surveyed
layer	 number of
	
household	 number of household visited
	
household	 unvisited	 total I	 incomp	 I	 comp(%)
total	 3,372	 61	 3,311	 388	 2,923(88.3)
Si	 2,244	 61	 2,183	 270	 1,912(87,6)
Gun	 1,019	 -	 1,019	 110	 909(89.2)
new a.p.t	 109	 -	 109	 7	 102(93.6)
incom: incompleted,	 comp : completed
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Table 1.3. Number Of Women Interviewed
tar	 eted
	
3,022
	
184	 2,838(93.9)
Si
	
2,012
	
111	 1,901(94.5)
Gun	 1,010
	
73	 937(92.8)
Si : city,	 Gun: country	 -
households answered, at least, to questions on household members, part one of the
questionnaire. Interview was not available to 184 persons due to a long time outing
or refusal. (see Table 1.3) The weighted sample total on the real value of each
question surveyed, was calculated like below;
= [ [ W'j Xhj
W'h1 = W(S/[jWhiS1,j)
Whj = (Mh/Nh)(Chj/Mbj)(S,j/Shi)
[ : abbreviation of sigma
X' : the weighted total about characteristic X
X : the number of unit (person, household, family) surveyed
to have a characteristic X or surveyed value on characteristic
x
WI : weight value to calculate the weighted sample total
W : multiplier to calculate total estimated value
M : measure of size
N : number of sample region
C : number of divided region
S 1 : number of household
S : number of household answered questions on household
members, part I of the questionnaire
h : abbreviation of layer (Si, Gun)
abbreviation of sample region
In conclusion, after the procedure of codification, error check, and weighting on
the data collected, raw data on 2,923 households (due 12,114 family members) and
2,838 interviewees was prepared for an operation of the SPSS program.
1.3.1.5. Uniqueness and limitation of data
Different from ordinary Census survey aimed at the study of household, the
uniqueness of this survey lies its survey target on family itself composed not only
of habitual residents at whom the Census survey is being targeted, but also of
family members with who do not share a same flat, but still are conceived as a
member of the family. That is to say, after checking every household members, all
and every family member as well whom the interviewees themselves are
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recognising as the members were checked. However one of the main limitation of
this survey is caused by the interviewee. As the target of the interview was set up
to married women at their age 15 and over, sometimes the result of analysis can be
misinterpreted as their spouse has same opinion. To avoid making this error, the
secondary data will be supplemented and compared at a point of significant
discussion.
1.3.2. FAM86
Ground, process, and principles etc. of sampling are the same as those of
the FAM89, and uniqueness and limitation as well are the same. The field survey
was delivered for 32 days from 11th June to 12th July 1986 by 7 groups of 21
interviewers and 7 supervisors who were trained for 5 days through instructions
and practices. The result of field survey is Table 1.4 below. As shown in the table,
unlike the expected number of household in the total region sampled, the real
number of household was slightly increased. Among them, 3,400 households were
completely surveyed, while the target interviewees whose age was from 15 to 64,
numbered 3,013 from the surveyed households. Lastly, the weighted sample total
on the real value of each question surveyed, was calculated just the same as that of
the FAM89.
Table 1.4. Sample Size And Number Of Household Surveyed
layer universe	 sample	 number of households
(household) region I household	 total I incomp	 comp(yo)
total	 9,575.356	 75	 3,409	 3,498	 98 3,400(97.2)
Si	 6,333,936	 51	 2,323	 2,405	 77 2,328(96. 8)
Gun	 3,241,420	 24	 1,086	 1,093	 21
	
1.072(98.1')
Si : city,	 Gun: country
incomp: incompleted, 	 comp : completed
1.3.3. Secondary Data
The secondary data comprises of the official statistics and secondary
secondary data. The data produced primarily by government or government related
organisations belong to the former category. The most frequently cited source of
data are; Social Indicators In Korea, by National Bureau of Statistics of
EPB(Economic Planning Board), Population and Housing Census by EPB,
Yearbook of Health and Social Statistics by Ministry of Health and Social Affairs,
and several reports including National Family Health Survey by KIHASA (KIPH),
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officially reported data by non-governmental organisation like Korean GALUP or
daily news papers like Choson Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo etc.
Meanwhile, the secondary secondary data are used as historical facts. There
are three noteworthy books which have dealt with family as an institution from a
historical perspective; the Study on the Korean Family Institution by D. Kim, the
Study on the History of Korean Family Institution by J. Choe, and Historical Study
on the Korean Family by K. Lee. The former two were from sociological
perspectives, the latter cultural anthropology.
As far as the author relies on historical analysis of other authors' work,
there can be some problems, say, of insufficient data, or of hermeneutics. In spite
of these limitations, the reason why the author has brought historical data from
other authors' work is rather to catch up holistic feature on some phenomena in the
past, than to verify a certain theory.
CHAPTER TWO
MODERNISATION,
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Chapter 2 is about the social changes which had a profound impact on the
family life. It might be necessary to overview the social change as a barometer to
understand the scope, size and speed of family change over the last a few decades.
First, it examines the modernisation, in general, being comprised of attributes of
industrialisation, urbanisation, and Westemisation, which swept every day life in
Korea for the last a few decades. Those were urgent issues being formulated as a
national consensus among Koreans of the period. Second, the chapter discusses
demographic changes: changes in the size and structure of the population and
attitudes associated with these changes. Of course the changes have derived from
changes in family size, nuptiality, and the associated changing ideas and values
relating to them. Nevertheless family change would have been impossible without
the successful accomplishment of the Family Planning Programme which
commenced in 1962. Thirdly, the chapter discusses economic development being
closely related to the demographic changes: labour supply, economic growth etc.
The demographic changes and economic development were both supreme targets
of the modemisation movement and an actual manifestation of it for the last half a
century. Lastly, concluding the chapter, it examines social mobility which can give
a good insight into the speed of the social changes.
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2.1. MODERNISATION
The social force of modernisation has affected the family structure of
present day Korea. The change ranges from ideological and value aspect of the
family to infra-structural changes of the family. Either it ranges from holistic
changes of the familial network to microscopic changes of the dyad between family
members. Some of them were total changes, but many of them were just an
external modification of the conventional familism leaving its inner dynamism
counteracting to the changing social environment. The traditionality was still alive
to co-exit with the superficial changes. Of course the modification was at different
range and at different degree. To sum the change in the family was a mirror of the
changes having happened and still happening in the society. The mirror was
coloured mostly by rapidity.
2.1.1. The Beginnings Of Modernisation
There have been some disputes over the point when Korean society became
receptive to the influence of modernization. These can be abstracted into three
periods according to the point of view: Tonghak Peasants' Movement(1894-1897),
the Japanese Colonization(1910-1945), and the middle of 20th century of the
Korean Civil War(1950-1953).
The Tonghak Peasants' Movement was a revolution from the grass root
against both the ruling class and the Japanese imperialist invasion, but it failed.
The reason for it being regarded as a corner-stone of modernization was that the
movement was for the first time collectively organised from the grassroots.
Secondly, there was a strong demand for the human liberation againsi the customs
and against the given institution of marriage and the family. To say it was one of
the main platforms against Confucianism in the demand for a modern way of
family life. Sadly it could not exert its influence long enough to achieve reform at
the societal level. It ended at a declarative level due to the failure of the
movement. 1
On the other hand, from the perspective of law, the Japanese Colonial
Government introduced a variety of modern ways of life during the middle of their
rule. Particularly those were such things as the revision of the law on domestic
relations, and statutory preparation of the marriage celebration etc. Its driving force
was note-worthy. Nevertheless being an oppressive policy based on government
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power, it was ineffective. Its ineffectiveness went side by side with the heated
atmosphere of the anti-Japan movement within Korea. Another reason for the lack
of success of modernization was that it was recognized to have been prepared, not
for the benefit of the colonized, but for an efficient execution of policies. 2 It struck
out the national spirit epitomised in the Neo-Confucian familism of the colonized.
One of manifested examples of the policy of coercion aimed to uproot national
spirit was the change to the family name to fit to the Japanese style. All in one, in
spite of strong legal preparations, a series of policies for modernization ended in
failure leaving some remnants in the field of family law and marriage custom.
Eventually after the Korean Civil War of 1950, modernization that shaped
the current style of family structure took place in earnest. With the U.S armed entry
into the Korean peninsula, modernisation commenced in a real sense. It has deeply
influenced the transformation offamily structure like the change to the nuclear
family, to love marriage, or to the increase in the social •participation of women. It
accelerated with the demands of industrialization from the first five-year
development plan in 1962. As a result Korean society was dominated by an
overwhelming tendency to pursue change and progress at the expense of traditional
values.
Of course it is hard to say that U.S. influence followed by industrialisation
were the only factors that shaped modern Korea. However it was true, at least
regarding the family, that, in its real meaning, it was the most significant step
toward the current Korean family structure. Most statistics on family demography
show a radical transition from the mid of 20th century. To conclude, discussing the
beginning of Korean modernization in this thesis, the characteristics happened
from the middle of 20th century are going to be the primary focus of description
and those from the earlier period will be of secondary importance.
2.1.2. Characteristics Of Modernisation
The characteristics of modernisation in Korea can be sub-divided into three
ideas: industrialisation, urbanisation, and Westernisation that, in turn, has a firm
grounding in individualism, the advancement of women's status, and
demo cratisation.
2.1.2.1. Industrialisation
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The characteristics of industrialisation in Korea can be seen as a rapid
decline of agriculture on the one hand, and on the other hand a sharp rise in the
field of manufacturing industry and service sectors.3
 However the speed and
quality of industrialisation were quite discernible following the Korean Civil War
(1950-1953). (Table 2.1)
	
Table 2.1. Composition Of Employed Persons By Industry 	 unit: %
year'	 total	 agriculture, mining & manufactu
	
forestry, ______________________	 &
man
	
others
1917'	 100.0	 91.1	 1.5	 -	 7.4
l921	 100.0	 91.1	 1.4	 -	 7.4
1930*	 100.0	 88.1	 1.6	 -	 10.3
1940*	 100.0	 80.2	 4.2	 -	 15.6
1955	 100.0	 60.2	 -	 -	 -
1960	 100.0	 65.4	 10.1	 9.5	 15.0
1970	 100.0	 50.4	 14.3	 13.2	 35.3
1980	 100.0	 34.0	 22.5	 21.6	 43.5
1990	 100.0	 18.3	 27.3	 26.9	 54.4
- statistics unavailable, 	 * statistics includes both the North and the South.
source: Census, 1955, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990.
The Japanese Government-General in Korea, Annual Statistics, 1917, 1921, 1930, 1940.
First of all, during the Japanese colonisation, the Land Survey law
promulgated in 1912 played a significant role in transforming the industrial
structure. The law, at least nominally, aimed at the modernization of the land
tenure relationship. It asked each land-holder to have his ownership rights
recognized, to report his name, address, and the name under which his land was
registered as well as the type of land use, the dimensions, and other pertinent data.
Koreans, however, felt very uneasy about reporting their landholdings to the
Japanese Government-General. Moreover, the registration procedure was not
adequately made known to the general farming population and many peasants were
negligent about making their reports. Nevertheless, all those who failed to register
their land had it confiscated by the Government-General. The Government-General
thus held, according to statistics for 1930, 22 million acres, 40 per cent of the total
of agricultural and forest land in Korea. 5 The result was severe ruin for farmers.
There were two alternatives the ruined farmers could choose; either
migration or change of occupation as a wage labourer. Korean farmer immigrants
in Manchuria numbered 560,000 in 1927, 800,000 in 1931, and 1,450,000 by 1940,
while Korean labourers in Japan swelled to 1,469,000 by 1941.6 The rest of the
ruined farmers remained in Korea and had no alternative but to be a wage labourer.
They had, generation after generation, no particular skills or no capital except their
own two hands to engage in farming. Hard manual labour in the service sector was
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the easiest job they could choose to earn a living. That was the reason why there
was almost no change in the manufacturing industry in spite of considerable
decreases in the agricultural population. More desperately, finances for industry
were highly manipulated, public service enterprises were controlled. Even the
natural resources were monopolised by Japanese imperialism. As a result, it was
very difficult for Koreans both to invest and to have a job in the entrepreneurial
sector. A sharp increase in the number of people employed in mining and
manufacturing industry in 1940 depicts the fact that Japanese enterprises took
advantage of cheap Korean labour who were once farmers. They invested in
mining under the protection of the imperial government,
Of course there was a persistent growth of native capital investment to
mercantile and manufacturing industry mainly by large landowners, and the result
was note-worthy. In 1923 side by side with the National Movement, 'a movement
to buy Korean' 7 was launched. It aimed at giving a positive stimulus to investment
in modem industry. The development of native capital and industry entered a new
phase. Many enterprises owned by Koreans came into being, and some of the
companies have survived until now. Nevertheless capital resources were too
meagre to enable Korean businesses to compete on a scale with those of the
Japanese and to contribute significantly to the industrialisation of Korea at the
time.
Under these circumstances, a statistical decline in the population in the
primary industries can be directly connected neither to modemisation nor to
industrialisation in its real sense. The decline simply brought to a deterioration in
socio-economic stability. The induced decline of the farming population was no
more than a collapse of physiocratism that could have been maintained by
traditional family structure. Koreans no longer believed economic ariibition to be
evil, or mercantile activity and entreprise humble. However when they had
awakened from a long dream of feudal self-sufficiency, the situation was too severe
to cure.
It was after the Independence that Korea could have undertaken
industrialisation in its real sense. However there were too many trials left yet. The
Korean economy was once again badly damaged by the Korean Civil War that
lasted for four years. Lee describes that8;
The damage to property has been estimated at something over 3
billion (1953 U.S.) dollars. About 43 % of manufacturing facilities,
41 % of electrical generating capacity, and 50 % of the coal mines
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in South were destroyed or damaged. One-third of the nation's
housing was destroyed, and substantial proportions of the countries'
public buildings, roads, bridges, ports, and the like also were
reduced to ruins.
Industrialisation was commenced only after passing through political and social
stagnation of the post-war period.
Since 1962 with the launch of the First Five-Year Economic Development
plan, rapid industrialisation has occurred in Korea. It was revitalised through the
New Community Movement that began in the early 1970s. The result was as
depicts of Table 2.1. Various economic indicators show that the change to the
socio-economic structure constitutes a 'miracle'. 9
 Within 30 years, the industrial
structure has been transformed. The GNP share of the manufacturing sector
enlarged from 14.4% in 1962 to 31.6% in 1988 especially by export-oriented
industry. The economy has grown at an average rate of more than 8% annually. Per
capita GDP has jumped from meagre U.S. $1 in 1961 to U.S. $3,500 in 1990 at
constant prices.' 0 To conclude the radical speed of the process generated by
government was characteristic of Korea's industrialisation.
2.1.2.2. Urbanisation
The term urbanisation has two meanings: firstly change of life styles in
rural area to conform to those of the urban pattern on the one hand, and the
agglomeration of population to the urban areas on the other." The second feature
of modernisation in Korea can be defined by the urban agglomeration of
population. It was influenced mainly by economic development that required
centralisation both of capital and of labour population.
As Table 2.2 shows, the late 40s and the early 60s saw a significant
increase of urban population. The first phase of urban concentration was caused,
after Independence, by the repatriation. They amounted to almost 2 millions (about
9% of total population of the South). They had already experienced, with their
adequate skills, an urban way of life during their lives overseas. Beside the urban
population rapidly increased caused by the North's refugees amounting to 1.5
millions before or after the Civil War. It had a great impact on the population
structure. 12 Most of them made their new home in urban areas. There was also a
post-war 'baby boom' that was a natural phenomenon occurring during the
reconstruction of the urban areas after the war. In sum, the rapid increase of the
population, until 1961, in the urban area was caused by political factors.
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Table 2.2. Population Size (in millions) And Proportion Of Urban To Total
Population
	year	 population size	 proportion of
total	 urban	 I	 rural	 urban pop"
19lO 4
	13.70	 .61	 13.09	 4.5
1920a*	 16.91	 .72	 16.19	 4.3
l930a*	 21.06	 1.26	 19.80	 6.0
24.33	 1.87	 22.46	 7.7
	
1949#	 20.19	 3.48	 16.71	 17.2
	
1960#	24.99	 7.00	 17.99	 28.0
	
1970#	 31.44	 13.61	 17.83	 43.3
	
1980#	 37.44	 21.42	 16.02	 57,2
	
1990#	 42.80	 30.64	 12.16	 71.6
	
2000k	48.01	 38.66	 9.35	 80.5
a : statistics both on the South and the North,
* : from Japanese Government-General, Annual Statistics, #: from Census
+: from UN, "Prospects of World Urbanization: 1988," Population Studies No.112 (N.Y., 1989).
The really critical increase in the urban population came after 1962 when
the economic development plan was commenced. From then on there was a sharp
decline in both the absolute number and the ratio of the farming population. This
caused a radical urban concentration of population who were following the trend of
capital flow, both of economic organization and public agencies, and of
educational, cultural, and health investment. The result was a turnabout of regional
distribution of population size, eventually raising metropolitan Seoul to the 7th
biggest city in the world in population size by the year 2000. 13 The characteristics
of urban concentration during the last 30 years can be abstracted into a few points.
Urban population was agglomerated out of balance in a few cities such as Seoul,
Pusan, Taegu, and Taejon etc. There was a severe depopulation phenomenon in
rural area. And women were more concentrated in metropolitan cities than men
were.
2.1.2.3. Westernisation
Ideological changes can be summarized as Westernisation. It was against
the authoritative order of patriarchal familism in favour of democratic
individualism. It was against an empty doctrinaire Confucianism in favour of the
empirical pragmatism of the Western powers. It is not easy to define
Westernisation precisely. Nevertheless at least three elements are indispensable in
discussing how Koreans adapted themselves to Western values and to Western
learning. These were the spread of Christianity, the establishment of modern law,
and the popularization of modern education. They interactively brought many
changes, both in individual and in social life. Such individualism as against family-
centric ideas, democratisation in politics, and the rise of women's status etc. are
those changes.
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First, the propagation of Christianity was directly linked to the
Westernisation and had two critical meanings in the Korean context: the
confrontation against the traditional belief system and the spread of Western
modern learning.' 4 The former was led by Catholics at the early stages of Christian
mission in Korea while the latter was primarily brought about by Protestants at the
following stage.
There was a severe tension between the Korean familism and Christianity.
The familism was the core of the traditional belief system. No reconciliation
seemed possible between the two. Absolute victory or total defeat were the only
alternatives they could choose at that time. Concretely the Christian god recognized
himself the only and almighty. Moreover he was jealous to see idols and he did not
like his followers to worship any other god.' 5 The case was exactly same with the
Korean familism which had been the alpha and omega of traditional society.
Naturally the Korean almighty god, ancestry felt very uneasy against the Catholic
god who disgraced ancestor worship. It did not miss even the fact that Catholic
converts were not legitimate children. They were mostly from those parts of
society which seemed to have had a deep discontent under the present power
relations. They were either from ruined yangban (ruling class) who were thrust out
from the centres of power in the process of factionalism or they were either born to
concubines or to women generally the most disregarded under the Confucian
discipline. In a word, Christianity and its converts were regarded as a critical factor
jeopardizing the given order of familism and disorganising society. With the
coming to power of the xenophobic prince regent Taewongun bloody persecutions
began in earnest, which continued until he lost power in 1873. He blamed all
Korean's problems on outside encroachments. However, it was the Christian god
who was crowned with the laurel of final victory. In 1876, Korea was forced to
sign treaties with Western powers guaranteeing the safety of foreign missionaries
and their freedom to engage in proselytising. It was an instrument of surrender of
Korean ancestry to the Western god. It was a declaration for the positive import of
Western learning instead of hanging onto an empty Confucian familism.16
Hearing the drum of victory, Protestant missionaries began to stream into
Korea and they established a glorious history of mission. The mission style was
quite different from that of the Catholics full of contradiction against the existed
values. The growth rate of Christianity, particularly of Protestants, was breath-
takingly rapid as shown on the Table 2.3. At least two points were critical in
leading the mission to success. The protestant missionaries, relatively speaking,
brought something Koreans were eager to take, while Catholics just asked their
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followers for devotion. The Protestants were recognized as bearers of modern
knowledge of the West in many fields. They filled a vacuum that the isolated
Korean nation desperately needed filled if it was to attain modernisation that might
assure its continued sovereignty among world powers.'7
Table 2.3. The Growth Of Christians	 unit: 1.000 persons
	year	 size of
	
Protestant	 Catholic	 ] total %
pop	 popn I	 pop'1	 %	 Christian
	
1914 k	15,958	 196	 1.2	 79	 .5	 1.7
	
1919*	 16,784	 190	 1.1	 90	 .5	 1.6
	
1929*	 18,784	 244	 1.3	 110	 .6	 1.9
	
1938*	 21,951	 263	 1.1.	 128	 .6	 1.7
	
1949	 20,167	 744	 3.7	 156	 .8	 4.5
	
1957	 22,949	 844	 3.7	 285	 1.2	 4.9
	
1968	 31,093	 1,873	 6.0	 751	 2.4	 8.4
	
1970	 31,569	 3,193	 10.1	 788	 2.5	 12.6
	
1972	 32,459	 3,452	 10.6	 804	 2.5	 13.1
	
1974	 33,450	 4,019	 11.9	 1,012	 3.0	 14.9
	
1976	 35,860	 4,659	 13.0	 1,053	 2.9	 15.9
	1978	 37,019	 5,294	 14.3	 1,144	 3.1	 17.4
	
1981	 38,723	 7,673	 19.8	 1,439	 3.7	 23.5
	
1985 18	40,420	 6.586	 13.8	 1.858	 4.6	 20.9
source: James H. Grayson, Early Buddhism and Christianity in Korea (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985),
p.126
* the statistics both the South and the North
They established modem schools, taught Western civilisation, arranged for the
advanced education abroad of many young potential leaders. They provided help
by mission-sponsored modemisation movements in everything from agriculture to
the health sector. Naturally, whether Christians or not, Koreans began feel
friendship to the West. They began to adopt new ideas instead of remaining
attached to traditional ideas that could do nothing during the darkest period. In
sum, the spread of Christianity did a great deal, both through a painful persecution
and mission of Western culture, in changing traditional culture and customs such as
ancestor worship, marriage rituals, match-making, and the concubine system etc.
The next impetus to Westernisation was the institutionalisation of modern
law. Modem law was already introduced at the end of 19th century.' 9 The masses
called for constitutional government and the rule of law passed through several
political reforms. Many kinds of laws and regulations were promulgated. Those
include "Guiding Principles for the Nation" (Hongböm) promulgated in 1895 as the
first Korean constitution. However it was too late to exert its influence deeply.
It was under the Japanese colonisation that modern law was settled down. A
basic philosophy of individualism permeated modem law. 2° The law prescribed the
predominance of individuals over the family as the subject of a juristic right/duty.
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It assumed individuals to be the basic component of a nation, unlike the traditional
National Code. The Code gave legal responsibility to the family as a whole under
the strong assumption that the family was the most fundamental cultivator of social
behaviour. Below was just a few examples that showed the implications of the
traditional code. For example, if a someone turned traitor to his country, the whole
clans, that is to say, all the members of father's, mother's, and wife's family were
exterminated, and needless to say the person concerned.; a son was required by law
to perform obligations inherited from his parents or grandparents who had already
passed away.; and a couple, no matter how old they were, were required to have the
consent from both sides' of the parents when they either adopted a child or were
going to divorce. Those were just a few of critical targets that had the
individualism make an excuse to bring about modern law. In a word, the coverage
ofjuristic responsibility was changed so as to be limited to the persons concerned
under the modern law. As a result there was no more need to keep a familial
solidarity that insured the protection of one's own interest under the traditional
code. Individuals alone were recognized as the only object and subject to stand
under the law and in society. However this was applied only to men during
Japanese rule. Women's legal status was, in a sense, far worse in the new law than
in the traditional code. Women were regarded as a person without legal capacity
and attached to husbands or their adult son. Their legal status was normalised after
independence. Although women took longer time than Korean men in getting their
legal rights as an individual human being, the slow and steady progress was
achieved by women themselves.
Last but not least, the other driving force of the value change toward
Westernisation came from the spread of modern education.21 Education moved
from the householder's responsibility to be under the control of the state. The state
asked its members to obey as individuals rather than as family members. The role
of the state was manifested throughout the curriculum. Traditional education
mostly delivered byeach family group, gave most emphasis to moral character
centred on filial piety which in turn was focussed on family solidarity. Modern
education put its basic emphasis on the demonstration of originality, respect for
individuality, and acquisition of expert knowledge. Most of this could be achieved
outside the family boundaries. To sum up, the responsibility as a member of a
national society, than as a good child of a family, was more emphasised as a
significant educational target. The new educational ideology of individualism
infiltrated widely together with the growth of modern schools. The contribution
was made both by government, Western missionaries, and private organisations
and individuals at an early stage. The development of education was disrupted by
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the Japanese colonial rule in spite of the increase in the absolute number of public
school. Educational opportunities were given to few Koreans. Primary schools
accommodated only 30 percent of all school-age children, one out of 20 or so
enroled in secondary schools, and very few attended college. 22 Be that as it may,
Korea's educational development reached a turning point after the independence
and education expanded dramatically until the 1970s despite the widespread
destruction of facilities and economic suffering brought about by the Civil War. It
maintained growth as shown on Table 2.4.23
Table 2.4. School Enrollment Ratio
year	 primary	 middle	 high	 pre-college
school(A)	 school(B)	 school(C)	 (A+B+C)
1966	 96.6	 42.3	 27.5	 71.8
1970	 102.4	 57.0	 30.5	 76.7
1975	 103.2	 74.2	 43.6	 80.8
1980	 101.0	 94.6	 68.5	 91.6
1985	 102.0	 99.7	 78.3	 95.0
source: Census
At the same time, the spread of modern education did not simply stop at the
growth of individualism but helped improve the status of women. 24 Modem
education made women aware of their rights that were totally ignored under
Confucian norms. According to the three obedience principle of Confucian
morality, a woman was subordinated to her parents before marriage, then to her
husband, and to her first son after her husband's death. Women only had a role
inside home. In a word, "a good wife and wise mother" was the only educational
goal allowed to women in traditional times. However, together with the extension
of modern education to women, they got more opportunities than ever before when
they started to participate in the labour market. More egalitarian power structures at
home were expected. It went side by side with the growth of thelegal status of
women. The economic activity rate among the female population showed a sharp
increase from 26.8 per cent in 1960 to 45 per cent in 1988. Eventually the voice for
gender equality has got louder and louder based on the educational attainment.
2.1.3. Conclusion - Government Interventionism
To conclude the characteristics of modernisation which occurred during the
last few decades, can be summarised as strong government interventionism, and
orientation to economic development. 25 Those were closely intermingled and
concretely embodied through the series of five-year plans beginning from 1962.
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The early plans concentrated strictly on building the economy, in keeping with the
desperate need for growth. Every policy, either economic or social, were set forth
indicatively to fit the strong government orientation to economic development.
This culminated in the new community movement, the Saemaul Undong that came
into being in the early 1970s. The government aimed initially at improving the
quality of life in rural areas. In the slogan "diligence, self-help, and cooperation,"
the movement over the past two decades has been termed a remarkable success.
The movement has dramatically contributed to the living environment in rural
regions. Soon after its inauguration among the people in the countryside, the efforts
began to expand very rapidly to urban and industrial sectors, and eventually to the
national economy. The industrialisation and the urbanisation followed by the
changes in the value system in present day Korea are unimaginable if there had
been no such effort from the government. Of course there was a side-effect of
rapidity caused by target-oriented government policy. The imbalance of industrial
structure, cavity phenomena of the rural areas, and value gaps between generations
are good examples of the side-effects caused by the rapidity of the modemisation
and by government interventioninsm.
Meeting demands fostered through the above-mentioned Westernisation,
and asking for both democracy and social welfare from around the mid-70s, a
slight change came into being from the government side. First of all, the plan began
to include more social policy tasks, such as education planning, health care
improvement, and housing programmes, etc. Government changed the term "Five-
Year Economic Development Plan" to "Five-Year Economic and Social
Development Plan" from 1982. The importance of social welfare objectives in the
overall plan has grown Over the past decades. Ho.wever the primary stress of the
plans still remained on economic growth until it met strong, and nation-widely
spread trade union activity in the last years of the 1 990s. Secondly, confronted with
the desire for the democratisation, the plan, from the "Sixth Economic Social
Development Plan" in effect from 1987 to 1991, placed stress on decentralizing
government functions. The planning process has become more flexible than before.
The Korean family was caught up inside these swirls of history and changed side
by side with society. People have begun to ask the government to pay more
attention to social policies concerned the family than ever before.
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2.2. DEMOGRAPIIIC CHANGES
Demographic change is a direct result of changes in the family. Change in
the size of the family, the rising age at first marriage, changing values on children
and the family, etc. have significant and immediate impact on the demographic
condition of society. 26 Despite their diversity, all these factors converge at the trend
toward the small family.
The current demographic situation has been achieved much more rapidly as
a result of government population policy which culminated in the Family Planning
Programme. 27
 Of course the Family Plaiming Programme was not the only factor
affecting fertility and population growth. The higher age at marriage and the
increased incidence of induced abortion have each also played an important role. It
is not possible to measure the relative impact of these factors in reducing fertility
rate with any real precision. However some studies have been conducted which
give a rough idea of the relative demographic effect of the programme and other
factors. It appears that about 18 per cent of the fertility decline registered in 1984,
was due to the rise in the age of marriage. Around 32 per cent was due to the
increase in the use of induced abortion, and the remaining 50 per cent to family
planning. 28 While these estimates are crude, they do serve to indicate that the
Family Planning Programme has played a significant role in the decline of birth
rate in Korea. The indirect influence of broad social forces has undoubtedly
contributed to the drop in fertility rate. Development and modemisatiori thoxgh
difficult to quantify, have had a strong influence. The rising status of women and
their greater participation in the labour force presumably help to account for the
rising age of marriage and reduced fertility rate within marriage. The enrolment of
men for compulsory military service also probably had an effect in this area.
The speed and scope of demographic change, however, might not have
been as great, if there had not been population policy which influenced the family
by the Family Planning Programme.
2.2.1. Population Policy
Population policies in Korea began as a part of the economic development
planning. 29 When the government adopted population policy, the relevant
considerations were not the demographic characteristics of the population per Se. A
comprehensive plan for national economic development was what identified
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population problems in the country. The plan took account of conflicts within the
areas of population growth, economic development, resource consumption,
environmental deterioration, and other factors. Korea had maintained an extremely
high birth rate until the adoption of the population control policy in 1961.
However, there were no serious debates about the problem even though the country
had a high population growth rate. Thus the rapid rate of population growth, urban
concentration as a result of migration, undesirable population structure, etc. were
not the direct reasons motivating the formulation of population policy. The most
important national goal was to raise per capita income and to eliminate poverty in
the country. With the accession of a new political leadership in 1961, development
planners realised that a high rate of population growth had interfered with the
country's development programme. This realisation has ultimately led to the
establishment of the population policy.
Population policy includes direct and indirect policies influencing births,
deaths, and migration of the people in general. Nevertheless, from the initiation of
the national programme, the government placed the main emphasis on the control
of births. 3° Birth rates were perceived to be the worst obstacle to economic
development. Naturally, consideration of the death rate was of secondary
importance and its effect on the population structure was relatively neglected. This
neglect grew at first as economic progress was evident. Ironically this orientation
was reinforced during the economic recession resulting from the oil crisis in the
early 1970's. The high unemployment rate in the late 1970's gave warning of the
over-population problem once again and the recession drove policy makers to
establish stronger and more comprehensive population policies in the early 1980's.
There were several steps to be taken until the policy could accomplish a
degree of success. First the Supreme Meeting for the Reconstruction of the Nation
decided to adapt a population control policy at its steering committee in 1961. This
policy focused on the fertility control programme as an integral part of the
economic development plans. The committee advised the government to adopt a
voluntary family planning programme as national policy. In order to maintain this
policy, the national family planning programme was under MOHSA (Ministry of
Health and Social Affairs). The programme began being implemented through the
government health service network consisting of health centres and sub-centres.
Family planning workers were assigned to the health infrastructure. The
administration of this system was handled by the MOHSA and the Ministry of
Home Affairs.3'
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Among the various factors during the 1960's, the Family Planning Mother's
Club which was organised from 1968 was the most influential in the early stages.
Generally each local club was composed of 15 or so mothers who agreed on the
idea of family planning and favoured improvements in home economics. They
exchanged information on family planning and home economics with other
members. They persuaded people who did not use contraception to use them,
arranged mass educational meetings and also distributed contraceptives. The
government subsidised the club's monthly meetings and supported their activities
until their integration into the Saemaul Women's Associations in 1 97732
The fertility control programme at this early stage evolved primarily in
response to the high level of total fertility rate in the early 1960's. Since 1970,
serious consideration was given to a small family norm. An extensive campaign
was conducted to encourage the 'two children family' and discourage son-
preference attitudes. Naturally the slogan was publicised: "Daughter or Son, Stop at
Two and Bring Them up Well." 33 The publicity underlined the abolition of deep-
rooted son-preference and the restriction of the number of children one may have in
order to achieve the further reduction of fertility. However, it could not be achieved
in a short time span.
From then on, the government strengthened its programme from two sides.
On the one hand the government established the Maternal and Child Health Bureau
in the MOHSA in 1972. On the other hand efforts were made, on the other hand,
by the government to inculcate small-family norms. To fit the purpose the
government revised population related laws and provided social support measures,
while in order to improve the quality and to help increase acceptance of the
programme, it was considered that the national family planning programme should
be incorporated with other developmental programmes like the New Village
(Saemaul) Movement in 1972. The Movement was for a community development
project based on the voluntary participation, co-operation of the individual
community members and self-reliance. As an integration policy, the government
has been conducting the training programme for multipurpose work of health
workers since 1978. The primary purpose of the training programme is to provide
in-service training to MCH, TB and FP workers. It was to have them serve as
multipurpose workers capable of providing comprehensive health services
including family planning at the community level.34
Starting in 1974, the government introduced a number of social support
policies that can be divided into two categories; the incentive and disincentive
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system and population education. The incentive and disincentive system was
mainly directed to inculcate the two-child family norm. Under this system, priority
in allotting public housing was given to those with one or two children whose
parents had undergone sterilisation operations. Allowances in monetary terms were
given to the poor who had undergone sterilisation. Medical insurance benefits were
also given for the first two-child deliveries. Family and education allowances were
provided for government employees with up to two children, along with income
tax exemption. During the period of 1977-1979, population subjects were included
in the formal school education curriculum. In addition, population and family
planning programmes for adults were conducted through government and private
organisations, as well as in the home reserve army and the army itself.35
From the beginning of the 1980's, fertility control measures have relied
heavily on integration with other social development programmes. The integration
was further expedited through the existing programme and sectoral policies within
government bodies. These fertility control policies were instituted in the course of
implementing the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1982-1986) by presidential orders. Their
primary content was improving the management of the existing family planning
organisation, strengthening various social supports to instil the value of having
fewer children, and establishing a system for inter-ministerial co-operation. The
main emphasis of the measures was to take population into account in all
government policies, to encourage the values of the small-family and to actively
involve all ministries as well as non-governmental organisations in population
programmes. It was judged that the policies have been conducive to increase the
contraception acceptance rate and have been effective in providing incentives to
lower fertility. Owing to these measures, the resi1ts of the recent family planning
programme have been truly dramatic.36
To sum up there were several elements which led to the family planning
programme being more successful than in many other developing countries. The
elements divide roughly into two categories: internal factors of the programme in
itself and external factors. First of all, The programme was delivered by the joint
efforts of the government and people. 37 Policy-making was characterised by its
broad range of participation from the whole nation and its continuity. Most of the
advisory bodies were composed both of government officials and civilian
specialists. The matter was discussed at the governmental level only after reflecting
the opinion of the academic specialists in universities and from the non-
governmental organisations, the research results of the institutes concerned, and
eventually public opinion from civilians of the final demand. Thanks to the
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democratic procedure of the policy-making, there were almost no serious points of
dispute regardless of social strata, of political group, or even from any religious
group. The programme was recognised to be a welfare policy for the benefit of
people as well as for economic development policy rather than being seen
primarily as a moral issue. Secondly, it was thanks to the comprehensive and
organic management of the programme.38 In driving forward the policy, a role
division was organically designed among the organisations concerned, and the
operations infiltrated effectively to the towns or villages. Execution and operation
were under the control of and audited regularly by MOHSA to maintain the quality
of programme delivery. The system induced voluntaristic participation from the
community. Thirdly sufficient finance and man power were invested in the
programme. 39 Particularly the positive participation of the medical profession and
medical man power was critical in delivering contraceptive treatment. Furthermore
there was no serious public criticism concerning the side-effects of contraception,
which taken all together, led the success to the family planning programme.
There was a couple of other external elements that led Korea to be more
successful in the execution of the policy than other countries. The first factor was
that the family planning was aimed at the advantages for small children, a
perspective that could gain sympathy among people. 4° People accepted that family
planning was a desirable means to attain individual prosperity as well as the wealth
of the nation as a whole. According to a survey by KIPH (former body of
KIHASA) in 1970, 90 per cent of women aged 15-64 approved of the family
planning programme. That led the government policy to progress smoothly without
significant resistance. The second factor was the formation of the small family idea
as being a result of rapid Westernisation accompanied with a sharp acceleration in
urbanisation, a drastic change in the life style, and a notable increase in the amount
of personal income.41 Lastly social conditions in general had matured enough to
accept the family planning programme.42 The expansion of life expectancy
followed by the decrease in the rate of infant mortality and of general mortality has
contributed for this. In addition the rising educational level of both sexes, the
formation of industrial cum urbanised society, improvements in women's status
both in the family and in the wider society, and changes in ideas relating to the
children, etc. had prepared social conditions able to gladly accept the family
planning programme.
All these factors had made the policy so successful that by 1990 the total
fertility rate stood at 1.6. During the last 30 years (1960-1990) of the family
planning, around 4 million sterilisations were carried out, 7 million cases of the
Chapter Two 52
IUD (Intra-Uterus Device) were fitted, 130 thousand boxes of condom were
supplied monthly, and 70 thousand cycles of oral contraceptives were consumed
per month. 43 Based on such efforts, the demographic transition would have been
completed within three decades looking for a zero rate of population growth by
2021.
2.2.2. Demographic Changes
2.2.2.1. Population size
Reflecting the great effort of the population policy, demographic change
has occurred both in population size and structure. First in terms of size, that was
distinctive at a watershed in 195 Os. Pre-50s change derived from socio-political
changes but in the next period the primary cause lay in familial change.
There was no socially perceived idea of population growth or of
overpopulation during the era of Confucian dominance. During the Japanese
annexation fecundity was encouraged as a colonial policy in terms of mobilisation
of labour power. Even after the independence in 1945 this policy had a continuing
further influence. At the time of the 1925 census, the total population of Korea was
19.5 million. (Table 2.5) In 1945 the partition of the country between the North and
Table 2.5. Total Population And Vital Statistics, 1925 - 1990
year-u	population	 CBR	 CDR	 PIR
1925*	 19,523
1944*	 25,120	 1.8
1949	 20,189	 4.9
1955	 21,502	 1.0
1960	 25,012	 42.0	 13.0	 2.9
1966	 29,160	 34.6	 9.5	 2.5
1970	 32,241	 31.4	 9.4	 2.2
1975	 35,281	 25.1	 7.2	 1.8
1980	 38,124	 23.4	 6.7	 1.67
1985	 41,056	 19.7	 6.2	 1.25
1990	 42,793	 16.2	 5.8	 0.98
source: SIlK
CBR: crude birth rate, CDR: crude death rate PIR: population increase rate
* : data include both the South and the North
the South marked a turning point in Korean population change. This period is
characterised by a tremendous social migration from both overseas and the North
into South Korea. The population census conducted in 1949 for South Korea only
found the population to be around 20.2 million. That was considered as a great
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increment of population size from the 1944 census result of 25.1 million for a
whole country.45
The decline of fertility levels after 1960 is mainly due to the family changes
derived from the successful accomplishment of population policy. 46 The speed of
the decline was hardly paralleled in modern human history. Now the fertility rate is
already below the replacement level within three decades.
The fertility level of the period 1955-1960 was influenced from the post-
war 'baby-boom.' The baby-boom which had started from around 1955, but began
to decline after reaching the climax of 1959. Considering no effective devices for
population control were introduced at that time, the fertility increase was relatively
slow and shorter in period compared to the baby-boom the west experienced in the
1950s. Crude birth rate peaked at 48 per thousand by 1959. According to the
1960 Census, the South Korea population had already reached around 25 million,
as many as the whole country's population found in the 1940 Census. This faster
increment to the country's population size created many social problems such as a
lack of housing, educational and occupational opportunities, transportation and
foodstuffs.
After 1962, with the beginning of the government family planning
programme, fertility fell thanks to the willing participation of the people. The
period was characterised by a high aspirations for national socio-economic
development with the slow down of the rate of population increase. As a result the
CBR declined throughout the nation, but a particularly dramatic decline was
observed from 1966 in urban areas. Rural areas showed a faster decline in fertility
rate only from the end of 1960's.48
From the later half of the 1970's, the fertility decline began to show a
totally different pattern. The one and half decades from the mid-70's, saw a second
stage in terms of fertility behaviour. Before that fertility behaviour was based on
ideas formed during the fecundity policy of the Japanese government and they
never developed the values of the necessity for population control. The reason they
accepted contraception was to solve the mainly economic burdens of having too
many children. The people of the second stage after the mid 1970's by contrast had
seriously thought about the number of children they wanted and about birth control
prior to their marriage. The reason for the drastic decline in the fertility rate from
the 1980's can properly be explained as a consequence of this generational gap.49
According to the Census in 1990, the population reached more than 43 million,
Chapter Two 54
while the population increase rate (PIR) dropped significantly from 1.67 per cent in
1980, to 0.98 per cent.
To summarise, despite the steady increase in the absolute numbers in the
population, the rate of increase has dropped almost to a stable condition thanks to
the population policy of the last a few decades. As already shown in Table 2.5, the
crude birth rate (CBR) was over 40 per 1,000 in the population in 1960. Thereafter
it fell steadily during the last thirty years to 16.2 in 1990 and has reached below the
replacement level during the last few decades.
Trends in the fertility rates of all women aged 15-49 during the period,
1960 - 1989 are illustrated in Table 2.6. The level of total fertility rates has been
dramatically decreased from 6.0 in 1960 to 1.6 in 1989. It is significant that Korea
is the second of the developing countries in Asia after the Republic of China50
 to
reach the replacement level of fertility. The data indicate that fertility rates declined
systematically in each age group. The rates for the most reproductively active age
group, 25-29 fell during the period fell by about 45 per cent, while the rate for
those women aged 30 - 34 fell by 82 per cent.
Table 2.6. Age Specific And Total Fertility Rates By Years, 1960-1989
age group	 1960	 1975	 1981	 1985	 1989
15-19	 37	 12	 12	 7	 40
20-24	 283	 163	 161	 162	 90
25-29	 330	 273	 245	 187	 179
30-34	 257	 152	 94	 52	 45
35-39	 196	 68	 23	 8	 7
40-44	 80	 23	 3	 1	 1
45-49	 14	 1	 -	 -	 -
TFR	 6.0	 3.5	 2.7	 2.1	 1.6
source: SIlK
Mortality was another important factor affecting demographic changes. Of
course mortality is not an immediate result of family change but an indirect
consequence of improvements in living standards. The mortality decline was
responsible for the initial increase in population growth. A sharp decline in
mortality since the end of the Korean war has contributed to a higher population
growth rate of about 2.5 per cent compared to only 1.02 during the war. The crude
death rate dropped by 5 per thousand persons in the period of 1955-1960 thanks to
the introduction of antibiotics as was the case among other developing countries at
the time. At the same time life expectancy at birth also rose by about 6-8 years. The
changes in mortality is comparable with the change during the 15 years of the
period l925-1940.'
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After 1960 onward the mortality rate showed a continuous but steady
decline. The average lifetime of 50 years old in 1960 increased to 55 around 1965-
1970, and to over 60 years old in 1975-1980. Contrasted with the average of 35
years old in 1920's, the increase was a dramatic one. Infant mortality also dropped
drastically from the ratio of 200 per 1000 infants ever born in the 1920's to around
100 in 1955-1960, about 37 in 1975-1980, and eventually to 25-30 in the 1980's.
The decline after 1960 was possible thanks mainly to economic development, the
improvement in living standards, new medical knowledge, and the reform of the
health system. The expansion of medical opportunities accompanied by the
improvement in living standards had a significant effect on the mortality level. As
a result general mortality has steadily declined from about 15 per thousand
population in the 1950s to about 6 in 1985.52
To summarise, both the changes in fertility behaviour and the decline of the
mortality rate have contributed to increasing the absolute size of the population.
However the growth rate has been stabilised with the decline in fertility to reach
the replacement level or below.
2.2.2.2. Population structure
Change has also occurred in the structure of the population. Table 2.7
shows changes in age structure of the Korean population over the time, 1960 -
1990 and a projection after that.
Table 2.7. Changes In The Age Structure Of Population And Projection
year	 total	 age group	 depen
popu-	 0-14	 15-64	 65&+	 dency
lation	 pope I %	 popn I	 pop11 I %	 rate
	
1960	 2,501	 1,015	 40.6	 1,390	 55.6	 98	 3.9	 80.0
	
1970	 3,224	 1,357	 42.1	 1,760	 54.6	 109	 3.4'	 83.2
	
1980	 3,812	 1,296	 34.0	 2,371	 62.2	 145	 3.8	 60.7
	
1985	 4,106	 1,254	 30.6	 2,677	 65.2	 174	 4.2	 53.4
	
1990	 4,279	 1,108	 25.9	 2,970	 69.4	 201	 4.7	 44.1
	
1995	 4,596	 1,160	 25.2	 3,197	 69.6	 240	 5.2	 43.8
	
2005	 4,971	 1,058	 21.3	 3,544	 71.3	 369	 7.4	 40.3
	
2015	 5,196	 965	 18.6	 3,742	 72.0	 490	 9.4	 38.9
	
2023	 5,257	 904	 17.2	 3,695	 70.3	 658	 12.5	 42.3
source: EPB, Population Projection, 1986.
unit: 10,000 persons
Until 1960 the population structure in Korea showed the typical pattern
observed among underdeveloped countries. The structure was pyramidal with
youth aged 0-14 accounting for 43 per cent of the total population in 1955. The
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elderly were no more than 3.4 per cent at that time. Naturally the proportion in the
working age range with a high dependency ratio.
The population structure changed drastically following the changes in the
fertility behaviour and in mortality rate. The proportion under 14 years of age
dropped to 34 per cent of the total population in 1980 and again to about 26 per
cent in 1990. The ratio is anticipated to decrease further to about 17 per cent
between 2000-2020. The composition of the school age population has changed
as well. As shown in Table 2.8 below the population of primary school age has
increased by about one million over the last three decades, however, in relative
terms it decreased by a considerable amount thanks to the fertility decline
following the family planning programme. Without such a programme, the total
number of primary school age children was estimated to increase explosively to 7
million54 with huge costs for educational facilities and expansion of teaching staff.
The reduction of financial load in the educational field has helped in activating the
industrialisation of Korea. In contrast, the proportion in the working-age
population increased from 55 per cent in 1970 to some 70 per cent in 1990.
Naturally the increase reduced the burden of support for the elderly and children
and the dependency rate dropped from 83 to 61 over the period of 1970-1990. The
decreasing trend directly indicates the changes in fertility which was the main
determinant of the decreasing dependency ratio. Within the population of working
age the proportion of males aged 15-24 has declined considerably from 35 per cent
in 1960 to 30 per cent in 1990. The trend is expected to progress steadily to only 18
per cent by 2020. The average age of the workers population will have risen to 40
years old by then and economic activity rate of the population in their middle years
will have risen also.55
Table 2.8 Changing Trend Of The School Age Population
school age	 1960	 I
	
1990
No.	 No.
total	 855	 100.0	 1,339	 100.0
6 - 11 years (primary school) 	 363	 42.4	 475	 35.5
12 - 14 years (middle school)
	
157	 18.3	 235	 17.5
15-l7years(highschool) 	 142	 16.6	 261	 19.5
18 -21 years (universities)	 194	 22.7	 368	 27.5
source: SIlK	 unit: 10,000 persons
The elderly population increased by about 1.1 million from 0.98 million in
1970 to 2.01 million in 1990. The population over 65 years is likely to reach about
3 million by the year 2000 and about 6 million after another 20 years. The elderly
population increased by just 1.2 million over the 30 years between 1960-1990, and
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by as much as 4 million for the same period of 1990-2020. Thus the ageing
phenomenon has accelerated and the population of 65 and over will account for 12
per cent of the total population by 2020. Even then the population will be still
relatively young compared to other developed countries like Japan, UK., or
France.56
The population structure has been changed by the migration of rural
families as well. Being stimulated by urban-centric industrialisation, a large
proportion of rural families moved to urban areas. 57 Urban areas provided more job
opportunities, educational opportunities, and cultural facilities as well. As Table
2.9 shows 42 per cent of the urban population were aged below 14 in 1960 but this
has drastically decreased to only 29 per cent in 1990.
Table 2.9. The Change Of Demographic Structure By Region
age	 1960	 1990
total I	 urban I	 rural	 total I	 urban I	 rural
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
0-14	 43.0	 41.6	 43.5	 25.9	 28.6	 19.0
15-64	 53.7	 56.2	 52.8	 69.4	 68.3	 72.2
65+	 3.3	 12.2	 3.7	 4.7	 3.1	 8.8
source : Census, 1960 and 1990. 	 unit: per cent
The rural population structure has changed far more dramatically and the young
decreased from 44 per cent of the rural population in 1960 to just 19 per cent in
1990. Until 1960, that is to say, the urban and rural demographic structures were
not significantly different. However the rural populations are ageing faster than the
population in the urban areas do. The proportion of the population under 14 has
sharply declined while that of the elderly has significantly increased. Figure 2.1
shows the situation graphically. The proportion of the young rural population is
considerably smaller than that in the urban areas, however that of the elderly is
significantly big enough to surpass that of the urban elderlies both in proportion
and in absolute numbers while the working-age population is relatively small. That
means the rural structure is very much older than urban structure and eventually the
dependency rate imposed on the rural working-age population is overburdened.
To conclude, the whole of the section, Figure 2.2 summarises population
changes both in size and structure which have happened during the last few
decades. First, the absolute numbers in the population have grown considerably.
Second, the population structure has begun to progress from the pyramidal type to
the diamond type of the developed countries showing decline in the proportion
aged 0-14. Third a considerable increase in the group aged 65 and over is observed.
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Figure 2.1. Population Structure By Region And By Sex In 1985
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Figure 2.2. Change Of Demographic Structure By Sex
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This ageing trend is particularly true among women. Lastly a demographic
disparity by sex is found. Conventionally females throughout the history have
outnumbered males, which made patriarchal dominance possible in the marriage
market. However, the structure went dramatically into reverse from the group aged
20 years and below.
2.3. ECONOMIC GROWTH
Changes in the family have brought about the demographic transition, and
that subsequently has had iimumerable repercussions in the socio-economic field.
They range from the impact on economic development to conditions in labour
markets, environment, education, social security, and housing issues etc. This
section limits the discussion to the examination of economic changes only.
2.3.1. Labour Supply
The supply and demand of labour are closely related and interact with each
other. For example an anxiety about a decrease in the labour supply can have
employer make changes in methods such as introducing automation which demand
less power. 58
 Conversely, a lack of labour demand due to a long-term recession can
have people reduce their fertility and so influence the labour supply. 59 However the
primary elements inducing each trend are quite different. Labour supply is mainly
determined by the demographic transition of a society, like vital changes in the
level of mortality, fertility, migration, marriage, or of divorce etc. While the labour
demands are primarily settled by economic conditions such as economic growth or
changes in the industrial structure of society. Of course it is undeniable that
demographic changes influence the demand side as well. For example a manpower
shortage can induce progress towards mechanisation in the mining or construction
sector, or automation of a factory in the manufacturing sector, most of which
demand less labour. However many of the impacts are indirect and mediated so
that this section limits discussion mainly to labour supply and its immediate
relationship with the pattern of demographic change.
The total labour supply is determined by the size of the productive age
population and the proportion of the population economically active. Being a
certain age range of the total population, the productive age population is directly
determined by the level of births, mortality, migration, etc. 60 It is important to note
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that changes in demography trends affect the productive age population with a time
differential, in effect by the births, deaths, and migration which occurred 15 years
ago. The participation rate of the economically active population is influenced
more by socio-economic elements than by demographic ones. Roughly three
elements are crucial to the changes in the activity rate. First change in the
demographic structure like sex ratio or the age structure have an effect on the
economically active population. Next the rate is influenced by personal/familial
factors such as the level of education, marriage status, or the number of children of
individuals from each age group. Lastly labour market variables like wage level or
changes in the market prosperity etc. also affect economic activity rate. The Korean
labour supply was most directly and crucially influenced by changes in fertility and
divorce. Changes in mortality or migration also were rapid but not as fast or as
unpredictable while fertility and divorce were changing very rapidly and
unpredictably.
Table 2.10. Trends And Prospects Of Labour Force Supply
year	 total	 productive age	 economically active population
populatpopulation __________________________________
	
ion	 (%1)	 total (%2) employd unem(%3)
1963	 27,184	 15,085(55.5)	 8,343(55.3)	 7,662	 681(8.2)
1965	 28,705	 16,591(57.8)	 9,199(55.4)	 8,522	 677(7.4)
1970	 31,435	 18,253(58.1)	 10,199(55.9)	 9,745	 454(4.5)
1975	 34,679	 21,833(63.0)	 12,340(56.5)	 11,830	 510(4.1)
1980	 38,124	 25,335(66.5)	 14,454(57.1)	 13,706	 748(5.2)
1985	 40,806	 27,553(67.5)	 15,592(56.6)	 14,935	 619(4.0)
1990	 42,793	 31,723(74.1)	 19,415(61.2)	 18,910	 505(2.6)
1995	 44,870	 34,354(76.6)	 21,643(63.0)	 -	 -
2000	 46,828	 36,696(78.4)	 23,485(64.0)	 -	 -
2005	 48,407	 38,328(79.2)	 24,913(65.0)	 -	 -
source: 1965-1990; EPB, Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey
1995-2005; EPB, Population Projection( 1988).
unit: 1,000 persons	 - : statistics unavailable
the proportion of productive age population to the total population
%2 (labour force participation rate) : the proportion to the economically active population to
the population 15 years old and over
%3 (unemployment rate) : the proportion of unemployed to the economically active
The supply of labour displays three different stages; the early 60's to the
mid 70's, the latter 70's to the mid 80's and latter 80s on. First until the 1970s, the
Korean economy used to be characterised by a surplus of labour. A sudden growth
of population due to social factors such as repatriation and reftiges directly
increased the supply of labour force. Also during the period the group born in the
baby-boom grew up to join the productive age population. All these social and
demographic factors increased the labour supply. As shown in Table 2.10, the
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productive age population as a proportion of the total population greatly increased
to 63 per cent by 1975, from less than 55.5 per cent in 1963. The economically
active population as well increased to 56.5 per cent by 1975. The rate of increase of
the economically active population during the first half of the 1 970s averaged 3.9
per cent annually. The pressure came solely from the baby-boom group of 15 years
earlier. This was relatively less severe than in the West after the second war but
still was quite a problem for Korea. The economically active population increased
by one and half times in a decades so that labour supply increased at average of
333 thousand persons annually for ten years. 6 ' These demographic conditions had a
negative impact on the national economy as population pressure continued for
more than ten years owing to the impact of the baby-boom and the growing
migration from rural to urban areas. At the same time the national economy was in
a very difficult situation at the time as capital stock almost completely vanished
through the devastating Korean War.
The reason the nation survived economically in spite of surplus of labour
and the economic ruins was the Five-Year Economic Development Plan. Vigorous
economic development policy from 1962 succeeded in breaking the so called
vicious circle of poverty and surplus labour in Korea. The Korean economy
between the early 60's and mid 70s in the initial stage of industrialisation was able
to absorb the newly growing labour force as well as accumulated unemployment.
Employment increased by 347 thousand at an average rate of 4 per cent annually.
Thus the unemployment rate mounting to 8.3 per cent in 1963 dropped to 4.5 per
cent in 1970 and again to 4.1 per cent in 1975. In addition employment below 18
hours per week which is an indication of potential unemployment decreased very
rapidly from 667 thousand in 1963 to 299 thousand in 1975. The accumulated
surplus labour supply decreased and the new additions to the labour force could be
absorbed thanks to the economic growth rate at average almost 10 per cent every
year and to production methods being labour intensive. 62 Much of this growth was
in agriculture and Iiht industry, both of which demanded labour-intensiveness
while low wage levels also contributed as employers preferred labour to expensive
machinery.
In the second stage, the supply and demand of labour force were totally
different from the previous stage. The period between the latter half of the 70s and
the first half 80s is remarkable for change from unlimited labour supply to
manpower shortage. The latter half of 1 970s show a considerable decline in the
employment rate compared to the first half of 70s and the participation rate of the
economically active population also increased from a yearly average 56.3 per cent
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to 57.5 per cent in the periods (Table 2.10). The increase in the productive age
population weakened from a yearly average growth of 3.7 per cent in the first half
70s to 3.1 per cent in the latter half of the 70s. Correspondingly the increase of the
economically active population declined from 4.1 per cent to 3.3. per cent in the
same period. The most critical cause of the decline was the effect of fertility
control from the early 60s. The next reason was the astonishing increase in the
over-seas migration of workers to Middle-East countries. The numbers of the
overseas migrant reduced as much as 1 million between 1975 and 1979.63
The labour shortage was a highly transitional phenomenon. The labour
shortage was not solely attributable to the demographic elements. The proportion
of the over-seas migrant workers increased rapidly to as much as one per cent of
the economically active population, and was one of the primary reasons for the
labur shortage in the domestic market. However the more significant reason came
from the failure of upgrading the quality of the labour structure. In the latter half of
the 1970s, industrial strategy emphasised heavy and chemical industries, which
demanded new skill workers and new managerial manpower. Thus whilst the
heavy engineering and chemical industries were suffering labour shortage, other
fields were in over-supply showing quite unchanged high rates of unemployment.
Table 2.11. The Elasticity Of Employment To Economic Growth By Industry
period	 all	 agriculture,	 manufacture	 SOC &
industries	 forest &	 & mining	 other services
fisheries
	
1964-1971	 0.36	 0.02	 0.56	 0.65
	
1972-1979	 0,41	 0.01	 0.64	 0.54
	
1982-1986	 0.22	 -1.50	 0.59	 0.50
	
1987-1991	 0.31	 -0.91	 0.37	 0.49
	
1992-1996	 (0.26)	 (-0.70)	 (0.30)	 (0.40)
	
1997-2001	 (0.22)	 (-0.50)	 (0.25)	 (0.30)
source: EPB, The 6th Economic and Social Development Plan, 1986.
numbers in parenthesis are projected ones.
The situation was confirmed by the high rate of unemployment during the
economic slump of the early 80s. At the end of 1979 the society fell into political
and social instability following the assassination against President Park and
suffered a general economic recession. The unemployment rate increased to as
much as 5.2 per cent in 1980 and kept on over 4 per cent even during the period of
198 1-1985, when the chaos was already under control. As a matter of the rate of
increase in the productive age population greatly dropped at 2.4 per cent in the first
half 80s. Moreover the proportion of the population economically active declined
to 56.0 per cent. Thus the fact that unemployment was very high in the period of
economic recession, in spite of the decline in the labour supply, revealed that there
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was a surplus of labour unnoticed under the prosperous condition of the latter half
70s. It is true that the pressure of absolute over-population remarkably decreased
however a new hint of over-population appeared in the labour market: the pressure
of relative over-supply resulting from technological unemployment due mainly to
labour saving technology including automation and mechanisation. Reflecting the
industrial change the elasticity of employment to economic growth rapidly
decreased in the 1980s as shown in Table 2.11.64
The third stage begins from the latter 1 980s to the near future. The period is
characterised by greater complexity than ever before. The situation can be
summarised as a coexistence of labour shortage on the one hand and a relative
over-population resulting from the structural changes in the labour supply on the
other. The structural changes include a growing proportion of higher education
labour force and the old-aged and the increasing participation of females, and also
these made available by the structural unemployment. The former was caused by
the unanticipated fertility behaviour of the baby-boom generation while the latter
was a consequence of social changes.
Although the absolute number of the productive age population is rising,
the rate of the increase has slowed down from the late 1980s as a result of the
Family Planning Programme which commenced in the early 1 960s. In other word
the efforts made two decades ago have begun to manifest themselves from now on.
(Table 2.10) More significantly the productive age population is projected to
decrease from the year 2000. The New Demographic Projection (1988) of EPB
(Economic Planning Board) shows a great change compared to the conventional
population project of 1983. The TFR (total fertility rate: the average number of
children per woman), is newly estimated to have reached. 1.7 by 1987. It was a far
more drastic decline than the conventional projection of 1983 which estimated that
level to be reached only by the year 2000. The newly projected number of births in
1987 was no more than 651 thousand, 264 thousand births less than the earlier
estimate of 802 thoushnd. 65 The reason of the significant gap between the statistics
was an unexpected changes in the fertility behaviour among the young women born
during the baby-boom which lasted for about a decade after the Civil War. The
conventional anticipation that the baby-boom generation women would bring about
another semi-baby-boom due to their absolute number missed the mark. Because
they apparently hoped to have a far smaller number of babies. Of course the change
would not have an immediate impact, however, changes in fertility behaviour
might bring about both a decrease of the productive age population and a labour
shortage from the year 2000 or in the early 21st century.66
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The assertion that the decrease in the fertility rate does not have a short-
term impact on the productive age population does not imply that it has no
influence at all on labour supply. Rather it can cause, in the short term perspective,
an increase in the economically active population of a society as whole. 67
 A
decrease in the fertility rate can promote women's participation in economic
activity with enough time span after rearing a small number of children. Partly
reflecting this, change in the female labour participation rate has increased from
47.1 per cent of 1965 to 57.9 per cent in 1985, and again to 63.4 per cent in 1989.
Considering the unexpectedly rapid decrease in fertility among post-war generation
women, their economic activity is easily anticipated to increase quite drastically in
the near future around the year 2000 on.
Of course, the changes in fertility are not the only causes of the increase in
the female economic participation rate. A sharp increase in the divorce rate is
another cause that increases the labour supply. According to the New Demographic
Project (1988) of EPB, the crude divorce rate of 0.47, increased to 0.62 in 1980,
and again far more drastically than expected to 1.07 in 1987. The rate is anticipated
to increase further for the time being. It is important to focus on the divorce
occurring in the age group 25-34. The divorce rate for this age cohort was recorded
at 15 per cent. While female participation rate in economic activity is lowest
among the age cohort 25-34, because they are newly married or their children are
very young, the very fact that the divorce rate is the highest among this age cohort
connotes a high possibility of a sharp increase in their participation in economic
activity.
Before and after the year 2000, labour supply is expected to decrease
greatly in the long-run thanks to the sharp decrease in fertility among the post-war
generation women. Nevertheless, the change in fertility or a sharp fncrease in the
divorce rate increases the female participation rate in economic activity, which
might cause a relative over-supply in the labour market.68
2.3.2. Economic Development
Economic growth is generally measured by the increase in per capita
income. As per capita income is being calculated by division of GNP to population,
the increase of per capita income is in the inverse proportion to the population size.
Per capita income has grown from a meagre US$87 in 1962 to US$5,500 in 1991.69
The pace of the forced-draught development of the economy has been remarkable
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even by the standards of the East Asian newly industrialised countries. Of course
two criticisms can be made against the formula. The first is a question about the
real variable that produced an increase in the income level. It can be debatable if
the de facto increase has come from the increase in the GNP or decrease in the
fertility rate. As a matter of fact since Korea launched its first five-year
development plan in 1962, real GNP has expanded by an average of more than 8
per cent per year. As a result the GNP grew from US$2.3 billion in 1962 to
US$170 billion in 1988. Of course it is true that the increase in the GNP has greatly
contributed for the increase in the per capita income. Nevertheless unless
population growth slackened the reproduction on a progressive scale based on the
increase of investment expansion was hardly possible. 7° It is not difficult to find
developing countries suffering from investment reduction due to financial over-
burden in the educational sector due to a increase in the school age population. 71 It
is definite that the decrease in the fertility rate has contributed to the increase in the
per capita income. The next criticism against the formula lies on the attributes of
the GNP calculation. GNP is in a functional relation to the size of population. If
population increases GNP also increases. Unless the population growth goes with a
proportional growth in reproduction and an improvement of labour quality
(technology), it eventually diminishes the return of the nation's economy. For
Korea poor in resources, fertility decline was a good strategy to help develop the
national economy and per capita income as well in the long run.
Adam Smith argued that an increase in the population is a precondition for
economic development under a closed economy system. 72 Increasing food
production to feed a growing population, the agricultural sector develops as the
initial stage of the economic development process. As agricultural productivity is
improved and agricultural production increases, demand for agricultural product,
according to the Engel's law 73 , remains sttic and produce a surplus of farm product
and a surplus of labour in the agricultural sector. These surplus agricultural
products and surplus labour power in turn form a base for industrial development.
Thus an increase in the population in the agricultural sector is a precondition for
the development of manufacturing industry or for an overall industrialisation under
the closed economy system. However, in addition to the surplus labour, there must
also be a surplus of agricultural products which can be diverted into the capital and
raw materials for industrialisation. Naturally if population pressure is too great the
possibility of a surplus of production is reduced because of the consumption of the
agricultural products.
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In the case of Korea under the open economy system, the role of the
agricultural sector at least until the early 1 970s was limited to the supply of surplus
labour. The Korean economy has relied for the capital for industrialisation and raw
materials on overseas investment. 74 The increase in the population brought about a
level of demand which exceeded the availability of home-produced agricultural
products and caused a serious burden on Koreas economic development. Thanks to
the successful population policy in accordance with other factors like cultural,
political, economic and international, industrialisation was able to accelerate. The
decrease in the population growth rate on industrialisation has had three effects.
First the financial burden to import overseas food was reduced and a surplus of
agricultural products was established particularly from the early 1980s. Second
demographic change allowed an increase in savings which could promote
investment following the formula <economy in consumption>-<accretion of
domestic saving>-<reduction in the induction of foreign capital>. Lastly
demographic change encouraged the development of capital intensified advanced
technology industrialisation. With its orientation to the qualitative change of
population, the family planning programme of the early 60s led to a change from
quantitative labour to qualitative labour. Without that programme, there is a strong
possibility that the Korean economy would have remained an underdeveloped
industrial structure with a relative priority given to unskilled labour intensive
production. To sum up even if demographic change, the fertility decline in
particular was not the only cause of rapid economic development, it played a
significant role in the fast industrialisation process in accordance with cultural,
political, economic and international factors etc.
2.4. CONCLUSION: TI-IE SPEED OF CHANGE
To understand the overall social changes occurring in Korea, it is very
useful to look at the. speed with which they have taken place. Social mobility can
be a useful measure of this and moreover is an indication of the inner motivation
underlying social change as a whole over the last half century.75
The astonishingly high speed of social change reflects a strong enthusiasm
for a limited social objective. The race to change accelerated as this enthusiasm
grew. Traditional Korean Neo-Confucianism blended with Buddhism gave a
distinctive interpretation of the class system whic can be summarised in the phrase
"there is no seed of yangbanhood (classhood)." 76 Even though hard to attain, high
status was, at least in principle, open to every class and was achievable through the
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study of Confucianism as prescribed by law. 77 In present day Korea this idea has
survived to motivate free competition among individuals. Nobody was believed to
be born yangban. It was rather a target to be achieved. Everyone could participate
in the competition to attain the status.
In the course of modernisation and industrial development a new pattern of
competition to gain the most valuable resources emerged. If land was the most
valuable asset in the past, in the present day money, power, reputation, etc. have
become more important. 78 Achievable resources have become far more diversified
and magnified and more widely accessible to a wider public. This has induced and
activated the whole nation with the entthusiasm for upward social mobility. In the
past social mobility was mostly a competition among the upper class due to the
extremely limited resources. The boundary for participation in competition for
status has been opened to the members of other social classes in present day Korea.
Education was, as it was in the past, a prerequisite condition to enter
competition. Education was the most certain ticket to the other resources of
society. 79 A high school career ensured a high salary and high social reputation,
and satisfaction as well. This was particularly true during the Five-Year Economic
Development Programme. The government's efforts to promote education
culminated in the Charter of National Education promulgated in 1968.80 It served
to guide people in developing their creative power to contribute to revitalising
national strength and common prosperity. The charter stressed a balance between
tradition and development and the needs of the individual and the needs of the
nation. Meeting the needs of the nation by attaining a high degree of education was
recognised the best ticket to achieve personal upward social mobility. Present day
Korea is no different from the past in the sense that education is the best strategy.
The only difference is in the syllabus at school. In the past, the Confucian
scriptures were taught in the present day the emphasis is on modern knowledge.
Family values operated as a guiding principle for upward social mobility. In
other words the family, as in the past, was the basic unit to participate in the
competition for social mobility. Most families were not rich enough to have all of
their children enter high school. Strategically the child with the best prospects
among all the children was selected to compete for the highest levels of education.
Daughters were usually excluded from the selection because they were still
believed to belong to another family after their marriage. Among Sons however
there was no difference and the stem principle did not apply in the selection among
sons. But once a son was selected the other children were expected to support him
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in earnest. The other rural girls and boys, not chosen to compete within the
educational system, left home to work as a housemaid or an unskilled factory
labourer in the cities. They sent what they had earned to help have the chosen
brother educated. That is the reason for the big flow of capital from the cities to
rural areas from the end of 60s until the middle of 1980s. 81 Of course this
arrangement was possible on the premise of a strong family tie. The reward they
were to share after the selected brother was successful was primarily neither an
economic one nor political power but just the enhancement of family reputation
and self-satisfaction. The chosen brother poured his best efforts into gaining entry
to a good high school to win the competition among the others selected from other
families. However the competition was not easy due to the educational system.
Colleges and universities operated under strict enrolment limits. Because of the
difference in college admission quotas and the number of applicants, each school
year produced a large number of repeaters who added to the intensity of
competition for college admission. This disparity has been continuously augmented
because the rate of increase in the number of high school graduates has far
surpassed that of college places. It used to be described as 'exam hell' 82 and every
December universities' entrance examinations have been the focus of nation-wide
news. This competitive zeal was not limited to the chosen brothers only but
generally pervaded the whole generation at that time.
The final goal of this demanding competition was not so much academic
distinction only but rather gaining a good occupational job. 83 The reason they
invested a huge effort in education was to gain access to a good job that assured
upward social mobility. Candidates applied to the academic department which was
assumed to provide the best access to the labour market after graduation.
Occupational transmission from father was almost totally absent. The main concern
was upward social mobility.
The reason present day Koreans have enthusiasm for upward social
mobility is because dë facto social mobility was quite easy. If social mobility had
been as hard as in traditional society or a caste system, there would have been no
reason for Koreans to try in earnest to get higher education and a better job. Table
2.12 demonstrates the prevailing enthusiasm for social mobility and is an indirect
sign of social mobity having occurred during modernisation.84
The table produced from the EPB survey in 1988 shows three phenomena.
First most present day Koreans think upward social mobility quite possible within
their generation or at latest within children's generation. The proportion thinking
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the between-generation social mobility difficult is less than 6 per cent. Naturally
the proportion believing mobility to be very easy (I) is lower than that believing it
to be moderately easy (II). Nevertheless, overall attitude in society is generally
optimistic about social mobility.
Table 2.12. Attitudes Toward Social Mobility By Educational Level
Respondents'	 total	 easy	 fair	 - difficult
education	 I	 I	 I	 I IV
possibility of between-generation social mobility;
total	 100.0	 64.0	 21.6	 42.4	 30.2	 5.8	 5.2	 0.6
	primary 100.0
	
56.6	 14.8	 41.8	 36.0	 7.4	 6.7	 0.8
	middle 100.0	 61.6	 20.5	 41.1	 32.3	 6.1	 5.5	 0.6
	high 100.0	 68.0	 26.0	 42.0	 27.3	 4.7	 4.2	 0.6
	university 100.0 75.1	 28.0	 47.2	 20.7	 4.1	 3.6	 0.5
possibility of intra-generation social mobility;
total	 100.0	 53.6	 15.9	 37.7	 34.3	 12.1	 10.6	 1.6
	primary 100.0	 49.5	 12.3	 37.2	 37.8	 12.7	 11.0	 1.7
	middle 100.0	 52.1	 15.1	 37.0	 35.7	 12.2	 10.8	 1.4
	high 100.0	 55.7	 18.2	 37.5	 32.0	 12.3	 10.6	 1.7
	university 100.0	 60.1	 19.8	 40.3	 29.8	 10.1	 9.0	 1.1
source: SIlK, 1988.
I: very easy to move to move upward, 	 II: moderately easy to move upward
	
III: very difficult to move upward,	 IV: moderately difficult to move upward
	
primary: primary school graduates and under,	 middle: middle school graduates
high: high school graduates, 	 university: collegeor university graduates and over
Thus most Koreans believe upward mobility is not impossible and the only element
required is a blood-and-tears endeavour. Secondly attitudes are more optimistic
about between-generation mobility than about intra-generational mobility. The
difference denotes that social mobility is achieved not by chance but by endeavour
for long time. However, the proportion with positive attitudes about intra-
generational mobility is not small. More than one out of every two Koreans believe
upward mobility is achievable within their own generation. The fact denotes
present Korean society is an open society and that many things can be achieved by
individuals and for the nation. If society as a whole is perceived to have limited
achievable resources, the apparent possibility of gaining access to the resources
would be narrowed. Finally attitudes are exactly related to the respondents' level of
education. Even the less educated are quite optimistic about social mobility
chances, however, the more educated, the more optimistic the respondents felt
about social mobility. Thus as many as two out of three university graduates
believe social mobility is possible within their own generation while three out of
four believe it to be possible from one generation to the next. This confirms that
education has been a very important mechanism in achievement in present day
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Korea as it was in traditional society. 85 In this sense at least, modern Korea has
scarcely changed from the traditionaJ pattern.
According to a Korean Gallup survey in 1985 there are several occupations
that are perceived as having the highest social status in present day Korea. They are
scholars, higher government officials, politicians, and great entrepreneurs. They are
the jobs present day parents like their children achieve. The two latter jobs are
regarded as attained when the individual has made his fortune and is in a powerful
situation, while the first two jobs are attained purely by blood-and-tears endeavour
and hard competition through national examinations. That is why the final
successful applicants for the first two jobs are far more respected than those of the
latter two jobs in Korea. Thus the best way to win the most respected social status
has been through educational achievement. In hard times when an individual
family had not enough money to educate all of their children, a promising son was
selected from each family and was encouraged to compete with other prospective
Sons in the educational system. This was a family competition to earn the most
socially respected status and better rewards. Thus modern society is not greatly
different from traditional Korea in the sense that it was family competition and
education was the most effective means to win the competition. The greatest
difference is that the social resources to achieve are wider than traditional society
could offer. As a result people have more actively sought the possibility of upward
social mobility and that is why the nation as a whole could achieve the dramatic
rate of social change within such a short period of modernisation. Of course it is
quite risky to conclude a relationship between the economic growth and social
mobility under the condition actual mobility rates are unavailable, however
considering the fact that attitudes on a social phenomena generally reflects actual
condition in a society, the conclusion may be not totally rootless in understanding
present day Korea.	 .
PART II
CHANGES IN
FAMILY STRUCTURE
1950s to 1980s
72
Part II comprising of four chapters examines the result of socio-economic
change or modernisation of the last four decades in the family field: how the family
has changed and resisted in response to the changes in other areas. First Chapter 3
as an analytical framework, reviews the traditional family: family structure, family
demography, marriage custom, inheritance system, and clan group, which
formulated the uniqueness of traditional society. Chapter 4 examines changes in
family size and pattern, and analyses what sort of social problems the changes
provoked. Chapter 5 examines, from the aspects of system approaches, how the
traditional clan groups have turned themselves to a new form in response to the
need from the modernisation, and what has changed and what has not changed
among the traditional marriage custom as an institution, and what is the result of
the changes in the marriage custom to family life cycle of individuals. Lastly
Chapter 6, primarily from the interactionist aspect, examines how the relationship
among family members, particularly between husband and wife, has changed, what
are new roles allocated to each family members, how the traditional role
differentiation turned to fit a new need from industrialisation, what sort of conflicts
have sprung out from the changes, and lastly, who has taken more power in the
process of changes in the role relationship.
CHAPTER THREE
THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY
IN KOREA
Three major topics will be discussed here; first of all, the concept of the
Korean traditional society used in this thesis, next, a description of traditional
society, and, lastly, an analysis of ideological, socio-economic, cultural, and
demographic aspects of traditional family structure.
3.1. TRADITIONALITY
Whenever there is a discussion of social change or modernisation, one can
hardly omit the past from which the present has sprung. Nevertheless, it is not easy
to choose exactly which historical period and which element of the period should
be identified as traditional. Characteristics which identify the present have emerged
from various social backgrounds each of which have different historical roots and
each one has intermingled, unceasingly, in the process of social change. The
difficulty in defining both the period and content of the traditional identifies the
advantages of an operational definition.
In this thesis, the traditional has been defined as referring to the Chosn
dynasty after 17th century with its ideological pillar, Neo-Confucianism. Even
though this has been determined for analytic convenience, there is also substantial
theoretical justification for doing so.
First of all, this period has been chosen because it is the nearest past which
can be effectively contrasted to the present. Of course Confucianism is not the only
tradition which has formed the modern era. Elements from Buddhism, Taoism, or
shamanism which have far longer or sometimes even stronger historical
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background, have still survived and have exerted their influences on everyday life
of present day Koreans. Even so, it was Confucianism that has been most deeply
influential, particularly, in relation to family structure and, accordingly, that also
has been most severely altered during the social change of the last hundred years of
so called modernisation. In other words, it was Confucianism that has had the most
systematic influence in the traditional or pre-modern era.
Next, there has been an implicit agreement or a consensus among family
sociologists about prescribing Chosn society for the traditional period. As a
matter of fact, in terms of literature, most articles discussing the modernisation of
the traditional family structure published since 1945, have set up Confucianism or
the Chosn dynasty as a frame of comparative analysis.' There is no reason to
disregard this general agreement unless there be a reasonable alternative.
Lastly but most importantly, it was from the end of the 16th century or the
beginning of the 17th century, in spite of its early import in the 14th century, that
Neo-Confucianism stabilised and exerted its deep influences not only on the ruling
class but also on the ruled. Again thmid-17th century was the turning point from
a non-patriarchal family system which had been a strong tradition for more than 15
centuries before the 17th century to the patriarchal pattern which was a by-product
of Confucian ideology. It was in the 17th century that there was an
institutionalisation of the patriarchal family system in the base of society by
passing through factionalism after the social change following on, the Japanese
Invasion(Im-jin Oe-ran, 1592), which, in turn, caused fossilisation of Confucian
ideology.
3.2. THE SOCIAL SITUATION
3.2.1. Neo-Confucianism
With the establishment of Chosn dynasty, the founder T'aejo and his
retainers searched for legitimacy for their revolution from a new value system, viz.
Confucianism. They confucianized not just politics, political structures, or
economic systems only but also intellectual, cultural patterns, and social
institutions as well. They got rid of ideological and religious remnants of the Kory
dynasty based on Buddhism by adopting Confucianism as the national religion, and
by supplanting the hereditary aristocratic system with a civil bureaucratic one with
a state examination system, and by setting up Confucian shrines on village level
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throughout the nation instead of breaking down Buddhist temples. As a result,
Chosn society became more Confucian than Confucian China.2
As a matter of fact, Confucianism was not a newly introduced ideology.
There are records of various forms of Confucian practices throughout Korea's early
history. The Primitive Confucianism had already reached Korea from before the
fourth century. 3 The Unified Korea, Shilla, embracing the Tang model, established
a national university for teaching Confucian texts in 682, and there was an office of
government in charge of education. 4 Coming to the Koryö dynasty, Chinese
political concepts and systems and Confucian civil service examination (Kwagö)
system were imported in 958, and brought about an inevitable evolution of Korean
culture during the later stages of the dynasty. Many famous scholars arose,
important literature was published. A national university called Kukchagam was
established in the capital city in 992, and iany Confucian schools in local regions
in the late tenth century. 5 Thereafter Confucianism began to gain influence in
staunchly Buddhist Kory and survived side by side with the dominant religious
belief.
Still, it was not Confucianism that held the supreme position in the
philosophy of everyday life and cultivation of the self but Buddhism. As Ch'oe
Sung-No, a Confucian scholar associated with the establishment of central
bureaucracy patterned after the Chinese system, states, the influence of
Confucianism was limited to regulating the state affairs of the present only whereas
Buddhism was exerting its influence deep into the core of belief system of Kory
society. Even among elites, it was simply a ruling code rather than a profound
philosophy.
There remained a great tension between the Confucian literati and the
Buddhist aristocrats on two points. On the one hand, Confucian scholars could not
agree with the Buddhist idea that one should denounce one's family ties to become
a monk because the very basis of Confucianism was founded on strong family and
social relationships. On the other hand, the literati began to question the excessive
amount of money spent on Buddhist celebrations, and the power and wealth
distributed both to temples in general and their aristocratic adherents possessing
big estates. However there was, at the time, no ideological justification for
displacing Buddhism.
It was just around this period that the Neo-Confucianism advocated by Chu
Hsi (1130-1200) of Sung China, was introduced in Korea to become rapidly
imbued among literati. He had identified the logical connection between morality
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and politics. Highly moral behaviour became a prerequisite of good government
and governing. Chu Hsi revitalised the Mencian doctrines combining with them
elements of transcendental Buddhism and Taoism and put the morality of both
individuals and governors at the core of Confucian decree. Confucianism became
the orthodoxy among Korean literati and came to be accepted as a popular moral
ethics and even as a religion. Eventually, the moralistic platform of Neo-
Confucianism got to be the rationale among literati for revolt against the Buddhism
of the Koryö dynasty and to open an unique political power game to monarchs in
the Choson era. In the 14th century, during the final years of Kory society, Korea
thus became test-bed for the Neo-Confucianism for the half millennium of the
following Chosn dynasty.
3.2.2. The Yoksong Philosophy
The Neo-Confucianism adopted among scholars, which became a plea to
revolt against Kory society, and which got to be a political cornerstone of future
Chosön, did not allow any other interpretation regarding the nature and behavioural
patterns of government, society, and individual human being. There was "no room
for political reconciliation or compromise in dealing with differences of opinion
concerning policy, court rituals, and ethical and moral issues. Compromise meant
dishonesty, disloyalty, and depravity."6
Broadly speaking, it can be abstracted into two doctrines on human nature
and behavioural patterns; sugi (cultivation of self) and chi'in (governance) 7 . Even
though they are like head and tail of the same token, there was different priority in
practice. While the former was emphasised by a group of Neo-Confucians who
were more concerned with the study of the origins of human nature in ethical,
metaphysical terms, the other was given primacy by a group who were interested in
the study of practical, political ethics that expound the mutual relationship of ruler
and subject. It was 'the latter which gave way to the philosophy of ydksng
revolution. Chóng To-jan or Cho Churi was one of literati who had crystallised
chi'in philosophy as a basis for revolt against an old order and to rebuild a new one
based on it.
In the Chosdn KyuUnggukflln (the Administrative Code of Chosbn)
submitted by Chong to King Yi Sunggye, the relation between monarch,
bureaucrats, and baksung (hundred surnames - a metaphor for the people) is
prescribed. The monarch is the person who executes the Mandate of Heaven.
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Officialdom shares the monarch's role and as a result, both monarch and
bureaucracy have higher and more noble status than individual baksI1ng. But they
are not expected to reign over people but to practice in by means of safeguarding,
loving, and stabilising them economically because 'baksung is the foundation of a
nation and is the Heaven of the monarch.' 8 In other words, even if the monarch is
the agent of Mandate of Heaven, as the will of Heaven is not permanent but
changeable according to the mind of people in collectivity, if he loses in from his
mind, he loses popularity and accordingly can be replaced by another monarch of
different surname who has the support of the people. This is yöksöng (substitute of
surname) revolution. Based on the above philosophy, a peaceful change of regime
was possible in 1392 from Wang dynasty, Kory to the Chosn dynasty whose
king uses the surname, Yi.
3.2.3. The Formation Of Bureaucratic Society
Apart from the nominal aspect of the yök.söng revolution, there was a
decisively important point at the level of practice, which determined not only the
fate of the Wang dynasty but also the future of Chosn dynasty. Bureaucracy was
that. It was seeded in the interpretation to the role of officialdom. If the Wang
dynasty was overthrown according to yks5ng ideology, the same logic was
applicable to the new dynasty. So there was a need to prevent the monarch losing
in which is the core of the Mandate of Heaven. As a result, a significant role to
check and balance the authority of the monarch via both the power of speech and
formal political organs, was given to officialdom. And it was regarded as sincere
loyalty to the monarch to check everything which deviated from Confucian
principle.
The idealistic role of bureaucrats was visualised through several political
systems. The Council of State, Ujfdngbu which was the policy deliberation council,
would be an example. "Three High State Councillors discussed important matters
of state, conveyed their consensus to the king and, receiving his decision,
transmitted it to appropriate executive branch." 9 Through this organisation,
arbitrary decisions by the king were prevented and even the smallest actions of
kings, queens, and their families were checked and criticised. Beside U6ngbu,
there were three mechanisms called samsa which functioned as organs of public
opinion, like the Office of Special Advisers (Hongmun'gwan), the Office of the
Inspector-General (Sahnbu), and the Office of the Censor-General (Saganwon),
Many other institutions performed the role of checking the monarch from
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despotism, including the Royal Secretariat (SuVngjongwon), the National Confucian
Academy (S5nggyungwan), the Hall of Worthies (Chiphyuvnjn) etc. In a word,
officialdom functioned as a practical transmitter of the Mandate of Heaven, and
society grew into 'one of oligarchic centralism by bureaucratic power and
Confucian ideology,"0
The reason Confucianism could infiltrate deep into the new society was that
the proponents of the Confucian value system were the ruling classes themselves
who had established the Chosen dynasty. They obtained abundant economic
resources and socio-political power through study of Confucian doctrines and state
examinations. They devoted themselves to the investigation of Confucian values
from which their political and economic interests originated and to the maintenance
of the system by establishing Confucianism as the state religion penetrating every
part of social structure and accordingly reinforcing their vested privileges.
With the growth of bureaucracy the contest between the monarch and
officialdom on the one hand, and the factionalism among bureaucrats on the other,
was inevitable. The former continued until the early of 16th century with bloody
purges called sa-hwa (the disaster for scholars). But unfortunately, this, in turn led
officialdom to split into factions with opposing interpretations of Confucian
concepts competing for the control of important government positions." These
internal difficulties weakened the foundation of the kingdom causing a
deterioration of political and economic conditions and the decline of creative spirits
from the end of 16th century.
During the process of sa-hwa and factionalism, the literati felt the necessity
to intensify kinship solidarity. The strong clan network was thought as a good
mechanism for formulation of public opinions, in league with other families, to
resist the monarch and to compete against rivals. And once it had been successful
in resistance and competition, kinship served to maintain the given privileges.
Accordingly, to meet the need of rivalry, the relationship among members within
the kinship network became a centralistic and authoritarian rather than a
democratic one. That was the reason why Chosn society from the 17th century
was stabilised with a patriarchal family structure. This exactly coincided with the
sugi (self-cultivation)' 2 doctrine of Neo-Confucianism and that is why hyo (filial
piety) was laid as a higher virtue than ch'ung (loyalty). For example, whereas the
political legitimacy of royal authority was questioned by the baeksng-centric idea,
'monarch should get the mind of people' for 'baekng is the foundation of a
nation', but the legitimacy of parents' social position never ever had been queried
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from a child-centred idea. In a word, compared to the relative, conditional and
reciprocal value of loyalty demanding responsibility and self-sacrifice from
political groups, hyo to parents was an absolute and unconditional virtue in Korean
society, at least after the 17th century. These phenomena were visualised through
publication of Chokbo (genealogies) which could be used as an ostentation of
kinship solidarity and prestigious authority of a clan and, in return, as a text book
to socialise descendants to the importance of familial union.13
3.2.4. Class Society
The Choson dynasty was called the yangban society. Not only because the
group of yangban took hegemony to control both socio-economic structure and
superstructure of the society but also their ideology and culture was moulded into
the core of the Choson belief system commonly shared even with other classes.
The term, yangban means literally 'the two groups,' the civil and military
branches of the bureaucracy who achieved their due position through national
examinations. As the civil bureaucracy became the dominant influence throughout
the country, the term came to signify mainly the bureaucracy cum the Confucian
literati class rather than the military.'4
The social structure of the Chosn dynasty was classified into three
categories, namely the yangban, the commoner, and the lowborn, and into four by
dichotomization of yangban to yangban and chung-in from around 17th century.
The lowborn was composed mainly of the slave population and partly of outcasts
who hereditarily worked at such occupation as butchering, tanning, and
wickerwork, including puppeteers and exorcists. While the commoners consisted
mainly of peasants and a trifling minority of artisans and merchants. The yangban
were the ruling class and protectors of Confucian ideology, chung-in being
composed of technocrats, born of concubines of yangban, and as humble
placement in the local areas, stood between the yangban and the ruled.
The Choson dynasty was classless society in a nominal sense. The yangban
status was not ascribed but achieved by taking government posts via kwagO'
(national examinations) or by becoming a literati through the study and moral
praxis of Confucian classics. As a result the commoners could attend public
schools and were allowed and encouraged to apply for national examination.
Conversely, the yangban would fall to the chung-in or commoner class if there
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was, for generations, none who achieved high position in the government position
or who showed academically outstanding achievement. Accordingly social
mobility was allowed to any person except the lowborn at least by law.'5
But the reality was different. Almost no peasants had time enough to read
and understand sophisticated Confucian classics. Almost no commoners were
allowed economic resource enough for the long preparation for the national
examinations. Moreover application to kwagd and provision of a government
position after success in final examinations was restricted according to the family
he came from. For example, the candidates were asked to write, on their
application form, names of four ancestors (father, paternal grand-father, paternal
great-grand-father, and maternal grandfather). From these entries, firstly, lowborn-
originated or concubine-originated family were sorted out and next, distinguished
families were selected among rest of them. Accordingly it was almost impossible
for non-yangban class to apply for the examination, and even- if he was a successful
candidate with a top grade, to get a due government position. Naturally these were
monopolised amongst the ruling class, and were ascribed to generation after
generation of the yangban.
In the 16th century and side by side with the completion of the bureaucratic
system, access to the national examination for the limited number of government
posts was getting more and more competitive. This resulted in two important social
trends: the rise of 'rustic literati' called sarim and the reinforcement of the family
system.
First of all, the yangban felt a need to have their children have an intensive
and high-quality education under the supervision of noted scholars. As a result,
instead of sending their children to public school, they established a private one or
supported an established private school directed by famous Confucian scholars.
These private academies were called so-won, and the literati, their disciples and
followers were commonly designated as sarim(forest of scholars). Sd-won sprang
up everywhere and numbered more than one hundred by the early of 17th century.
And nearly three hundred sd-won were founded during Sukjong's reign (1674-
1720) alone.' 6 At the same time, together with the political factionalism of the
yangban class, sarim groups increased rapidly representing neo-mainstream of
Confucian scholarship on the one hand, and accelerating factionalism on the other
hand. In a word, the sd-won functioned not merely as a preparatory course to the
national examination but also as an outpost to compete against other academic
schools, other political parties, or other clans.
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On the other hand, the over-heated climate in the examination system
reinforced kinship solidarity. As mentioned above, accreditation to a good family
increased from the 15th century as a requisite to apply to national examinations and
to get a good position in the government bureaucracy. Such a demand stirred up the
consciousness of the yangban class to keep-patrilineal purity of their lineage which
was displayed externally through the publication of chokbo (genealogy) and which
again was internalised to the descendants through feed-back procedure. As a result
endogamy within the yangban class and extreme exogamy to clan was the
inevitable pattern of marriage and there was no place in the chokbo for descents of
concubines or the lowborn. Meanwhile, as a success in a national examination was
alpha and omega guaranteeing economic wealth and social status directly to one's
own family, indirectly to one's clan, enthusiasm among yangban about education
was not restricted to his sons only, but extended to sons of his relatives who were
clever but poor. Accordingly, there used to be set up an autonomous kye (mutual
aided society) among members of same clan or same local community, apart from
government policy. The kye had the role of mutual aid both in economics and in
labour power on the one hand, and the role of mutual promotion of socially
encouraged behaviour, and of mutual constraints to deviance on the other hand. In
the end, the kye became one of the significant social networks which mobilised the
later half of Chos6n era.
The social structure of Chosn society met a serious challenge during the
Japanese invasion which lasted for seven years (1592-1598). The whole of the
Korean peninsula was disrupted economically, politically, culturally, and
ideologically. The class system was one of the reasons which increased the rigidity
of Chosn society after the 17th century.
The degeneration of Chosön class system can be viewed from two sides.
First of all, the ruled lost their respect for the yangban class because government
was too weak and too slow to react to the Japanese invasion, and second the fact
that invaders were not from a big country like Ming China but from none other
than Japan who was known to be inferior and barbarian at that time both culturally
and economically, and in Confucian spirit. This hurt national self-esteem.
Moreover, the people disappointed by invasion turned angry and could not
believed in the process of recovery after the war, due to the sluggish government
reaction and yangban exploitation. Naturally there had arisen a new idea against
empty and fossilised Confucianism, called the silhak (pragmatism) idea.
Unfortunately it was drowned in the political factional whirlpool between
ideological groups of orthodoxy and heterodoxy. This ended by the victory of
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orthodox Confucianism. This not only intensified prevailing ideology but also
deepened the fossilisation of family life and reinforced the patriarchal family
system.
On the other hand the seven-year war meant disorganisation of the lowborn
class which had been the economic and social base for the yangban class. First,
during the war, the census registers and official document on the lowborn were
either burnt by the invaders or destroyed and stolen by the lowborn themselves.
They could now claim to be commoners or even yangban. Moreover what made
the thing more complicated was the fact that "the government resorted to selling
official titles and ranks in exchange for grain contributions in fixed amounts in
order to overcome its financial difficulties resulting from a shortage of food
grains." 7 Anybody who was rich, even the lowborn, could become yangban, and
conversely, any yangban c6uld fall to the status of a commoner if he was poor.
Social mobility thus increased greatly among classes in 17th century Korea.
Ironically, the openness of the class system did not directly contribute to its
disorganisation. Instead, hegemony was concentrated into the yangban class. There
were two reasons for this. Ideologically speaking, Confucianism, with its
intrinsically jealousy toward any other interpretation or ideas, had already spread
far and deep into layers of the ruled. And the orthodoxy of Confucianism was
reaffirmed through the factional strife amongst the heterodox academies called
silhak after 17th century. Accordingly the many social changes could not uproot
the existing common belief system, particularly about the ideological justification
of the yangban system sui generis. At the same time the ruled were stimulated with
a temptation to move upward to yangban status. On the other hand, from a realistic
point of view, to be a yangban meant everything. It was not a simple social honour
or credit, but also a certificate to guarantee economic wealth and political power.
As a matter of course, instead of striving to reorganise the society in its intrinsic
structure, the competition to enter into the given yangban class, and efforts to
follow family life which the existing yangban class used to emphasise, were
increased in the later half of the Choson period.
Table 3.1. Social Mobility Amongst Classes In The Early 18th Century
class of son	 class of father
total	 I yangban I	 commoner	 lowborn
	
total(N)	 100.0(1461)	 100.0(214)	 100.0(959)	 100.0(288)
	
yangban	 13.8	 49.1	 9.9	 0.3
	
commoner	 60.2	 47.0	 80.1	 6.3
	
lowborn	 26.0	 7.5	 10.0	 93.4
source: HSKF, p.206.
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Table 3.118 shows the result of the social change in terms of class structure.
All the classes of sons, largely speaking, had followed those of their fathers. But t
least one person out of five, in total, had moved down-ward or upward (8%
upward, 14% down-ward). Among them, most of down-ward mobility to lowborn
was caused by mother's class, say, concubinage. The National Code in 1485
prescribes the class of a person to follow that of the mother. And upward mobility
was achieved through payment of ransom or through national examination. In
conclusion, in inverse proportion to the fall of yangban authority, the percentage
belonging to the yangban population class was increased via national examination
or trafficking of official posts on the one hand, the Confucian ideology of familism
was diffused more widely and more deeply on the other hand.
3.3. TRADITIONAL FAMILY STRUCTURE'9
3.3.1. The Ideological Aspect
The family was significantly influenced and transformed by Confucian
moral teachings and ethics during Chosön society because the family was the alpha
and omega of Korean Confucianism. In other words, among the virtues of
Confucianism, the hyo (filial piety to parents) which symbolises patriarchal family
structure, was regarded as the most sacred items in the Chosn belief system. Only
Chosn society has ever made hyo the core of its social symbolic system.
In Confucianism society was seen as woven with samgang i.e. three
cardinal relationships; between the monarch and retainer, between parents and
children, and between husbands and wives. In (benevolence) was regarded as the
highest idea which stabilises and smoothes the society, and ye (courtesy, ritual) the
social realisation and objective manifestation of in. To achieve ye, required the
practice of o-ryun (five ethical norms). These were the norms of justice and
righteousness between the ruler and his vassals: cordiality and closeness between
parents and children: distinction between husbands and wives: order between
elders and juniors: and trust between friends. Among them, Choson literati
interpreted hyo as the most absolute value which following the original idea of
Neo-Confucianism emphasised moral and ethical principles in human
relationships. 2° To conclude, the ruling class made hyo the ethics of familial
solidarity, stressing cordial devotion among consanguine relations, and made them
the principles of harmonious cohesion for society and politics as a whole.
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Hyo, largely speaking, had three characteristics in Chosn context;
formality, absoluteness, and closedness. The uniqueness of hyo lay in its demand
for formalised patterns of behaviour. It was not enough to feel respect only.
Children were asked to show their thoughts and feelings in their behaviour and
attitude. For example, they were expected neither to comb their hair nor to play a
musical instrument when their parents are sick, but to wear only a worried look on
their faces. They were asked to hang down their heads when they sat at the same
table with their parents. Again they were not expected to turn their backs when
they came out of their parents' room etc. In a word, there was a formalised pattern
of behaviour from which the degree of hyo could be judged, and which was
diffused everywhere deep into family life. Thus the hyo to parents was as seriously
formal as the ceremony in relation to a foreign sovereign. The formality of
Confucian morals was accelerated from 17th century and was most fully set out in
The Handbook of Family Ritual (Karye Pyuwnram) of Yi Jae in 1844. Korean
family structure particularly affected by the Handbook, in marriage, inheritance,
kinship, and rituals etc.
Next, the hyo was, unlike the Eros or Philanthropy, regarded as an
unconditional, one-way, and absolute obedience to parents, like Philos in the Bible.
The essence of hyo was to make parents feel comfortable mentally and physically.
There were two extreme cases during Chosön period, which showed the
absoluteness of hyo to parents. A poor farmer was deeply devoted to his parents but
was too poor to serve every member of his family. As a result he used to give the
first priority to parents. One day, his beloved only son who were aged three was
going to eat the food served to the peasant's parents. The peasant, however, thought
that he could have as many children as he wanted after he got rich but his parents
were the parents he would ever have and moreover would not live till he became
rich. At length he decided secretly to bury his infant son alive, so as to support his
parents more effectively. 2t There was another farmer and his wife who having no
more food to provide their parents, scooped out their own thighs to cook. Going a
step further, the absoluteness of hyo was extended even to the dead parents. For
example, a son whose parents passed away, was expected to keep mourning for
three years to show his hyo to the dead. In practice he ate crude gruel and water
only with no sweet or savoury food like vegetables, meat, liquor, or fruit. He slept,
without taking off his mourning dress, under a piece of straw mat instead of a
bedquilt, and laid his head on a lump of earth instead of a pillow. Furthermore he
was expected to leave public life at least for three years and to ill-treat himself as a
sinner. He was regarded as a sinner by himself and by his neighbours.
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The belief in absoluteness of hyo on the one hand, together with ancestor-
worship on the other hand, led impiety to parents to be regarded not simply as an
amoral event but as a significant crime to be restricted by law, and both were
represented in the legal code. The efforts to codify immortal Confucian truths
based on the hyo idea, were evident in the National Code, Kyungguk Tae-jdn in
1485 after developing through several stages after the establishment of Chosön
dynasty. This Code had deeply influenced family institutions in the early Chosdn
society and there was continuous revision of the Code during the rest of Chosn
dynasty. Accordingly It was quite natural that Chosön was called by Chinese
themselves, the country of courteous people in the East.' And it was inevitable that
it became a model country of Confucian familism.
Lastly, hyo, in spite of its humanistic voice, was closed against some
groups of people. In other word, the more the hyo idea was deepened and
formalised, the mare some were severely alienated and dehumanised by Confucian
familism. First of all it was closed against children and juniors. As mentioned
above, the essence of hyo was not simply to take care of parents but to respect and
follow their opinions unquestioningly. This was widely applied to juniors or
subordinates. Hence any creative thoughts or any deviant behaviour from those
prescribed in the formal Confucian doctrines were firmly suppressed and
sometimes regarded even as a crime. They were asked only to follow ideas of their
parents and seniors. This was one of the reasons why Confucianism was fossilised
in the later half of Chosön dynasty.
Secondly, it was closed against the illegitimately born. Hyo, the core of the
Chosön belief system was a virtue asked between parents and their children but in
reality, the concept of children was strictly limited to legitimate sons. Even though
it was yangban themselves who had concubine born babies, and even though the
same degree of hyo was firmly asked of the sons of concubines, the reward given to
them was bitter. The severity of treatment of sons, needless to say applied even
more to the daughters of concubines and was found in several areas. They were
excluded from distribution of succession to the same father's property and even
from the performance of ancestral sacrifices. Their right to apply for a national
examination except lowest level of those for technocrats, was strictly prohibited by
law. More severely there was neither legal nor any legitimate chance to escape
from their social status itself except by revolting against the Chosen dynasty. That
is the reason why they became leading members of rebellions during the later half
of the Chosn period. So that is the reason the legitimacy of the Chosn family
system was questioned by this group during the last stage of the dynasty.
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Thirdly but the most decisively, the hyo tradition dehumanised and
oppressed women. The social sanctions against Chosön women were particularly
severe. Quite apart from their social, economic deprivation in public life, they were
moaning even in private life. Nahm describes22,
Under strict moral code, ... re-marriage of widows were prohibited
by law of 1485 (the National Code: added by the author) The so-
called samjong (three obediences: added by the author) principles
was practiced. Under it, a woman was to follow (to be subservient
to) her parents before marriage, then her husband, and after her
husband's death her first son.
In a word, subordination was the only thing allowed to women. Furthermore, there
was a principle of chilgdjiak (seven evils) which allowed the husband's kin the
right to divorce a wife against her own will or sometimes even against her
husband's will. It prescribed seven kinds of legitimate excuse for divorce:
disobedience to her parents-in-law, failure to bear a son, adultery, jealousy,
hereditary disease, talkativeness, and larceny. Moreover, in the case of women
from the yangban class, they were requested to go out in public with their head and
face covered by a large scarf.
Lastly it was closed against other families, other clans, and the wider
society. As mentioned above, hyo to parents was not a rational love but a blind
subordination. As a result, Hyo required a man to avenge his parents against their
enemies and to welcome persons with whom his parents were pleased, in any case
regardless of his father's rightness and wrongness. And it was defined as amoral to
respect or love others instead of his own parents. Every kind of behaviour in life,
even a success in life was not aimed for himself but to please his parents. It is quite
natural that unconditional inclination to hyo shaped a family egoism exclusively
against other families, other clans. The rest was competition and conflict instead of
compromise or reconciliation. Acute factionalism during the later half part of
Choson dynasty, was none other than a reflection of family egoism amongst the
yangban class.
In conclusion, Korean familism can be described as a pattern of social
organisation to which every kind of values is connected and formulated for the
maintenance, continuance, and function of the family group composed of blood
relations. Individuals can not be independent from the family, and primary
importance is given to the family as a whole rather than each members themselves.
Furthermore, it is the familial pattern of behaviour, social relation, and value
system that was applied to every social area beyond the boundary of the family.
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3.3.2. Demographic Aspects
The ideal type of family pattern in Chosn society, was the extended
family, or more exactly speaking, the stem family centred patriarchal blood
relations. But due to mis-understanding about the concept of the ideal type, there
have been quite widely spread beliefs on the traditional family that it might,
compared to the modem one, be large in size, multi-generational, and prevalent of
the extended pattern. 23 This view is partly true and partly false.
3.3.2.1. Size of family
First of all, the average number of household members, as shown in Table
3 . 224 , was too small to be called that of the large family. The family size during the
Chosn dynasty, was no bigger than that of present day Korea with 4.2 family
members on average by the year 1985, and even smaller than those indicated
during the period of Japanese Colonial Rule.
Table 3.2. Average Number Of Household Members At An Interval Of
30-year
year	 household	 population	 average
(Japanese Colonial Rule);
1912**	 2,885,404	 14,566,783	 5.0
1944***	 4,920,203	 25,917,881	 5.3
source: * SKFI, p.353,
** HSKF, p.355.
l' Government-General, Vital Statistics, 1944.
Some of the causes can be identified. To begin with the inaccuracy of the
official record might be the first reason. Due to a high level of infant mortality
during Chosön dynasty, registration used to be reserved until the child was one
year old. The fact that infants' names were omitted from most hojbk (the Family
Register) surveyed on regional base, backs this up. As a result, it has functioned as
decreasing the total number of population. On the other hand, over-counting of
households was another cause. Due to a financial pressure of government and the
practice of local corrupt officials exploiting the ruled, from later half of the Chosn
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era, large families were coercively divided into two or three administrative
households for the collection of tax. As a matter of course, it inflated the size of the
numerator.
But even taking these factors into consideration, it is hard to judge these
average numbers as evidence of the prevalence of the large family. The decisively
important reason for the small size is neither the omission of infants nor the
exaggeration of household numbers but the traditional custom of establishment of a
branch family. The traditional Korean family closely followed the patrilineal stem
family principle. Eldest sons married and remained in their fathers households
(chong-gachib: pon-ga) while, on marriage, younger brothers established
households of their own (pun-ga) as soon as they got married. While these formed
the majority of family households, ideally each in turn would become the focus of
a new stem family (pon-ga). However as a majority of households at any time had
not reached this ideal state, so that there was no time that the number of family
members of pon-ga could have been counted as a large one.
Of course there can be some degree of variation among classes. As shown
in Table 3•325, lowborn families were small in size as single household and two-
person families. The yangban and commoner families were distributed with
relative evenness from large member families to small ones. In other word, the
lower the class the more usual the small size family. The degree of variation is not
big but a matter of more or less.
Table 3.3. Size Of Family By Numbers Of Family Members
In The Early 17th Century And Early 19th Century
size of	 17th century	 19th century
fam £	 total I	 high I middle I low	 total I •high I middle	 low
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
(r.N)	 (660)	 (149)	 (392)	 (119) (2989) (1128) (1621)	 (230)
1 pr	 25.6	 15.4	 27.3	 32.8	 3.9	 1.3	 4.7	 10.4
2 prs	 47.7	 53.7	 44.9	 49.6	 22.1	 16.9	 25.2	 25.2
3prs	 15.3	 20.8	 14.3	 11.8	 29.5	 25.8	 31.1	 35.7
4prs	 8.9	 6.0	 11.2	 5.0	 22.3	 24.9	 21.3	 16.1
5 prs	 1.8	 3.4	 1.5	 0.8	 12.5	 15.7	 11.0	 7.4
6 prs	 5.6	 8.1	 4.3	 2.6
7prs	 0.6	 0.7	 0.8	 2.5	 4.3	 1.4	 1.7
8prs	 1.3	 2.1	 0.8	 0.9
9prs	 *	 *	 *
l0prs+	 *	 *
* : 0.5 % below
$: high: yangban, middle: commoner, low: lowborn
£: Pr: person household, prs: persons household, prs+: household composed of 10 persons
and more
source: SHKF, p. 397, 465.
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During the Chosn dynasty after the 17th century, families contained a relatively
smaller number than expected. In any case socio-economic conditions of the higher
classes had them can able to keep stem family pattern household.
However, there seems to be a noteworthy degree of geographical variation.
For example, the average number of family members was as high as 15.7 persons
in the town of Yöngju, 12.2 persons in Hayang, and 11.3 persons in SO'nsan etc.26 In
those cases, they all belonged to Kylngsang province where the population density
was the highest due to the fertile soil for agriculture. However, the places were
crowded with powerful Confucian clans who were leading groups during the later
half of the Chosn both in politics, academy, and even in economic affairs. As a
result the family size could not but be large.
3.3.2.2. Patterns of family membership
The second misunderstanding about ideal typical traditional Korea, was
about the predominant family pattern. In other words, the stem family household
was believed to have been prevalent during the Chosön dynasty but in reality two
out of three families were of the conjugal family type as shown in Table 3.4. There
was almost no fluctuation in the prevalence of the conjugal family during the
whole period of the Chosön era from the 17th century. From the table, several
distinct trends can be discerned.
First of all, the higher the social status was, the higher the proportion of
extended or stem family households. The proportion of the stem and collateral
family households increased remarkably with time. On the other hand, the
proportion of unstable patterns of family like the transitory family household
composed of brothers or sisters, or disorganised patterns of family like one person
households,
Table 3.4. Distribution Of Family Pattern By Class In 17th And 19th
Centuries27
type of
	
17th century	 19th century
household	 total high + I midd	 low	 total	 high	 midd - low
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
conj *	 65.5	 75.9	 62.8	 61.4	 65.2	 56.4	 71.2	 65.7
stem	 6.8	 8.7	 6.9	 4.2	 26.8	 33.7	 23.2	 18.3
coll	 1.4	 2.0	 0.8	 3.5	 8.4	 0.1	 4.3
tran	 0.8	 1.0	 0.8	 0.6	 0.2	 0.8	 1.3
sing	 25.6	 15.4	 27.3	 32.8	 3.9	 1.3	 4.7	 10.4
source : SHKF, p.491 and SKFI, p.353..
* conj: conjugal family,	 stem: stem family; coil: collateral family
tran: transitory household, sing: single person household
+ high: yangban,	 midd: commoner,	 low: lowborn
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were found much more amongst commoners and most frequently among the
lowborn. The proportion of the former was steady but that of the latter declined
considerably with time. However, it was always the lowborn class who showed to
have the highest rate of single person household, and which had an unstable pattern
of family life during both periods. This can be explained from the economic
subordination of the lowborn to the yangban class who owned most of the
farmland during the later half of Chosön period. In other word, slaves composing
most of the lowborn28 had no right to set up an independent family outside the
owner's house unless allowed to set up one so as to have them cultivate a farm far
away from the owner's house. It was still impossible for them to marry a woman
due to lack of economic potential unless the owner let them marry out of charity.
As a result it was natural that many of the single person households were found
primarily among the lowborn, and their family type was disorganised or unstable.
To conclude, the proportion of stem and collateral families were higher among the
higher class, while that of unstable family or household was most frequent among
the lowborn. The conjugal family household was more frequently found in
commoner and lowborn classes than in the yangban, while the proportion of the
extended family households was higher in yangban than in the commoner or in
lowborn classes. However the absolute number of stem family households in
traditional society was not notably high compared to that of modern Korea where it
was 16 percent by 1989.29
3.3.2.3. Family composition
The next nostalgic opinion about the deterioration of family life since the
Chosn epoch is the belief that the traditional type of family was composed of
blood relatives only, and that members of a family were only rarely scattered out of
their own home like those of urban families in modern industrial society. However
this also has been found to be untrue. By hojök, the Family Register, it is not
possible to determine exactly how many members from a family, or which of them,
and for what kind of 5urpose, were away from home for a long period. But at least
a rough estimate of trends can be made from Table 3.5. First, there seemed to have
been quite significant amount of movement outside their own family. Two
alternatives are available to persons who have moved away from their own family
for a long time: to live in a family as a non-family member on the one hand, or to
become a one person household by oneself or to compose a transitory household
with sisters or brothers on the other. The increase in the number of one person
households or families including non-family members, indicates a high level of
inter-household mobility of family members. Chos5n society had a high rate of
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inter-household movement. The high proportion of single and transitory
households in the previous Table 3.4, and again the high proportion of families
composed of non-family members in Table 3.5 are evidence of this mobility.
Table 3.5. Proportion Of Households Containing Family Members Only
And Non-family Members
type*	 17th century	 19th century
total high+	 midd [
	
low	 total	 high	 midd	 low
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
(r.N)	 (660)	 (149)	 (392)	 (119) (2989) (1128) (1631)	 (230)
fam	 72.4	 36.2	 82.1	 85.7	 62.5	 43.8	 75.7	 60.9
h-h	 27.6	 63.8	 17.9	 14.3	 37.5	 56.2	 24.3	 39.1
source :SHKF, p.388, 457.
* fam: household composed of family members only 	 h'h: household including non-family
members
+ high: yangban,	 midd: commoner,	 low: lowborn
Meanwhile the percentage of families containing non-family members is
never a negligible value compared to 1.1 per cent of current Korea in 1990. It
means that, in spite the importance of blood relationships or family solidarity
among members, it was not connected to the closure of their household boundary
against other non-family members who are not in blood relatives. In this sense, the
traditional family was more opened to non-family members than the closedness of
the modern family. Of course it was mostly opened to slaves only. Strictly
speaking, it was not a matter of openness or closedness but of the economic
subordination of slaves to the owner. As a result the more a family had non-family
member meant the stronger its economic potential was. In this sense, as shown in
Table 3.5, it was the yangban class who most benefited from the slave system.
Table 3.6. Rate Of Household In Possession Of Slaves By The Number Of
Them
	No. of
	
17th century	 19th century -
slaves total	 highK I midd	 low	 total I high ] midd F low
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
(r.N)	 (660)	 (149)	 (392)	 (119)	 (2989) (1128) (1631) (230)
no	 72.4	 36.2	 82.1	 85.7	 62.5	 43.8	 75.7	 60.9
yes	 27.5	 63.8	 17.9	 14.3	 37.5	 56.2	 24.3	 39.1
	
1	 10.6	 20.2	 8.1	 6.7	 26.2	 35.6	 19.3	 29.2
	
2	 6.5	 14.8	 4.1	 4.2	 5.9	 9.8	 3.0	 6.5
	3	 2.6	 6.7	 1.8	 2.1	 4.1	 0.9	 1.7
	
4-5	 4.4	 13.4	 1.8	 1.7	 1.9	 3.7	 0.7	 1.7
	
6-10	 2.6	 5.4	 1.8	 1.7	 1.1	 2.4	 0.3
	
11-20	 0.6	 2.0	 0.3	 0.3	 0.6	 0.1
	
21+	 0.3	 1.3
source: SHKF, p.493.
* high: yangbarz,	 midd.: commoner,	 low: lowborn
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However, the degree of economic concentration was much weakened in time, with
the development of both commerce and industry which on the one hand allowed
the lowborn to have their own property instead of being subordinated to the
owner's farmland and on the other hand the relaxation of class system in general
during the 19th century. This opening of the class- structure can be found again in
Table 3.6.
First of all, it is clear that there is a link between proportion of slave
holding families and the rate of households containing non-family members as
previously shown in Table 3.5. The increase in households possessing slaves can
be interpreted in several ways. The most decisive reason is the economic
development after the 18th century. At the end of 18th century, a pragmatic
reaction (silhak idea) to the fossilised doctrine of Neo-Confucianism, came to the
forefront emphasising the development of national wealth based on commerce and
industry. It brought general development in economics, the improvement of the
economic position of commoners and the lowborn, and as a result, allowed them to
buy slaves who until 17th century were owned primarily by the yangban class.
There were notable fluctuations by class. To begin with, it was always the
yangban class who showed the highest proportion of household possessing slaves
during the whole later half of the Chosn period. But the proportion was in marked
decline in relative terms compared to the sharp increase in the proportion of the
households in possessing slaves among the lowborn or commoners. The reason for
increases in the rate of lowborn households holding slaves as already explained
was due to development of the economic position but it was particularly
government slaves who benefited from economic improvement and themselves
bought private slaves. The fact that they held a position in the government,
however low it was, and however contemptible their occupational function was,
frequently gave them access to the economic resources, in commerce or industry
which though denigrated by the physiocratism of Neo-Confucianism, enabled them
to accumulate capital'more easily than the mainly farmer commoners or even than
the yangban who fossilised themselves by means of dogmatic Confucianism. On
the other hand, some of commoners were economically successful and could obtain
a government positions which promised them far bigger economic returns with
which they could buy slaves. In a word, economic wealth or occupational position
in the government was the most significant variable which allowed people to
possess as many slaves as possible. So even a yangban could not have had any
slaves unless he was rich enough or unless he was in a government post.
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However the possibilities for the lowborn or commoner to surpass the
economic strength of the yangban were not unlimited. Their social or official status
was determined by Confucian law, and more decisively, the physiocratism based
on Confucian doctrine was still too strong enough to be replaced by modern
capitalism which does not raise questions of occupational status of the
economically successful. The idea of silhak which had prepared a base for the
development of industry and commerce, was only available among a small portion
of society. Naturally, there was no room left for the accumulation of large scale
capital for either commoner or lowborn. The number of slaves owned by
commoners or lowborn was mainly limited to one. And economic potential was
still in the hands of the yangban class and they possessed bigger numbers of slaves
than the commoners or lowborn did.
In sum, the average size of family was too small to be called a stem family
pattern, and the prevailing pattern during the Chosin period was the conjugal
family in all classes in spite of strong cultural orientation to the patriarchal stem
family. However the higher the class the greater the percentage of stem or
collateral families on the one hand, while on the other hand in the lower classes the
conjugal family and disorganised patterns like one-person households or transitory
ones prevailed. Meanwhile, the proportion to allow non-family members in the
home was quite high compared to that of modern Korea, but those non-family
members were slaves who were subordinated economically and by Confucian law.
The proportion of households possessing larger numbers of slaves, was mostly
confined to the yangban class. The increase in the percentage among commoners or
the lowborn who owned slaves were found in the 19th century when class system
weakened and the improvement of their economic position was based on industry
and commerce.
In conclusion, however small the size of the family was, however rare the
pattern of the stem family was, however many non-family members in the yangban
family were, and however unstable the lowborns' families were, the reason Chosön
society cannot but be designated of patriarchal stem family, was because of its
ideals commonly believed and shared by its members. Even if the idea was not
realised through the external family pattern the most decisive thing was that (as
already mentioned in section 3.3.1, and would be further discussed in 3.3.4) the
ideal of patriarchal stem family was the core of the symbolic system of Chosth
society. It was intrinsic in the constitution of other institutions rather than an
external pattern of the family which was merely externally affected mainly by
economic factors.
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3.3.3. Marriage
Some misunderstandings about the traditional patterns also relate to
marriage and the age at first marriage, the age gap between couples, or the incest
taboo.
3.3.3.1. Early marriage
Early marriage was prohibited by the National Code. According to the
marriage articles, 'men were allowed to marry from the age of 15, and women from
14. However man or woman could marry after a report to a government office at 13
years old when one of his/her parents was suffering from a chronic disease, or
he/she could marry at the age 12 when either of both parents were over 50 years
old'. The minimum limitation to the age of marriage was slightly increased with
time to 20 years at the end of Chosn period. 30 Even though exceptional clauses
were prepared under a consideration not to have a patrilineal family line be cut off,
the basic purpose of legal prescription on the minimum age at marriage, was to
establish Confucian morality against a corrupt custom which was fashioned during
the last stage of the Koryö dynasty. However, the reality did not follow spirit of
law.
There is no data which gives exact statistics about early marriage. So the
author can only infer from two indirect ones: firstly the age gap between fathers
and children in the early 19th century, and secondly data on the age at marriage
calculated during the Japanese Colonial period. First of all, according to Monthly
Survey of the Japanese Government-General of Korea, 6.7 percent of brides, and
7.6 percent of bridegrooms who married in 1921, were married below the age of 15
which was designated by law. About one out of two brides, at least two out of three
bridegrooms got married below the age of 20. Another clue of a tendenày for early
marriage can be discovered in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7. Age Gap Between Father And Son In The Early 19th Century
age gap
	 total	 yangban	 commoner	 lowborn
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
(r.N)	 (1648)	 (762)	 (790)	 (96)
	
13-15	 1.2	 2.0	 0.5	 -
	
16-20	 12.8	 16.7	 9.0	 13.5
	21-25	 24.0	 24.2	 24.3	 21.9
	
26-30	 22.5	 20.6	 24.6	 19.8
	
31-35	 16.6	 14.3	 18.1	 21.9
	
36-40	 11.9	 10.5	 13.0	 13.5
41+	 11.0	 11.7	 10.5	 9.4
source: SHKF, p.400.
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In concrete, the age gap between father arid son should be over 15 years old, a
father could not marry at 14 years old or less, but might marry at least at his age 15
or over. Inferring from this hypothesis, at least one out of seven bridegrooms were
married at the age below 20 years. The proportion of brides married below 20 years
old might have been much bigger if a special consideration is given to the
historical fact, which will be explained soon, that the early marriage rule was much
more enforced for brides than bridegrooms. The early marrying trend was found
more prevalent among the yangban class than among commoners or the lowborn.
The reason why the lower classes married later than yangban can be attributed to
their economic poverty. To conclude, in spite of a lack of exact statistics, early
marriage was quite common during the whole Chosn dynasty and particularly
amongst the yangban class.
Several explanations can be inferred from historical, economic, and
ideological perspectives. Historically speaking there were two reasons. The first
one can be traced back to the Koryô dynasty when it was attacked from Yuan
China at the end of 13th century. Yuan asked Korea to deliver unmarried women
while getting the Kory king and princes married to Yuan princesses with the aim
of racial mixture. The Koryö government could not but to accept this oppression
and established an organisation to select women to send to Yuan, and dispatched
special officials to each province to select unmarried women or widows.
Simultaneously all women except the ones from the lowborn, were asked to report
to government offices before their marriage. This process lasted for some eighty
years, and women were delivered to Yuan 51 times. Under this terrible situation,
the only alternatives for parents who had unmarried girls were getting them
married earlier than the official notice on the age at first marriage. In spite of the
mental and biological side effects of early marriage, this was thought much better
than to have their children married into a barbarian country too far aay to meet
their daughter before their death. This became a turning point from a marriage by a
free will between the contracting persons to coercive early marriage arranged by a
match-maker, and was continued under the Chosn dynasty.
Another historical factor which accelerated the trend toward early marriage,
was due to a special law on the marriage of kings and princes during the Chosen
government. Under this law, no adult woman was allowed to marry while a mate
for a king or a prince was being selected. The most desperate thing was that a
woman who was selected for a preliminary examination and brought to a palace,
was very hard to marry to another man even after being freed from the selection
procedure. She was believed to have lost spiritual virginity. Therefore parents who
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had a daughter liable to marry, used to hurriedly get her married before a official
announcement for selection was made.
The custom of early marriage was escalated by adopting Confucian ideas
about patriarchal right and the use of match-maker. First, under the Confucian
atmosphere, continuance and prosperity of family line was regarded not only as a
personal pleasure of a householder himself but also as a hyo or duty which should
be kept in order not to disgrace his family and ancestors. Bound by the Confucian
concept of hyo demanding absolute subordination of children, householders had
their children married so as to have a grandson as soon as possible. On the other
hand, due to the extreme requirement of the virginal purity of women under Neo-
Confucianism, no girls were expected to share the same seat with a boy from an
early age at seven on. Father, brother, and father's brother were the only males
women were allowed to engage in a dialogue. Naturally, it was match-making
women who were able to go between bride and bridegroom. They were expected
and encouraged to be women of knowledge and experience. However
occupationally and tactically, they exaggerated good points of both sides to hurry
up marriage and this coincided with the householder's desire to have a grandson as
soon as possible for the continuance and prosperity of a family line.
Further, economic factors can not be omitted from the cause of the early
marriage. In agricultural society, the increase of labour power was directly related
to economic prosperity. As a result, bringing a wife or daughter-in-law into a
family meant an increase in the labour force and led to an accumulation of wealth.
However, even if that is true, bringing an adult bride into one's family was quite
burdensome for a family which is too poor to prepare household goods which may
demand quite a large amount of money. Naturally, to have their son marry a young
bride was the next alternative and, of course, if one had not enough finances to
bring even an immature bride, unmarried life or a late marriage was irresistible.3'
3.3.3.2. The age gap between husbands and wives
The age gap between couples could not escape from historical and politico-
economic influences any more than the age at first marriage could. Cases of the
older husband were dominant in all times and classes, and the next comes the older
wife, and then the same age (Table 3.8). Until the 17th century, the ratio of older
husband was overwhelmingly high among the yangban and commoners, but
decreased considerably in 19th century due to a rise of that of the older wife. The
trend was much more dramatic in the yangban class. The reason for the older wife
becoming predominant among the yangban in 19th century can be explained by a
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need from both the side of the bride and bridegroom. From the point of view of a
brides parents, it was thought better to get a daughter married to a child
bridegroom than to have her be an old spinster by being trapped by a match-
making period of king or prince. Because once a lady was selected as a candidate,
she had no alternative except living on to die as a old-maid unless she won the final
selection as a queen.
Table 3.8. Age Gap Between Couples
gap	 17th century	 19th century
total J	 high	 midd I	 low	 total I	 high f midd	 low
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
(r.N)	 (413)	 (104)	 (257)	 (70) (2198)	 (976) (1098)	 (124)
W>H	 10.4	 4.8	 8.9	 24.3	 25.4	 33.4	 18.6	 22.6
W=H	 7.9	 5.8	 8.6	 8.6	 10.6	 10.5	 10.6	 12.1
W<H	 81.7	 89.4	 82.5	 67.1	 64.0	 56.1	 70.8	 65.3
source: SHKF, p. 501.
high: yangban, midd: commoner, low: lowborn
And even if she was not selected as a candidate and was regarded as keeping the
condition of a virgin, once she was no longer of a marriageable age, it was hardly
possible to get back into the marriage market in normal way. At best, she was taken
as a second wife. As a result, marrying to a younger brother-like husband was
thought much better than to be left as an old spinster lifelong or to be a second
wife. At the same time, from the perspective of the groom's side, desiring a
grandson as soon as possible, parents wanted a daughter-in-law to be mature
enough to be highly fertile on the one hand, and on the other they expected her to
be old enough to skilfully practice the complicated Confucian rituals being held at
home. As a result, younger son and older daughter-in-law was fashionable among
the yangban classes. But, the older wife among commoners or the lowborn is best
explained from the perspective of economic need. Under an economic condition
where an increase of household members - meant an expansion of gricuItural
cultivation size, and as a result, increase of a family's wealth, to have a son married
to a woman was directly related to the purchase of a labour power and future
wealth. Therefore a trend to have a child son married to a matured girl appeared.
The degree of age gap between couples, is broadly constant. First of all, in
case of older wife, it was mostly from one to four years (Table 3.9). This means
that even though the daughter-in-law was chosen at parents' will to have her deliver
a grandson as soon as possible or to share burdensome house-chores and carry out
complicated Confucian family rituals among the yangban classes, consideration of
emotional harmony between son and daughter-in-law was not totally ignored.
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Table 3.9. Size Of Gap When Wife Is Older Than Husband
gap	 I	 17th century	 19th
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
(r.N)	 (45)	 (5)	 (23)	 (17)	 (558)	 (326)	 (204)	 (28)
1-2	 53.3	 (3)	 47.9	 (10)	 49.6	 45.2	 55.4	 57.1
3-4	 20.0	 (1)	 30.4	 (1)	 33.3	 36.8	 28.4	 28.6
5-6	 8.9	 13.0	 (1)	 12.5	 15.0	 8.8	 10.7
7-8	 11.1	 8.7	 (3)	 3.0	 2.1	 4.4	 3.6
9-10	 0.7	 0.3	 1.5
11 +
	 6.7	 (1)	 (2)	 0.9	 0.6	 1.5
source: SHKF, p. 502.
high: yangban, midd: commoner, low: lowborn
Table 3.10. Size Of Gap When Husband Is Older Than Wife
gap	 I	 17th century	 19th c
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
(r.N)	 (352)	 (93)	 (212)	 (47) (1407)	 (548)	 (778)	 (81)
1-2	 11.1	 8.6	 9.9	 21.2	 24.1	 28.6	 21.2	 18.5
3-4	 11.3	 6.5	 14.2	 8.5	 21.2	 17.2	 23.0	 32.3
5-6	 14.2	 10.7	 14.2	 21.3	 14.4	 12.8	 16.0	 9.8
7-8	 13.7	 11.9	 14.6	 12.8	 11.1	 10.4	 11.0	 17.2
9-10	 10.8	 7.5	 12.2	 10.6	 8.8	 9.1	 8.7	 8.6
11 +	 38.9	 54.8	 34.9	 25.6	 20.4	 21.9	 20.0	 13.6
source: SHKF, p. 502-3.
high: yangban, midd: commoner, low: lowborn
Even if a daughter-in-law was regarded primarily as labour power to cultivate
farmland among commoners or the lowborn, her ability for a biological fertility
and emotional sympathy was not disregarded. The problem was, however deep the
considerations were, that it was at parents' will, and not the will of the persons
directly concerned. The result was often maltreatment of both sides. Nevertheless,
it rarely led to a dissolution of the family. Disorganisation of a family was scarcely
possible first because of a strict Confucian law against a divorce, next because a
family was formed neither On the base of a contract nor by love between couples,
but at a parents' will. The fundamental purpose of married life for a housewife, lay
not in the love for her husband, but on the hyo to her parents-in-law.
Due to the size of 17th century sample in Table 3.9, it is not easy to find a
trend by time or by class. In spite of the limitation of the data, it is clear the gap
size ranged widely from one to eleven years old and over, and extreme gap is much
more usual for older husbands than that of older wives.(Table 3.10) It can be
explained as a result of the remarriage of the rich. Contrary to a strict prohibition
against the remarriage of women, which was regarded as amoral or even as a crime,
men were allowed and even encouraged to engage in a second marriage or
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sometimes to have a concubine in the pretext of getting a descendant to keep
family line maintained.
3.3.3.3. Clan exogamy
The Chosn dynasty was one of the societies in which incest was the most
widely and severely prohibited in the world. Prohibition of incest was regarded a
basic, biological and cultural requirement to achieve Confucian morality. As a
result, no one was allowed, by law, to marry a person not only in the paternal line
but also either in the maternal line or in the wife's line. And running to an extreme
of Confucian logic, the boundary of taboo was extremely wide.
By the National Code, a marriage to a person of tongs?fngdongbon (the
same place of origin of the same surname) was proscribed as a crime. As for
Koreans four points have been used, at least until the early 20th century and even
until 1960s, to identify oneself one's own place of origin, surname, name of branch
clan, and lastly one's first name in sequence. All Koreans can be categorised into
four different groups according to the criteria of surname and place of origin;
tongsdngdongbon, tongsng-yibon (different place of origin of the same surname),
yisiYngdongbon (same place of origin of different surname), and yisiing-yibon
(different place of origin of different surname). Persons of the first group are
descendants of a same ancestor who lived almost thousand years ago, and use the
same surname, while persons of the second group, a same ancestor several
thousands years ago, and use a same surname. In case of the third group, it is
subdivided into two: mostly a group of different ancestor of different surname, and
more rarely another group of the same ancestor thousands years ago but of a
different surname. And lastly, different ancestor of different surnames belong to
the fourth group. It was the first group in whichendogamy was not allowed by law,
but even a marriage within the second group, and the latter of the third group were
thought as an amoral incest by socially enforced common sense. So the marriage
boundary became extremely narrow with time.
Of course, if the law was one thing, the reality was another, as shown in
Table 3.11. According to the Family Register of the town of San-am, most
condition of marriage was almost extreme clan exogamy, but it was not difficult to
find some cases of clan endogamy (5.8 percent). Among them, all of the endogamy
of same surname of same place of origin was among commoners, but in the case of
endogamy of same surname of a different place of origin, a small portion was from
the yangban, though largely conm-ioners. In conclusion, no matter that clan
endogamy existed, exogamy in Chosón was enough for it to be called a clan
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exogamous society, not simply because of a statistical prevalence of marriage
outside tongsóngdongbon clan, but also because of its exhausting pursuit of
consanguine genuineness by tabooing even the marriage between cousins
thousands of times removed, who are hardly possible to be, even biologically,
called the same descendants in real life.
Table 3.11. Percentage Of Clan Endogamy And Clan Exogamy In 17th
Cen tu rv.
surname	 place or origin	 percentage(IN)
total	 100.0(431)
same	 same	 1.9(8)
same	 different	 3.5(15)
same	 unknown	 0.0(2)
different	 94.2(406)
source: SHKF, p.371.
The thoroughgoingness against the incest taboo did not halt at inter-
patrilineages but extensively applied even to relatives on the mother's side and
relatives by law, who are from different places of origin using different surnames.
Even a secondary cousin in a matrimonial relation was defined as an unethical
crime and punished by severe flogging. Moreover, even a marriage to a third
cousin in a relationship on the mother's side or parents' mother's side, was punished
as a crime.32 This strict taboo derived from the matrilocal marriage custom which
was traditionally strong enough to have remained upto the first half of Chosön
period. Putting all Korean history together, matrilocality was a strongly established
pattern of marriage. A bridegroom went to bride's house to marry, and lived at an
annex until children of the couples grew up. As a result, from a perspective of the
husband, living with matrimonial relatives, or from the view of children, living
with relatives on the mother's side for a long enough time to feel intimacy, husband
or children could not but feel taboo about sexual relation with one, of them. The
custom lasted to the middle of Chosn dynasty, and as a matter of natural course,
the same Confucian ethical code was applied. That was one of the reasons why
Korea was called the country of courteous people in the East during the traditional
times.
The concrete result of exhausting pursuit of courtesy was found far more
bitter than beautiful in the real life. Being prohibited to marry any person who is
connected, directly or indirectly, near or distant the degree of consanguinity, the
marriage market was very much narrowed. The only exit was to remain single by
going beyond marriageable age or to bargain for an early marriage. As a result, a
child groom got married to an adult woman, vice versa, a little girl to an another
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little boy or to an adult. Of course, there were exceptional cases of old spinsters
who were waiting for a marriageable bridegroom. However this was a rare case
found only among yangban who had, economically, enough room to allow their
beloved daughter to remain under their roof for a long period. Through a
thoroughgoing taboo against clan endogamy, each family in Chosen society could
afford to foster one's own clan's moral sentiment which, in a feed-back process,
encouraged clan consciousness and reinforced clan structure. This was one basis of
a family's pride to fight against other families to get a vested interest in government
posts, and also the basis for positive competition for social co-operation to
overcome various national disasters.
3.3.3.4. Class endogamy
The more strict a class structure- was, the more frequently members were
inclined to marry persons within their own class. The marriage custom of Chosen
dynasty, was not exceptional from the principle of class endogamy. As shown in
Table 3.12, during the 17th century, over 80 percent of marriages were carried out
within the same class, while only 18.7 percent were class exogamous.
Table 3.12. Marriage Pattern By Class
class of
	
17th century	 I	 19th century
us
100.0	 100.0
(436)	 (2230)
20.4
	
9.0
5.7
	
35.1
	
0.5	 0.1
2.5
49.7
	
47.7
	
5.0	 2.5
	
5.0
	
3.9
11.5
	
1.7
(real Number)
yangban	 yangban
yangban	 commoner
yangban	 lowborn
commoner	 yangban
commoner	 commoner
commoner	 lowborn
lowborn	 yangban
lowborn	 commoner
lowborn	 lowborn
source: SHKF, p.496.
Among the latter, from the perspective of a wife, the proportion of upwardly
mobile marriages was slightly higher than downward marriages. It was women
who benefited from upward marriage, because the National Code prescribed for a
wife's class to be ascribed by marriage, according to that of her husband, but the
contrary was not possible. Accordingly, no bride wanted to marry a groom of lower
class unless her family was extremely poor, or she was past a marriageable age.
Even in that case, no bride of the yangban class married a groom of the lowest
class due to a strict class consciousness while it was not unusual to find
bridegrooms of the yangban class married to a bride of lowborn. Thus Confucian
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morality or class consciousness in marriage was more generously applied to men,
making the excuse of the maintenance of patriarchal family lines.
In the 19th century, with the relaxation of the class system, the rate of class
endogamy drastically dropped to below 60 percent. The most significant change
was derived from the yangban and lowborn classes. First of all, only one groom
out of five yangban maintained class endogamy, almost four yangban grooms out
of fives made a downward marriage. This was caused first because of an increase
of the absolute number of the yangban class, next because of the poverty of the
majority of them who failed in competitions for the limited number of government
post. Due to the social consciousness of the role of yangban class, prohibiting
participation in any job concerned with an economic interest, reading Confucian
books and poverty was the only alternatives allowed to majority of them. As a
result, it was only brides from the commoner class that poor yangban bridegrooms
could ask for in marriage. This created a momentum for the breakage of the myth
of the yangban class, and an argument for bringing about a social change to a
capitalism.
On the other hand, out of every ten bridegrooms of the lowborn class, just
three married within their own class, while seven married upwardly. The majority
of grooms who made an upward marriage were government slaves. Contrary to
private slaves who were strictly subjected to an owner, they, in spite of their
nominal class, could enjoy much more power and economic privileges deriving
from their governmental position, than private slaves or poor farmers or even
ruined yangban did. They could have chances to get into a well paid job which had
been despised under the vocational ethics of Confucianism and they could
accumulate money enough to marry a woman of the upper class.
In conclusion, class endogamy was jeopardised from both the side of the
yangban and lowborn. However considering that exogamy was mostly with
neighbouring classes not with the highest or the lowest ones, and that exogamy had
been never found among yangban brides, the Confucian principle of marriage was
not greatly broken down but was still quite strongly exerted.
3.3.3.5. Divorce
As discussed above, considering the structurally irrational elements of the
Confucian marriage system coercively applied primarily to women both by her
parents and husband, and secondarily to sons by his parents, it is not difficult to
imagine a prevalence of disharmony between couples. And as a result, one might
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expect considerable family disorganisation. Due to lack of exact statistics, it is not
easy to test this hypothesis, but referring to the Official Record of Chosdn Dynasty,
divorce was never encouraged whether couples were in harmony or disharmony. In
a society where the primary purpose of marriage was considered as the
reproduction of descendants for family lines and as the practice of ancestor
worship, the cohesion of couples was sanctified so that divorce was not easy unless
they were recognised to have failed in the maintenance of family lines.
Of course, there can be some variation by classes. In case of commoners or
lowborn, whether it was a divorce by consent or a forced one, the procedure was so
simple that they did not bring even a forced divorce to a court of justice. Giving
and taking a word of separation was enough for a divorce by consent. To divorce in
force, husband or his parents cut the edge of the wif&s neckband and drove her out
of the house. That was all. Notwithstanding the easygoing process, the reality was
not so generous to a divorced person under the Confucian doctrine of familism, and
under a social atmosphere where divorce was regarded as a failure of life.
Meanwhile, it was much more difficult to divorce among the yangban class. This
was strictly controlled by the National Code, and sometimes, even punished as a
crime. Being regarded not only as a disorganisation of an individual family but also
as a serious deviance against the social contract of patriarchal familism which had
been the core structure of the Chosn dynasty, divorce was restrained in many
cases. In a word, a divorce by consent was not easy due to the public sentiment,
and a judicial divorce, due to strict control by law.
Divorce in ChosSn society had two unusual characteristics, first the unfair
operation showing favouritism to the patriarch on the one hand, and the fact that it
could be forced by parents-in-law even in disregard cif the wishes of the persons
directly concerned. Both denoted another facet of the strong patriarchal rights and
how strongly Chosn society was structured by the subordination of children on
the grounds of hyo.
The right to conduct a divorce was given to the husband's side only. Wives
could not divorce their husbands however bitter their marriage was. There was
roughly three barriers to wives seeking to divorce. First of all, public constraints
discouraged her from divorce. There was a case raised by a woman in 1713.
Taeyng, from jealousy of her husband who abandoned her to enjoy himself with a
concubine, asked the government to let her divorce, complaining of him as a
corrupt official. The matter gave rise to a socially heated controversy and the
opinion of the Royal Court was divided, under a mutual agreement that she was as
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bad as vampire because of the very fact that she had debunked her husband's bad
behaviour however bad it was. A group argued from a criteria of disciplinary
punishment, that the King should let them divorce to keep Confucian ethics against
amoral behaviour of a wife debunking husband's secret. Another group argued a
divorce should not be allowed so as to prevent successive occurrence of the second
and the third case of betraying a husband to divorce. 33 In conclusion, it was a
controversy between Confucians who emphasised the importance of absolute
patriarchal right one the one hand, and those who stressed the sacredness of the
marriage and the family which composed essence of Chosön ideology on the other.
Once divorced, however legitimate her reason might be, she was regarded as a
Xanthippe, and even her own parents felt shame and did not allow her to return
home.
Next, by the law of 1477, remarriage was prohibited and severely punished,
reckoning it as a loss of fidelity and chastity. Moreover, a divorced woman's name
was listed as a Lewd Woman and her descendants were restricted against an
opportunity of promotion to government post. 34
 Accordingly, no woman could dare
to think of divorce under an atmosphere in which remarriage was not guaranteed
after divorce. A woman, whether she was widowed by her husband's death or by
divorce, was expected to maintain her faithfulness till death. Lastly but most
realistically, as a result of the first and the second conditions above, she could not
have any confidence about her economic security after divorce. Because no person,
even her own parents, regarded divorce an irresistible alternative, and no man
except lowest one of lowborn class, would want to marry her, a present husband
and present family-in-law, however bitter to live with, was the best she could
depend on economically.
At the same time, since the primary purpose of marriage wa not the love
between the couple but the maintenance of the family line, the marriage would
have been arranged, by force, by the parents, not by persons concerned, and as a
result, a right to have a couples divorced, was a matter for the parents. In fact,
pulhyo (undutifulness to parents-in-law) was one of the most significant reasons for
which a daughter-in-law could be divorced.
To put it concretely, as we have seen, chilgóji-ak (seven valid causes for
divorce) was prepared by law to provide for an irresistible divorce. The judicial
right to issue a forced divorce was allowed to the husband and the husband's
parents only. To prevent patriarch's side abusing divorce articles, the National
Code prescribed another articles in favour of women's rights. It was called
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sambulgö (three resistible provision against divorce); a case when she had gone
into mourning for three years for at least one of her parents-in-law, a case when a
husband's family got wealthier and more honourable after she had married, and
when she had no relatives or no friends to turn to after a divorce. The articles of
sambulgI were generally enforced on the more dominant position than that of
chilgdji-ak. Nevertheless there were two exceptions when the latter was
predominate over the former. These were Pulhyo and sexual unchastity.
For example, in 1426, Kim Oe was accused on a charge of a forced divorce
from his wife to engage in a second marriage for a purpose of having a second wife
to have her deliver a son to succeed the family line, whose first wife already had
gone into mourning for his father for three years. But he was freed and was allowed
to remarry when it was proved that a divorce was not his own will, but he was
following in fact his father's last will and testament in which his father's desire was
to have him have a successor was stated. There was another case, in 1443, of
recognised forced divorce. Lady Wang, in spite of her husband's family having
become notably wealthier and honourable only after her marriage and even though
she had gone into mourning for her mother-in-law for three years, was divorced on
a charge of ill-treatment to her father-in-law to revenge herself on her husband who
had fallen in love with a concubine.35
As shown above, in spite of its patriarch-centred orientation, as it was
demanded to keep Confucian morality emphasising the importance of the family
and the sacredness of marriage, divorce was hardly possible, conventionally and
institutionally, in real life. As a result, a safety-valve was required to soften a desire
to divorce which threatened the foundation of Chosön society. Sexual pleasure was
allowed to men and the, strict division of labour by sex, to women.
First of all, men were allowed to engage in a second or third marriage, or to
take a concubine for the purpose of getting a son to succeed in the family line. This
was permitted by laws, but in the case of most yangban and rich persons whether
they were commoner or lowborn, it was mainly just an excuse to satisfy sexual
appetites, a means to escape from emotional conflict against a wife who he had
married as a consequence of match-making by parents' will. The dysfunction of an
arranged marriage or forced one, did not stop at the cruel system of concubinage. It
also developed into another social problem. Disputes arose about the succession
between sons of a legal wife and those of concubine in the later half of Chosön
dynasty. Under a Confucian moral norms despising the descendants of concubines,
which was contradictory to the institutionalisation of concubinage itself, sons of
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concubines were almost totally excluded from a share in inheritance and from
social position. Increasingly dissatisfied with time, they rose as a leading group
against the social order at the end of the dynasty.
On the other hand, women were allowed to monopolise household affairs
without any interference from men. Of course, strictly speaking, it was too hard
work to be judged a privilege, but a monopoly of household affairs was the only
opportunity allowed under a society where no public life was permitted to women,
and no leisure activity was thought honourable. Unfortunately, this caused another
contradiction in the authoritarianism of mothers-in-law. As the household affairs
were thought of as an independent area of women, no husband or no father-in-law
could interfere to prevent cruel behaviour on the part of mother-in-law against her
daughter-in-law. The more bitter the life of mother-in-law when she was daughter-
in-law under another mother-in-law, the more cruel she was to a new bride. As a
vicious circle continues, the circumstances of the women in general were getting
worse so as to regard black-hearted rather than those of a human being. As a
natural matter of course, in feed-beck mechanism, this, more and more, accelerated
son-preference ideas.
3.3.4. Inheritance
The perpetuation of the family line was the root and trunk of the extended
family system, and as a result, of Confucian familial society as a whole. After the
establishment of the patriarchal family system casting off a primitive clan society,
mechanisms to give concrete form to its continuance were required. They were the
succession of the ancestral rites on the one hand, and the inheritance of family
property on the other.
3.3.4.1. Inheritance of ancestral rites and adoption
The absolute hyo to father was not limited to the living father but extended
even to the dead. The souls of dead fathers and ancestors were believed to have
remained in this world to observe their descendants and to exert powerful
influences corresponding to their behaviour. Descendants believed that an ancestor
punishes unfilial behaviour which brings disgrace to the name of the ancestors, and
takes care of those with honourable attitudes. As a result, a ritual of ancestor
worship was as important as hyo to the live father was, and it was regarded not
only as a sacred duty but also as an honourable right.
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Either glorious or dutiful, the succession of sacrificial rites was defined by
the doctrine of chongbcp(the principle of the ancestor). The chongbO'p, according
to a primogenitive hierarchy, prescribed who was the closest to the founder of a
family and defined him as the superintendent of ancestral rites. A person nearest to
the direct lineage of the originator, was called taejong (the great ancestor), and
inherited a right to perform sacrifice to originator, while the next nearest one,
sojong (the small ancestor) could make sacrifice to his direct lineal ascendants
only. For example, in Figure 3.1, however younger in age among cousins in the
same generation, and however lower in generation among kin alive, 'H' person
takes position of taejong, and is in charge of the nominal delegation of whole
family trees, and as a result, is a legitimate successor of sacrificial rites to the
founder and 'B' needless to say to 'C' and 'E'. Meanwhile, 'L' person was
prescribed as a sojong being ascribed a right to summon 'D' person's descendants to
perform a sacrifice to him. And 'J' would be another sojong to perform an ancestral
rites to 'F' if his father died.
Figure 3.1. Heirs Of Ancestral Rite
,,.—< legend >
I capital letters: own name of each male
	
I d: the dead, a: the alive.	 Founder
e: the eldest son, y: the rest
6de
	
dy	 Cde
	
G de	 Fay	 Ede
I	 I	 I	 H
May	 Lae	 Kay	 ae	 'ay	 Hae
The concept of chongb'p was socially prepared, in a narrow sense, to
define a centripetal point for the establishment of patriarchal extended family
system, but in a broader sense, to give a previous warning against amoral
behaviour like keeping a concubine or a sexual deviance which can exert
significant harm on the monandry of sacred marriage life and the order of
patriarchal family system. According to it, a person most directly descended from a
progenitor, was regarded as keeping the purity of blood relation of a family, and
was defined as a superintendent of ancestral rites. As a result, needless to say
illegitimate children or children of concubines, daughters and even brothers of a
same father, were excluded from the symbolic centre of a family on the one hand,
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and the eldest son of a head family took an independent position differentiated
from that of a real leader like the eldest man or a rich and powerful man among a
clan. The position was important in the nominal sense but not in a realistic one
until the 17th century.
The rule of chongbô'p was not thoroughly obeyed at the early stage.
Ancestral rites were performed, except a few cases of primogeniture sacrifice,
generally in division or in rotation among brothers, regardless of the eldest son. Far
from consolidation by the eldest son, it was performed even by daughters or a
daughter's son. This implies that there still remained too strong emotional
integration between maternal side which was traditionally formed under the
matrilocality, to allow the chongbO'p idea to penetrate deep into the early Chosn
period. It was only after mid-i 8th century that ancestral rites were inherited firmly
according to primogeniture.36
Clues that chongbäp was not absolutely kept, could be found from the
object of rites. Being simply called ancestors, the object of rites was not concretely
defined until the 17th century. It was only after the mid- 18th century that parents,
and grandparents etc. were prescribed clearly, which signified an increase of
interest in making a sacrifice to parents or ancestors. More significantly, even a
father's concubine was the oblect of rites before the 18th century, which could not
be imagined in the latter half of the Chosn period under the strong principle of
chongbdp. To conclude, it was after the mid-1 8th century that primogeniture was
thoroughly kept.
The settlement of chongbYp idea and its deepening brought another feature
into the family system, namely, the adoption system. It is not difficult to imagine
families with no children or no son to inherit the ancestral rites. Strict as the rule of
chongböp was, excluding either daughters, second and third son, or cousins, the
proportion of families with no successor was increasing. The adoption system was
an alternative to deal with this situation.
The adoption system was needed not merely because of the Confucian
ideology of primogeniture, but due to several social situations. First of all, there
arose the necessity of systematisation of kinship groups centred on the paternal or
patriarch, as a way to cope with the factionalism among political groups,
intensified after the middle of the Chosn period. Next, there was also the need to
organise social groups to deal successfully with economic wants caused by the
Japanese Invasion (1592-1598). In this particular culture and history, paternally
centred organisations could plot economic development more effectively than
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broad but vague groupings of both maternal and paternal sides did, and adoption,
was judged a much better way to realise the intentions of the deceased than to give
up hope of prosperity due to discontinuation of a family line. Lastly, kinship,
including the adoption system, was systematised to maintain the position and
authority of the yangban class against the relaxation of the class system after the
18th century.
Table 3.13 shows the general trend except few minor fluctuations in a
particular period. As noted in the Official Record of 1516 that " even if a member of
the gentry has no son, one does not adopt a child of others, but have daughter or
son-in-law perform ancestral rites," 37 there was no statistics on adoption in the
early stages of the Chos6n period. Adoption cases began to appear in small
numbers, after or before the early 16th century. Thereafter the number increased
and was significantly augmented from around the mid- 18th century. As a result,
there was even a case of both father and son who were adopted from other families,
showing a reinforced social atmosphere on chongbdp cum adoption idea.
Table 3.13. Percentage Of Adoptions Among Successful Candidates
Of National Examination38
	1393-1478	 802	
-( - )
	
1498-1504	 161	 2(1.24)
	
1520-1528	 208	 2(0.96)
	
1546-1549	 108	 4(3.70)
	
1570-1577	 238	 8(3.36)
	
1599-1603	 176	 9(5.11)
	
1618-1624	 246	 13(5.28)
	
1635 - 1644	 264	 14 ( 5.30)
	
1657-1663	 222	 18(8.11)
	
1678-1683	 307	 21(6.84)
	
1696 - 1702	 263	 15 (5.70)
	
1723 - 1728	 328	 18 (.5.49)
	
1747-1754	 313	 29(9.27)
	
1773 - 1777	 400	 42(10.50)
	1798 - 1803	 265	 33(12.45)
	
1822- 1829	 287	 34 (11.85)
	
1847- 1853	 247	 31(12.55)
source: SHKF, p.603.
There were two tendencies in adoption. First of all, the boundary from
within which a child could be adopted, was narrowly limited to near relatives like a
cousin or a nephew, in the first half of Chosn dynasty. Coming into the later half,
the boundary was extended far, to distant relatives, some times, even to include an
abandoned child whose origin was unknown. But in any case, however far away an
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adopted son came from, he was selected within same clan using the same surname.
It implies that the adoption was for solidarity among clan and no other purpose.
Next, another tendency can be seen at the boundary of decision-makers on
adoption. An heir was adopted basically under a consented decision between
couples who expected to have a son, and under a legal acknowledgement of a near
relative of both couples. It was legal prescription and maintained well until mid-
17th century. Thereafter, consent from the wife's relatives was of less importance,
and, at last, from mid- 18th century, the adoption procedure was possible under the
consent of the husband's side only. 39 It reflected that paternal lines were respected
and their solidarity reinforced on the process of adoption from later half of the
Chosn period. To conclude, inheritance of ancestral rites, following strict
primogeniture, was retained, even accepting the side-effects of the adoption
system, to organise Chosn society by paternal lineage groups.
3.3.4.2. Inheritance of family property
According to the National Code, "every child, whether it be son or
daughter, alive or dead, natural or adopted, had a right to parents' property as an
heir." However that did not mean an equal distribution. The principle of succession
to a family's property reflected the chongbO'p idea. There was a definite
discrimination according to ranking in a family, and birth. For example, an
additional fifth share was prescribed for a person who performs ancestral rites, say
the eldest son, whilst just a seventh share was allowed to a child born of an
ordinary concubine, a tenth to that of lowborn mistress, and a seventh to an
adopted son. Apart from these provisions, all of the parents' property was
distributed equally among legitimate children whether it was the erdest or the rest,
son or daughter. No exclusive possession was allowed to any child by law.4°
However as is any society, if the National Code was one thing, the actual
rule of succession to property was another. As we have already seen in the early
period of Chosn dynasty reflecting the divided or rotating ancestral rites, priority
of succession could not be given to the eldest son. By the mid-l7th century,
however, the situation was changed by the reinforcement of primogeniture under
which the monopolisation of ancestral rites was emphasised.
There are no systematic and official statistics about how family property
was shared among children, except fragmented and informal records called
Punjaegi (record of property division) which was drawn up by each common
family, partly submitted to the government and partly owned by individuals. As a
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result, it is impossible to tell exactly how the custom was, but at least, it is not
difficult to make out the general trend. The table below is based on data from 81
cases of Punjaegi.
Table 3.14. Pattern Of The Property Division Among Legitimate Children
patterns of property division 	 1500-1649	 1650-1749	 1750-1850
total	 24	 43	 14
	
equal	 20	 19	 4
	
priority to the eldest son 	 1	 7	 3
	
priority to sons
	 -	 9	 5
	
priority to non-eldest	 3	 8	 2	 -
source: recalculated from SHKF, p.53 1.
Slaves, paddy fields and ordinary fields were the most frequent types of important
family property. Only land, however, is dealt with in the table. In the case of
slaves, it was difficult to draw a generalisation from the data on them, because they
lost value as a good when inherited due to their drastic decrease in number. For
example, in the above record, 62 out of 68 families owned slaves before 1749, but
the proportion decreases notably to three out of fourteen families after 1 850.'
Anyhow, as shown in Table 3.14, until mid-17th century, there was almost no
discrimination between sons and daughters, the eldest and the rest. From the mid-
17th century on, inheritance was gradually becoming less favourable to daughters
or the non-eldest, and became still less so with time.
Table 3.15 Ratio Of Paddy Additionally Inherited By The Eldest Son
On A Condition Of Making Ancestral Rites.
additional share
	 1500-1649	 1650-1749	 1750-1850
total cases	 18	 38	 11
	
no succession	 2(11.1)	 3(7.9)	 1(9.1)
	
below 20%	 1(16.6)	 2(13.2)	 -
	
20 - 40%	 5(44.4)	 3(21.1)	 2(27.3)
	
40 - 60%	 4(66.6)	 12(52.6)	 1(36.4)
	
60 - 80%	 3(83.3)	 5(65.8)	 -
	80 - 100%	 2(94.4)	 6(81.6)	 2(54.5)
	
100 - 150%	 -	 3(89.5)	 2(72.7)
	
150 - 200%	 -	 3(97.4)	 -
	
200 -300%	 1(100.0)	 -	 1(81.8)
	
1600%	 -	 -	 1(90.9)
	
monopoly	 -	 1(100.0)	 1(100.0)
source: SHKF, p.541.
percentage: a ratio to average amount of succession per a legitimate child.
numbers in brackets: cumulative percentage of inheritors
The factor which increased the share for the eldest son, was the increase of
an additional share given to the person in charge of ancestral rites. As mentioned
earlier, ancestral rites were at first divided or rotated among children and not
fixedly inherited by the eldest son only. It was after the reinforcement of the
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chongbtYp idea that the eldest son came to be recognised as the only superintendent
of ancestral rites and, accordingly, became more privileged in the succession to
family property. Table 3.15 gives some indication of this.
The legal ratio added to the person in charge of ancestral rites was 20
percent, but in actual practice, except in a minority of cases, most of the additional
share for persons in charge of the ancestral rites was over 20 percent with a great
fluctuations regardless of times. It is not difficult to find a general trend from the
table. The additional proportion for a person in charge of the ancestral rites shows a
slight increase from the mid- 17th century and a notable rise from the mid- 18th
century. Certainly then the share of property inherited by eldest sons increased
particularly from mid-l7th century onwards.
The causes which had led from an equal division in the early stages of
Chos6n society to an unequal one can be categorised in three types. First of all, the
change reflects the intensified ethos of ancestor worship. Granting the Family Rites
of Chu Hsi was introduced early in the last stages of Kory dynasty, the idea did
not reach the level of a nation-wide ethos until the National Code was promulgated
in 1516. It was after the mid-l7th century on that the Confucian idea of ancestor
worship was strengthened, and accordingly, led to discrimination of sex and rank
in the family.
The emphasis on ancestor worship and ancestral rites created a need to
settle on the eldest son to superintend them and to stabilise his status and means to
fit him to be the master. Otherwise occasional skipping or neglecting rites could
occur, especially under a system when rites are rotated or divided among children
as in the early Chosön period. In the natural course of things, the share of the estate
left to the eldest son or the additional share for the performance of rites, which
might be assigned to him, increased more and more.
The second cause was the growth of clan consciousness consolidated from
the mid- 17th century onward. Emphasis on ancestor rites on the paternal side could
not but reinforce clan consciousness and solidarity. The membership of a clan was
composed of paternal males only. The pivot of a clan was defined by the chongböp
idea as being ascribed to the eldest son or the head family in charge of ancestral
rites, and as a matter of course, his status was respected and protected. The more
they became responsible for the ancestral rites or for the maintenance and
development of their own clan, the more discrimination against daughters and the
rest of the sons intensified. As we have seen, the increasing specification of the
Chapter Three 113
object of worship, can be one of the clues to the strengthening of clan
consciousness; the publication of genealogies would be another one.
The third factor derives from the fragmentation of agricultural land. The
amount of farmland for development was basically limited in most traditional
societies. Going through many generations, shares divided among descendants
would become much smaller than those among the early generations. Coincidental
with the proliferation of chongböp ideas and the ethos of ancestor worship from the
mid- 17th century on, it was inevitable that a priority to the economic benefit could
not but be given to the eldest son who is socially believed performing a significant
role. It might function, in feed-back, as enhancing the prevailed ideology.
3..4. CONCLUSION: CLAN SOCIETY
3.4.1. Summary - the Chib Idea
The development of familism in Chosön society was intimately related to
that of bureaucracy. The embryo of Chosön bureaucracy began to emerge even
before the dynasty was established. The fact that the leading group of the Chosn
revolution was the literati opened the way to a new social order based on free
competition through Kwag, the national examination. Participation in the
officialdom through kwagI was believed to be the only honourable goal. No other
social resource was judged more valuable than becoming an official. As a result
competitiveness was inevitable. In addition, as times passed and as population
increased, the race for this extremely limited social resource was getting fierce.
Naturally it was thought that individual effort alone was not enough to win in this
overheated competition. Some institutional mechanism to support individual
competitors and to preserve and maintain what they got after successfully
competing was needed. This was the chib42 (family). The family was not only a
closed field for the emotional satisfaction of individual members but also
functioned as a socially recognised gateway to access to the limited social
resources as well. In this sense, Chosön family organisation was utilitarian and
self-centred as against other families.
The need for the family as a method of access to social resources, coincided
with the establishment of Neo-Confucian morality in Korea. Among various
general principles of Neo-Confucianism, hyo which could be exactly fitted to
familial structure was emphasised as a core ideology. By joining the value of hyo
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to the basic structural unit of society, the family, the literati set up the basic
framework of Chosn society. By adopting and emphasising the moral principle of
duty and devotion to superiors in the family community, they made it a
fundamental of social integration, on the assumption that a person dutiful to his
parents would obey the ruler in society as well, and on the assumption that loyalty
and devotion to a family would, automatically, be extended to the level of kin,
local community, and nation. The primogeniture stem familism of Chosn society
was the outcome of agreement on these principles.
However, in spite of this familial system in Chos5n society, it is not easy to
find many examples of this external pattern of family as a residential group. Either
the number of members or their family pattern was hardly consistent with those of
the stem family. Instead, except for a small portion of the ruling class, the conjugal
family pattern was much more widespread during the whole of the Chosen period.
Moreover even non-family members were significantly included in the family.
Economic variables more decisively affected the pattern of family than the
ideological ones did. First of all, the reason for the number of non-family members
was the economic subordination of slaves, mostly, in the ruling class household. At
the same time, the size of arable land was too limited to allow a family to maintain
a pattern of extended families. In addition, children except the eldest son, were
each expected to set up an independent family of procreation as soon as they got
married. As a result, there was not enough time for a large number of family
members or an extended cum stem pattern of family to emerge.
The importance of primogeniture and the stem family could be found rather
in the dynamics of family customs than in day to day phenomena. Marriage and
inheritance rules were, the outstandingly observable institutions of the patriarchal
system in traditional Koea. The principle of inheritance and the adoption system
were the basis of common interest among members of primogenitive stem families
or those of a paternal lineage group. Extremely strict clan exogamy and both
constitutional prescription and social sanctions against divorce, together with
endogamy within the same class, all sustained the common interest of the paternal
lineage group. \Vith the intensification of patriarchy, the society went through a
fluctuating pattern of age gap between couples and a declining age at first marriage
by class and over time. To escape from the intense strains arising from strict
application of the patriarchal system, the custom of concubinage and strict division
of sex roles were adopted as a social safety-valve. Contrary to their original
purpose, these spread son-preference deeper into the layers of consciousness, and
in a feed-back process, reinforced patriarchal familism.
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To sum up, the traditional familism of Chosn was a structural pattern in
which every kind of values was judged in connection to a pattern maintenance and
continuance of the patriarchal family group and its functioning. In other words, it
was a norm in which individual members could not become independent from their
own family, and in which more importance was attached to the family than to its
members, and in which this kind of familial human relationship was extended to
every social field beyond one boundary of the family. Concretely speaking Korean
familism could be defined in several points. First of all, the basic constituent unit
of society was the chib(family) based on paternal pedigree. Second, the chib was
valued above every other social group and, as a result, developed its own to
achievement orientation or egoistic attributes. Next, an individual, in terms of
psychology, could not become totally independent from the chib. Every aspect of
the behaviour of individuals was evaluated in terms of the unit of the chib. Fifth,
The relationships inside the family were not democratic and equal in condition but
were hierarchically organised according to status ranks, and this finally, extended
beyond the chib itself.
3.4.2. Munjung: The Clan Group
How were individual families organised into the wider society ? In other
words what secondary group integrated the separate families within the larger
system? The munjung (clan group) was the secondary organisation through which
patriarchal familism was expanded to a societal level. 43 Munjung was a general
term given to a patriarchal family tree which was, conceptually, composed ofpon-
ga (family of orientation) and pun-ga (family of procreation). (Refer to 3.3.3.1) A
pon-ga was headed by the eldest son or sometimes by an adopted son, who was in
charge of the rites of the paternal ancestors. Other sons were expected to leave the
family of orientation and to establish their own family of procreation. That was
pun-ga. What was most significant was that, even if, geographically, far away from
their pon-ga, their status in the munjung never changed so that they possessed
strong identity as a member and maintained a deep and unceasing solidarity. The
chokbo (genealogy) was a manifestation of these sorts of munjung consciousness.
As shown in Table 3.15, coinciding with the starting period of consolidation both
of Neo-Confucianism and familism, the greater the emphasis on the paternal
lineage group, the stronger the clan consciousness was.
A munjung organisation was established by the suggestion of one or more
leading members and through discussions among members in a clan. Once agreed,
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grain or cash was collected for an organisation fund. It was gathered mostly in
family units fairly and disinterestedly but sometimes extra contributions were
requested to persons in government post, according to their ranks. A fund manager
was nominated to see to the accumulation of a large sum by moneymaking. The
money was spent largely in three ways; ancestral worship, education for
youngsters, and aid such as condolence expense in mourning or congratulation
expenses for marriages or successes in the national examinations.44
Table 3.15. Frequencies Of Chokbo Published
duration	 period	 frequency *
150 years	 1500-1649	 4
100 years	 1650-1749	 41
100 years	 1750-1849	 67
50 years	 1850-1899	 50
10 years	 1900-1910	 101
source: SHKF, p.552-3.
* cases of unidentified period omitted from calculation
As in the outlay of finances, the munjung organisation fulfilled many
functions which can be grouped into four general categories. The first and the most
important function was sacrificial rites: promoting idea of ancestor worship,
servicing ancestral rites, and caring for graveyards etc. To enhance the idea of
ancestor worship was the most important of any of them. To emphasise this more
completely, sanctions were applied to persons who did not attend a ritual. For
example, he was punished with a fine of grain or money at the first and second
absence, by flogging his slaves at the third non-attendance, and removal from
genealogy at the fourth absence. Similarly any relaxation of clan consciousness
was noted and prevented, and the social structure of the primogeniture system was
maintained.
Secondly, the Confucian order based on consanguine relatidnships was kept
through the function of munjung. A covenant in which virtues and regulations were
prescribed in detail was prepared to socialise clan members and to re-socialise
deviants. Behaviour nforced by the regulations served to establish the status order
by age and generation within the clan, by respect to the eldest grandson of the head
family and to the head of the clan, by courtesy to parents, and by harmony and
solidarity among clan members etc. The clan agreement encompassed the village
code of each local community. It was a mode of local self-government infused with
a spirit of basic justice for all and mutual assistance in time of need. However there
was no distinct difference in the sense that it functioned to establish and maintain
the paternal lineage group.
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The next function was mutual aid through congratulations and condolences:
misfortunes such as disease, natural disaster, or funerals and congratulations for
success in national examination or marriage were attended to by the clan
organisation. Aid was provided by the munjung organisation and also by individual
family units in the name of a family head according to their economic
circumstances and more attention was given to condolences. The mutual aid among
clan members developed into kye(voluntary mutual assistance association) among
local community members. As Lee describes,45
The kye was quite unlike the Confucianist village code that operated
under yangban leadership, attempting to enforce Confucianist moral
prescriptions from above. The /cye, in contrast, came into existence
for the purpose of securing tangible benefit of its participants. Thus
as the village code lost its meaning with the disintegration of
yangban society, the kye in contrast flourished all the more.
The associations, in the initial stage, were formed for mutual assistance or simply
as social gatherings, but later organised primarily to overcome economic hardship
through the pooling of resources. Be that as it may the munjung organisation, in
Parsons' terms, performed the adaptation function to the prevailing social order
through mutual assistance.
Lastly, munjung had an educational function. It offered scholarships to clan
members who were poor but brilliant. Or sometimes a munjung established a
private school to teach children locally instead of sending them to public sc'aooL hi
this case, a schoolmaster and teachers were recruited from within the same clan or
sometimes from famous scholars of other families, and the internalisaicvi c t1k1i
consciousness was emphasised in addition to the regzi)ar curriculum. Through the
process, integration among clan members was reaffirmed.
As reviewed above, being a collectivity based on consanguinity like the
family, the clan group was extremely closed against non-clan members, and being
an extension of a family, it was working rather more like a primary group than as a
secondary one. In a word the group was operated, in Parsons' terms, on
particularistic norms rather than being open to the universalistic values.
As a matter of course, there was no inducement to members of Chosen
society to cast off familial ties and push forward common goals hand in hand with
others from different family groups. There was no place to create voluntaristic and
universalistic human behaviour due to the lack of openness. Neither commerce nor
handicraft manufacturing was lively enough to attract anonymous members to
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cities. The conmierce of Chosön society was underdeveloped due to agricultural
life being self-sufficient under physiocratism and due to the narrowness of the
capital market consequent upon taxation in kind. In addition the biggest market in
the capital city was monopolised by government. Again, even though private
enterprises flourished more than the government ones, manufacturing was in the
same situation due to the extremely limited amount of demand.
To conclude, due to the lack of geographical movement in the population
which derived from narrowness of the commercial and manufacturing market, there
could be no possibility for people to organise themselves into secondary groups, in
its original meaning, beyond consanguine and territorial boundaries fixed by
particularistic and patriarchal norms. The consequence was that Chosön families
were extended and organised at a societal level through the munjung group instead
of any other secondary ones.
The question then arises how social change in the social order was possible
with the munjung group ? As far as each individual units were organised by
munjung structure, and as long as there was no real sense of secondary group
which can manipulate each. family and liberate family members from their closure,
the basic structure of society was not hierarchical but, borrowing from M.G
Smith46' segmentarily independent from each segment and exclusive with respect
to other families. Moreover the firmer solidarity within each family unit was, the
more it was prone to be defensive and aggressive against other units. Confrontation
or competitiveness used to be sharpened and naked when it was bound to important
interests politically or economically. However strict the hierarchical order inside a
family was, once he was out of his family, there was no other group which could
influence the individual with alternative principles to those of familism so that his
pattern of behaviour could have been liberal, individualistic or achievement-
oriented toward society. In other words, from a long-distance perspective, the
relationship among different family groups in spite of its hierarchical structure
internally, was organised segmentarily. However once there came a definite goal to
achieve, families in the horizontal segmentary order developed competitive
relationships between one family and another. Examples existed through the whole
period of Chosön society, for instance in competition in the national examinations
to get a limited number of government positions, factionalism to achieve initiatives
against the monarch, later, against other parties, etc. Finally, inherent achievement
orientation was latent in the traditional familism of ordinary times, but once
stimulated by a particular conditions, was manifested. It competitively could
become a motive either for social change or for the maintenance of social order.
CHAPTER FOUR
CHANGES IN
FAMILY SIZE AND PATTERN
This chapter comprises of four sections. First how the family differs from
the household in concept and what the difference means in reality. Second, what is
the predominant size of the householdlfamily and next what is the most dominant
family pattern combining a household in present day Korea. Lastly what are the
deviated types of family, how prevalent they are, and eventually how the social
structure has been changed by the above-mentioned transitions.
4.1. FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD
The terms 'family' and 'household' are often used interchangeably. There are
two reasons for the lack of conceptual clarity. Firsily, it is because the two coincide
empirically in most cases. If th household is just a group of person(s) dwelling
under a same roof, the family is distinguished by having a bio-social relationship
among its constituent members by ties of marriage, blood, and adoption.' The
family is a subjective concept while the household objective one due to the very
fact there are non-overlapping groups between the two concepts. First those who
live in the household being never family on any social or legal definition are one
group. Those considered as bound by the obligations of family in popular sense or
in law but who do not co-reside are the other group. 2 (Figure 4.1) Due to these
marginal group, if the concepts are not defined elaborately, important areas of
social reality and social change become impossible to identify. The next reason of
unclear usage of the two comes from problems with surveys. Even if a researcher
made a clear definition of the two, it is hardly possible, due to the limited time,
A: non-familial
household members
B : family members
= household members
C : detached family members
Family
7:
Household
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finances and efforts, to extend a survey to those who have left home as well at the
moment of survey. The household survey has been the most frequently adopted
alternative to family study. Even if it is the case, analysis should be scrutinised in
discerning the two concepts in the process of interpretation. In this thesis, for the
pragmatic purpose, the data on the household is used as a frame of reference to
analogise the family situation. However both are going to be compared statistically
if required to validify the interpretation.
Figure 4.1. The Conceptual Gap Betiveen Household And Family
What kind of insight into research is produced by clarification of the two
concepts ? The change of household reflects that of family. The household changes
in conformity either with a part of family members leaving home or with non-
familial members co-residing. It is these two marginal groups that reflect the
changes in the family and that change household type and that reflect social
change.
Figure 4.2. The Four Kinds Of Household
family members
equal to
household members
<the congruous type>
family members
[ome-
________ [javin)
<the fragmenting type>
familial
members
family members
<the inclusive type>
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Four different types of household are distinguishable by the combination
(Figure 4.2): the congruous type, the inclusive type, the fragmenting type, and the
mixed type. First the congruous type is the household that comprises no non-
familial members and where no family members have left home. Household and
family overlap exactly. As a result, both the family members and the household
members have the same identity. Secondly the inclusive type includes not only all
the family members but also non-family members as well under the same roof. The
number of household members is bigger than that of family members. Thirdly, the
fragmenting type is the one where some family members are absent at the moment
so the current number of household members is smaller than the total number of
family members. Lastly, the mixed type is a combination of the fragmenting type
and the inclusive type. The lower the proportion of inclusive and mixed types in
the population, the more the household is closed to the others and is exclusive. The
greater the proportion of fragmentary and mixed types, the more the household is
actively responding to society but the greater the instability of the household itself.
Table 4.1 shows the broad trend of change in Korean household types. The
year 1955, at the time of the most severe economic conditions, marked the lowest
proportion of the congruous type. Just one out of three households consisted of a
complete set of family members, while four out of seven households broke the
same bread with non-family members (II and IV). It was far higher than those in
the 19th century. Non-familial members included two groups. The first group was
employee, like slaves in Chosön society, primarily for domestic affairs or
sometimes for business affairs. This situation was thanks to the cheap labour price
resulting from the high rate of the unemployment after the Korean Civil War. Next
it was owing to the mass of rural migrants who exited their home to cast off
Table 4.1. Percentage Distribution Of Each Household Type
type of household 
f	
l9'	 '55 
I	
FAM86
I. congruous	 62.5	 31.5	 71.4	 81.0	 50.1
II. inclusive	 37.5	 39.5	 0.8	 1.0	 0.4
III. fragmentary	 u.k.	 11.3	 27.5	 17.7	 49.2
IV. mixed	 u.k.	 17.7	 0.3	 0.2	 0.3
u.k.: unknown,	 C: century (refer to Table 3.6)
'55: SKF
the historically chronic poverty particularly in the rural areas. They turned into the
cheap labourer in the cities. The next significant group was the boarders. Whether
her husband was employed or unemployed, it was not unusual that a housewife
took in lodgers to add to her income. It was the case at least until the late I 970s,
and the total amount of boarding charges they could get from lodgers, was more
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than that of living expenses. Frequently it was more than that of the income their
husband brought in. If rural boys and students could enter a school for higher
education thanks to the money sent from sisters/brothers working as unskilled
labourers or as a kitchen maids in the cities, the urban youths, mostly as poor at
that time as those in the rural areas were indebted to their mothers who had them
educated by taking in lodgers. Of course it was true that private life was interrupted
very deeply in proportion to the opeimess of a family to non-family members.
Coming into the 1980s, the statistics indicated a tremendous change. This
has been marked by the highest level both of the congruous type and of the
fragmentary type, and the lowest rate for the inclusive type. First the total
percentage of households where some members have left home(III, lv), is almost
similar to that in 1955. However there is a great difference between regions.
Almost one out of two rural households had lost some of its members, compared
with just two out of eleven in urban areas. In a word rural households have
experienced a lot of instability, while urban ones were in a relatively quite stable
condition. It was due to the huge rural migration to urban areas caused mainly by
the economic development policy. 3 Table 4.2 explains how this instability came
about. In any region the most significant reason for households being unstable was
economic. This is true particularly among rural women. The next most important
cause
Table 4.2. Percentage Distribution Of Socio-Economic Activity Of Persons
Leaving Home
activity	 whole country	 urban areas	 rural areas
total J male] fern total [male fern total male fern
real No.	 1496	 916	 580	 540	 339	 201	 956	 577	 379
employed	 55.2	 50.4	 63.1	 43.9 43.7 44.8 61.6 54.4 72.9
study	 17.0	 18.7	 14.5	 .13.7	 12.4	 15.9	 18.9	 22.4	 13.7
army	 12.5	 20.2	 -	 18.3	 28.9	 -	 9.2	 15.1	 -
family	 4.3	 -	 11.2	 7.4	 -	 19.9	 2.6	 -	 6.6
others	 7.7	 8.2	 6.5	 9.3	 9.1	 9.4	 6.7	 7.6	 5.0
n.r.	 3.3	 2.5	 4.7	 7.4	 5.9	 10.0	 1.0	 0.5	 1.8
source: FAM89
army: to do army duty for 34 months
family: to help family member who left home by marriage
others: unemployed adults, pre-school children, 	 n.r.: no response, fern: female,
arises either when urban youths leave home to do their army service for three years,
or when rural boys enter a school for higher education. A third element involves
urban women middle aged to elder women who move to give a helping hand to a
married son's family, or to a married daughter. This occurs when most of the
married children are working in double harness. The middle-aged/aged women
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help in the role mostly of baby-sitter or sometimes do housework. This was an
unavoidable alternative in the absence of enough nursery places and a high level of
labour charges for babycare and household chores.4
Households encompassing non-familial members (II, IV type) dropped
almost to none both in urban and in rural areas. In other words, present day Korean
families are showing an extreme exclusiveness against non-familial members, and
prefer to live with their own family members only. This trend was most
pronounced in urban regions (just 1.2 per cent of II, IV type and 81 percent of
congruous type). The rural areas are showing relatively much less proportion of the
congruous type than the urban areas are. It is because the fragmentary type is
predominant. To say too many family members migrated to cities to retain its
original form of family. Anyhow the reason for the rise of the congruous type can
be traced from two points: the changes in the economic situation and in values on
the role of family. Firstly it owes to the rise of living standard by virtue of the
general growth of the national economy. 5 Housewives no more have to keep
lodgers to add to their income. The charges to pay for a kitchen maid have
increased too high to employ her. The next reason for the exclusiveness was due to
the changes in the family role towards emotional stability among family members.
Unlike the bitter socio-economic situation of 1950s in which maintenance of
livelihood was the most important and urgent need of each family, economic
conditions of both nation and each individual family have been improved. This
made family members wonder what they have lost whilst gaining economic
prosperity. 6 The husbandlfather was a moneymaking machine who went to work
early in the morning before his children could see him and came back late in the
night after they had fallen asleep. Moreover, even mother had not enough time to
pay significant attention to her children while lodgers were occupying their home.
Every inconvenience, every breakdown of private life, and every deertion of wife
and children was excused by economic growth. It was a family history full of
sorrow and pain during the last few decades. Now, both housewife, children, and
husband no longer wanted their family and private life interrupted by any other
elements than familial ones. Emotional stability at home has been more highly
regarded than ever before.
The same logic applied to persons leaving home. They did not like their
privacy interrupted by sharing a tiny lodging room with other boarders whom they
have never seen before or by eating with friends in a small rented flat. They have
come to prefer an independent and unconstrained space nobody can disturb, putting
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up with paying a fairly good amount of money in rent. That was the reason of the
rise both in the congruous type and in the fragmentary type of household.
In sum, present day Korea displays two complicated and even contradictory
characteristics in household organisation. The highest exclusiveness and deepest
instability distinguish today's Korean household. Firstly they are feeling their
families to be a nest-like place full of their own family members. They like to take
a full rest both physically and emotionally at home without being interrupted by
outsiders. They showed an extreme exclusiveness in accepting non-family
members whom they supposed would disrupt their privacy and private life. While
persons leaving their own home have never decreased since 1955. The rural areas
were extremely exposed to this instability. This was the result of the economic
policy of pursuing rapid economic development, and by the mal-distribution of
educational resources across the nation. In short, in spite of the deepening idea
looking for a sweet home, the number of inter-regional migrants has not decreased
but increased considerably due to occupational migration. 7 The alternative to
someone leaving home could choose was to have his or her own space to be free
from any household or any person, whom they never met before.
Reviewed so far, the household has subtly reflected the changes in family.
Those leaving home and their changing attitude toward having an independent flat,
were crucial factors that caused instability of households. While the deepening idea
of the sweet home carried out the exclusiveness of household. However it is too
early yet to judge the family situation out of the household transition only. For
example, home-leaving in physical term can not directly be connected to the
instability of a family per Se. In the West, leaving home by an adult child can be
connected to the independence from his/her family of orientation. However in the
traditional Korean context it simply means establishing a household. This leads
neither to independence from the family of orientation nor to the establishment of a
family of procreation unless she/he leaves home by marriage. Even if it was by
marriage, there remained persistent and strong familial ties on the emotional and
social level. 8 Leaving home without parents' recognition meant losing everything
under the familism. However at least two things are definite in the future of Korea.
First considering the economic policies of which the stress still on the
development, the inter-regional migration is easily anticipated. The migration
might induce the increase in the number of the fragmentary type of households.
Again considering the deepening idea of individualism or of sweet home, people
are foreseen to be more reluctant in admitting non-familial household members.
That might increase the number of the congruous type. All in all the result is the
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increase in the absolute number of household on the one hand and the household
can get more point than ever before as a conceptual frame of reference to measure
the society on the other hand.
4.2. THE SMALL FAMILY
There are various factors that influence the size of the family. These can be
summarised as socio-economic variables, cultural tradition, environmental
variables and demographic conditions etc. 9 Each of them has a significant influence
in its own way on the size of family. Among them change of demographic
elements has been the most direct and prompt one that influenced on the size of
family. This has certainly been the case in Korea for the past more than half a
century.
Borrowing from Donald J. Bogue, Korea has entered the post-transitional
stage, by achieving the total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.1 by 1985. He divides the
demographic transition into three stages: the early transitional period, the
transitional period, and the post-transitional stage. 1 ° The first stage is distinguished
by high rates both in fertility and in mortality, which are shown in the
underdeveloped countries. The second stage is marked by a decrease of both rates
and the final stage is reached when the low level of both rates results in stability.
Concretely, first, the early transitional stage was from the early 191 Os to the early
1960s. It was the period dotted with many historical events like Japanese
colonisation, the second World War, Independence, partition of the peninsula, and
Civil War etc. Each of them made a significant impact on demographic change in
Korea. For example, the introduction of modern hygiene and medicine, the many
deaths during the war, the huge migration during the colonisation, the partition, all
these factors mingled to influence the demographic condition of the period. During
this period the crude death rate (CDR) dropped from 35-40 per 1,000 persons to 25
during 1910-1930. It owed a great deal to the spread of modem medicine, medical
techniques, and the wide implementation of an anti-epidemic programme. The rate
dropped again to the level of 15 during 1955-60 as a result of the diffusion of new
medicines like antibiotics. In spite of the drastic decline in the CDR, the crude
fertility rate (CFR) was still at a high level at about 40-45. Next the transitional
stage(from the early 1960s to the early 1980s) was marked by the most rapid
decline of fertility rate in the world. The CFR decreased from 38.7 of 1961 to 22.6
in 1982, while the TFR from 6.0 to 2.7 persons in the same period. The CDR
declined not as rapidly as the CFR or TFR but with a steady trend to some 6
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persons per thousand by 1982. The most critical causes of the rapid decline in the
fertility rate were the success of the Family Planning Programme on the other
hand)' It was delivered as a part of the Economic Development Five-Year Plan.
The next cause of the decline was a continuous increase in the age at the first
marriage.' 2 Lastly, the post-transitional stage which commenced from 1983 has
been characterised by an accelerated decline in the fertility level. The CFR dropped
drastically to 15.3 by 1988, the TFR to 1.7. As a result the population growth rate
has been decreased to below 1 percent, and eventually reached that of the
developed countries.
There were two points that make Korean demographic experience unique
and different from those of the developed countries. The first thing was rapidity. It
took merely seven decades for Korea to reach to the final stage. Considering the
West spent one and a half centuries on average, it was a surprisingly short time.
The next was its unpredictability. Unlike the experience of the developed countries
of which the fertility rate is stabilised and is foreseeable, it is unforeseeable yet at
which point the Korean fertility level will be stabilised.' 3 The family has changed
in ways parallel with that of the demographic change. That is to say the small size
family has been the result of the demographic change.
The decrease of family size developed through a few stages. First, as
already mentioned in the previous chapter, the average size of the traditional
Korean family was not as big as its strong orientation to the stem family as one
might expect. According to the Family Register (hojk), the average number of
members composing an ordinary household' 4 was quite stable at no more than 4.5
persons during the whole period of Choson society after the 17th century.'5
The statistics increased during the Japanese colonisation to .3 persons on
average, in spite of a slight improvement in socio-economic and hygiene
conditions accompanied by modernisation. The reason the fertility rate stagnated at
a high level was because modemisation policies were believed being not for the
benefit of the ruled but designed to support colonial rule.' 6 As a result, the effect of
modemisation was confined to the minority of the ruling class only. The
modernisation could not bring about an overall change for the whole of the
country. The size of household once again increased very rapidly to 5.71 persons
by 1960, followed by the peak of the Baby Boom after the Civil War (1950 -
1953).
Passing the peak of the early 1 960s, the statistics declined dramatically and
eventually reached less than 4 persons by 1989. It took less than 30 years.(Table
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4.3) Even the regional difference between rural and urban areas has been
dramatically decreased to reverse its course. First, the narrowing of the urbanlrural
gap was caused by migration from rural to urban areas, which was driven by
industrialisation and the economic development policy. In other words the rural has
suffered from depopulation while the urban areas experienced over-population. As
a result the average size of rural households was lessened due to the youths leaving
home. According to FAM89, one out of two rural households lost a member or
more by home-leaving, while three out of eleven in the urban. The reason the rural
population leaving home was to get jobs(61 .6%) or to study(l 8.9%) while the
figures for urbanites were: to find a job(43.9%), army duty(18.3%), or study
(13.7%).
Table 4.3. Average Size Of Ordinary Household
region	 '66	 '70	 '75	 '80	 '85	 '90
whole nation	 5.49	 5.24	 5.04	 4.55	 4.09	 3.71
urban areas	 5.1	 4.9	 4.9	 4.4	 4.0	 3.7
rural areas	 5.7	 5.5	 5.4	 4.7	 4.2	 4.0
source: Census '66 - '90.
On the other hand, the size of households in the whole country showed
other trends. (Table 44, Figure 4.3) It can be summarised into two points. First, the
size of household has been reduced very speedily from 5.71 persons on average in
1960 to 3.71 persons in 1990. That is to say, as many as two persons were reduced
in the course of just one generation. Next, the range of prevalent household size
has been intensively narrowed in contrast to being spread quite broadly in 1960.'
It means social consensus on the small family size was stronger than the idea of the
big family had been in the past.
Table 4.4. Percentage Distribution Of Ordinary Household By Its Size
No. of	 year
members	 '60 (
	
t66	 '70 [
	
'75	 '80 (
	
'85 (
	
'90
total 100.0
	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
1 person	 2.3	 3.6	 3.7	 4.2	 4.8	 7.0	 9.0
2 persons	 7.1	 7.7	 9.3	 8.3	 10.5	 12.4	 13.8
3 persons	 11.8	 11.5	 12.8	 12.3	 14.5	 16.5	 19.1
4 persons	 14.7	 13.9	 15.0	 16.1	 20.3	 25.2	 29.5
5 persons	 15.9	 15.2	 17.0	 18.3	 20.0	 19.3	 18.8
6 persons	 15.3	 15.4	 16.3	 16.6	 14.7	 12.2	 5.9
7 persons	 12.7	 13.1	 12.2	 11.7	 9.7	 4.3	 2.5
8 persons	 8.9	 9.1	 7.3	 7.7	 3.0	 1.9	 0.9
9 persons	 5.3	 5.9	 3.6	 2.5	 1.5	 0.7	 0.3
10 prs & over	 4.5	 4.6	 2.6	 2.3	 1.0	 0.4	 0.2
	
1-2persons	 9.4	 11.3	 13.0	 12.5	 15.3	 19.4	 22.8
	
3-5 persons	 42.4	 40.6	 44.8	 46.7	 54.8	 61.0	 67.4
	
6-9 persons	 42.2	 43.5	 39.4	 38.5	 28.9	 19.4	 9.6
	
10 prs & over
	 6.0	 4.6	 2.6	 2.3	 1.0	 0.4	 0.2
sourc: Lensus pp -
25
20
15
10
5
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re 4.3. Historical Change Of Household Size
percentage distribution
1	 2 3	 4	 5 6	 7 8 9 10 persons
household size
The reason for the trend to a small family and to the socially intensified
consensus on the small family norm, can be traced back to two facts. The first
element was an increase of an average age at marriage. Together with an extension
of education duration and increase of women's participation rate in the labour
market, both women and men felt no need to hurry up marriage. Self-development
was preferred to the reproduction of the next generation. The average age at first
marriage during the period 1912-1932 for men was 22.2 years old and for women
was 19.7 years.' This increased to 24.5 and 20.4 by 1955 and again to 27.8 and
24.8 by 1985. The survey data from FAM89 calculated 28.2 and 25.3 for each sex.
It reduced the fecundible frequency to decrease the feriility rate and led eventually
to the small family. The next element was a successful execution of the Family
Planning programme. This had more to do with a strong consensus on the small
family norm. The population policies in Korea, as already mentioned, began to
appear as a part of economic development planning. With the accession of a new
political leadership in 1961, development planners realised that a high rate of
population growth interfered with the most important national goal to raise per
capita income and to eliminate poverty in the country. Naturally, government
initiated Family Planning policies very resolutely keeping pace with the nation-
wide diffusion of contraceptive measures, with improvement of women's social
status, and with changes of the value on children. Above all, an autonomous
demand from citizens for a small family and their positive participation in the
- family
household
number percentage
di stri b uti on
of family
and
household
20
10
%
30
Chapter Four 129
programme was the most critical factor establishing the small family idea. TFR of
1.6 persons by 1991 reveals a successful march to the small family.
The trend to the small family can be criticised as pseudo. It is true that the
small family household has been over-estimated. The decrease of household size
can not directly be interpreted to the decrease in the family size. Table 4.3 and
Table 4.4 can be the target of criticism. Misleading interpretation arises from the
conceptual gap between the household and the family as already shown in the
Figure 4.1. It is a statistical gap came about in the process of analogising the family
situation by the household. The household misses the information on those leaving
home. If persons who have left home are included as non-familial members of the
inclusive household type (Figure 4.2) over-estimation will be far less statistically.
However reality does not go that way in present day Korea. Many of them occupy
own flats to establish themselves as independent householders instead of entering
into another household. Moreover the deepening idea on the sweet home shows the
high exclusiveness against non-familial members. That is the reason for the
statistical discrepancy between the family size and the household size. That is the
reason for the small family household being counted as more common than it really
was. This criticism was verified by the FAM89 data (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4. The Gap Between The Distribution Of Household Size
And Family Size
1	 2 3 1 5 6 7 8 9 10 persons
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The dotted line was made of the statistics in which whole of family members is
included, whether still at home or not. That is to say, it is calculated by adding in
all the people who had left home for other purposes than marriage and by
excluding non-familial members. The solid line encompasses just the current
number of household members excluding the members who left home temporarily.
As shown in the figure the percentages of the small size household (1-3 persons per
household) increased, while those in the large households (4-10 persons per
household) decreased. It means that most of those leaving home from a large
family established a small size household alone or with a couple of other persons.
Concretely if the small sized family is over-estimated, the big sized family is
under-estimated. To say there are less small-sized households than they are
analysed superficially. That is one of the reasons why the criticism of the statistics
on the small family have got a good point. In spite of all this criticism against the
mis-estimation we still can not reject the irresistible trend to a small family in
absolute numbers as already shown in the Table 4.4.
Table 4.5. The Change Of Ideal Number Of Children And The Total Fertility
Rate
	
'58	 '65	 '71	 '76	 '81	 '85 FAM89
No. of children	 4.4	 3.9	 3.7	 2.8	 2.5	 2.0	 1.9
(No. of son)	 -	 (2.4)	 (2.2)	 (1.7)	 (1.5)	 (1.0)	 -
TFR	 6.0	 4.6	 4.3	 3.1	 2.5	 1.7	 -
source: KPH, National Family Health and Family Survey
- unavailable
It is supported even by a small family norm and fertility rates as surveyed by KIPH
(Korea Institute for Population and Health Affairs) during the last three decades.'8
(Table 4.5) As shown on the table, women like to have no more than two children
and no longer have the son-preference idea that was a chronic cause of high level
fertility rates. The norm of 'three boys and two girls' at the early 60s shifted to 'two
boys and a girl' during 1970s, and again to 'a boy and a girl' by the middle of 80s.
Responding to the value change, the fertility rates that is a crucial indicator of
family size has drastically decreased to mark even below two children. To sum up
in spite of the slightly unreasonable statistics by analogy with household, it is not
difficult to conclude that present day Korea has achieved a small family by casting
off son-preference idea.
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4.3. THE MODIFIED STEM FAMILY PRINCIPLE
4.3.1. Decrease In Stem Family Households
The demographic transition has been associated not only with a decrease of
family size but also with the shift from the stem family of settled peasant societies
to the more mobile and residentially separate nuclear family which is more
responsive to the employment opportunities of an industrially developing and
urbanising society. R. M. Maclver's classical statement of the loss of family
functions and decline of the extended family as the dominant social institution with
the emergence of modern society' 9 was more systematically developed by Parsons
who stressed the functional adaptation of the nuclear family to modem industrial
society.2° Goode summarised evidence up to that date for the move toward more
nucleated families in societies undergoing the early stages of industrialisation in
his World Revolution and Family Pattern21 . W. E. Moore too identified the link
between industrialisation and the emergence of the conjugal family unit as the
functionally apposite form:
"Strong emphasis on the bonds of lineage, the consanguine principle
of familial organisation, is clearly inconsistent with individual
mobility or merit. The separation of small family units, and
especially the probability that young adults will seek new
employments in new locations as industrialisation proceeds, provide
both a spatial and a social foundation for the appearance of the
conjugal family with its emphasis on the marital unit and its
immature children"22
While for Moore the link between modernisation and the small family unit was one
of functional convergence rather than one of necessity, 23 ' he clearly implies a
degree of causality, as does Smelser, in accounting for the structural aifferentiation
of the family unit in the wider process of modernisation.24
 And reviewing British
trends in his excellent study The Family and Industrial Society, Harris concluded:
"The 'extended family' household as a national phenomenon
(however important in certain localities), would appear to be
virtually extinct; and the elementary family household now also
appears to be shrinking to its nuclear core" 25
Vogel, on the other hand, writing of Japan has argued that industrialisation
tends to strengthen rather than weaken the links of solidarity in the extended
family.26
 And, though he suggests it may be different in Korea, in his study of
economic development and kinship links in Hong Kong families, Worig has
Chapter Four 132
concluded that in 'entrepreneurial familism' strong extended family connections
may be highly adaptive in the process of industrial and commercial development.27
On the other hand Greenfield, Nimkoff and Middleton, Laslett and
Macfarlane have all shown that the nuclear family unit is not uniquely a product of
industrialisation but was found in many pre-industrial societies in many different
parts of the world. Hunters and gatherers mostly have lived in elementary family
groups. 28
 And in England and Northern Europe at least, there appears never to have
been a pre-industrial predominance of stem-family households, while highly
individuated nuclear families have always been the norm, statistically and
culturally, for as far back as direct and indirect evidence will take us. Laslett, for
example, found only ten per cent of households in England from the sixteenth to
the early nineteenth century contained kin outside the nuclear family.29
We should not exaggerate the changes consequent of modernisation, firstly
because the traditional household was on average not large, and secondly because,
in spite of the vastly changed socio-economic and political circumstances of
present-day Korea, many cultural assumptions relating to relationships within the
family persist.
The traditional Korean family closely followed the rule of patrilineal
primogeniture(chongb5p). Eldest sons married and remained in their father's
households(chong-ga-chib: pon-ga) while, on marriage, younger brothers
established households of their own(pun-ga). While these formed the majority of
family households, ideally each in turn would become the focus of a new stem
family(pon-ga). This ideal played a powerful role in the culture of Choson society
wider than its key place in the family value system. However as a majority of
households at any one time had not reached this ideal state, even in the nineteenth
century two-thirds of all households consisted of nuclear families only and less
than 27 per cent contained stem families. 30 Throughout the Choson period, from
the seventeenth century to the late nineteenth, according to the Family
Register(hojok) the average membership of ordinary households remained at about
4.3 persons. This furthermore included household slaves in more than a quarter of
households in the seventeenth century and more than one in three in the later
nineteenth century when early industrial and commercial developments improved
the economic circumstances of some entrepreneurial families and the practice
formerly limited to the landowning class (yangban) spread more widely.3132
While changes in household size and family life in general should not be
exaggerated as far as most ordinary Korean families are concerned, nevertheless
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there has been a very remarkable reduction in the proportion of large family
households notably in the last fifteen years or so after the mid 1970s. The nuclear
family household has proportionately increased in inverse ratio to a decrease in the
stem family household. Table 4.6 shows exactly what happened in the last three
decades.
Table 4.6. Percentage Distribution Of Each Family Pattern
1960	 1966	 1970
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
1 generational family household;
total	 5.4	 5.5	 5.8
	A	 4.5	 4.4
	
B	 0.3	 1.3
	
C	 0.8	 #
2 generational family household;
total	 64.0	 66.1	 70.0
	
D	 52.9	 55.5
	E	 2.0	 2.0
	
F	 0.7	 10.6
	
G	 7.2
	
H	 0.6	 0.6
	
I	 0.8	 0.8
	
J	 1.9	 0.6
3 generational family household;
total	 26.9	 23.5	 22.1
	
K	 6.7	 5.1
	L	 12.7	 12.3
	
M	 4.1	 4.7
	
1975	 1980	 1986
	
100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
100.0
6.5	 8.3	 9.6
	
10.7
	
4.8	 6.0	 7.1
	
8.3
	
1.7	 2.3	 2.5
	
2.4
	
#	 #	 #
	
#
68.9
	
68.5
	
67.0
	
66.3
	
53.2
	 53.0	 52.8	 51.9
	
2.1
	
2.3
	 2.3
	
1.7
	
9.7
	
9.3
	
8.9
	
7.8
	
0.1
	
0.1	 0.2
	
0.2
	
0.4
	
0.4
	
0.5
	
0.6
	
3.4
	
3.3
	
2.3
	
4.0
19.2	 16.5	 14.4	 12.2
	
2.0	 1.9	 1.9	 1.7
	
8.5	 7.9	 7.2	 6.7
	
8.8	 6.7	 5.4	 3.8
4gen	 1.6	 *	 1.1	 0.9	 0.5	 0.4	 0.3
fam
non-fam	 2.1	 2.6	 1.0	 1.2	 1.5	 1.7	 1.5
single	 2.3	 %	 4.2	 4.8	 6.9	 9.0
Abbreviation; gen: generational type, fam: family pattern, A: couple, B: couple + brother/sister, C:
other one generational family, D: couple + children, E: couple + children + brother! sister, F: father
+ children, G: mother + children, H: cou,ple + parents, I: couple + a parent, J: other two
generational family, K: couple + children + parents, L: couple + children + a parent, M: other three
generational family, 4 & over: families composed of four generations or more,
#: calculated to add to B; @ to F; * to K
%: included in the 1st generational household
Source: Census 60 - 85
The extended family including both the stem and the collateral family,
which accounted for 30.3 percent of cases in the later 19th century (Table 3.4 of
Chapter 3), remained relatively stable until 1960. From the early 1960s when the
first Five-Year Economic Development programme was commenced, the
proportion of extended family households began to fall rapidly. The extended type
due to its size, was unsuitable in the process of industrialisationlurbanisation that
requires high mobility. The small family pattern was the convenient alternative to
accommodate with regional job mobility. In the two and half decades from 1966 to
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1990, as shown in the Table 4.6, the extended family type (H, I, K, L, M, 4 & over)
declined more than 10 percent to 13.3 percent. Among them the one(K) that was
believed to be the ideal type of the stem family accounted for just 1.7 per cent by
1990. However strong social nostalgia for the stem family may be said to be, it is
hardly possible to describe present-day Korea in such terms with that small
proportion of cases.
The nuclear family type (A, B, C, D, E, F, G), does not show as high rate of
change as the extended family household did but has maintained steadily, with a bit
of fluctuation, a high ratio of some 74 per cent on average since 1970. Of course,
this does not mean every type of nuclear family pattern kept on rising. In case of A
or B types in which the composing members are very young and are small in size,
it has increased dramatically. However, other types like D, E, F, G that are larger in
size and are including members of older. ae than those of the A and B types
showed some fluctuation. The D type, regarded as an ideal type in the West, even
shows a slight decline after attaining a peak in 1970. However, it is important to
give attention to the absolute number of nuclear family household. Whether its
philosophy be exactly the same as in the West or not, a society can hardly be
labelled a nuclear family society unless it has a moderate amount of the nuclear
family pattern. 72.1 per cent by 1990 is more than that.
However, there still remains some questions both on the breakdown of the
stem family and on the emergence of the nuclear family. As already mentioned, the
family situation does not exactly coincide with change of the household. The
decrease of family size does not coincide with the increase of the nuclear family. It
is because the family is characterised by its social and emotional ties among its
constituents which is invisible through household observation. Therefore questions
arise. Has the Korean family really gone far away from the traditional structure?
Do the statistics show just superficial and external changes or do they represent a
more fundamental transition of inner dynamism?
When traditional Korea was characterised by the stem family structure, it
did not mean just the statistical prevalence of that household types. Its
primogeniture principle of family composition with parents, eldest son and their
spouses, and the grandchildren of the eldest son was the point. It was almost
impossible for the eldest son to establish an independent family of procreation(pun-
ga) away from his family of orientation(pon-ga). It was disapproved of socially
and even by the law to prevent unfilial impiety toward parents. This tradition
seemed to have drastically declined if we look at Table 4.7 calculated by familial
Chapter Four 135
status of householders. Just about two out of seven eldest sons are serving their
own parents. With these numbers, it is hardly possible to argue that Korea today
retains the stem family culture. In addition, even there are extraordinary patterns of
co-residence being ill-matched to the primogeniture principle. Other sons or
daughters than the eldest one living with their parents was socially disgraced in the
past. Both the children and parents were said to wash their dirty linen in public
when the parents lived alone or with other children than the eldest son. The same
family situation applies to the householders who have married children. Among
228 householders who had the children married, two out of three are living alone
without being served from any married children. 33 In sum, the primogeniture
principle of the traditional stem family appears being dismissed judged from the
above data.34
Table 4.7. Percentage Co-residing With Parents
By The Family Status Of The Householder
family status total number householder 	 householder	 percentage
of	 of	 whose	 co-residing	 co-residing
householder	 householder	 parents alive with	 with parents
(A)	 parents(B)	 ((B/A)* 100)
total	 2,923	 1,873	 286	 15.3
1st son	 1,173	 765	 224	 29.3
other son	 1,360	 860	 57	 6.6
daughter	 390	 158	 5	 3.2
source: FAM89 (The total number of household 2,923 is the statistics calculated by extracting
unanswered households about the questions.)
Table 4.8. Percentage Distribution Sharing/Shared a Residence with
Parents-in-law by Interviewee's Characteristics
total	 codwelling*
	
independent
	
lastingly	 temporarily
total	 100.0	 31.2	 22.3	 46.5
family status of husband among his brothers;
	
the eldest	 100.0	 46.0	 23.9	 30.1
	the only	 100.0	 62.5	 12.6	 25.0
	the rest	 100.0	 16.0	 21.8	 62.3
age cohort of the intetviewee women;
	
- 29	 100.0	 17.3	 17.3	 65.4
	
30 - 39	 100.0	 16.3	 27.4	 56.3
	
40-49	 100.0	 33.7	 24.5	 41.8
	
50 - 59	 100.0	 49.6	 22.4	 28.0
	
60+	 100.0	 61.1	 15.8	 23.9
source: FAMS9
*: lastingly; lived with parents-in-law from the time of marriage until now! the death of them
temporarily; does not co-reside with them at the moment but did in the past
#: the North or a foreign country
Another Table 4.8., however, affords quite a different interpretation of the
transition. Both of them are telling a truth in the end. The differences of the two
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tables are; firstly, the previous one included householders regardless of their
marital status, the Table 4.8 is based on married women. Next, the former produced
data from the current point of time, while the Table 4.6 scans the whole of the past
life span of the interviewee. If the former Table 4.6 in some way shows a
superficial change of the stem family, the next Table 4.8 allows us to look more
dynamically and even more exactly at change over time.
Table 4.8 calculates more than one out of two Korean women are living or
once lived together with their parents-in-law, which denotes a higher degree of the
tradition than the previous table did. The figures increase tremendously if their
husbands were the eldest or the only son. This pattern is more common in rural
areas than in urban. The primogeniture principle seems to have remained still
strong. Of course it depen.ds on which age group a woman belongs to. The more
older, the longer and the more of them share a same roof with parents-in-laws
whilst just one out three of the youngest women are living or once lived together
with their parents-in-law. There are some more variables that affect co-residence.
(Table 4.9)
Table 4.9. Correlation Coefficient Between The Co-dwelling Wth
Parents-in-law And Socio-DemoraDhica1 Characteristics
	(1=the eldest, the only, 0=others) 	 0.219	 0.270
age of interviewee women
	
(1= -29, 2=30-39, 3=40-49, 4=50+)	 0.240	 0.239
employment of interviewee women
	
(1 =employed, 0=unemployed) 	 0.239	 0.017
economic level of the household
	
(1=low, 2high)	 0.247	 0.3 13
educational level of interviewee women
	
(1=none, 2=6years, 3=9years, 4=l2years) 	 - 0.230	 - 0.276
p<o.o1
First, it depends on the economic conditions of the parents-in-law. For example if
parents-in-law have enough money to arrange a moderate size of house equipped
with many rooms and enough space to fit a large family, it is easier to co-reside
with each other. At the same time, the interviewee's occupational career has a
significant influence on the pattern of family. 35 For a dual career woman, child-care
has been the most serious factor that makes her stop working outside the home.
Traditionally strong enthusiasm for education and child rearing has made her so
reluctant in continuing her job. She could not easily take her children to a baby-
sitter or to a nursery. She is recognised as being an insincere mother even now.
Worse than this even the number of them was not enough to meet the need. The
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alternative was the unemployed grandparents. A stem family therefore was thought
a moderate alternative for a woman going out to work. They could continue
working by handing over their role to co-dwelling parents-in-law. Lastly, the level
of women's education had a negative effect on co-dwelling. 36 The more educated a
daughter-in-law was, the more deeply she preferred the independent life free from
any interference of any person except her own family of procreation. By the
concept of sweet home, the parents-in-law were mostly excluded from her home.
The more greatly the parents-in-law were aware of the different way of life from
their daughter-in-law the more they felt even an anxiety about sharing residence
with a well educated daughter-in-law.
A great demand on the nuclear family replaced the weakness of the stem
family principle. The demand was mainly rooted in the increase in the
individualism being impacted from the Western way of life. Urbanisation followed
by the high migration became a timely excuse to ask for a nuclear pattern of family
life. Of course there has been an effort to retain the traditional principle of the stem
family but with a greater flexibility. First Koreans transformed the duration of co-
residence. Once a woman was married to the eldest son of a family, conventionally,
she was supposed to live with them until her parents-in-law passed away. The
duration of co-residence was modified to meet the need from both generations.
Newly wed couples were individualistic and looking for an independent life on the
one hand. The elder generation was feeling a generational gap and even uneasiness
to stay long with a well educated but incompatible daughter-in-law. For example,
she was allowed to be independent after a relatively short period of adaptation to
her husband's family of orientation and to its family customs and so on. It generally
took several months or a few years or sometimes several years. She was allowed to
have her flat, to create her own way of life domestically or socially without
interference from her parents-in-law. However she was supposed to reunite with
them when they are in need: in case either one of them should be seriously ill ot if
a partner of them passed away. In addition there is another case of family reunion.
As already mentioned a daughter-in-law herself likes to live with her parents-in-
law to get their help in taking care of children during her time out at work. While
there has been the other adaptation of the stem family principle, traditionally
primogeniture meant that no parents and no married eldest son dared to think of
setting up an independent household. With growing egalitarianism associated with
the decrease of the (eldest) son preference idea. filial piety was thought not only a
matter of the eldest son but also applied to the rest of the sons as well. The change
was concomitant with the successful Family Planning programme and with the
change in the family law on inheritance. If co-residence with a parent was thought
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both a duty and a privilege of the eldest son in the traditional family, this idea
expanded to include the rest of sons in the present-day Korea. As a result co-
residence with parents-in-law, whether on a temporary or lasting base, was applied
to daughters-in-law married to non-eldest sons and was even sought by them for
their own benefit.
To conclude, the nuclear pattern households are prevalent in present day
Korea, however it has not brought about breakdown of the stem family. There is
still a strong tendency in Korea to retain the stem family culture. Of course the
working principle for this trend has not been limited to the eldest son only but has
expanded to include the rest of the sons as well.
4.3.2. Changes In Family Membership
The family group is composed basically of close relatives. That is to say,
the family members are composed generally of couples, parents, children, brothers,
sisters, grandparents, or grandchildren etc. who have been recognised as the most
immediate. As far as the family is the group of near relatives based on emotional
solidarity, it is hardly possible to have remote relatives as family members. Even if
that may be a case in chance, it is only when there are no other nearer relatives.
However, membership networks have changed reflecting the changes in the
household types. In this section three things are going to be discussed: who are the
close relatives composing a family: who are standing on the marginal area of the
family: and what is the change in the membership by period and how it is different
by region.
One problem which arises in examining the boundary of the family
membership is that person's position in a family is very relativistic depending by
whom s/he is viewed. Assuming a three generational family composed of
grandparents, couples, and their children, the family can be categorised having no
children if it was described from the point of view of children. Or it can be
categorised as the family of no parents and no grandparents from that of parents or
grandfather. As a result it is all too easy to miscalculate the closeness or
remoteness of membership. In spite of the ambiguous character of membership
definition, it does not mean the analysis impossible. Should it be examined from
the viewpoint of householder, such problems lessen. In traditional socIety the
householdership was ascribed, by law and by custom, to the eldest male or vith a
rare exception to the eldest female. He was householder both defacto and in ntme
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Whilst, in present day Korea, householdership is not prescribed in law but is likely
achieved by breadearning. Anybody can be a householder by report. However, it is
still rare for a female to register as the householder unless she is widowed.37
Modem or traditional, one thing has been quite common, the householder whoever
s/he is, takes the central position in determining family affairs. S/He was still
powerful in setting the boundary of the family membership whether that power was
ascribed or achieved by economic contribution in the family. To sum up, in spite of
the ambiguity of membership definition among family members, it seems
reasonable to have the householder as the criterion of membership positioning
because s/he mostly has the final power to decide the boundary of family
membership.
Table 4.10 is showing the ratio of each member to 100 householders. As
shown in the table, the boundary of family membership has changed very
drastically.38 Compared to the family boundary of 1955, the range of family
networks has sharply narrowed. Even the density of the relationship among
members has fallen. It is most distinguishable among patrilateral members both in
direct and in collateral lines. While family members in the matrilateral line and
wife's relatives have increased very slightly. Greatest decline is evident in rural
areas.
Firstly among members in patrilateral direct line, the ratio of spouses has
slightly increased reflecting rise of life expectancy of men (from 54.1 years in 1940
to 66.9 in 1989). Child ratio was the most notably decreased denoting the small
family norm influenced by the successful Family Planning programme launched
from 1 960s. The decline in the ratio of daughters-in-law, grandchildren, parents, or
grandparents was brought about by the relaxation of the stem family principle,39
and by the expansion of individualism 40 or preference for conjugal family life
among the younger generations. For fathers the change seems statistically
insignificant. However, considering the rise of the average life span of Korean
men, the actual size of change is not small. Considering the ratio of fathers 25 in
193441 , the older men's position in the family seems far more marginalised.
Mothers' positioning is not exceptional from this trend. Even though statistics
indicate many more mothers than fathers this reflects just higher rate of average life
span for women to men(66.9 years for of males compared with 75 for females by
1989).
The weakening of patrilateral kin is found again among collaterals.
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Table 4.10. Ratio Of Each Family Member To 100 Householders
relation to householder	 I	 1955	 1	 FAM8
householder	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
patrilateral direct line;
	
total	 389	 360	 400	 260	 263	 256
	spouse	 79	 76	 80	 81	 81	 81
	
child	 242	 238	 244	 158	 164	 144
	
spouse ofa child 	 17	 10	 19	 3	 3	 4
	
grandchild	 30	 19	 34	 8	 6	 12
	
spouse of a grandchild	 *	 *	 *	 -	 -	 -
	
grand-grandson	 ''	 *	 1	 -	 -	 -
	
spouse of a grand-grandson 	 -	 -	 -	 *	 *	 -
	
father	 3	 3	 3	 2	 2	 3
	
mother	 17	 13	 18	 8	 7	 11
	
grandparents	 1	 1	 1	 *	 *	 1
patrilateral collaterals;
	
total	 23	 17	 23	 6	 7	 2
	
brother(A)	 9	 8	 9	 3	 3	 2
	
sister(B)	 7	 6	 7	 2	 3	 *
	
spouseofAlB	 2	 *	 3	 *	 *	 -
	
child of a brother(C)	 5	 5	 4	 1	 1	 *
	
child of a sister	 -	 -	 -	 *	 *	 -
	
father's brother/sister(D)	 *	 *	 *	 -	 -	 -
	
spouse ofD
	
*	 -	 *	 -	 -	 -
	
child of D (E)
	
*	 *	 *	 *	 *	 -
	
spouse ofE	 *	 -	 *	 -	 -	 -
	
grandchild of a brother	 *	 -	 *	 -	 -	 -
matrilateral kin;
	
grandmother of mother	 -	 -	 -	 *	 *	 -
	
child of mother's sister	 -	 -	 -	 *	 *	 -
	
child of mother's brother	 -	 -	 -	 *	 *	 -
wife's relatives;
	
father-in-law	 -	 -	 -	 *	 *	 *
	
mother-in-law	 *	 *	 *	 1	 1	 1
	
brother/sister-in-law(F) 	 *	 *	 *	 1	 1	 1
	
spouse ofF
	 -	 -	
-	 *	 *	 *
	
childofF	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
W: whole country, U: urban area, R: rural area,
* less than one person, - no one
source: '55; 1/1,000 abstracted data from Census'55 in SKF,p.58.
According to the 1934 survey, uncles or aunts and their families averaged 11
persons, however they had totally disappeared by 1989. The same applies to
brothers and sisters and their families. The further the degree of consanguinity and
the more remote the generation goes, the more their place has been marginalised
and eventually it has disappeared. Collateral relatives were once welcomed as
fanning hands in traditional society. However, they are perceived as unwanted by
present day urban housewives and economically burdensome to salarymen's
housekeeping, sometimes disturbing couples having a sweet time, or couple's own
family dining out.
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If most of the patrilateral household members have become marginalised or
even excluded from their conventional network, there is a group of persons who
newly gained their membership. The members in the maternal line and of the wife's
relatives are those. They have become accepted as close family members. The trend
denotes a rise of women's voice, particularly from wife side rather than mother
side. It is thanks to the progress of women's status inside and outside family. She
raised her voice loudly to husband, "If your parents are my parents, my parents are
your parents as well." Under the traditional atmosphere the daughter-in-law was
expected to call her parents-in-law 'parents' and to serve them as her own parents,
the reverse was unaccepted. A son-in-law was disgraced if he called his parents-in-
law 'parents.' Both of them were expected to behave as the best guest to each other.
Even if the parents-in-law had no one to serve them and even if they were in severe
need of health care, they would not be expected to be a family member of the son-
in-law. Now the taboo of being the wife's relatives has gone. The statistics on the
ratio of them will increase in the future. However, it is unlikely to see statistics
increased far over that of householder's parents or brothers and sisters. There are
too widely spread preference to conjugal family or to individualism among young
generation to be the statistics increased. That is to say the matrifatera fines would
be stronger than ever before but not as strong as the patrilateral lines are at the
moment.
On the regional level it has been believed that traditional trails have been
more persistant in rural areas than in orban ones. The myth was disproved by the
statistics of FAM89. This theory was plausible until the 1950s as shown in Table
4.10. The boundary of close relatives in patriarchal lines in rural areas was wider
than that in urban areas. The degree of the network intensity was far higher,
particularly among those in patriarchal direct line. Yet such trends changed quite
drastically except in few cases. Of course the intensity of the network between
grandchildren or parents which has been an element for the three generational
family, maintains a strong existence, in a relative sense, in the rural areas.
However, on being looked at more closely, almost two thirds of them are coming
from abnormal pattern of family of no intermediate generation. 42 The generation
moved to cities to earn money. It was an unwilling choice, and might diminish very
quickly as soon as the generation organise themselves for city life. Except for this
case, the boundary of the close relative has been narrowed greatly among families
in the rural areas. Figure 4.5 shows the change very realistically.
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Figure 4.5. Family Tree By Region
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To conclude, the change in the family membership reflects infusion of
individualism and weakness of the stem principle among younger generations. It
was an inescapable result of the high mobility caused by socio-economic
development. The actual family members under the same roof have become
couples and children, that is to say the conjugal family type. Even the intensity to
the marginal members has been thinner than ever before particularly in the rural
areas. However it is another thing to examine the actual density of emotional,
physical, and socio-economic relationship to the conventional members who once
shared the same roof. It may be possible to continue strong patriarchal relationship
not as family members but as just relatives. It sounds plausible considering the
modern condition that requires a high level of regional mobility. The physical
instability can provoke a homing instinct or identity consciousness among the
migrants. Of course the author has no intention to deny even some degree of
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weakening of membership consciousness caused by regional mobility, or
redistribution of membership by feminist voice. There is a striking clue about the
weakness of the family consciousness. To an open question of FAM86, who are
your close family members, just 10 per cent of the interviewee women answered
parents-in-law. Looked at in detail, one out of two housewives from three
generational families, and just one out of seven housewives whose parents-in-law
are still alive, included the parents-in-low in the family membership. It denotes that
most of parents have been marginalised from their conventionally strong position
in the family. In spite of these, it is more likely that they would keep on
communication among themselves in modified forms, directly or indirectly, and
socio-economically or emotionally.
4.4. NON-IDEAL TYPICAL PATTERNS
Defining Korean family pattern gives rise to many difficulties. First the
dichotomy between the stem family and the nuclear one remains as it was. As
already discussed, there is an ambiguity in defining the present-day situation in
Korea. The absolute number of the stem family as the ideal type is too scarce to
distinguish present-day Korea in those terms. However, if we want to say that
Korean society is taking on a nuclear family structure we must also point out that
the stem family tradition still exists and is of significance. The argument that the
stem family structure is under going a change towards the nuclear one, is a
superficial one. As shown in Table 4.6 (D type), the typical nuclear family
composed of couples and children, has from the early 1970s declined in spite of
very slow tempo. Rather there has been an increase in households that do not fit
any ideal type such as one person households and extraordinary patterns that
deviate either from the nuclear family or from the stem family. 43 Basically, current
Korean family patterns are characterised by a complexity or an ambiguity which
does not fit any one ideal typical form.
4.4.1. One Person Households
The one person household is one of the current family situations that have
brought about suspicion of the existing family framework. A family can not consist
of one person. The one person household was traditionally deeply despised of
being a changdolbaeng-i (an itinerant market dealer) or was analogised of a
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humble floating weed. The reason was due to the strong enthusiasm for the family
life. That is to say that the family was the most important homing place and source
of identification. Naturally the number of the one person households was very tiny
in the past. However, as shown in Table 4.11, single person households have
increased very steadily and rapidly both in absolute numbers and in proportion as
well. According to Census data, the proportion reached 9 percent by 1990. The
only exception was the year 1955 when hundreds of thousands refugees from the
North moved mainly to cities in the South during the Civil War and have not yet
settled down. Most of them fled from the communists by themselves or
accompanied by just a part of their family. 45 They never thought the partition
would be forever and that was the reason for the high rate of one person
households. Except for the year after the historical disaster, the table shows two
trends. Firstly the single household increased steadily until 1985 but swelled
explosively from then on. Secondly, the proportion of the single household began
to surpass that of urban areas from 1980.
Table 4.11. The Growth Of Single Household
year	 7 total No. of	 proportion to total household(%)
oneperson ________________________________________
household	 whole	 urban areas	 rural areas
country
1960	 100,168	 2.30	 2.36	 2.26
1966	 182,040	 2.32	 2.83	 2.04
1970	 216,706	 3.74	 #	 #
1975	 281,077	 4.23	 4.52	 3.07
1980	 382,743	 4.80	 4.71	 4.93
1985	 674,440	 7.04	 6.75	 7.20
1990	 9.00	 8.55	 10.3
source: Census 60 - 90.	 # data unavailable
The increase in single households during the 20 years between 1960 and
1980 has a close relationship with the rural migration to the urban areas.
Urbanisation was driven mainly by the National Economic Development
programme which began in 1962. Among the migrants, over 4 persons out of 10
rural persons moved to the cities to get a job, one out of three to re-join a
householder or household members who had already moved ahead of them to get a
job in an urban area.46 In addition one out of six rural youths migrated for
education in the cities.47 The steady increase of single households almost
proportionately reflects the growth of rural migrants who left their families to get a
job or to do study in the city.
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Coming into the 1 980s, an unusual phase of migration began. Inter-city
migration increased while rural-urban moves declined in relative terms. 48 The
primary cause of the change in the direction of migration was education. One out
of three persons moved from city to city or from town to city to have more
opportunity for education. This reflects a reaction of citizens to the educational
reform policy of 1980 for a standardisation of educational opportunity. The policy
aimed at the abolition of private tutoring that had been one of the most
controversial issues in education. Enthusiasm for education coupled with a feverish
rush to the so-called "first-rate' universities precipitated the widespread practice of
private tutoring. The practice resulted in a financial burden for parents, undermined
normal school education, and even caused stratification conflicts among citizens.
The government proclaimed a legal ban on private tutoring and changed the college
entrance system. It administered a state examination for all high school graduates
wishing to advance to colleges or universities after l98l. The scores in this
uniform written test and in high school records are combined to determine the
qualifications of a student to enter a certain college or university. The new system
prohibits individual colleges and universities from conducting their own entrance
examinations. However, the reform policy could not crush the enthusiasm for
education. Driven by parents obsessed with finding "first-rate" schooling, moved to
other districts or cities to change from one school to another with a high reputation
in the state examination. That was the reason the 1 980s showed a steep increase in
single households and inter-city migration.
Next, the increase in the proportion of rural single households so as to
outstrip that in urban areas reveals the side-effect of the huge migration which
occurred during the last three decades. First of all, contrary to the trend in the urban
area, the increased proportion of single households does not mean an actual growth
in its absolute numbers but only a relative increase as a result of the absolute
decrease of ordinary households which moved to join a family member already
settled in a city. Accordingly the characteristics of single households differ by
region. As shown in Table 4.12, urban areas have mainly the unmarried single
household while rural areas disorganised single household.
Table 4.12. Percentage Distribution of Each Single Household by Region
region	 total No of	 unmarried	 disorganised
household	 real No. I	 real No. I	 00
whole	 3,400	 156	 4.6	 8	 2.5
urban	 2,328	 119	 5.1	 35	 1.5
rural	 1,072	 37	 3.4	 44	 4.1
source: FAM86
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If the former is the pattern of initial stage of the nuclear family cycle, the latter is
the last stage, that is to say a disorganised pattern of the nuclear family. Concretely
if the former is composed of younger population, the latter consists of persons who
were once married but are alone at the moment either as a result of divorce or the
death of a partner. As a matter of fact this mostly results from the death of a
partner, and naturally have a quite old age structure (mean age 64.0 years) arid
consist mainly of women (sex ratio 20). Those in urban areas are mixed including
those resulting from both the death of a partner and from divorce and have a
relatively young age structure (mean age 45.6) and more balanced sex structure
(sex ratio 66) compared to those of rural areas. On the other hand unlike the
distribution of the disorganised pattern, the unmarried single households
encompass a wider range of age cohorts and include more women in urban areas.
This is reversed in rural areas (sex ratio 82.0 in the urban, 92.3 in the rural, mean
age 23 in urban 22 in rural).
It is possible that some of the single households, either unmarried
households or disorganised ones, might re-join their family of orientation or
establish their own family of procreation reducing the overall numbers. However it
is more likely that single households will increase. 50 There are two points which
allows the anticipation plausible; the acceleration of regional migration and the
growth of individualism. First, regional migration is unlikely to decline but is more
likely to remain at least at the same level. In the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1987-1991)
the government declared a target for a stabilisation of economic growth and re-
shaping of the industrial structure to increase the balance of development between
regions, and to improve the overall standard of living. However, the primary stress
was still on economic development not on the redistribution of the economic gains
or on welfare. For example, the economy wasexpecfed tci grow at an.average rate
of 8.2 percent in real GNP. Accordingly, whichever kind of restructuring the future
industry undertook, society basically requires the continuous mobilisation of
human resources. This might cause an acceleration of regional migration. There
might be two different phenomena in the migration trend. First it might not be an
uni-directional move from the rural to cities as it was before. Instead it would be
multi-directional: from city to city, to the rural areas, or overseas as well as from
rural areas to the cities. It depends on government policy on the regional
distribution of fmancial investment either by private companies or by
governmental ones. Next, the average age of the migrants would slightly increase
due to an active participation of householders following moves by their company.
This is contrasted to the previous migrants being mostly rural young age groups to
get a new job in a city. To sum up it is natural that the single household will
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increase in response to a growth of regional migration unless the government gives
up its development policy or unless it deliver sincerely an agriculture foster policy.
Another factor that might increase the growth of single households is an
expansion of individualism based on affluence and late marriage. 51
 First the
individualistic atmosphere can drive some minor groups to the household
multiplication. Returning back to Table 4.6, the non-familial household of which
the each constituents are non-familial members and C, J, M type of family in which
a portion of non-familial members are comprised can be a primary target of
household fission. The main reason they have shared the same flatlroom or being a
non-familial member to a family so far was to save expenses on rent or living
expenses. If the economic condition gets better, there is no reason to share a private
space and no reason to accept infringement of private life. It means that about one
out of ten ordinary household would split to multiply the number of one person
household. In addition this might be reflected more dramatically in statistics by the
delay of the marriage among young generations.
To sum up, the growth of single households looks inevitable in the 1 990s.
Of course it is too early yet to analogise weakness of family consciousness with the
increase of one person household. Rather it has been due more to the unreasonable
economic policies causing a huge migration. Simply it is enough to recognise that
the single households are and they have become stable as an alternative in the way
of life apart from the family domain. That is to say we should probably allow an
independent identity to that type neither as a nuclear family type nor as an
abnormal and temporary pattern.
4.4.2. Extraordinary Patterns
No mature theory is likely to cover every individual instance. The more the
unexplained portionsgrow, as Kuhn suggests, the more a given theory is under a
threat of scientific switch-over to another. 52 There is a similar problem in
describing the Korean family pattern. In other words, there are many exceptions
that fit neither to nuclear family nor to the stem family pattern. Beside the single
household, there have been various kinds of family patterns once unusual but no
longer at the moment. Those are the household composed just of a mother and
children, of a father and children, of a grand-parent and grand-children, of a couple
with brothers/sisters, or of four generational families depriving of intermediate
generation(s) etc. These are no longer a negligible amount. Table 4.13 that is
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abstracted and re-mapped from Table 4.6 shows a trend away from the ideal type
pattern. Pivoting at 1970, ideal typical family patterns have kept level at below 55
percent and were in decline inspite being very slow and steady. The transitory type
is the one under a change either to an ideal typical family household or to non-ideal
ones sooner or later, and is fluctuating. Examples of the transitory type would
include a household consisting of a couple only whether it be a young couple
household or an empty nest, of a couple and a parentlparents, or of a couple,
children, and a single parent etc.
Table 4.13. Percentage Distribution Of Ideal Type
And Non-ideal Type Of Family
family type	 '66	 '70	 '75	 '80	 '85
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
ideal type	 59.6	 60.6	 55.2	 54.9	 54.7
	
nuclear family
	
52.9	 55.5	 53.2	 53.0	 52.8
	
stem family	 6.7	 5.1	 2.0	 1.9	 1.9
transitory	 18.6	 19.1	 13.8	 14.4	 15.0
non-ideal type
	 21.9	 20.3	 31.0	 30.7	 30.4
	
single household	 2.3	 -	 4.2	 4.8	 6.9
	
collateral family	 2.3	 3.3	 4.0	 4.6	 4.8
	
single parent fam	 7.9	 10.6	 9.7	 9.3	 8.9
	
others	 9.4	 6.4	 13.1	 12.0	 9.8
source: Census '66 - '85
The non-ideal typical patterns include households encompassing the
brother/sister of the householder, the single parent household, three generational
family households with none of second generation couple, or a household
embracing relatives who never thought to be stemlnuclear family members such as
matrilineal relatives or relatives by marriage etc. These non-ideal typical families
indicate a great leap in the middle of 1970s, and continues at some 30 percent. At
this level it is hard to put them aside as a marginal. To sum up, it is difficult to
adhere to just a nuclear-stem dichotomy. It is necessary to consider whether current
Korean family structures really are under a progressive change toward the nuclear
family type or under going a revolutionary shift to some other framework.
4.5. CONCLUSION
4.5.1. The Increase In The Number Of Separate Households
Most discussions on the change of family size and family patterns converge
at a point: the increased number of households. Figure 4.6 explains the situation the
most clearly. Except for the huge fluctuation during period between 1944 and 1960
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when political upheavals supervened, the demographic growth rate follows a
relatively proportional curve.' The household curve shows a geometric increase
from around the early 1 960s. There was once a balanced growth rate until 1944,
and it was not dissimilar in the period between 1960 and 70. However, the
population growth rate was tremendously exceeded by the household growth rate
from the mid-70s on. That was the principal cause that provoked the shortage of
housing from the early 1980s on in Korea.
Figure 4.6. The Growth of Household Numbers
Contrasted to That of Population
source: Census '25 - 85
There were no statistics on the number of household for the period '49, '55.
The causes of household growth can be summarised in a few points. The
first cause derives from ideological change. In the global movement towards
modernisation Korea could not have selected to adopt just a part of the process.
Although much was .gained there was a loss of tradition, which can be seen as
being good and/or bad. Economic growth was gained, the family patterns modified,
with increased individualism as a by-product. The young generation was looking
for individual rights and duty; casting off the group psychology characteristic of
the traditional familism. Individualism, because of its central idea of individuality,
could not help but have an affinity with a small nuclear family against a big stem
family. They preferred one person households rather than sharing a cramped room
with some total stranger. As a result of preference for individualism it is expected
that an existing household will split and its numbers multiply. For example, a
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newly married son whose familial status is the eldest/only establishes his family of
procreation after a moderate period of co-residence with his family of orientation.
Of course it was on the condition of re-union when a parent is lonely or severely
ill. That kind of split was never thought of a couple of decades ago. It was a
compromise of traditional principle of stem family loyalties with the individualistic
ideology of the son's generation.
The second cause of the increase in the number of households was
migration resulting from industrialisation and the shortcoming of the education
policy. It is natural that labourers follow the flow of capital, where jobs can be
easily obtained. It is general that students pursue more educational opportunity.
The problem was that it was highly concentrated in the cities. Upon that, there was
the unique habit in the Korean migration for a job. Whole of family members
scarcely moved to city until a frontier member has settled down in a new place.
Naturally the family splits into two households until they re-unite either at the new
place or at their original place. That is the reason the rural households showed a
severe instability and why there was such a considerable amount of single
households in the urban areas, and extraordinary types of families in the whole of
the nation. This tendency was strengthened by the growing idea of a distinctive
home excluding non-familial members who, in the past decades, would have been
attached to an ordinary household somewhere.
In conclusion, there arises a question to the family situation. Does the
increase and instability of household indicate directly the weakness of the
traditional familism ? As already examined through the pattern of co-residence
between generations, Korean familism still exists even passing through the rapid
and profound modernisation. However, it could not have maintained the original
principle. It has expanded its influence to other sons or even to daughters as well
instead of limiting room for the eldest son's couple only. The stem family structure
is still there but in modified form. In other words in spite of the predominant
number of nuclear patterns, the households are still organised by the stem family
principle in the inner dynamism. Of course many socio-economic factors can affect
the future condition of the family values in Korea. Among them the deep diffusion
of individualism among younger generation can be one thing. Far widely activated
inter-regional occupational mobility can be another thing. Both factors can give
impact either to weaken or to strengthen the family consciousness in the future.
However the factors have been used to excuse modification of the conventional
family principle among present day Koreans.
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4.5.2. Housing Problem
The increase in the number of separate households, in association with
other related variables, has caused a housing shortage.
Among the basic elements for human life the provision of food and clothing
has come to be solved thanks to the economic development of the last few decades
of industrialisation, and the proportion of the cost of food and clothing to the total
domestic consumption is still declining. 53 However the cost of housing has steadily
risen to record 38 per cent of total domestic consumption in 1987. In spite of a big
increase in housing construction, the housing shortage has deepened until three out
five households are without their own homes in urban areas. The housing shortage
is a serious social issue in present day Korea.
The most frequently used quantitative social index for the level of housing
is the housing supply rate. The rate is the total housing stock divided by the total
number of ordinary households. The housing supply rate has greatly changed for
the worse as time has passed in spite of apparent growth of national wealth and an
improvement of individual economic conditions. As shown on Table 4.14 the
housing supply rate has seriously degenerated from about 83 per cent in 1960 to 63
per cent of 1990 in spite of the fact that total house stocks have more than doubled.
Table 4.14. Population, Household, And Housing Unit Change By Region
	
I	
1960	
I	
1970	
I	
1980	 1985	
I	
1990
whole country
	
population	 24,989	 30,852	 37,407	 40,432	 43,410
	household(A)	 4,198	 5,576	 7,470	 8,763	 11,377
	housing stock(B)	 3,464	 4,360	 5,319	 6,107	 7,160
	lB/A (%)	 82.5	 78.2	 71.2	 69.7	 62.9
urban areas
	
population	 6,997	 12,685	 21,409
	
26,458	 32,309
	household(A)	 1,209	 2,377	 4,362	 5,937	 8,480
	housing stock(B)	 805	 1,398	 2,468	 3,428	 4,646
	B/A (%)	 66.6	 58.8	 56.6	 57.7	 54.8
rural areas
	
population	 17,992	 18,167
	household(A)	 2,989	 3,199
	housing stock(B)	 2,659	 2,962
	B/A(%)	 88.9	 92.6
source: EPB, Census, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1985, 1990.
unit: thousands
	
15,997
	
14,009
	
11,102
	
3,107
	
3,038
	
2,897
	
2,850
	
2,846
	
2,514
	
91.7
	
93.7
	
86.8
The situation is far more serious in urban areas than in the rural areas. Housing
conditions in the rural areas have steadily improved to reach about 94 per cent of
housing supply rate by 1985 except for a slight variation in 1990. The decline was
due to the people looking for a home who were feeling burdensome about
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purchasing a flat in urban areas, moved to rural areas. Thus rural areas also began
to suffer from a housing shortage. However, in urban areas there is a serious
shortage and the housing supply rate does not exceed even two thirds of that of
rural areas. Although the urban housing stocks have increased almost six times in
three decades, still the housing supply- rate has become worse. Of course there was
undeniable improvement of the quality of the housing supply. Improvement in
dwelling density is a good example of this. As shown on Table 4.15, the number of
persons occupying a room has greatly reduced and the per capita floor space has
greatly expanded as well from a meagre 6.8 m2 of 1970 to 13.2m2 in 1990. The
improvements are more evident in the rural areas. However, another indication
shows the quality of housing conditions may be worse. Referring to Table 4.16 it is
apparent that, in spite of a slight improvement in 1990, the proportion of houses
containing just one household has significantly decreased (with a partial exception
of the urban areas in 1985), while the proportion of houses crowded with two or
more than two households has generally increased in the whole country.
Table 4.15. Housing Space
	
1960	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1990
persons per room:
	
whole country	 2.5	 2.4	 2.3	 2.1	 1.8	 1.5
	urban areas	 2.8	 2.7	 2.5	 2.2	 1.9	 1.5
	rural areas	 2.4	 2.2	 2.1	 1.9	 1.7	 1.3
per capita floor space(m2):
	
whole country	 6.8	 8.2	 10.2	 11.1	 23.8
	urban areas	 5.7	 7.4	 9.3	 10.8	 13.0
	ruralareas	 6.1	 9.0	 11.1	 11.6	 15.9
source: EPB, Census, 1960, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990.
Table 4.16. Percentage of Households Per Hous
1970
79.6
13.2
4.4
2.8
55.2
26.6
10.9
7.3
whole country;
one household
two households
three households
four & more households
urban areas;
one household
two households
three households
four & more households
rural areas;
1975j	 1980 [
	
1985
	
75.6	 71.8	 69.7
	
15.1	 16.9	 16.8
	
5.5	 6.5	 7.5
	
3.8	 7.5	 6.0
	
51.6
	
51.1
	
53.8
	
28.6
	
28.3
	
24.6
	
11.6
	
11.7
	
11.8
	
8.3
	
8.9
	
9.8
1990
72.2
13.7
6.9
7.3
62.0
17.9
9.6
10.5
	one household	 91.1	 90.5	 89.8	 89.1	 90.9
	two households	 6.8	 6.8	 7.0	 7.2	 5.9
	three households	 1.4	 1.7	 2.0	 2.2	 1.8
	four & more households	 0.7	 1.0	 1.2	 1.5	 1.3
source: EPB, Census, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990.
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In other words among the 11.4 million households in 1990, just 72 per cent had
their own space to reside while as much as 28 per cent that is equivalent to 3.2
million households were sharing a flat with some other family. Unlike the semi-
detached house in the UK with the structural attributes of independent living
conditions, most Korean houses sharer a common kitchen, bathroom, and living
room etc. So the tenants' family sharing a house with other households which
amounts to a good 30 per cent in 1990 (Table 4.16) are living under very difficult
living conditions. The absolute shortage of housing and the inconvenient dwelling
environment are major social and political issues in present day Korea. The issue is
becoming more heated as the general level of economic conditions improves
thanks to the economic development of the nation.54
The first reason for the serious housing problem arose from a failure in
housing policy. Purchasing power for housing is in a direct relationship to the level
of income and the price of the house. Thus when the housing price is bigger than
the income of the purchaser, dealing poses a problem. The income of the working
class in the urban areas has sharply increased by 28 time during the period between
1965 and 1980, however, housing prices have jumped 39 times for the same period.
Naturally the gap made it difficult for the low-income group in urban areas to have
their own house. That is the one of the reasons a considerable proportion of
households dwelling in the urban areas live in rented housing. (Table 4.16)
Secondly, demand is inescapably related to the number of population. As
shown on Table 4.14 the absolute numbers of population has increased faster than
the growth in the housing stock. There has been a strong government policy to
control the population and the population growth rate has unprecedentedly declined
for the last a few decades. Nevertheless, the absolute number of the population has
increased as much as 61.7 per cent for two and half decades between 1960 and
1985 and has had a significant impact on the housing shortage.
The third reason is the regional movement of the population. Since
industrialisation began to accelerate from the early 1960s, the change was
inescapably accompanied by urbanisation causing a housing shortage for the new
urban immigrants. In addition urban housing conditions became worse due to the
migration. Over one out of two job migrants left their families behind their home
town55
 They re-joined their families when they achieved economic success in the
city. Naturally the migrants doubled housing demand to cause the housing shortage
in the cities.
100.0
92.5
0.8
6.5
0.2
100.0
89.7
1.0
9.0
0.3
100.0
95.8
0.6
3.5
0.1
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Lastly, the housing problem is directly related to the values relating to the
family in Korea. First, one of the basic organising ideas of traditional society was
chib idea. Chib (family) was a concept comprising both of the family itself, its each
and every member, and sometimes used to denote clan members as well and also
identical with their physical housing. A house was perceived not merely as a
physical place for comfort and rest of each member but rather as a significant
symbol of the family itself. It was a sacred thing which should be kept generation
by generation in order to distinguish a family's identity. Thus the house was a
distinctive instrument for family identity. This idea survives in present day Korea
and influences housing demand. The first thing is the type of house: however
expensive a house is, most people have feeling of fulfilment only after they get an
independent house of their own: neither an apartment nor a semi-detached house.
As far as housing is concerned most of Korean people feel a loss of family identity
about co-ownership of a dwelling. As shown in Table 4.17, the proportion of
present day Koreans wanting an independent house is greater in rural areas in
which general housing conditions are quite generous. Of course the proportion
preferring an independent house has rapidly declined as time passes and the
preference for apartment housing has sharply increased particularly in the urban
areas. The preference for an apartment is especially marked among the young
generation because of its anonymity of apartment life, its convenient facilities, and
relatively cheap cost. However, there is an undeniable possibility that they would
change their preference as they get older and if general housing conditions
improved.
Table 4.17. Desired Type Of Housing
I	 1979 1	 1982 I	 1987 I	 1992
w
	
country;
total
independent house
semi-detached house
apartment
others
urban areas;
total
independent house
semi-detached house
apartment
others
rural areas;
total
independent house
semi-detached house
apartment
others
source: EPB, Social Statistics Survey
	
100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
85.0	 79.3	 63.3
	
2.3	 1.9	 1.8
	
12.5	 18.3	 34.2
	
0.2	 0.5	 0.7
	
100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
78.7	 72.3	 56.0
	
3.0	 2.4	 2.1
	
18.0	 24.8	 41.0
	
0.3	 0.5	 0.9
	
100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
95.2	 92.7	 84.6
	
1.0	 0.9	 1.0
	
3.7	 6.1	 14.0
	
0.1	 0.3	 0.4
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The problem is that present day Koreans are too strongly possessed by the
traditional idea of chib. Koreans feel rootless if they have no house registered in
their own name. If they do not waste their money, time, and mental effort on
enormously expensive housing, they can easily upgrade their standard of living
staying in a rented house which might be more appropriate under the conditions of
modem industrial society in which high rates of occupational mobility are
demanded. Of course it is true that there is a risk the rental would increase and
sometimes the facilities of the rental house do not reach a comfortable standard of
living. Even considering the disadvantages of a rented house, however, the ideas of
tenant life as rootless are too deeply embedded in present day Korea. The
traditional idea of chib and preferring their own independent house has persisted to
the present day in Korea and demands more housing supply than there is land
available.
The next element directly related to the housing problem is the modification
of the stem family principle. It stipulated the duty and right of the eldest son's
family to share a house with his parents. The principle is still in operation as far as
the organic relationship between parents and children, however, the rule has been
modified in practice during modernisation. First the subject of the duty and right
was once limited to the eldest son only, but has expanded to other sons and
sometimes daughters as well and that has brought a vagueness of the duty
boundary. Thus there is now the possibility that parents can be abandoned latently
or manifestly. The proportion of de facto co-dwelling with parents has been
reduced not withstanding the organic connections still persisting. Most young
women married to an eldest son or the only son can have a separate married life
from his parents under the conditions that they re-unite when one of them is in bad
health situation or one partner passes away. This modification has doubled the
housing demand. Once a unit household in traditional society has split into two due
to the weakening of the stem principle. Roughly 1.7 millions were estimated being
doubled. 56 The increase in the divorce rate has also split households in two. All in
all the above changes in the values relating to the family, demographic change,
regional migration etc. have been deeply influenced on the increase in the number
of household with which the supply of house stock has been unable to keep pace.
Having extremely oriented to the development policy, the government could not
have invested enough resources to housing welfare.
Projecting the number of ordinary households, it is anticipated that there
will be an increase from 9.6 million to 13.8 million at 44.5 per cent by the year
2000. To solve the housing shortage problem, 6.9 million new houses must be
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constructed by the year 2000. Thus, annually, 540 thousand additions to housing
stock should be supplied. 58 However, regarding the limited land area and
environmental issues, it sounds almost unattainable The alternatives are changes in
the conventional values relating to the family and housing and continuous policies
on the population control etc. For example, housing of smaller size rooms can be
an alternative. In fact per capita floor space in Korea has notably expanded from
8.2 m2
 in 1975 to 13.8 m2 in 1990 which is never less than 9.3 m2 of Hong Kong
or 13.2 m2 of Japan in 1989. However, average number of persons per room is 1.5
in 1990 which is worse than 0.8 of Japan in 1978 or 0.6 of Netherland or UK 59 in
1978. Considering the far higher population density (432 persons in 1990) than 327
persons of Japan in 1985 or 366 persons of Netherland in 1971 or 234 persons of
UK in 1981,60 housing policy can induce the present day Korean to accept living in
a narrower room than before instead of having an independent room per person. In
other words a policy of smaller room space can contribute to constructing more
rooms per housing or more housing of smaller size rooms which might relieve
housing shortage problems.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE KINSHIP NETWORK
AND MARRIAGE
Chapter 5 is largely composed of two sections. The first section examines
the change of the clan and kinship network. It shows how munjung, the traditional
secondary group has changed its role and its function and how the relationship
among relatives has adapted to fit the modern era. The second section discusses the
changes in marriage patterns. It examines decision making in the choice of
marriage partners, class endogamy and clan exogamy. To conclude, the chapter
examines what these changes in the marriage field mean to the individual life
cycle.
5.1. CHANGES IN CLAN AND KINSHIP
5.1.1. The Munjung Group: Chongch 'in/toe
Munjung was the secondary group by which individual families were
regulated and through which familial values expanded to societal level. It was the
most basic unit motivating social changes in traditional society.' However, it lost
its main function as a secondary organisation, in the process of modernisation and
industrialisation. 2
 The cause can be attributed to two factors: political upheavals
and economic change. 3
 The farmland reform of 1950 and the Korean War were the
most critical factors among many social events. Since independence in 1945,
society converted its active mechanism from clan-oriented structure to an
individual family-oriented one. Through the reform, the communal property of the
clan was broken up. Losing its infra-structure, the cohesive power of the clan group
was weakened and the hierarchical order within community collapsed. During the
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war most of the ancestral shrines were destroyed and ancestral tablets and family
books were lost during the upheaval. These great events led people to think again
about the meaning of ancestral worship, of ancestor rituals, and eventually of
munjung. The second factor that weakened the munjung was the development both
of commerce and the manufacturing industry. These led munjung members to
abandon the land which had kept them from leaving the familial and territorial
boundaries in traditional society. The growth of commerce and manufacture led
familial members to migrate to urban areas, breaking from the narrowness and
closeness of their munjung group. Individual ability rather than familial identity
was the only condition required for a free and promising career in cities. Naturally
the munjung lost its predominant influence as a social institution over its
members. 4
 Each member lost their devotion to and respect for the clan group and
eventually individual familial interest gained precedence over munjung interest.
However this does not mean the munjung totally diminished. Rather it still
exists but is of different size, and is in a modified form of organisational structure,
and in an altered context of organisational activities. First, the boundary and size of
the munjung have changed. To examine the status of munjung in present day
Korea, it is first necessary to recall what it entailed. It was an organisation
composed of the descendants of the same progenitor. it was a group of persons
sharing the same surname and the same pon5 (place of origin). Unlike the Chinese
or Japanese who had no idea of pun, there were many different clans using the
same surname but from different pun. To belong to the same munjung, one should
use the same surname and the same pUn. The '85 Census showed 249 different
surnames being used among present day Koreans divided amongst 3,387 pons.
That is to say there were 3,387 clans at the time of 1985. These groups were
generally called munjung nd became the unit for exogamy.
The munjung group stood as a definitional and nominal group rather than
the unit for a group identity or for a collective behaviour. The active unit was the
pa(faction) smaller than munjung. A munjung was split into several or dozens of
p'a according to the total size of the clan. There were two principles in this
segmentation. Firstly, in most cases the first ancestor of each clan was the mythical
founder in anthropological terms. Nothing was known of his lifetime achievements
or most importantly of the burial place, so his real existence would not be verified.
The name and mythical story about him was transmitted by word of mouth only.
This was much same for the several generations after the progenitor, sometimes
even up to the tenth generation, where just the names and myths were enumerated.
Accurate records of the lives or the graves of ancestors began after that. These
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latter ancestors became key founders of p'a within each munjung. There was
another principle that allowed p 'a to be established. Thus, if there was a prominent
scholar or a politician who had deeply contributed to society, he was revered as a
key founder and segmented to ap'a by his descendants. (Figure 5.1) By munjung, it
meant this active unit, p'a. This segmented group was called p'a-munjung or just
munjung in the traditional society and functioned as a socially approved unit and as
the active secondary group and was the competitive unit in relation to other p'a-
munjung. As a matter of course social status or the economic wealth of each p'a
was different even within the same clan group, and each p 'a grouped and stayed
together to be an exclusive, leading group in each community.
Figure 5.1. The Segmentation Of P'a From Munjung
(Example From Cizang Family Of Indong)
generation:
1st ... 14th	 15th	 16th	 17th	 18th
AN	 01	 P1	
-	
01	 Ri	 .............. Chong-p'a
	
R2	 Hwangsang-p'a
I	 HR3
I	 L_R4
1- 02
H 03
L_ 04 .......................... Chinpyung-p'a
P2
P3 .................................................. Chin-ga-p'a
P4
02 ..................................................................... Namsan-p'a
succeed by descendant
legend:	 run out of generation
number hierarchy among brothers
It seemed at first these groups were collapsing during the modernisation
process, however du.iing the late 1 960s, a new concept of clan meeting emerged
and increased dramatically by the end of 1 970s. It was called chongch 'inhoe
(association of clansmen). The result was quite contrary to the modernisation
theory. 6
 Shin-A Daily reported some 50 chongch'inhoe held in the year 1977 alone.
For the clan meeting of Yun clan of P'ap'yuing, about 15 thousand of its clan
members came to celebrate at Seoul7 Such a large congregation was impossible for
the conventional clan meeting of p'a. Chongch'inhoe was based on the original
concept of munjung putting the first originator as the central figure unlike p'a (p'a-
munjung) of the second originator. Thus chongch'inhoe is a trust organised of
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whole ofp'a groups. Unlike p'a groups led by a particular figure, chongch'inhoe is
open to everyone who uses the same surname from the same place of origin. As a
matter of course chongch'inhoe is of nation-wide size unlike the conventional
locally-based pi group. Therefore most chongch'inhoe have head offices in Seoul,
while p'a groups were down-graded to a substructure to be a liaison office ineach
region. To conclude, despite the weakened cohesive power of segmented clan
groups, a new integration of clan groups has formed and its influence has expanded
more widely thanp'a did.
The second characteristic of the change of munjung is observed in the
modem organisational structure of chongch'inhoe. The conventional munjung (p'a)
consisted of dual leadership of the eldest of the head family and the powers of the
clan group. 8 As a result, unless the eldest of the head family was powerful socially,
economically, and politically enough to regulate the other families, the leadership
used to become dubious and the p 'a weakened. However, the leadership has been
centralised to a socially and economically prominent person under chongch'inhoe.
The eldest of the head family had their status removed. Chongch'inhoe have their
head offices mainly in Seoul and are generally composed of a chairperson, a board
of directors, and executives. All of them are selected by democratic election. Local
substructures were organised according to the population of the members. The
given p'a groups were annexed to these local substructures.9 To conclude, the
conventional p'a-munjung showed frequent conflict between the eldest of the head
family and the powers of the clan. The chongch'inhoe is operated far more
effectively and consistently under the centralised leadership of an elected
chairman. If the former was under the vertical line of command, the latter
represents a democratic process of decision-making. If the status of the former was
ascribed regardless of his quality as a leader, that of the latter was achieved based
on leadership.
Finally munjung activity has been changed. If the ancestral rituals were the
prime purpose of the onventional p 'a-munjung organisation, the plenary session is
that of the chongch 'inhoe. The general meeting is held twice annually and decides
on the activities of the year. The activities can be summarised into three:
demonstrationof munjung power, educational work, and cultural work. First of all,
the opening of the annual meeting itself is a good arena to boast clan strength and
solidarity. The more they congregate, the better. Moreover educational work or
cultural enterprise is also another side of clan ostentation in terms of competition
with what the other clan groups do. Secondly, educational work has two directions:
private and public. Chongch 'inhoe encourage younger members to study on the one
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hand by offering scholarships to their clan members regardless of sex and by
offering dormitory facilities to students from rural areas or from poor families,
while they found private schools on the other hand. Of course, teaching staff or
students are recruited regardless of the clan and the same curricula are taught as in
the other public schools. Only the board of directors is nominated from their own
clan group and sometimes a monument to some historically distinguished figure
from the clan is built in the schoolyard. Sangmun High school in Seoul is a
successful, educational institute of the chongch'inhoe of Sang clan from
Mokch'O'n'°.
Lastly but not least, cultural enterprise shows another side of
chongch'inhoe. The work is roughly divided into two: 1> publications and 2> care
of the clan cultural heritage. Chongch'inhoe publishes great family genealogies
encompassing every p'a group. Unlike conventional family genealogy that was
very strictly limited to patriarchal lines and written in Chinese, the new genealogy
is very voluminous, reflects sex equality, and is frequently written in Korean
characters. Besides these, historical performances or literature etc. of historically
eminent heroes, scholars, or politicians from the clan are translated and published
in Korean". Other cultural works are the care of historical remains like
tombstones, graveyards, and shrines. Each chongch'inhoe makes efforts to
redecorate their historical assets and open them for the benefit of the public as a
leisure garden or for educational and cultural purposes. Often the works are
subsidised from government finances or by assistance from other clan groups who
share the same cultural heritage for a historical event. For example, the erection
committee encompassing the Speaker, the Chief Justice, the Prime Mihister, and
the chairman of other clans etc. was organised and it helped the chongch'inhoe of
Yun clan of P'ap'yungto set up the statue of General and Scholar Yur Kwan, who
had greatly contributed to society during the Japanese Invasion of the 16th century.
To conclude, the conventional munjung has lost its influence as a social
institution over individual families, however it still exists to exert its authority as a
secondary group. Even though it has lost the visibly strong coerciveness upon each
individual, it has expanded its influence more widely, overcoming its regional
limitedness.' 2 The conventional munjung was segmented and was exclusive or
against other clan groups or even against the other p'a-munjung of the same clan
group. However chongch'inhoe has been successful in mobilising not only its own
members but also even others on a nation-wide scale. It has functioned successfully
in integrating national consensus at a certain point. It has spread to educational and
cultural works for the benefit of the public instead of being restricted to ancestor
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rituals of their own. In a word, if the conventional munjung is past-oriented and
ancestor-centred, chongch 'inhoe is opened to the future and is descendant-oriented
through sound competition among clan groups. To conclude the clan group is still
alive to give influence in organising social consensus. It has changed its external
format and its way of exerting power, responding to the over-all social change to
modernisation.
It might be interesting to trace back the background of the new clan group
which emerged in the form of chongch'inhoe in present day Korea. The
background can be abstracted to the socio-cultural demand. It is a sort of cultural
and ideological trend restoring to the past tradition. 13 At the beginning of the
l970s, Koreans began to weigh the balance of social changes. Economic welfare
which they had earned during the last half of a century of modemisation was like a
miracle. However, the side-effects of the rapid achievement looked more serious
and offset of the value of the miracle. They recognised themselves as having lost
too much. It was particularly severe in the cultural and moral domain. They came
to the view that the distressing socio-cultural phenomena were due to the rapidity
of the change on the one hand and the discontinuity of the tradition on the other
hand. Naturally the restoration movement appeared to harmonise the traditional
heritage with the modern way of life. The value of familism was emphasised.'A
However, they did not like the conventional type of familism which suffocated
individual. Openness to society and comprehensiveness to its members as a whole
was preferred, rather than the closeness and narrow-mindedness of the past.
Chongch'inhoe was a natural conclusion in terms of the restoration. Through the
activation of the new clan group, people wanted to recover their cultural self-
identity. They expected some social issues like sexual openness or the rise of the
divorce rate etc. to be halted. Thus chongch 'inhoe was born from a social demand
for an alternative to re-integrate socio-cultural disorder.
It is hard to say how far chongch'inhoe will develop as a secondary group.
Will it again participate deeply in competition for political and economic
hegemony as it used to do in traditional society or will it be replaced by the
occupational group in Durkhemian terms ? 15 In fact, the occupational organisation
has not yet succeded in integrating social consensus in present day Korea. Instead,
the organisations have been interwoven more by familism, by the affinity of the
same regional territory, or by the tie-in of the same school. In any case, it has been
true that it, at least, exerted its influence very significantly in the development of
public opinion in some fields. Chongch'inhoe offices are necessary places for MP
candidates or for the Presidency to visit to win an election. Some clan groups along
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with the Confucianists were very active in the process of the Family Law Revision
of 1989, and other social affairs as well. The New Community movement that was
the stepping stone for economic development for the last few decades gained great
assistance from the clan groups.
5.1.2. Kinship Membership
Both kinship network and the consciousness have changed during the last
few decades of modernisation. This can be observed in many fields like the
changes in the appellation given to relatives, in the legal definition on the kinship,
or in the frequency and contents of the communication in every day life among
relatives. However the due data are not enough to verify the situation in detail. The
survey of FAM86 and FAM89 did not pose the due questions for the data.
Moreover, there has been little data by other researchers on the changes in the
kinship, and even those are old-dated or surveyed on a regional base.'6
Nevertheless, some of them are good for evaluating the present situation in the
kinship network in modern Korea.
The change in the kinship is best described in the revised family law of
1989. (execution from 1st Jan. 1991) Of course there can be different opinions on
what the law says. If law is a simple reflection following public demand, it is also
true that law is created to lead the public to a certain social atmosphere which has
not yet arrived.' 7 The latter seemed more true among developing countries. In any
case it is true that any law reflects, directly or indirectly, the trend of the times,
whether a society is mature enough or not to accept the law. The established title of
Korean family law is The Kinship and Inheritance Law in the Civil Law of the
Constitution. As the prescribed title denotes, one of the most essential frameworks
of the law was the prescription on the kinship boundary. The law defined the
boundary of relatives including up to 'the eighth degree' 8 (third cousin) of the
patrilateral line, the fourth degree (first cousin) of the matrilateral line and wife's
parents.' The prescription reflecting the traditional frame of the kinship network
was sustained until 1991 of the revised family law. The new prescription has
changed to reflect the voice of sexual equality, and a relative weakening of the
patrilateral kinship network. The new law prescribes the boundary of matrilateral
line to expand to the third cousins equally as that of patrilateral lines. The
boundary of matrimonial relation has also expanded to the first cousin of the wife
which was, in the past, limited only to her parents. To sum up, the new family law
is backing up the positions of the matrilateral line and matrimonial relatives. It
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reflects a relative decline of the patrilateral line from the conventional kinship
positioning in the past. Of course, the prescription is just a nominal level in the
Constitution. The de facto relationship can show stronger and more frequent
communication among patrilateral members of a kinship network depending on
regional base, individual families, or religious orientation. Nevertheless, it is
undeniable that the new law is reflecting general changes in the conventional
kinship relationship to manifest sexual equality among family members. On the
other hand, it is hard to say that the boundary expansion of the matrilateral line and
matrimonial relatives in law denotes the expansion of actual strengthening of the
relationship among kinship members. Rather, the expansion tells us nothing but a
relative weakening of the traditionally strong relationship among patrilateral
members.
Weakening of the patrilateral line or of kinship as a whole can be observed
in the appellation custom as well. 19 Traditional society developed the appellation
system to a high level. Naming identified each position in the kinship network. The
more the kinship network developed, the more accurate positioning with precise
appellation was needed. This was exactly the case in traditional Korean society.
Concretely 146 different terminologies were used to designate the distinctive
position of each relative. Among them 101 designations were for the relatives in
the patriarchal line, 19 for wife's relatives, and 26 for maternal relatives. The total
146 terminologies varied again according to the speaker's familial position or sex;
to the age gap between the speaker and the relatives; and whether the relatives were
married or not. For example the appellation a husband used to his brother was
different from what his wife called to him. Moreover, the appellation a housewife
used to her brother-in-law was distinctive according to whether he was married or
single, or whether he was older than her husband or younger. Those were summed
up to 458 distinctive relative titles. 2° Through the highly developed appellation
system, each member could have a definite identification of position cum role in a
kinship network. Eventually it promoted kinship consciousness to a high level.
Modernisation has weakened kinship consciousness in terms of these
appellations. The majority of present day Koreans are forgetting or misusing the
meaning of the complicated appellations. For example, by nephew, all positions of
the sons of brother/sister or of brother-in-law/sister-in-law are included in the
West. As a result if there is no personal intimacy between them, in principle all
children have the same relationship as nephew. However, there are 8 different sorts
of nephew in the Korean relative network by law: choka (sons of brothers): saengjil
(sons of sisters): chongjoka (grandsons of father's brothers): naejongjoka
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(grandsons of father's sisters): ijongjoka (grandsons of mother's sisters): oejongjoka
(grandsons of mother's brothers): chaejongjoka (great-grandsons of grandfather's
brothers): and ch'ojoka (nephews on the wife's side). Each naming was strictly
controlled to be used correctly, because each nephew was recognised as having a
different kinship position and a different role within a kinship network: For
example choka, chongjoka, and chaejongjoka were expected, to different degrees,
to participate in ancestor rituals 21 , while the rest were hardly recognised as relatives
in a real sense. Only the role of emotional intimacy or of mutual aid was expected
to them. Moreover the degree and content of feeling intimacy or of mutual help to
each of them varied even among the rest of them. However, the boundary of the
appellation has reduced to only a few namings of cho-ka or ch'ojo-ka etc.
Distinctive positions were referred to vaguely using the term choka. According to
FAM86, only one out of nine in the urban areas and one out of five interviewees in
the rural areas answered correctly who each of the above eight nephews were.
While just one out of eight interviewees in the whole country gave the correct
answer to which of them could attend at ancestral worship. Kinship consciousness
once strong in the past has faded away during the process of modernisation. The
conventional clan group is in a similar situation but in a modified pattern as already
mentioned in the first section..
Changes are observed in the communication among kinship members as
well. 22 According to Han's survey, quite a good proportion of modem families are
still in touch with each other. However, the boundary of the frequent contacts is
limited to fifth ch'on (a first cousin once removed) of the patrilateral line and fourth
ch'on (a first cousin) of the matrilateral line. If the genealogical distances become
remote, kinship meeting was rare. 23
 In other words, the relationship with the
secondary kins who were never under a same family of orientation, has been
weakened, while the primary relatives(kin of orientation)24
 still keep a close
relationship with each other wherever they are.
Changes are happethng not only in the boundary but also in the contents of
the communication. The relatives below are those of the primary kins. As shown in
Table 5.1, the proportion of the families visiting relatives has been generally
weakened particularly on institutionalised days like festival days, ritual days or
birthdays. Especially on the day of ancestor worship for father's patrilateral direct
line, like father's parents, visiting was previously compulsory. The proportion has
declined considerably. Nevertheless, a good proportion of urban families still keeps
good contact with each other at various aspects.
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Table 5.1. Proportion Of Families Visiting Relatives
relatives	 sample	 proportion of families visiting relatives
size	 at time of
	
festive	 ancestor f birthday	 any time
	
days	 worship I
father's parents	 211	 53.1	 37.4	 46.0	 73.0
father's brothers	 312	 44.6	 34.3	 21.2	 65.7
father's sisters	 300	 39.7	 18.0	 16.3	 67.0
mother's parents	 309	 43.7	 22.0	 40.8	 61.8
mother's brothers	 347	 31.1	 17.9	 17.9	 69.7
mother's sisters	 349	 21.5	 7.7	 13.2	 82.8
source Han Nam-Jae, Study on Korean Modern Family, p.306
The pattern of kinship association can be abstracted into a few points. First, at the
time of festive days like New Year or Korean Harvest Moon day or ancestral ritual
days, the father's parents are the most visited relatives among primary kins. It is
because, no need to say about the ancestral ritual days, the festive days as well are
open by giving thanks and respect to ancestors in the patrilateral direct line.
Courtesy calls to other relatives on that day are only after an ancestral sacrifice to
the patrilateral direct ancestors. That is the reason why the proportion visiting
father's parents are the highest in most cases. Thus the patrilateral direct line is still
the most important subject of association in modern Korea nominally or
practically. The line is the most frequently pursued subject to find familial identity
emotionally or genealogically.
Secondly, the proportion visiting relatives other than the patrilateral direct
line on ancestral ritual days is never small. They are not there to perform ancestral
sacrifice but to give helping hands to the complicated and hard work of the
preparation for relatives' rituals. It was a strong custom among kins of mutual aids
passed down through traditional socfety. The custom has weakened in the process
of modernisation but still appears quite a lot. This extent denotes traditional
Confucianism in courtesy calls as well. Under Confucianism, ancestral ritual was a
sort of consensus that should be kept at any cost and should be praised at any time,
regardless of who the rituals were for. Thus it was quite natural to have a courtesy
call to other relatives' ancestral rituals to praise the good behaviour of the opposing
ancestor.
Thirdly, the extent of association with the mother's parents is never small
compared with the father's. It is as much as that of father's parents. In fact father's
sister was traditionally regarded as belonging to the other family after her marriage.
Her name was not registered even in the genealogy book. Of course, the genealogy
offered no separate space for the name of the mother's father, but unlike the
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daughter's name, records about mother's father took at least minimum space
beneath the name of mother. Genealogically the mother was perceived as an
indispensable contributor to the family prosperity and correspondingly the mother's
father, due to the fact that he produced her, was highly respected. Even if
emotional intimacy to the mother's parents was relatively lacking compared to the
father's sister, the respect was significantly attributed to him. Naturally the extent
of association with the mother's parents was higher than with the father's sisters on
festive days or ancestral ritual days. The situation is most highlighted on the
birthday of the mother's parents. They are the second most visited relatives for
paying respect but are the least remembered in every day life of emotional contact.
The conventional degree of distance has not changed in modern Korea either
emotionally or in genealogical status.
Fourthly, the mothers sister is the least associated relative at times like
festive days or ancestral ritual days or even on her birthday. It confirms the
traditional idea of the woman married into other family. If mother was a new
member came from another family by marriage, mother's brothers were members
of another family where mother was from, but mother's sister was having totally no
cotmection because she went to the other family by marriage. The mother's sister
was completely isolated from any of her family so there was no point in associating
with her at least genealogically. Considering the traditional custom expecting
women to fully integrate into the husband's family, and considering geographical
isolation or transportation condition of the time, it was hardly possible to
communicate or come and go to the mother's sister. However, the situation has
greatly changed in modern Korea. Although she is still the least associated relative
at a formal level, reflecting the traditional custom, she is the most frequently
coming and going-relative. The strongest emotional ties in every day life are to the
mother's sister.
To sum up, the kinship network among relatives has been narrowed to
primary kins in modern Korea. However, the pattern of association among the
kinship members is almost as it was in the past. The kinship network still functions
conforming the stem family principle in amended pattern. The patrilateral direct
line is still an important centripetal point in forming kinship relationships. The only
exception is the great rise of the mother's sisters' position in every day life. This is
due to modernisation accompanied by the rise of women's status in general, and the
progress of national transportation system etc.
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The function of the kinship group has not changed even under
modernisation. The group still stands together for kinship solidarity based on
ancestral ritual performances. According to Han, four out of five modem Korean
families in the urban areas are visiting each other for ancestral rituals.
Nevertheless, the primary function of the kinship group moved from the coercive
solidarity to emotional comfort among kinship members. For example, the families
joining a kye (a mutual aid club) among the kinship group were no more than one
out of three and just four out eleven families join together for kinship intimacy on a
regular basis. 25 In traditional society kye was an important centripetal mechanism,
promoting kinship solidarity by meeting regularly, or by giving economical or
physical help to other members on occasions of congratulation or condolence.
Through the mechanism, the kinship group could show solidarity, confirm kinship
identity, and exert coerciveness over each member of the group. Of course there are
still a majority of families mutually aiding each other economically and physically.
Seven out of ten families give and receive economic aid when needed and lend or
borrow helping hands when there is a need. However, this is not normal practice,
and is not coercive. The mutual help does not come from an institutional basis but
from emotional intimacy. The change of the kinship function is being confirmed by
other statistics as well. For example, 95 per cent of the modem urban families
inform their relatives when they are in good or ill fortune, and three out of four
have their children visit relatives during the academic vacation. To sum up, the
primary function of the kinship group is more as emotional comfort or servicial co-
operation than economic exchange.
5.2. MARRIAGE
Marriage is the legal, social, and customary institution prescribing how the
family ought to be formed and maintained. Being married means two individuals
being a couple to pursue self-perfection and to create their life values based on
autonomy, contract, love etc. These are meaningful enough as an individual affair.
However, the reason the marriage ought to have been under the social regulation
was because of its social characteristics. Marriage does not stop at the individual
cohesion between two different sexes but more critically, expands to social
integration. Marriage has functioned as a mechanism, at an initial stage,
transmitting the socially recognised values to generations and socialising social
consensus to each and every social member. That is the reason society
institutionalised the process of social recognition of the marriage.26
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As far as social affairs, the marriage is also about human affairs, and shows
inescapable differences according to each society, each culture, and each period.
The primary purpose of marriage in the traditional society was to keep the
continuation of a family line. As a result the conjugal relationship was expected to
be domination-subordination, and their life recognised as an instrument for
reproduction of generations and eventually for maintenance of the community
order. It was marriage of the family, by the family, and for the family with almost
unjust regard to the individuals concerned. However, modern marriage emphasises
autonomy and is formed by the choice and decision between individuals rather than
between families. As a result, self-realisation and contracts based on love and
personality have been far more highly regarded as the virtues of married life. In
this section, the demographic characteristics and dynamics of marriage, and values
relating to marriage etc. will be examined in terms of modernisation and
industrialisation.
5.2.1. Mate Selection
In traditional society marriage was meaningful only as a familial affair.
Marriage was recognised not as the creation of an independent family but as the
expansion of the stem family. It was therefore natural that parents, instead of the
persons concerned, dominated the choice of partner in the marriage. 27 With
modernisation, marriage has been illuminated as a love affair between two
individuals rather than conventional family affairs. 28 Individual right and personal
choice play a much greater role in the decision to marry. Table 5.2 was produced
from FAM86 and was calculated regardless of what sorl of marriage interviewees
took: love marriage or an arranged mttch. It shows a dramatic change in the
location of decision-making. Viewed from the years when interviewee women
were married, the older she was, the more the final decision-making of marriage
was in her parents' hands. The younger she was, the more likely it was to be her
own decision. One interesting thing is that in spite of the dramatic decline of
parents' overall power(I-type), the proportion of bride's absolute power (IV-type)
has not increased in the same proportion. Instead it was the type III, in which the
bride took the lead of marriage accompanied by parents' approval, which increased
most. It is a sort of harmonisation. 29 It is a quite different pattern of decision-
making from the compelled marriage disregarding the preference of persons
concerned as in the traditional period. It is a reconciled pattern of decision-making
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allowing a space for parents' opinion in the process of mate-selection. Much the
same applies to the type II though that case is more inclined to the parents' opinion.
Table 5.2. Choice Of Marriage Partner By Marriage Cohort And By
year	 I total(real No)	 types of decision-making
she married
whole country
total
	
100.0(3008)	 21.2	 32.1	 38.7	 7.7	 0.2
	
1934-49	 l00.0( 357)	 71.7	 22.7	 2.8	 2.5	 *
	
1950-59	 100.0( 431)	 45.5	 37.6	 13.0	 3.7	 *
	
1960-69
	
100.0( 589)	 22.9	 43.8	 26.3	 6.4	 *
	
1970-79
	
100.0( 865)	 4.6	 51.4	 10.3
	
1980-86	 100.0( 766)	 1.3	 22.7	 65.4	 10.4
urban areas
total
	
100.0(2044)	 14.2	 31.1	 45.5	 9.1	 *
	
1934-49
	
100.0( 173)	 67.0	 26.6	 3.5	 2.9
	
1950-59	 100.0( 245)	 35.5	 40.0	 19.2	 5.3
	
1960-69
	
100.0( 393)	 17.3	 42.7	 32.1	 7.6	 *
	
1970-79
	
100.0( 639)	 2.5	 31.3	 55.6	 10.6
	
1980-86
	
100.0( 594)	 *	 20.7	 66.7	 12.0	 *
rural areas
total
	
l00.0( 964)	 36.0	 34.2	 24.6	 4.7	 *
	
1934-49
	
l00.0( l4)	 76.1	 9S
	
1950-59
	
100.0( 186)	 58.6	 34.4	 4.8	 *	 *
	
1960-69
	
100.0( 196)	 34.2	 45.9	 14.8	 4.1	 *
	
1970-79
	
100.0( 226)	 10.6	 40.3	 39.8	 9.3
1980-86	 100.0( 172)	 4.1	 29.7	 61.0	 5.2
source: FAM86 (5 cases of no response excluded)
I type: Parents decided overall. 	 II type: parents decided followed by my agreement.
III type: I decided followed by parents' consent.
	 IV type: I decided overall.
(R.N.) real number * real number below 5 cases	 - no case observed
The attitude of compromise can be proved first by the continuing existence
of a high percentage of arranged marriages among present day Koreans. Of course
it depends on which generation they belong to. According to FAM89, even the
youngest generation who married in the 1980s showed a high frequency of
arranged marriage, which accounted for one out of two brides. Of course, the fact
that she was interviewed at the matchmaking meeting does not exactly demonstrate
the decisive power remained in the parents' hands. She still can have the initiative
in decision-making, regardless of who arranged the meeting. Nevertheless,
attending a meeting arranged by the parents can save the parents' face. It is, at least
superficially, a good gesture to the parents to earn more points in the on-going
decision-making process. Another indication of reconciliation can be observed in
the duration of acquaintanceships. In traditional society, once a bride was
introduced to a would-be-groom, it was nothing different from marriage itself,
there was no alternative but to marry him. However, the younger generations have
asserted their voice for the final decision on mate selection instead of having their
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parents keep to the conventional pattern of match-making through a match-maker.
Now she can refuse a would-be-groom if she does not like him. As a result, while
the duration of acquaintance for those who married before 1959 was on average
two months maximum, that of those who married in the 1980s was calculated to
almost one year on average30 Prospective brides reconciled the change by being
very sincere and positive in using their final decision power that they took over
from their parents. It was because young girls still retain a belief that love can not
only arise instantly but can also be produced by the couples' efforts as in their
parents case. That is the reason they think of the arranged marriage positively.
The reason brides have shown an attitude of compromise instead of running
alone can be analysed from various angles. Among them the continuance of
traditional values and economic strategy seems the most plausible and both are
closely intermingled. First, There is deep-rooted traditional belief that the older one
is the wiseer one is both in the experience of familial life and social life. The
elderly are believed to be very strong in the intuitive power of judging persons at
first glance, in spite of their lack of knowledge about modern technology. As a
result, unless she has fallen in love with a would-be-groom for life, she generally
pays more attention to her parents opinion. She can make an excuse to her
charming but novice lover at the initial stage of their meeting. If he is not the
person her parents were expecting, she eventually gives up the love as a temporary
romantic affair. Even if she has decided to marry him, she waits until she can
persuade her parents to find good points in her would-be-husband instead of
marrying away as she pleased. She is not so brave yet as to bear being stigmatised
as an indiscreet person by her relatives or even her friends. The second reason for
the attitude of compromise comes from utilitarian, grounds. 3 ' Marrying without her
parents' blessing does not stop at psychological disapproval but practically can lead
to the loss of the economic base of married life. Most young couples do not have
enough savings to pay for very expensive rents or for living expenses to keep the
life style enjoyed under the parental roof. And they can not afford to think lightly
of some extra money to pay for luxuries that may, from time to time, brighten
conjugal life. They are not foolish enough to forget how money can enrich or
devastate one's marriage in a society deeply pervaded by capitalism. Unless they
levels down the quality of life, marriage without parental approval means losing
too many things once promised. Eventually poverty can cause even the wrecking of
married life. Either as an economic tactic or under the influence of traditional trust
in parents, the use of extreme power in decision-making has not been found among
the young generation.
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There is no regional difference in the trend discussed so far. With the same
pattern but at a different speed, marriage choice has been handed over from the
parents to the persons concerned. Of course it does not mean a total change but is a
compromise between the two generations. In the flow of this general tendency,
those from rural areas are a bit slower than those from urban areas shown in the
statistics tending towards I- and IT-type regardless of marriage cohort.
Table 5.3. Marriage Choice	 Interviewees' Education Level
decision-making I
	
educated years of the interviewee
types	 I	 total	 I	 0-6	 7-9	 I	 10-12	 I	 13 & +
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
(real No)	 (3011)	 (1401)	 (763)	 (707)	 (140)
I-type	 21.2	 40.8	 5.1	 3.7	 0.7
lI-type	 32.1	 35.2	 36.4	 24.2	 17.9
111-type	 38.7	 17.7	 48.8	 63.2	 71.4
TV-type	 7.7	 6.0	 9.7	 8.8	 9.3
others	 0.2	 *	 *	 *
source: FAM86(2 cases of no response excluded)
* real number below 5 cases, - no case observed
The educational level of the interviewee also affects the decision-making as
shown in Table 5.3. The more educated the woman, the more the decisive power of
the parents was reduced. However, even educational factors did not break down the
general tendency observed above. Thus, even educated women are very reluctant to
be the sole decision-maker in their choice of would-be-groom, in spite of their
preference of autonomy in the decision-making. The more educated, the more she
is against her parents' total power. However, ironically, the more reconciliation is
likely to be needed. The reason for this comes from her economic background. For
a woman to be educated at the highest level, she must have had moderate economic
background from her parents, particnlarly under the social condition where
educational awards are still rar. t follows that she has enjoyed a better quality life
style than the less educated young girls with poor parents. While the less educated
has no more things to lose from her parents, the better educated still have more
things to get from hei parents. That is the reason she is no more likely to ignore her
parents' opinion about her marriage than less educated women.
To conclude, there arises a question of how much the type IV would
increase, how much the use of complete power of the person concerned, would
increase in the future. Firstly, the young generation would not like to give up their
rights, however reserved and however compromised it is. It is a matter of interest
particularly under the prevalence of individualism. It is anticipated that the idea is
likely to be more widely and more deeply pervasive than ever before as
Westernisatjon increases. Moreover, it is much more likely to increase if either the
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familial function weakens or economic status of the younger generation gets better,
enabling them to be more independent of their parents. However, the reverse can
also be true. Thus, an aversion against ego-centricism followed by a homing
instinct can lead the younger generation to recognise the importance of the family
of orientation. The deepening of social competition also means that individuals
find it difficult to gain success without the support from parents and this may be
another good cause. Generally the parents have more resources than the young
generation, and this can make the young generation more dependant on their
parents. To conclude it is difficult to say at which level the statistics will be
stabilised. However it is definite that the trend would be influenced by social,
cultural, and economical factors. Again it would affect other factors concerned
with marriage, like age at marriage, process of the marriage, and values relating to
marriage etc.
5.2.2. Demographic Features Of Marriage
The changing pattern of choice relating to marriage has led to another
consequence: change of the age at marriage. In traditional society parents had
complete control over the children's choice of marriage partner on the one hand
while on the other hand they thought of the succession of generations as the best
expression of filial piety to the parents and duty to their ancestors. Naturally these
ideas led parents to have their children marry as soon as possible. 32 Early marriage
was instigated once again by two points: the high rate of mortality and the
Mongolian invasion followed by the tributary of Korean girls. (Refer to 3.3.3.1. of
Chapter 3) Modernisation brought about changes and the age at marriage was not
exceptional from the influence of modérnisation. As shown in Table 5.4, the age at
marriage has increased as modernisation progressed, and sexual difference of the
matrimonial age has narrowed as well. Thus the speed of the increase in the brides'
age at marriage has surpassed that of grooms. Over about the last 7 decades brides'
ages have increased by almost ten years. The fundamental cause of the steady
increase in the age at marriage can be attributed to the change of socio-cultural
values relating to marriage. Early marriage was thought of as restraining self-
realisation. Both men and particularly women began to prefer spending time in
attending higher education, in economic participation or in social activity. Thus
they liked to develop self-cultivation instead of being confined to married life. The
idea of the perfection of the ego replaced the conventional obsession of
generational reproduction for the benefit of family succession. Women, being
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particularly deeply influenced by feminism, have shown a greater interest in this
field. This again was supported by the government Family Planning programme
aimed at achieving a low fertility rate. 33 The programme attacked the son-
preference idea and devalued the image of early marriage. That was the reason why
women's age at their first marriage increased faster than the men's age, narrowing
the sexual difference.
Table 5.4. Historical Change Of Average Age At First Marriage
year	 men	 women	 difference
	
19251)	 20.2	 16.7	 3.5
	
1930 1 )	 21.2	 17.0	 4.2
	
1935 k )	 21.6	 17.3	 43
	
1940 k )	 21.7	 17.5	 4.2
	
19552)	 24.5	 20.5	 4.0
	
19602)	 25.4	 21.6	 3.8
	
1966)	 26.7	 22.8	 3.9
	
1970)	 27.1	 23.3	 3.8
	
1975)	 27.4	 23.7	 3.7
	
1980)	 27.3	 24.1	 3.2
	
1988)	 28.4	 25.3	 3.1
source: 1) Y.S.CHANG, Population in Early Modernisation :Korea (Princeton Univ.,1966),
p.238-330.
2) Y.KIM, "Age at marriage and trend of fertility in Korea," World Population
Conference Vol.II(N.Y., 1967), p.'47.
3) EPB, population and Housing Census of Korea
4) The Population Association of Korea, The Journal of Population association of
Korea Vol.13(1), 1990
However, there still remain some facts that cannot be clearly explained by
socio-cultural or educational factors, for example why the age at marriage showed
a sharp increase at around the year 1955, and why the age at marriage of men is
three years older than that of women. The first and the most influential thing was
military affairs. The Korean Army was established in 1946 and they soon
participated in the Civil War of 1950, required a huge number of young men to be
recruited until 1953. Since then three years of military service was compulsory for
every young man. Economic instability before and after the war also contributed to
late marriage both of brides and of grooms. These were the reasons for there being
three years age difference between the sexes with a drastic increase in 1955.
The trend is closely related to the change in the rate of unmarrieds. 34 Of
course this rate, in a sense, is a tautology of the age at marriage. In fact both have
been used very often interchangeably to analyse the same trend of mating.
However the boundary both statistics explain is quite different. The former allows
more detailed explanation than the latter does on mate-selection. Table 5.5 is a
good example. The unmarried rate has increased very rapidly as the age at marriage
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did. However, the table shows the inner dynamics of the change by age cohort and
adds new findings. Firstly the total rate of unmarrieds increased rapidly but showed
a slight decline recently. The statistics do not imply a real decline but a pseudo-
decline from demographic characteristics of the age cohort of between 15-19 and
that of 30-34 year old. The latter group is the generation born during the baby-
boom period after the war. As a result of the successful Family Plarming
Programme of the late 1 960s onwards the former was small enough to change the
pyramidal demographic structure. Thus the larger population of the 3 0-34 year old
group gives it a greater influence on the overall statistics than the former. The
general trend of increase in the unmarried rate shown in Table 5.5 roughly
conforms to the trend in the age at marriage.
Table 5.5. Change Of The Unmarried Rate By Age Cohort And Sex.
(1935-1985
age	 male	 female
cohort	 '35 I	 '55 I	 '75 I	 '85	 '35 I	 '55 I	 '75	 '85
total	 19.4	 31.5	 40.7	 38.5	 6.8	 18.5	 28.5	 27.8
15-19	 76.5	 94.3	 99.7	 99.9	 38.0	 85.2	 97.4	 99.1
20-24	 35.2	 67.1	 92.9	 94.4	 4.3	 20.8	 62.5	 71.8
25-29	 9.5	 25.3	 47.0	 49.8	 0.7	 3.0	 11.8	 17.4
30-34	 3.1	 3.7	 7.0	 9.5	 0.3	 0.6	 2.0	 4.3
35-44	 1.4	 0.9	 0.9	 2.2	 0.2	 0.3	 0.5	 1.2
45 +	 1.5	 0.8	 0.5	 0.8	 0.4	 0.6	 0.5	 0.6
source: Census, 1935, 1955, 1975, 1985.
It is notable that the sex ratio is greater among those in the latter
marriageable age range, if we match the male age group 30-34 of the baby-boom
generation to the female age group of 25-29 to allow for the current tendency of
brides' age to be three or four years younger than would-be-groom. We find over
one out of six women was unmarried while just one out of ten males from the due
cohort in 1985 was unmarried. The Table 5.6 examines the situation in detail. One
out of two females aged 25-34, and a third of the age cohort 20-24 are destined to
fail in mate-selection. These imbalance phenomena brought about a social problem
for marriage expenses.
Table 5.6. Sex Ratio Among Matchable Age Group
	groups matched	 sex ratio (males per 100 female)
male	 female	 in total	 among thc
unmaried
15-19	 10-14
	
105
20-24	 15-19
	
102
	
99.9
25-29	 20-24
	
99
	
68.3
30-34	 25-29
	
82
	
42.4
35-39	 30-34
	
89
	
47.7
source: FAM86
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Driven by the groom scarcity phenomena, parents of a would-be-bride paid
excessive expenses for a would-be-groom, to his parents and families. They even
paid his distant relatives in the form of wedding gifts 35 . Particularly if a would-be-
groom was well-educated and had an economically and socially good job, such as a
medical doctor, lawyer etc., he was guarantied a flat andlor a car as a wedding gift
from his would-be-parents-in-law. Sometimes shockingly even the existing couples
divorced after a naive dispute on the amount of the wedding gifts from the brides
side. It was a serious social issue which very frequently adorned daily newspapers
from the middle of the 1 980s. Of course there was excessive spending on marriage
expenses even during the traditional period in the shape of wedding gifts. However
it was of a different pattern. In traditional society this was caused by ostentatious
competition and occurred only between the families of the rich minority. Excessive
expense was generally regarded as a barbarian custom. Moreover, even if it was the
case, the affairs were reciprocal not one-sided. If the would-be bride's parents paid
a airge amount of expenses for wedding gifts, the same was returned to them from
the would-be-groom's parents out of courtesy. It was zero-sum calculation of no
gain and of no loss economically. However, in modern times the problem has
become more serious. It is one-sided flow of economic resources, regardless of the
economic ability of the persons concerned or the parents concerned. The social
problem caused from the groom scarcity phenomena has revived the son-preference
idea. It has also caused social alienation of those who had not enough money for
the large financial outlay. Regarding the sex ratio of the younger age cohort, the
problem is expected to continue until the demographic structure becomes more
balanced.
The future of the marriage market is likely to be significantly different due
to a dramatic reversal of sex ratio. Thus a scarcity of potential brides is likely to
replace the shortage of potential grooms. According to EPB population prospection
in 1990, as shown in the Table 5.7, the sex ratio reveals a radical reversal if
matched to the girl groups three years younger than the cohort. Initially this was a
side-effect of the Family Planning programme.
Table 5.7. Sex Ratio In General And Matched To Girls 3 Years Younger In
1990
age cohort of male	 sex ration(males p 100 females)
in general	 I ma	 to 3 years younger
females
	
0-4	 111	 -
	
5-9	 109	 118
	
10-14	 107	 113
source: Census (1990).
rural areas
	
99.5	 99.5
	 98.9
	
72.5	 93.7
	
55.8
	
16.0
	
46.5	 8.2
	
4.4
	
8.4
	
2.9
	
1.4
	
3.5
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Table 5.8. Trend In Pregnant Cases And Induced Abortion Rate
year	 total number of pregnant cases and the ratio of induced abortion per
100 births
I	 total I	 20-24	 25-29	 I	 30-34	 I	 35-39	 40-44
(total number of pregnant cases)
1978	 923	 196	 341	 200	 138	 -	 48
1984	 1,655	 330	 849	 363	 88	 25
1987	 1,198	 218	 637	 260	 66	 17
(the ratio of induced abortion per 100 births)
1978	 84.1	 18.5	 57.5	 116.8	 513.6	 366.7
1984	 77.6	 30.6	 65.5	 149.2	 272.7	 240.0
1987	 68.2	 42.9	 51.3	 108.6	 550.0	 166.7
source: KIHASA, 30 Years of Populaf ion Policy(1990), p.574.
The government allowed amniocentesis testing and overlooked abortion. The
induced abortion rate among the age group 20-44, reached 84.1 cases per 100
babies born in 1978. Since then it has steadily decreased to 77.7 in 1984, and 68.2
in 1987 as the Family Planning Programme turned its orientation for the benefit of
maternity health. (Table 5.8) To prevent induced abortions due to the son-
preference idea, the government prohibited amniocentesis testing. 36 Nevertheless,
the rate of induced abortion did not decrease among groups aged 25-34 who were
showing a strongest fecundity. That is the reason for the increase in the male sex
ratio of the age group 5-9 although the total rate of induced abortion decreased. A
pregnant woman influenced by both the traditional son-preference and the
prospective economic burden of rearing many children, easily chose an induced
abortion if the test revealed a girl. We find therefore, within little over one
generation, two quite contradictory social phenomena ; groom scarcity and bride
scarcity. Furthermore this is not limited to marriage only. As already discussed
above, it causes socio-economic problems followed by some confusion in the value
system.
Table 5.9. Unmarried Rate By Sex And Region In 1986
age cohort I	 urban areas
	
15-19	 99.8
	
20-24	 94.4
	
25-29	 44.0
	
30-34	 5.0
	
35-39	 2.0
source: FAM86
Apart from these problems in the near future, the marriage market is also in
regional dis-equilibrium. Looking at the matchable cohorts, in Table 5.9 from
FAM86, matched on the assumption of brides three years younger than grooms,
there is a matchable male to female surplus in the urban areas far more severely
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imbalanced than that of the whole country. On the other hand, would-be-brides in
rural areas are in great shortage. This problem derives from the failure of economic
policy rather than fertility structure. Due to the acceleration of economic growth
policy since the late 1 960s, a huge migration swept young girls into the rural areas.
Until the 1 970s the girls who earned enough in the city returned to the country to
marry. At the beginning of the 1980s, with the deepening of regional discrepancy
of economic wealth, cultural facilities, or educational opportunities etc., the rural
girls were very reluctant to return to the farm in the devastated country side.
Farming was physically hard and offered less economic, cultural, and social
rewards than white-collar or even the unskilled work in the cities could. They
preferred to settle down to marry in the city and gave up any lingering romanticism
of rural life The people who remained in the rural areas were mainly the aged, the
small farmers and their families, those afraid of changing jobs and older bachelors
without specific skills guaranteeing jobs in the city. Thus, the more the cities suffer
a groom scarcity, the worse the scarcity of brides in the country. The marriage
market in rural areas seems unhopeful regarding either the general trend of bride
scarcity among the younger generation or the deeply pervasive feeling of alienation
toward rural life.
Finally modernisation has affected the age gap between couples as well.
Traditional society had quite a high proportion where the wife was older than the
husband or where couples were age-fellows. As already discussed in Chapter 3,
there were two main reasons for this. First parents did not like their daughters
being selected for the tributary of Ch'ing dynasty of China, so they had their
daughters married before the selection. Parents chose the alternative of marrying
their daughter to a boy groom instead of to barbarians far away. The next but still
more importaiit reason was on the groom's parents side. They sought to do two
things at the same time. The first thing was to have their son reproduce the next
generation as soon as possible. To achieve this aim, the bride should be mature
enough to be quickLy pregnant as soon as their son was mature. The second
demand on the bride was of her skills in preparation for the very complicated
process of ancestral rituals. Preparation for these rituals was too hard and difficult
for a young girl. Such conditions had a groom's parents choose a slightly older
bride or at least one of the same age as their son.
As modernisation progressed, the need to practice ancestral rituals
weakened and moreover both men and women came to reject the conventional
meaning of marriage as mainly concerned with the reproduction of a new
generation. Instead, the criteria for prospective bridegrooms have moved to more
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individualistic ones. In hard times socially and economically, a groom was
expected to have a stable job as a good breadwinner. Thus it was important for a
groom to have a would-be-wife believe that he was strong enough to protect her
socially and economically. A bride could feel respect to the socially and
economically prospective man whom she relied on for her whole life, and that was
an important element that helped the married relationship. For a man to have an
economically stable job, first he should have completed three years of compulsory
army duty and have had a couple of years more for settling down with his job until
he could earn a minimum amount of money to pay for rent. As a result the average
age gap between couples in 1989 was calculated to be 4.31 years.
Table 5.10. Distribution Of Age Gap Between Husband And Wife
By Wife's Birth Year Cohort
year the	 age gap between wife and husband
wife born	 real No	 I	 total	 wife>hus I wife=hus I wife<hus
total	 2260	 100.0	 4.9	 7.0	 88.1
1905-20	 78	 100.0	 5.1	 2.6	 92.3
1921-30	 216	 100.0	 4.2	 6.0	 89.8
1931-40	 464	 100.0	 4.7	 6.3	 89.0
1941-50	 609	 100.0	 4.3	 6.6	 89.1
1951-60	 744	 100.0	 5.0	 9.2	 85.5
1961-68	 149	 100.0	 9.4	 16.1	 74.5
l9thcentury*	 100.0	 25.4	 10.6	 64.0
source: FAM89,
* from Table 3.8 in Chapter 3.
In Table 5.10, two groups can be distinguished. The first group, born
between 1905-1950, were those who suffered from economically, socially, and
politically severe events, and the last two.cohorts(1951-1968) are from the post-
war period. Particularly interviewees born betven 1961-68 have benefited most
from economic development. A man with potential economic success was the most
important for the next group. The next group cared slightly less for this and was
more concerned with other conditions for her would-be-groom. A man with good
personality, love, and the same generational identity were considered to be more
important as a base for conjugal communication and eventually for love. As a
result, casting off the traditional pattern, the conjugal age gap settled down with
about 4 per cent of wives older than husbands and 6 per cent age-fellows for many
decades with only a slight fluctuation. However the statistical trend changed very
dramatically, to a sharp increase with the wife older than the husband or of the
same age. The reason young post-war generations took age-fellow or younger
males as grooms can be explained from two perspectives. The first reason
particularly for the same age groom, was derived from the change in the values of
marriage and in lifestyle. This generation was the one most exposed to the
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individualistic atmosphere and they saw how dreary and depressing their mother's
marriage was because of marrying an older man who had an economically stable
job. The marriage they saw from their parents was deeply affected by the battle
against poverty. They saw a life far removed from what they had learned from
textbooks, novels, and movies which were deeply western-influenced. Fortunately
or unfortunately, they have been free from economically hard times thanks to their
parents' effort. Naturally they regarded age-fellow marriage as a good condition for
conjugal communication. Moreover it, more or less, points to emancipation from
the authoritarian conjugal order reflecting the age-oriented social structure still
prevailing in most parts of society. It was also a good opportunity to raise the issue
of her equality against her husband unlike her mother in relation to her father. The
next reason for the increase in the wife older than husband and the age-fellow
pattern came from the narrowness of the marriage market. Would-be-brides were
driven by the groom scarcity phenomena to turn their eyes to groups once
neglected as simply friends or younger-brother-like persons. From the perspective
of bride's parents, they were perceived neither stable economically at the time, nor
mature enough emotionally to protect their daughters. However, from the aspects
of the would-be-brides, they looked neither as authoritative as their father did nor a
slave of manimon as the all too scarce older potential grooms did in the exchange
of wedding gifts. In addition since the military service law of 1983, the period of
active service was reduced and job opportunities after army service improved
compared with what the elder generation had endured. There was therefore no
reason to be reluctant in choosing a younger groom. That was the reason post-war
generations began to show an increase in the wife older than the husband and the
age-fellow patterns of marriage. Of course still as much as three out of four
youngest brides choose a husband older than them. In other words respect and
guardianship are still important attributes perceived to maintain the conjugal
relationship among the younger generation as well. However, mutual love is being
embossed as an alternative to replace the conventional conjugal relationship.
There remains the question of which factors affected couples in selecting
mates most. So far two factors have been examined: changes in values on marriage
and the change of demographic structure. The data of FAM89 and FAM86 is not
extensive enough to examine the question fully, but it seems possible at least to
determine which factors are unlikely. To state the conclusion first, the value factor
seems more unlikely than the demographic element does. If most of the changes
were derived from a change in the values of marriage, the interviewees would have
shown a due amount of change in their opinions. However the reality was not so.
For example, the age gap between couples does not correspond to the change in the
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ideal value as shown in Table 5.11. There still remained a strong preference for the
husband older than the wife. Of course, the statistic has decreased from the bride
Table 5.11. Ideal Age Gap Between Couples
	year she	 ideal age gap between wife and husband
	
married	 total	 I wife>hus I wife=hus I wife<hus	 don't care
	
-1939	 100.0	 -	 4.1	 92.4	 3.5
	
1940-49	 100.0	 1.0	 2.4	 90.3	 6.2
	
1950-59	 100.0	 0.3	 2.0	 94.0	 3.7
	
1960-69	 100.0	 0.2	 2.5	 94.3	 3.1
	
1970-79	 100.0	 1.1	 3.6	 92.5	 2.8
	
1980-89	 100.0	 0.9	 5.2	 89.0	 4.9
source: FAM89
who married in 1970 onward. However the amount has been too slight to judge it
as the main cause of decline in the percentage of husbands older than wives. The
situation is the same with the age-fellow pattern. The preference, among those who
married during the last two decades, for the age-fellow has increased in relation to
those who married before 1970. Yet the increased amount does not match the
statistics of Table 5.10. There is too big a gap. In contrast to the increase of couples
of the same age and of the wife older than husband, ideal expectations about the
age of a would-be-husband have not changed yet. The husband is still expected to
be a protector of the family rather than to be a friend lacking a sense of
responsibility. All in all, the changing demographic structure, with its impact on
the marriage market looks to be a more plausible cause of the decrease in the
conventional husband older than wife pattern of pairing.
5.2.3. Regional Propinquity Of Modern Marriage And Match-maker
Before progressing to the regional propinquity of marriage, we will discuss
the principle of regional exogamy in the traditional society. The matrimony
followed the rule of regional exogamy at village level. Although being not as strict
as the clan exogamy or class endogamy, the regional exogamy principle was quite
pervasive at village level across the nation.
There were a couple of reasons for the regional exogamy. First it was
because, excepting a few big cities, most of villages were composed mostly of the
same clan. Thus seeking a would-be-bride/groom within a same community could
violate clan exogamy. Of course there were a few other clans using a different
name and different pon in a same village. However they were minorities in number
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and the social rank of their families was not similar enough for marriage with the
dominant families in the community.
Secondly, each family of a different clan felt a sort of brothership. Although
they were of different clan genealogically they were too deeply bonded at territorial
relationship provoking brothership among different families to have a nuptial
matter. As a matter of fact there were many cases of prohibition of marriage
between families of different clans living in the same village. For example, the
Chang family of Andong, the Kim family of Andong, and the Kwon family of
Andong is a case. As the pon (places of origin) denotes, three of them lived at
Andong over one thousand years ago and contributed, in good co-operation, for the
establishment of Kory dynasty. After the successful accomplishment, they made a
verbal promise to have a brotherhood relationship. From then on marriage among
the families was prohibited as moral incest even until present day Korea. The
territorial identification functioned in prohibiting marriage within the same
commumty.
Thirdly, but most importantly, a would-be-bride/groom was sought outside
the community to prevent the influence of the matrimonial relatives. To strengthen
solidarity among the munjung group that mostly formed a regional community, it
was felt to be necessary to isolate the influence of matrimonial relatives. Naturally
a bride was sought outside the groom's community. The saying, a toilet and a wife's
family are the better the further away, reflects the regional exogamy. The saying is
wide spread even in the present day. There is another clue of regional exogamy that
is observed in the wedding process even in modem Korea. After a wedding
ceremony at a bride's home, a newly married groom is expected to entertain the
bride's neighbours to a dinner party. It was perceived as a sort of cost paying for
bringing out a member from the community. He used to be asked to compose a
poem within a limited time, to sing a song, or to mimic funny behaviours. If he
failed at the request from the community members the soles of his feet were beaten.
Beating the sole of the groom's feet symbolised him having difficult in bringing his
wife out from the community. By the way the reverse was not true. It was because
a groom's community gained a member if a bride's community were the losers. In
other words, the bride was expected to move to the groom's family after three days
of wedding ceremony under the patrilocality principle. That is why a son-in-law
was likened to a visitor while the daughter-in-law was as a real family member.
After the marriage celebration both daughter-in-law and son-in-law were rarely
expected to visit the bride's family by both family and community in order to
prohibit the influence on each other. That was the reason why a would-be
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bride/groom was sought outside the regional boundary a clan. However, even with
regional exogamy, the absolute distances involved hardly stayed outside the same
provincial or township boundary because transportation or the information network
for would-be groonVbride was not as developed as in the present day.
Modemisation deeply stirred regional exogamy. 37 Regional exogamy lost
its meaning by casting off from the conventional community life, pivoting at clan
group. There is no more conventional clan coercing community-based familism.
The breakdown of exogamy was accelerated by the high rate of regional mobility
followed after transportation development, and it has stirred the conventional base
of community life. In addition, three quarters of the population are living in the
urban areas of anonymity, so talking about the regional boundary itself has become
useless. Moreover, regional bondage of conventional marriage has been rapidly
broken-down by the spread of preference for a love marriage. The basis for the
regional exogamy has almost disappeared in modem Korea in the process of
urbanisation, migration, and Westemisation all of which stirred conventional
community identity.
The breakdown of regional exogamy does not mean that there is not
regional propinquity 38 in marriage matters. If breakdown of regional exogamy is
one thing, regional propinquity is another. Regional propinquity existed from the
traditional period. Even though the society was under the principle of regional
exogamy, the regional boundary within which a family could seek a would-be-
bride/groom outside own community was not open nation-wide. Rather, the
boundary was mostly limited to province level at maximum. In traditional society
people were geographically isolated and since transportation was undeveloped, it
was hardly possible to marry a child into a family too far away to hear no news
about the child after marriage. Even the match-maker had not enough information
about would-be-bride/groom to introduce them across the nation. As a result the
regional boundary showed quite a homogeneous propinquity at a provincial level.
In modem society, thanks to the development of the transportation system, the
regional boundary of marriage was seen to be heterogeneous. However, in reality it
has not happened like that. It still revealed a high degree of regional propinquity.
There are some difficulties in examining the regional boundary of
matrimony. The first is a lack of historical data on the degree of regional
propinquity in the past. The next and worst difficulty comes from the high rate of
mobility before marriage. It makes measurement difficult. In traditional society for
most husbands, the place where he married was the same place he was born and
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brought up, because the society was under patrilocality principle. The probability
of a wife living in the place she was born and brought up after her marriage was
relatively quite rare at village level due to the patrilocality principle interwoven
with the regional exogamy. However the probability, at town or provincial level,
was not relatively low due to the geographical and transportation barriers
mentioned above. Regional basis of most of husband and wife was decided roughly
at town level.Due to the high rate of regional mobility since the late 1960s, the
frame of reference for measuring the regional base has been quite weakened. In
other words in modem times many have moved too frequently to measure the
conventional concept of the matrimonial region. Urbanisation has developed too
much to make an operational definition of the conventional regional community. In
spite of the barriers on data, Table 5.12 gives some insight into the change of
regional propinquity. In general both husband and wife are not living in the same
place when married as when they were single, hinting at regional propinquity.
Table 5.12. The Consistency Ratio of Residential Boundary Of Mrriage
By Sex And By Marriage Cohorts.
marriage	 consistency ratio of the places39
cohort	 born and married	 before & after marriage
husband	 wife	 husband	 wife
total	 62.4	 69.3	 85.6	 71.3
1934-39	 88.9	 95.6	 93.3	 84.4
1940-49	 85.6	 92.9	 90.1	 81.4
1950-59	 78.4	 84.5	 89.6	 80.3
1960-69	 70.0	 76.8	 83.9	 71.0
1970-79	 52.1	 63.5	 84.4	 68.7
1980-86	 48.2	 50.4	 83.9	 64.6
source: FAM86
The table calculated what percentage of persons were married and living in
the same place where s/he was born and how many of them, after marriage, are
living in the same place they lived before. The table reveals many social facts
about the marriage pattern. Firstly the first two columns of the table tell how
frequently the bride/groom moved regionally before marriage. The statistics show a
dramatic decrease in the 1 970s. It reflects the high mobility to the cities brought
about by the Economic Development programme. At the beginning of the 1 980s,
the gap between the sexes reduced greatly to just 2.2 per cent. This again reflects
the high mobility of female labour into the cities. The last two columns come close
to the explanation of the pattern of regional propinquity. In spite of the fact that
modemisation has progressed very rapidly both sexes show a high regional
endogamy. This is more evident among the male group. The consistency ratio for
females is smaller than that for males and the gap is getting bigger with each
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younger generation, notably among those who married after the 1 970s. The reason
for the lower ratio amongst females reflects both the lower social status of women
and the tradition of patrilocality. In traditional society, a bride was expected to
move to the groom's house after the marriage ceremony at her home. The trip from
her home to her husband's house after the ceremony was called the honeymoon
trip. Along with the decline of the stem family principle, neo-Iocality has
increased. However, the newly married couple is still expected to stay nearer to the
groom's parents or even to stay with them for a time until they judge the bride is
able to learn her husband's family customs. Women's socio-economic status also
added to their lower ratio of regional endogamy. In spite of modemisation, the
would-be-brides' salary is usually smaller than that of the would-be-groom and her
occupational status is still likely to be lower than his. A would-be-bride could
therefore more easily give up her job to move to where her would-be-husband was
working. The situation has been getting worse for would-'be-brides due to the
groom scarcity phenomena since the 1970s which has dsco'iiagei women from
taking the initiative in raising their voices to the matrilocality or neolocality.
To conclude, in spite of these variations, the trend shows a high ratio of
residential propinquity. The reason is neither transportational nor geographical as it
was in the past, but the main reason for this is the match-making mechanism. As
discussed previously the hegemony of decision-making about the marriage partner
has moved to the children, but the children's rights and parents' authority have been
reconciled by allowing them space in the process of match-making. Employing a
match-maker is the mechanism parents can conventionally offer in the process of
mate-selection and the average rate of women married by a match-maker was 71.8
per cent by 1989. In fact, unless the match-maker is a highly specialised woman,
the information she has about would-be-brides/grooms is mostly limited to her own
residential area. That is why the consistency ratio for residential boundaries is quite
high.
To help understand the situation, it is necessary to scrutinise the process of
match-making and the reason for its prevalence, even in modern times. First a
match-maker is appointed at the request of the parents. Of course, the parents ask
their daughters/sons about their intention to marry in advance. At the request of the
parents, the match-maker, usually a woman in her fifties or sixties, visits the
client's home. She observes the features and personality of the would-be-
bride/groom and in addition asks questions or makes her own self-estimates about
the family's condition. The important points generally include the degree of
education and the occupation of the person concerned, and the economic condition
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or social status of the family or near relatives concerned. After this she introduces a
few candidates whom she judges the most well-matched to each other. The
candidate can be either from the same socio-economic and educational group or
from a different group that may compensate for the weak points of each other. If a
would-be-groom is highly educated and holds a job with good prospects but is
from a poor family background socially or economically, he can be introduced to a
would-be-bride of a good family but lacking these other attributes. If a would-be-
bride is well-educated and even beautiful but from a poor family, she can be
introduced to a candidate with less education from an economically well endowed
family. However such cases are not as frequent as those where candidates from
similar backgrounds are introduced.
Once the level of the person concerned and of her/his family is judged, the
match-maker introduces candidates one by one until marriage is decided upon. The
candidates themselves have to estimate the personality of their opposite. Both
candidates are allowed a considerable length of time to understand each other.
Sometimes the match-making is successful with the first candidate, but sometimes
dozens of other candidates are introduced. Interestingly most match-making is
successful after just a few introductions because both candidates are from similar
backgrounds which makes it easier for each to discover identical concerns.
Once both candidates show a clear intention to marry each other, the role of
the match-maker comes into operation again even more earnestly. She visits the
parents of both families and mediates in detail until the end of the marriage
celebration. Under conventional familism the marriage process was strongly felt to
be the most serious and dignified undertaking for a human being. To lLit this sacred
purpose, the procedure of marriage was highly elaborate and complicate. However
the more elaborate, the more conflicts were observed between families in the
process. That is why the match-maker was enrolled as a mediator for the marriage
and a supervisor for the marriage decorum. The present day match-maker
negotiates the amount of the marriage gifts that otherwise may cause conflicts
between the persons concerned or between the families. In most cases, the disputes
about the marriage gifts predominantly reflect the remains of conventional family
competition rather than economic conflicts. There used to be many cases of
breakdown in the middle of marriage over the amount of marriage gifts, though the
underlying cause of the conflicts came basically from the traditional competitive
familism.
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The reason a match-maker was needed can be explained on the basis of two
points. The side-effects of a match-maker have never been negligible, sometime
she escalated family competition in terms of marriage gifts. Worse, she might even
intentionally break up the on-going event if the reward she got from both the
families was not satisfactory. In spite of these side-effects, the custom has
continued until the present day mainly from the deep-rooted sense of decorum. The
Code of the Chosön (1395) society prescribed that marriage should be delivered by
a match-maker. The law was prepared as a reaction against the immoral trends
associated with love marriage at the end of the Koryö dynasty. Love marriage
without a match-making process was restricted as a barbarian practice. This
historical root has been handed down to present day Korean parents. They tend to
view couples choosing love marriage as indicating a lack of home training. The
next reason is more pragmatic. With deepening urbanisation, most members of
society have fallen into anonymity. Most present day Koreans are unaware of who
lives next door or the identity of their neighbours. As a result information on the
most suitable person for a would-be-bride/groom is extremely limited.
Nevertheless, the parents are very reluctant to leave their children to a love-
marriage, because they have always believed it to be a most barbarian custom on
the one hand, and they are not sure their children can choose a moderate would-be-
groom/bride by themselves on the other hand. They know that the young
generation attracted by externally attractive features rather than by good
personality or socio-economic potential. The former may seem good when they are
in love but the latter is far more important for a balanced family life. Considering
their own matrimonial life, they believe that similar background or a better off
partner were very important elements for a sound family life. On this point children
of marriageable age are of the same opinion as their parents generation. Naturally a
match-maker is the most convenient person they can consult about thir possible
marriage. That is the reason for the prevalence of arranged marriage in present day
Korea.
5.2.4. Changes In Clan Exogamy
No marriage was allowed within the tongsëngdongbon in the traditional
society. It was a strict clan exogamy. The group sharing the same surname and the
same place of the origin was tabooed regardless of how distant the kinship relation
of the persons concerned. Clan endogamy was strictly regulated as an incest taboo,
and even as a crime.
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Matrimonial customs have remained almost unchanged in the process of
modernisation. Clan exogamy still persists in present day Korea. Of course the fact
that clan exogamy has persisted for centuries both legally and socially does not
mean that there were never any cases of marriage of rongsöngdongbon. The Census
of 1985 counted 1.1 per cent of clan endogamy, and FAM89 0.5 per cent. However
the statistic was very meagre compared even to the 17th century's of 5.4 per cent40.
However minor the figure may be, it still concerned an issue of human rights.
There were gigantic efforts made in 1977 and 1990 which resulted in the revised
law of 1978 and 1991. The result however was just a series of hot disputes between
women's groups and the Confucianists. Both of them appealed to public opinion
but none of the points they made were critical enough to win the argument. The
women's groups pin-pointed how ridiculous it was to cage a couple in the incest
taboo on the ground they had origins in the same clan hundreds or even thousands
years ago. Even if there were a point eugenically, the chokbo was purchased too
often during the social disorders caused by wars in the traditional period so that it
is hardly believable that the book-holders really are the descendants of the
originator in the book. The Confucianists on the other hand focused on the
significance of marriage regulation as a social reference of morality and a
crystallised symbol of human morality. They attributed the increase in illegal or
pre-marital sexual affairs and divorce rate etc. to the symptoms of a moral vacuum.
They argued this was the consequence of breakdown of the fvni2y principle. Once
the matrimonial regulation is loosened, hundreds of other social disorders occur.
They believed human behaviour and thought to be closely interrelated and resulted
in change after change. Both sides had some support from public opinion and as a
result, a reconciliation was commenced leaving both unsatisfied. The ad hoc law
was pronounced to relieve the minority who could not have registered as a legal
couple and whose children were prescribed as illegitimate. ObsessiOnal belief
against clan endogamy is still pervaded deeply unchanged in the present day. U is
observed in the initial process of a date between youths. Both sexes almost stereo-
typically ask two questions at the first greeting; name aridpon( place of the origin).
If they recognise the same genealogical ancestor, they laugh and do not go further.
5.2.5. Changes In Class Endogamy
In the traditional society, the matrimony was strictly class endogamous. No
male from a non-yangban class could marry a woman born of the yangban. Even a
love affair meant the loss of his life. A female could marry a yangban, however
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this conferred no socially and legally guaranteed status. She was just a plaything, a
concubine of an old man. However the custom has changed, since modernisation,
the most profoundly at least externally. The class system itself has disappeared
from the first Constitution of 1905 and nobody believes in class as a condition for
marriage. The concubinage as well has totally disappeared both from legal
proscription and from social recognition. Class endogamy of the conventional level
is being recognised and prescribed as an evil in modern times.
Nevertheless there still remains a question of class concept. Of course the
conventional class system has collapsed and accordingly the conventional class
endogamy has also disappeared. The question is a possibility of the presence of a
modified pattern of class endogamy.4 ' However there are many barriers that
examine the difficult issue. Among them, defining the capitalist characteristics of
present day Korea is not easy work. Thus there has been no consensus about the
capitalist structuralisation of class in Korea. It has been recognised as not a matter
of absolute deprivation but of relative deprivation. Conventionally the income
inequality index (Gini's coefficient) has been relatively quite low compared to any
other Asian society or even to the U.S.A or many developed countries in Europe. It
was 0.359 in 1980 and was much lower up to the 70s. 42 The reason for the low
index came from the high rate of social mobility during the last half a century. Of
course there were the rich. However, they were a sinking and a very transient group
reflecting the speedy change in Korean society. In a word there was no socially
recognised rich class in Korea, in spite of there being many rich people. As a result,
it becomes meaningless to examine the existence of class endogamy in the Marxian
way. The next barrier to analysis of class or class endogamy comes from the lack
of historical data and lack of an economic scale to measure the class structure.
Unlike the West measuring a persons class position according to a scale of
economic income, Korea has not sorted out a proper scale yet. Even the salary
schedule regulation is not identical in each organisation. Worse, there still exists
huge amounts of money earned in the parallel economy that carmot be identified in
a conventional social survey. As a result it is very difficult to measure social class
relying on the registered amount of salary an individual gets.
Quite recently the issue of class has been revived. Kong is a representative
scholar who argues the arrival of the upper class in Domhoffs concept 43 . In the
early 1 980s Korea achieved a good rate of economic growth and accordingly the
big companies, once unstable due to the very fragile political, economic and social
conditions began to stabilise and to transmit their wealth to the next generation. To
reinforce this class reproduction, they established relations through marriage to the
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figures in the same business world or in political or administrative circles.
Relatives by marriage were expected to make a trust to protect their own wealth
and that of their children. According to Kong who surveyed the marriages of
children and grandchildren of the hundred big companies, one out of three Sons
from these married brides from political or administrative circles, two out of five to
those from the famous business families, while two out of five daughters married
grooms from the famous business families and one out of four from the political or
administrative world. On the basis of these statistics Kong asserted the arrival of an
upper class in recent Korea.
It is a quite plausible interpretation. However, there are still a couple of
unverified and ambiguous points to have the argument settled. It is still hard to
assert that this demonstrates class endogamy. First Domhoffs concept of class is
much too limited to the family group to denote the economic concept of C. W.
Mills or K. Marx. Of course, the fact alone cannot be an excuse for rejecting
Kong's analysis. However, the suspicion lies with the social characteristic of
modern Korea, if Korea has already reached to an extreme capitalist country. The
problem is that the marriage practice of the other groups from the political or
administrative circle have not yet been verified. Considering the historically
inherited spirit of 'honourable poverty' that is still strongly prevalent, it is natural
for the economic circle to have their children marry to families of honour such as
political or administrative circle or scholarly families, since it is perceived as
upward social mobility for the rich by marriage. However, it is downward social
mobility for the political and administrative circle at least nominally. Deeply
influenced by the traditional idea of 'honourable poverty', Koreans tend to think
negatively of rich people and it is still an aspect which exists against the business
circle, due to their capitalistic attitude of pursuing an excessive interest. Most
Koreans think a person who contributes to society cannot be rich but poor.
Scholars, politicians, or administrators were extremely poor but the most respected
because of their sincere devotion to society. The idea is still powerful in the
modern Korea. One of the most outstanding clues on the social status of each
occupation is observed at any formal public meeting or event at townlvillage level.
The seats reserved for honoured guests are hierarchically arranged, first of all to
scholars or administrative heads of the region, next to politicians, and lastly and
rarely to the rich who were directly concerned in the event. An opportunity to
deliver a congratulatory address is allowed almost rarely to a man of enterprise or
rich person. They are perceived of just rich but with no authority or honour.
Another clue to the status of the rich is observed when they visit their home town.
If a famous scholar or politician visits his/her home town the administrative head
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of the town goes to the train station to meet them or at least sends their head's car
to bring the visitor to the opposite's home comfortably if the head is really busy.
The residents as well sincerely welcome the visitor with great respect. However
nothing happens if a man of enterprise visits, however rich he is. Reversely he
himself visits here and there to give to the honourably poor. The fact that some
children from rich families marry into families from political or administrative
circles cannot directly explain the arrival of the upper class. It can be an upward
mobility of their social status but not a formation of an upper class yet. Unless the
matrimonial custom of the political and administrative circle or scholar group as
well is proved, Kong's argument is a bit of an over-generalisation under an
assumption that Korea has been structuralised into a typical capitalist society. Yet
the assumption is implausible under the condition the rich are not yet sotha22y
perceived as an upper class in present ..day Korea. SeconcX\y, the data surveyed
referred to less than half of the relevant population, and collaterals were excluded
from the analysis. It is quite risky to assume the collaterals are under as much
similar matrimonial flow as the direct lines are. Considering the weakness of the
conventional primogeniture stem principle, there is no definite clue that the rich
can coercively draw their collaterals to marry like them. Lastly, as the Korean
business world is, directly or indirectly, closely related to the political hegemony, it
rises and falls too often according to changes in the power structure to structuralise
a stable class. So it is still uncertain for the rich to reproduce their wealth
generation by generation. To conclude neither capitalist class nor the class
endogamy has settled down in present day Korea.
However, it seems possible to examine class endogamy in terms of the
stratification of M. Weber. As we have stated above the scales to measure
economic condition or social position in Korea are not yet elaborated: Even if a
would-be-bride/groom's salary was known, it would be almost meaningless to
quantify it as a measure of the class endogamy. Firstly, because women's salaries
are generally lower than those of men, even if the educational level is same. Next
more importantly, because the economic condition estimated for making marriage
deal is not that of the persons concerned but that of the parents. Of course match-
makers try to find out about a would-be-groom's salary level for the future life of
the would-be-bride. The present level of economic wealth that insures pleasant
married life at least in the initial stage for those concerned, is judged by their
parents' economic condition. However, there is no data in FAM86 or FAM89.
Naturally the educational or occupational level is therefore the best alternative left.
In spite of the lack of economic indices, the educational scale has been a quite
reliable barometer for the analysis of the stratification. Due to the deep enthusiasm
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for education, economic and social reward conforms closely to educational
achievement at least until the mid-80s when the trade union movement became
more active. The educational aspect of the choice of marriage can be a good index
of endogamy in Korea.
Table 5.13. Percentage Distribution Of Educated Years Of Husband And
Wife.
educated	 educational years of husband
yrs of wife	 total	 0-6	 7-9	 10-12	 I	 13 & +
total	 100.0	 26.7	 19.1	 36.4	 17.8
0-6	 40.7	 25.5	 9.4	 5.4	 0.4
7-9	 23.2	 0.8	 8.4	 12.2	 1.9
10-12	 29.9	 0.4	 1.2	 18.6	 9.7
13 & +
	 6.2	 -	 0.1	 0.3	 5.9
Kendall's correlation coefficient: 0.4645 (sig. = 0.000)
source: FAM89 (Among 2838 cases in total, 469 cases of no response, or of no couple were
excluded)
As shown in Table 5.13, educational condition shows a very high
correlation in mate-selection. The table shows a few interesting trends. Firstly at
the more extreme educational levels that is to say the lowest and the highest level,
the stronger the correlation. Next, while males tend to marry women with a lower
educational level than themselves, it is very rare to find female married to a
husband of lower educational level. Thus educational condition was recognised to
be a very significant one to qualify would-be grooms, while other conditions such
as beauty or good nature were added as qualifications for would-be-brides. To
conclude, in spite of a slioght variation by sex a high rate of educational matching
was found among present day Koreans.
The similar degree of high correlation is observed in the occupation
between husband and wife. Of course •. the correlation coefficient of the
occupational field is statistically lower than that of the educational level. However,
if Vill-category of unemployment is excluded, the statistic increases very
significantly to as hi'gh as the correlation coefficient of the educational level. In
fact, the opinion towards an unemployed bride is totally different from towards an
unemployed groom. If a would-be-groom is unemployed, he is socially perceived
as being an incapable person and very shameful, however rich a family he is from.
However, if a would-be-bride is unemployed, she is perceived as just having no job
doing other things she might think more important like self-cultivation or attending
a school for domestic training. It is nothing to feel shameful at all about for Korean
women. Measuring correlation between an unemployed groom and an unemployed
bride is meaningless, at least in the Korean context of social consciousness. As a
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result, if we calculated excluding the unemployed women before marriage, who
occupy half of women, the statistics might increase far higher.
Table 5.14. Percentage Distribution Of Occupation Of Husband And Wife
Before Marriage
wife's occupation before
occupation I total	 I	 I	 I III I IV	 I	 V	 I	 VI	 VII	 VIII
	total 100.0
	
3.6	 14.4	 6.0	 4.9	 20.5	 0.2	 50.3
I	 7.2	 0.8	 1.9	 0.4	 0.2	 0.8	 -	 3.1
	
II	 3.9	 0.3	 0.9	 0.2	 0.2	 0.5	 *	 1.8
	
III	 14.1	 1.1	 4.8	 0.8	 0.2	 1.9	 -	 5.3
	
IV	 25.9	 0.9	 4.3	 2.3	 1.4	 6.8	 *	 10.1
V	 20.2	 *	 0.6	 0.6	 1.4	 2.5	 *	 15.1
	
VI	 8.1	 0.1	 0.9	 0.5	 0.3	 3.2	 *	 3.0
	
VII	 12.3	 0.1	 0.6	 0.8	 0.6	 3.9	 -	 6.1
	VIII	 8.3	 0.1	 0.5	 0.6	 0.6	 0.9	 -	 5.7
Kendall's correlation coefficient: 0.1942 (sig. 0.0000)
source: FAM86 (Among 3013 cases in total 394 cases were missing due to no response etc.)
Category of occupational job : I. professional and engineering, II. administrative and managerial
III. clerical, IV. sales and service, V. agriculture, forestry and fishery,
VI. skilled manual, VII. unskilled manual, VIII. unemployed.
legend : - no cases observed, * below 0.1 per cent, bold character: correlated cells
There is quite a high rate of correlation between the husbands' occupational
or educational level and the wives' level. In other words, although modern marriage
does not follow the conventional principle of class endogamy, a high rate of
endogamous characteristics are observed at the level of stratification. By
stratification only educational or occupational variables are examined not income
level. However regarding the educational variable dominates over other variables
in achieving social status, endogamous marriage is assumed to have been prevalent
in the income level as well. Of course, the trend may be false in a relative sense at
the end of the 1980s after the formation of the trade union movement which made
one of its targets the reduction of the wage gap through education. 45 However, the
fact the income gap became a serious issue of the movement denotes nothing but
the income strata have existed and it was decided by the level of education.
However mitigated the correlation by stratum is at moment, it may be true Korean
marriage custom is being regulated to be endogamous within same educational,
occupational, and even by income level.
	VI	 VVII
15.5
[60.4)
	
12.6	
I [63.7)
9.1	 II	 7.6
/
5.0 I	 1U.2
[66.8)
7.6
(71.2)
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5.3. CONCLUSION: THE LIFE CYCLE OF INDIVIDUALS
Changes in the pattern of fertility behaviour and in the matrimonial trend
accompanied by the general increase in average life expectancy, inevitably brought
about further changes in the life' cycle of individuals.46
Before going into the main context, it is necessary to describe the
background of the life cycle calculated, because part of the data in the cycle was
produced by projection. Firstly, the age at first marriage of the interviewee was
calculated directly in the data collected from FAM86. The age of interviewee
women at the first born was also directly adopted from FAM89 data on the fertility
history of women. Secondly, women's age at the last born was produced by a dual
scale. In the case of the youngest group (marriage cohort: 1975-85) of whom 22
per cent of them have not completed fertility behaviour, the age at the last born was
projected by two variables. subtracting the given number of children already born
from the number of the expected children (0.2 persons at average), the period until
she would deliver the last baby was estimated reflecting the time other women of
the same age group delivered their last baby from the time the second to last baby
was born. Then the estimated age was re-averaged with the statistics of the age at
the last born from 78 per cent of the women who had already completed fertility
behaviour in the same marriage cohort.
Figure 5.3. Individual Life Cycle Of Women By Marriage Cohort
I	 II
	
III	 IV
4.1	 15.5	 9.3
<I> irrige, cohop-t: j935-144
I 3.2 1	
12.6	 12.9
<18.0> marage cohort l9454
	
9.1	 17.1
<20.3> mriage cohort/I 955-64
1.5	 5.0	 21.2
<21.7> nrriage cfort: 1965-74
I1 	 2.2	 24.0	 15.0	 I	
7.2
<22.7> marriage cohort: 1975-8511	 [74.5)
I. marriage. II. the first child born, III. the last child born. IV. child begin to many
V. every child married, VI. death of husband, VII. death of her, [number): age at her death
number: years required to complete each stage. <number>: age at marriage
dotted line: husbands death preceded the completion of childrens marriage
Source: FAM86
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On the other hand, in the case of women married before 1974 among whom 99 per
cent have completed fertility, their fertility history was directly used for the
calculation of the life cycle. The third projection of the IV-stage(at the women's
age a child begins to marry) and the V-stage(the age every child married) was the
most difficult and sophisticated. According to the data collected from FAM86, the
proportion of women who had a child married was just 22 per cent, and no more
than 2.2 per cent of women had every children married. If the data was used
directly, it definitely caused a bias from the truncation effect due to the high
unmarried rate. As a last resort the stages were estimated in an empirical study that
children's age at the first marriage can be moderately estimated from the age at the
first marriage of one generation younger group than the interviewee women. 47
 Of
course it is quite risky to adopt the assumption, but under a condition lacking
sound data, it can be an alternative. To estimate the women's age at a child began
to marry, census data in 1966 and 1975 were used for the marriage cohort of 1934-
1944 and 1945-1954 in each. In the case of women married after 1955, census data
of 1985 were used. In fact, the age at the first marriage depends on social and
demographic and sex difference of each individual and the sequence of each child
married does not exactly correspond to the sequence of child born. Nevertheless,
for the purpose of simplification, only the sexual difference of marriage age of the
first born child and the last born child was considered for the calculation of the life
cycle. For example in the case the first born child being a boy and the second child
a girl, the second child may probably marry earlier than the eldest son did if their
age gap was short. However the difference was disregarded to simplify the
calculation as primary data was lacking at the time. While for the calculation of the
women's age at the every child married, in the same procedure above, the women's
age at the last child born was added to the due value of the age at the first child
married. Lastly VI- and Vu-stage were calculated based on the life table of each
marriage cohort. Using the life table, the duration of expected ftiture life from the
age at their marriage was calculated by the statistics of linear interpolation and
added again to theirage at marriage. In spite of a few weak points latent in the
procedure of the estimation, it might give enough insight into the general analysis
of life cycle. Although the figure is mapped out from the women's life cycle, there
may be some misinterpretation of the life span of men in detail, and it is still
valuable in giving a general insight into the family life as a whole.
As shown in Figure 5.3, several patterns can be observed. First, in spite of
the trend towards late marriage among the younger generation, the total period of
married life has been extended. 48
 The main reason comes from the extension of life
expectancy. The average life span of both women and men has extended almost 15
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years for the last two decades with a sex difference of about 7 years on average.
The increase is due to medical progress, and the advancement of living standards
brought about by the economic growth of the last a few decades. While the age at
the first marriage has been prolonged by some 7 years. As a result, the total period
of family life for both of them has been extended from 44.5 to 51.8 years for two
decades.
The second characteristic of the cycle is the reduction of the honeymoon
period until the first child is born (TI-stage) and of the period until a woman
delivered the last baby (Ill-stage). 49 The reduction is closely related to the
reproductive behaviour of the younger generation. First, since women believe a
baby born of a younger mother is healthier than that of an older mother, they
deliver a baby as early as possible to compensate their late marriage. 50 In addition,
if married life with no children is unimaginable, it is best to have a small number of
children as early as possible to enjoy a second stage of individual life. That is the
reason the Il-stage has been quite reduced among younger generation. Second the
popularity of the small family idea, ITT-stage when the last child was born has come
far earlier than with the older generation. Thus the duration between the first child
born and the last child born has radically shortened. The reduction of the fertility
duration brought another change in women's life cycle. The period for childrearing
has been reduced. In other words, the duration between the first child born (TI-
stage) and every child married (V-stage) has been radically shortened from 39.3
years among those in their sixties to 28.4 years among in their twenties. Naturally
the reduction has increased the remaining life until the husband's death and the
woman's own death. The changes in the fertility behaviour have allowed a second
stage in which younger generations may have time for themselves rather than for
the children.
The third aspect of the life cycle is the time of a husband's death. Husbands
used to die very much earlier than at retirement from their job and even prior to the
marriage of the last of the children.5 ' In the eldest generation, on average he died in
his early fifties. His death affected not only his wife but also probably the children
not mature enough to control themselves psychologically and emotionally. More
seriously perhaps than the emotional deprivation, was the loss of economic base for
the remaining family. The early fifties was the age when a husband just began to
stabilise his home economically. It was the period when economic support for the
children was most needed and when for his wife it was too late to find a new job.
This occurred when society had not yet even dreamt of providing even moderate
social security. Husbands from the youngest generation live long enough to have
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all their children married, owing to the general increase in the life expectancy.
Even if he dies before the average life expectancy, the economic impact on the
surviving wife and children is not as serious as it was for the eldest generation
thanks to the pension system.
The fourth factor is the expansion of the empty nest period of between V-
stage(the time every child married) and VI-stage(death of husband). For the women
group of marriage cohort 1955-64 and below, they had almost no concept of empty
nest. The group in their sixties and over (marriage cohort: 1935-1944) is a typical
example. There are two reasons of the absence of empty nest. The first reason is
that they had too many children. The second reason is that life expectancy of both
husband and wife was too short to have such experience. The husband died before
he could complete his familial duty and his wife as well died soon after she had all
her children married. Thus, the elderly group in their sixties and over had no more
individual life. They devoted almost the whole of their life to childrearing and
family affairs. That was the general image of women. That was the reason
motherhood predominated womanhood. Under the situation where her children had
not became independent yet, the discussion of womanhood was luxurious and
nonsense. However, the situation has changed very dramatically in the last a few
decades thanks to the changes in the attitude towards a smaller number of children
and the extension of average life expectancy. For example, for the youngest
generation in their twenties, the average husband lives 15 years more after all his
children are married and his wife 22.2 years. As a result a husband and wife keep
an empty nest for at least 15 years. It may be a good time for a couple to enjoy their
married life but without adequate levels of social and financial provision for their
old age, it becomes boring, and even deprived, and their home an iron cage.
Husbands still enjoy an occupational life until they retire and die after several years
of retirement. However a wife mostly lacks a social or economic job with the
decrease in mortality rates and this may be the case particularly for women in the
future.
There is one thing more which makes the situation of women in the empty
nest complicated. As a matter of fact, no concept of empty nest existed under the
traditional principle of stem family. As the eldest son and his family were sharing
the same roof after his marriage, parents who had all of their children married did
not have to be alone. According to FAM89 data, 15.7 per cent of household still
remained a stem family pattern. Thus parents belonging to the stem family
household are not in an empty nest, at least nominally in spite they had all children
married. Except these cases, many of parents are in the empty nest. Under the
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modified stem principle after modernisation, parents have separated from the
married children but re-join only when one of the partners passes away or is in bad
health. Of course, if the parents are economically lacking, children, in co-
orporation, contribute during the empty nest period. However the modification is
quite reasonable if parents are physically and emotionally healthy enough not to
feel any deprivation. It can be an alternative to prevent possible conflicts between
mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. However, the reality does not always exactly
correspond to the theory. If children are not wealthy enough to support poor class
parents in the empty nest, or if the circumstances of children's family are not
moderate enough to serve parents in ill health, eventually the parents are deserted
in the empty nest. The newly arrived, in the process of modemisation, concept of
the empty nest looks like expanding, accompanied with the modification of the
stem family principle..
Lastly the change in the life cycle affects married life, particularly far
housewife. In the case of the older generations, they spent the whole of their
married lives in handling familial affairs. With large numbers of children preferred,
they used the whole of their time, resources, and energy in attending to their
children's affairs. In addition they were expected to pay more attention to the near
or even distant relatives' problems under the patriarchal familism. Naturally there
remained nothing left for themselves. A few years of honeymoon period were the
only time they could concentrate on each other but not enough to foster the love
that youths prefer. Brought up to express none of their feelings in front of their
parents, they could not fully make use of the honeymoon, sharing the same roof
with them. Co-operation rather than love was more important in coping with the
exhausting, repetitive familial affairs between couples. They spent the whole of
their life believing that was joy and the goal of a sincere life and the real meaning
of married life. As a result the present day idea of love between couples was
recognised as the affair only of the young. Among older people it was thought
immature and selfish,behaviour, forgetting their responsibilities for their children.
However this situation has changed due to the change in the familial life
cycle. Among the youngest generation, significant affairs like the birth of children,
their marriage, and the death of a husband, occurred at great enough intervals to
handle them calmly because they prefered a small number of children. In addition
there is no need to pay attention to remote relatives due to the general trend toward
greater individualism. As a result, both the wife and husband can afford much more
time, effort, and economic resources to concentrate on each other. Moreover thanks
to the development of household appliances, a housewife has much more time than
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her parents could. They do not have to stay under the same roof with their parents-
in-law thanks to the modification of the stem principle. In a word it is the best time
for young couples to enjoy their own married happiness. However if other
conditions are not adequate the free time can create unexpected disasters. For
example, conflicts can be worsened by a wife's concentration on her husband's
behaviour on the one hand, or she can feel much more severe deprivation if her
individual economic or social conditions are not sufficient to enable her to make
use of her free time on the other hand. The occupational market in present day
Korea, is not enough to offer all housewives a full time or part time job, and even
healthy recreational or educational programmes have not yet fully developed. The
change in the family life cycle has come too early for the society to cope with. If it
is time to make a consensus about the dealing of the free labour, it should be done
in the home as well as at social level.
To conclude, going back to the discussion on the atypical pattern of family
households (Refer to 1.1.4 and 4.4.), each and every change in individual family
life cycle mentioned so far are closely related with the emergence of diversity and
variation of family life: single person households, empty nest, single parent
households, etc. which was rarely observed in the traditional society. However, as
already discussed in Chapter One, the emergence of the atypical pattern of family
households does not mean Korean families are under the third family principle as
postmodernists asserted, but merely a change in the life cycle together with an
increase in the divorce rate. Present day Koreans are still under either the principle
of lineage or the nuclear family principle even though both are sometimes
conflicting. The changes are in tempo and pattern of the life cycle but the
organising principles either of stem family or of nuclear family are not. Rather, it is
important to recognise the atypical patterns as families rather than abnormal or
residual ones.
CHAPTER SIX
HUSBAND AND WIFE:
ROLES AND POWER
In this chapter mainly two themes are going to be discussed: role allocation
in the family and the distribution of power among its members. First I will examine
four roles that in traditional society were very strictly defined and this has been
mitigated to meet the demands of young generations, together with the resulting
new patterns of role conflict. Finally I shall consider the de facto distribution of
power over familial affairs
Before proceeding with these themes, it is necessary to have a brief look at
the overall characteristics of roles and power in the Korean context. The role
structure or power allocation within a family is determined by both familial factors
and social elements which eventually interact with each other. Of course it is
difficult to separate one set of determinants from the other. Both are the cause and
effect of each other. However, for analytical purposes the causes and. results of
change in the role distribution and authority structure, will be separately discussed
both at the macro and at micro levels.
The concept of the role has been influenced by several intellectual
traditions including, interactionism, behaviourism, utilitarianism, pragmatism, and
phenomenology etc. All these traditions influenced the behavioural capacity of
individuals, crucial to playing roles. Role theory is roughly comprised of the
structuralist approach and the interactionist approach. The former focuses on the
social characteristics of role assignment, the latter on inter-personal relationships
betweenlamong the role performers. The difference of the two approaches are
different opinions on what is the nature of script guiding role behaviour. The
scholars belonging to the former tradition like Parsons or Linton argue that there
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are norms attached to each status position in a social structure, and so, roles are
simply the behaviour of people in particular positions following normative
script(expectations of appropriate behaviour). The latter scholars including R. H.
Turner, Handel, Colomy, Blumer, etc., argue that norms are only broad parameters
within which individuals make roles confirming self and meeting their needs.
Eventually both are the heads and the tails of the same coin but different in their
primary emphasis. Both regard the family as individuals interacting with each
other.1
Microscopically role or authority in a family is decided according to
familial characteristics. Elements such as sex, age, and generation etc. ascribe to
each family member a due position or role and a due amount of power in the
family. Between generations, the parent's role is given to the elder generation, and
children's position to the younger generation. Again the children's role is different
between daughter and son roles. The more children a couple has, the more
complicated are the role relations among the children. Even power sharing among
children often gets very sophisticated. Role structure and power allocation become
more extensive and more tangled when sharing a roof with another generation like
parents or grand-children. Power relations for the senior generation becomes
confused unless it is defined institutionally. The role structure and the power
relations among family members become more diversified and more complicated if
the number of children and generations gets bigger.
To add to this complexity, role distribution is characterised by its duality.
An individual can have two or more roles within a family at the same time, for
example a woman can play the role of housewife to her husband, concurrently the
role of mother to her children, and again the role of daughter-in-law as well to her
parents-in-law. The smaller the family is, the simpler each member's position
becomes. The bigger the family by generation, the more doubtfttl role allocation
within a family is.
Macroscopically role and authority in the family are influenced by social,
cultural, and environmental variables etc. as well. Role relations and power
allocation in the family are significantly influenced by the sort of family pattern
which is prevalent: by how big or small the average housing size is, and by what
sort of social norms concerning family life prevail within a society etc. Changes in
any of these non-familial factors can have a significant impact on the allocation of
power among family members or on role relations within a family not only in a
quantitative sense but also at a qualitative level as well.
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The same changes of role structure and power allocation within the family
have happened in Korea both at macro and at micro level. The decrease of the three
generational family household made role relation within the family far simpler than
ever before. At the same time the density of relationships has been far intensified.
Thus much of the previous role relations between married couples and their parents
have diminished, however the relational density of couples to their children has
been reinforced while the increase in families with a small number children has
also intensified and simplified the relationship.
These changes are closely connected to the non-familial factors as well.
First the weakening of the stem family principle has changed the position of each
member. Next the rapid increase in urban migration followed by the increase in the
number of separated households has led to changes in the distribution of roles and
power. While the cultural changes arising out of the eminIst movement or
individualism have led to similar changes in the role and authority distribution.
These changes reached even to the qualitative level. The vertical power relations
among family members in traditional society have changed to more horizontal
ones. Once strictly differentiated roles associated with sex and age have now
become more co-operative ones.
In order to examine these changes, data from FAM89 have been analysed.
Of the 2,923 households in the survey, 1,939 households containing still married
women are the target of this analysis. Women separated by the death of their
husbands or by divorce are excluded. Three generational families composed of
daughter-in-law and mother-in-law were almost equally distributed by region but
two generational families were three times more frequent in the urban areas than in
the rural areas.
Table 6.1. Demographic Characteristics Of Married Women
By Family Pattern And By Reñon
	age	 L	 generational ramity	 2 generational tamiiy
whole	 urban	 rural	 whole	 urban	 rural
	
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
(N)	 (275)	 (154)	 (121)	 (1624)	 (1195)	 (469)
	
15-24	 6.5	 5.8	 7.4	 5.2	 5.9	 3.4
	
25-34	 40.7	 44.8	 35.5	 41.9	 47.4	 27.8
	
35-44	 28.4	 31.8	 24.0	 27.7	 29.5	 23.2
	
45-54	 20.4	 15.6	 26.4	 17.8	 14.3	 26.8
	
55-64	 2.9	 1.3	 5.0	 6.1	 2.2	 16.0
	
65+	 1.1	 0.6	 1.7	 1.3	 0.7	 2.8
source: FAM89
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There are a few points about the sample which need to be noted. To begin
with in three generational families mothers-in-law are partly excluded. This might
lead to a misinterpretation of the role structure in the family and therefore
discussion of the contrasting opinions of mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law will
be considered subsequently. The next problem is the exclusion of husbands or
children from the analysis. While it is hardly possible to encompass all family
members due to the lack of time and research funds. Yet given the Korean
domestic situation relying on the housewife, is not wholly misleading. The last
problem comes from the lack of comparable historical data. There are many case
studies of family roles and authority but nation-wide surveys on the subjects are
very rare. Even the results of the survey contradict each other. To compensate for
the lack of historical data by age-cohorts of the interviewee can be attempted but
does not look wholly convincing. As shown in table 6.1, the cell size of age-
cohorts are not equally distributed but are greater for those in their thirties and
forties. Except for the urban two generational families members are too small to be
quite reliable. It may as a result, be more plausible to compare traditional society to
present-day Korea at a descriptive and holistic level. In spite of all the
shortcomings the data can give some insight into the change of role structure and
power distribution in broad terms. While the percentage of involvement in each
area was measured by time spent on each activity in a area, which was finally
summated and averaged. FAM89 asked who were spending the longest time for
each activity in each area, gave ordinal number in the order of contribution amount,
and finally summated and averaged whole of the ordinal number to find the best
contributor.
6.1. THE CHANGES IN ROLE STRUCTURE
6.1.1. Changes In Role Performances
Role structure in traditional society was strictly differentiated inside and
outside the home. It was rigorously dichotomised by sex and by age. The situation
has changed in the process of modemisation during the last a few decades. Four
different sorts of role performances will be discussed; housework, childrearing,
outside activities, and economic activities. In these areas a strict role differentiation
was strongly expected in traditional society, however the idea has greatly changed,
sometimes with deterioration of women's status. Each area of role performance is
encompassing a couple of activities related and they are collectively measured at
arithmetic mean.
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6.1.1.1. Housework
Housework, includes preparing meals, cleaning the house, laundry,
needlework, production of soy and bean paste, and interior decoration or repair
etc. 2 With a slight exception of repair of the flat, these were firmly believed to be
the responsibility of the housewife. In the case of soy and bean paste, this was one
of the most important annual responsibilities for housewives in traditional society.
Preparing a suitable amount and achieving a good taste of the soy or bean to last a
whole year long for use in almost every cooking process, was very important for
female family members. No commercial product was available or in any case
would have been ridiculed. Sometimes a taste of the soy or bean paste produced by
bride's family was asked for by groom's mother before an offer of marriage was
made. All the management of affairs concerned with food, clothing, and shelter
were the absolute domain of women with which male family members could not
and ought not interfere under any conditions in traditional society. This principle
was applied even to the small children below 7 years old. 3 A small boy who
happened to enter kitchen just for a drink would be disgraced and sometimes
punished both by his mother and by his father. Housework was not a thing a manly
man ought to give any attention to.
Housework was rigorously differentiated not only by sex but also by
generation, mother-in-law was the supreme commander and supervisor inside the
family, daughter-in-law was expected to be simply a sincere follower. She could
have independent opinions on domestic affairs only after her mother-in-law passed
away. However old and however incompetent her mother-in-law was, a woman
was strictly expected to ask her direction for every domestic affair no matter how
trivial because of the strong orientation to filial piety imposed by Confucianism.
Even the househoIdercould not interriipt a mother-in-law's despotic role in relation
to the other female members of the household. An order from mother-in-law and
execution by her daughter-in-law were the typical division of labour in the
traditional family.
This situation has changed as the result of modernisation. The pattern of
change can be summarised in a few points. First, husbands' contribution for the
housework averages ten per cent throughout the nation and across different family
patterns. This proportion does not mean the husband's role has increased by this
amount in present day Korea. Husbands' participation is far smaller than the
statistics might suggest. In spite of the contempt of male members participating in
the domestic affairs, those demanding physically hard labour like house repair or
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fence mending etc. were always given to men. As these activities were included in
the domain of the domestic duties, the actual increase in the proportion of
husbands contribution is far smaller than the statistics appear to indicate. Husbands
from the rural stem families contribute more than other husbands even more than
the contribution from their mothers. The reason for this is that their fanning
situation allows them to participate in domestic affairs more easily than other jobs
do. Other husbands in non-agricultural occupations have their work place separated
from home. They are chained to the work place and have not enough spare time to
lend a hand in their domestic duties like house or fence repair, and more readily
employ a repairman. Farming husbands do not make a strict division between
home affairs and farming and more readily participate in domestic matters.
Moreover the value of cash is still too important for farmers to pay for simple
labour. Naturally all these things have made rural husbands from stem families
contribute to domestic affairs more than other husbands.
Figure 6.1. Percentage Of Domestic Duties As Assigned To Each Family'
Member By Region And By Family Pattern.
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The second characteristic of the role distribution in present day Korea is the
participation of others than family members in domestic duties. These others
roughly comprise two groups; domestic servant or daily maid and the market. First
the role of present day domestic servant or daily maid was in traditional society
fulfilled by slaves. Considering the high proportion of slaves participation, the
domain of the home help's role has been sharply narrowed. The proportion of
households in possession of slaves was 27.5 per cent in 17th century and 37.5 per
cent in 19th century. (Refer to Table 3.6.) However the total percentage of the
others in the present day does not exceed 7.7 per cent of urban nuclear family at
maximum.4 The reason for the decrease in the proportion of others' contribution
came from the abolition of slavery in the modem era and high expenses for labour
charges.
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In spite of this, the proportion of others' contributions is still non-negligible
amount. The share in urban areas is bigger than in rural areas, and in nuclear
families than in stem families. This is the result of the increase in the proportion of
housewives participating in economic activities outside the home. Domestic
servants or daily maids have been needed to make up for the domestic work they
can not do while they are at their work place. Even when a mother-in-law is able to
contribute to domestic matters, the home help was needed to do physically hard
labour not fit for the aged woman. In such work as cleaning, laundering,
preparation of meals, etc. a dual career woman is likely to make use of a paid
servant.
The other outside contributor is the public market. Particularly for soy and
bean paste many housewives deeply depend on the public market. According to
FAM89, at most 7.3 per cent of urban housewives and 11.2 per cent of rural wives
prepare soy and bean paste for private use solely at home. The rest transfer the role,
in terms of preparing soy and bean paste, to the public market. The process of
preparing soy and bean paste is quite time-consuming and it is complicated to
produce a delicate taste. The paste produced by a factory is much cheaper than the
one produced domestically, and even the taste is not too bad so that housewives
could substitute the bought commodity for the domestic paste.
The third characteristics of present day role structure is the position of the
mother-in-law. The mother-in-law who traditionally was the leading member in the
domestic affairs of the family looks to have given way to her daughter-in-law. The
contribution of the mother-in-law in the stem family either in rural or urban areas is
quite small. Of course the mother-in-law was not the member who physically
executed domestic labour. Rather she was the figure ordering and supervising. Her
physical contribution to domestic matters was quite small even in earlier times so
there is almost no significant change in her physical contribution. However the
point is that she has lost her position as supervisor and become an assistant of
daughter-in-law's. Her decline from the supervising position, of course, resulted
from the trend to the democratisation of the society in general on the one hand.
While at the same time in traditional society the source of income was
monopolised by parents today a son has acquired economic independence as well.
That is another reason for mother-in-law's decline. Thus their economic power
allows the young generation to raise their voice against their parents. Moreover
mothers-in-law are unable physically to successfully execute the whole of the
domestic management. Harder work is done by a daily maid or by the daughter-in-
law herself leaving her mother-in-law as a role assistant.
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Another interesting point concerning the mother-in-law role is the
proportion of households comprised of a nuclear family only. Although these
amount to only a small proportion of all households, mothers-in-law nevertheless
contribute to their son's life mainly in the preparation of soy and bean paste.
However much it costs, mothers-in-law generally prefer the home-made product.
They are unsatisfied with the market paste and soy full of artificial(chemical)
sweetening. In addition, they can afford to have son's family save their living
expenses by themselves supplying home-made soy and bean paste. This is one
indication of the continuing existence of the stem family principle. Through this
process parents, can check from time to time how a daughter-in-law is managing
the affairs of their son's family, inspite of their physically separate living.
Lastly, in spite of modernisation followed by the general improvement in
women's position, the housework still remains the domain of female members only.
It varies by region and family type. Rural housewives have more housework than
urban housewives as a result of the slightly different way of life. The urban
housewife enjoys more modern domestic facilities while the rural housewife is less
well equipped due to lack of cash. The gap is partly compensated for by help with
more physical labour in the rural home. The housewife in the nuclear family
household has less help with housework than those from the stem family
households. Housewives in nuclear family households share almost ten per cent
more domestic work. They are paying cost for the separate life from their parents-
in-law. To sum up, in spite of modernisation followed by the women's liberation
movement, the burden of the conventional housewife has not reduced as much as
might be expected. Domestic affairs are still rigorously differentiated domains for
female family members.
6.1.1.2. Parental roles
Four aspects of parent roles, guiding children's studies, domestic training,
consultation and allowing children's pocket money are examined. 5 The traditional
ideal for parents were the 'affectionate mother and strict father.' Thus if the mother
was expected to play the role comforter, the father was the educator. The father
was the most deeply involved teacher, and supervisor in his children affairs. This
was the prevalent ideal at least until the mid-70s but it has changed very drastically
in present day Korea.
The educational role was different according to the sex of parents and the
children. Traditionally it was only boys who got a formal education. Girls were
educated by their mothers in the virtues of domestic life like tender mind,
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needlework, preparation of soy and bean paste etc. They were excluded from what
their brothers were learning. Boys were educated by their father or paternal grand-
father from their seventh year and learned Confucian literature. 6
 Thus a father or
paternal grand-father was the only educator, and sons the only ones educated at
home at that time.	 -
Table 6.2. Change In The Expected Level Of Education For Children By Sex
expected level of
	
sons	 daughters
education	 '77	 I	 '87 J	 '90	 '77	 I	 '87 I	 '90
	total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
middle school	 7.5	 1.6	 1.6	 23.7	 4.0	 3.9
	high school	 36.2	 13.9	 12.1	 42.7	 25.6	 20.4
	college & university	 55.5	 60.5	 61.9	 33.3	 55.1	 61.3
	graduate school	 0.8	 24.0	 24.4	 0.3	 15.3	 14.4
source: EPB, Social Statistics Survey.
The situation has changed in the process of modernisation. The change has
occurred both from the parents side and the children. First compulsory education
system required girls as well as boys to attend primary school. In addition even the
expected level of education for children has been equalised as shown in Table 6.2.
No big difference except at the graduate school level is found between sexes in
present day Korea. Daughters are expected to enter a college or university course
as much as sons are. Of course there are things that have not changed yet. Some
traditional aspects of home education are still very strong. Boys are expected to
show more interest in manly behaviour, while girls are expected to conform to
ideals of feminine behaviour. However the demands of gender do not displace
expectations about gaining a good mark in the formal education system regardless
of sex.
Figure 6.2. Role Allocation On The Children's
By Region And By Family Pattern 8
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The changes in parents roles are also drastic. A father's role vis a vis his
children has become relatively smaller even than in respect of other domestic
matters. His involvement in his children's lives is less than in any other roles of his
family, accounting for less than 10 per cent of the children's matters as Figure 6.2
shows.
A husband and father may almost seem to his wife and children like a
lodger who comes home just for sleeping. A father attends his office from early in
the morning before his children get up, and comes back late at night when all the
rest of the family are asleep. Fathers attend their offices even on weekend as well.
This has been a typical story among many Korean families for the last a couple of
decades. Whilst it was one of the most significant factors in the astonishing growth
of national wealth, both the father and his children and his wife lost a great deal
from the arrangement. Fathers were perceived by their children as merely a
breadearning machine or boarder or, at best, the person providing their pocket
money. Thus fathers lost patriarchal position and children has lost the experience
of paternal socialisation.
The same happened to grandfathers. Once as influential as a fathet as to
his children, the paternal grandfather lost his position as an educational guide to his
grandchildren. Even more than in the nuclear family, in the stem family there is a
very weakened role of paternal grandparents in the children's lives. The familial
position of the paternal grandfather as an educator of his grandchildren may have
disappeared from memory. Otherwise he has remained as a role assistant such as
baby-sitter or a kindly relative rather than a strict educator.
The children's upbringing has become almost wholly the responsibility of
their mothers. She does everything that her husband would have done for the
children in earlier times. Mothers train their children in household duties, guide
their studies, and gives them their pocket money. She has taken over responsibility
for the education role to compensate for the absence of their father. At the same
time mothers' contribution varies according to region and family pattern. First her
role is bigger in urban areas than in rural areas because in rural areas husbands are
engaged in jobs with less rigid time, schedules like farming and can participate
more in what is happening at home. Urban husbands, whether salary men or self-
employed, are working under the far more competitive conditions and thus spend
more time away from home than rural husbands do. Working late at night, may
make a favourable impression in their place of work, but is at the cost of severe
damage to their commitments as fathers. Naturally it has to be their wives who
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make up for the absence of the father so that the urban wife as a result contributes
more to her children's upbringing than a rural wife has to. At the same time the
difference in a wife's contribution by family pattern is also influenced by
demographic characteristics in particular. It depends on the number of 'others'
available in the household.
The others are involved in child's upbringing mainly other children
themselves or in rare cases sometimes a private tutor etc. The rural nuclear family
shows the biggest proportion of children's own involvement and the urban stem
family the least. The difference reflects the age structure in urban and rural family
and difference in family patterns. There are more grown up children among nuclear
families than among stem families, and rural families are on average older than the
urban families so that the proportion of older and grown up children is greater.
Thus according to the FAM89 data, the proportion of housewives aged 45 years
old and over in stem families was 33.1 per cent in the rural areas and 17.5 per cent
in the urban areas. The proportion of housewives aged 55 years old and over in
nuclear families was 18.8 per cent in the rural areas and 2.9 per cent in the urban
areas. Children's age goes roughly side by side with their mothers'. Many of the
children from the urban nuclear families are already grown adults, and children in
the rural areas left their homes at marriage or for ajob or to study.
However even if it is not the absence of parental involvement so much as
the demographic character of the family, significant role of other children at least
indicates the low level of patriarchal influence. In the traditional family, children,
young or grown-up, married or unmarried, could not be free from parents' influence
and particularly from their father's. However owing to the growth of modernisation
and individualism, autonomous and independent behaviour by children has come to
be highly regarded both by children and parents. Which explains the high
contribution of the adult children to the upbringing of their younger siblings, what
was once the domain of a father or grandfather, has increasingly become the
responsibility of a riatter of other children. This is not a matter of neglect of
children's upbringing but that children are exposed to the lack of influence from
their fathers.
6.1.1.3. Outside activity
By outside activities, we refer to going to public institutions for example to
have a certificate of residence or a copy of family register, or other formal
certificate etc.: attending a relative's on matters of congratulation or condolence: or
going to the parents' meeting at the children's school.9
Chapter Six 211
Outside activities were recognised as exclusive matters for the eldest male
of the stem family or husband of the nuclear family in traditional society. There
was a proverbial saying in traditional society reflecting Confucian principles. "If
the hen cries, family goes to the bad." Wife or any other female member of a
family was never expected to express any opinions outside the family. She was
expected to be subservient to her parent's opinion before marriage, her husband's,
and after her husband's death to her first son's opinion. In Confucianism, this
principle of samjong for the women was praised. As a result in all affairs outside
the family, the family was presented and led by male members.
Modernisation has rooted up the once conventional idea. Women now are
allowed to engage in socio-economic activity outside the home. Two things have
led women to participate in social activity outside home: first the general
enhancement of women's social status; secondly the separation of home and work
place, and the demands of occupational life. The work place in traditional
agricultural society, was not away from home. Today's workers however work far
away from their home, and are expected to concentrate fully at their work until the
end of the working day. As a result it is hardly possible for them to engage in any
outside activity concerned with their home unless they make use of their lunch time
or risk being unfaithful to their job. As a result they have handed over their,
conventionally, essential role to their wives like the other roles reviewed.
In spite of this general trend towards women's total dominance of outside
activities, husbands contribute a significant amount in relative sense. Compared to
their contribution to the domestic duties or their children's upbringing the role of
husbands in dealing with the outside world is still significant. It is greater among
the rural husbands particularly in stem families for three reasons. First, in spite of
the separation of their occupational lives, both husbands and wives are still active
in relation to the outside world in terms of personal contact. The avoidance of the
opposite sex is still pervasive. Both sexes still feel it unnatural to communicate
with each other espcially in rural areas. The division of labour by sex is still
pervasive among present day Koreans. Regional differences also reflect different
working conditions. However harsh modern occupational life is, rural husbands
enjoy relatively relaxed working conditions compared with the urbanites who are
overtasked with work and time. That is the reason a rural husband can afford to
keep his conventional position in relation to matters outside the household. Lastly,
husbands from the rural stem family are more likely to be engaged in farming than
the husband of the rural nuclear family which easily permits them to be, showing
the biggest contribution, involved in matters in relation to the outside world.
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Figure 6.3. Role Allocation In Respect Of Out-of-household Responsibility
By Region And By Family Pattern (percentage)
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Nevertheless extra-household responsibilities have been transferred
generally to the housewives. The housewives from the nuclear family particularly
regardless of regional differences, are taking on more responsibility than other
housewives are. This is due to the structural characteristics of each family pattern.
In the stem family parents-in-law can deal with outside matters on behalf of a busy
son at work or a busy daughter-in-law involved with domestic affairs. However in
the nuclear family a housewife is the only person, unless she has grown-up
children, who can take the place of her husband.
In terms of the housewife's role, outside responsibilities show the biggest
difference of role allocation by region and by family pattern. This is the area in
which the sexual division of labour is not yet settled. In other words, the
discrepancy between the expected family member and the actual person delivering
the role is greatest.
How role allocation in respect of outside relationships will be sorted out in
the future depends on how occupational life develops. The economic policies of the
government push husbands to become more attached to their work place than
before and the housewife's role is expected to grow bigger as a result. Again
considering the general attack of the women's liberation movement on sexual
differences, the responsibilities of the housewife role seem to be getting bigger
than ever before.
6.1.1.4. Economic activity
In the economic domain, questions on four activities are asked and
measured separately but aggregate arithmetic means are presented here: firstly who
is responsible for savings; secondly who buys daily consumption goods; thirdly
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who has income earning responsibilities; and lastly who is instrumental in buying
or selling the family house or apartment.'°
Traditionally economic activity was basically dichotomised by sex. The
husband was the breadwinner, the housewife manager of the domestic economy.
To be precise, most activities happening outside the home were the husband's
buoyness while the others at home were in the housewife's domain. Economic
activity was closely connected to the representative role in relation to people
outside the home. Naturally breadwinning, or purchasing or selling the family
home was undertaken by the husband or the eldest male member in the family.'
Figure 6.4. Economic Role Allocation By Region And By Family Pattern
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Economic activity is the least changed domain of role allocation in the
process of modernisation. As shown in Figure 6.4 there is a sort of balance between
husband and wife in their role performances. In case of the couples from the stem
family pattern, the gap between husband and wife is below 10 per cent regardless
of region, while the gap in nuclear family couples is about 15 per cent on average.
This may seem quite big but compared to the absolute dominance of the wife in the
other three role performances reviewed previously, the economic role is the most
balanced area between husband and wife.
The contributions of husbands show almost no difference by region or by
family patterns. The housewife's contribution differs very little between regions but
varies according to family pattern. The housewife in the nuclear family has a larger
share in economic activity than the housewife from the stem family household
since if she lives with her parents-in-law, they contribute a significant amount in
economic activity. Relatively the housewife of the nuclear family carries a greater
burden of economic activity except when this is compensated for by her grown-up
children.
saving
buying
consumption
items
b rca d earning
dealing of flat
saving
buying
consumption
items
b re ade a ruing
dealing of flat
urban
areas
rural
areas
Chapter Six 214
The next most important economic contribution is that of children or
sometimes of grand-children. The reason for the bigger proportionate contribution
of the children in the nuclear family is due to statistical relativism which comes
basically from the structural character of the family composition. The reason for
the bigger rate of rural children derives from the generally poorer economic
situation of the rural areas. Due to the regionally disproportionate distribution of
national wealth, rural families are more dependant on the children's income than
urban families are. In other words balance of economic exchange between the
generations is more likely in rural families than in urban families.
Economic activity is the domain to which the husband makes his greatest
contribution and it is the area of role allocation between husband and wife which is
the most balanced. However, unlike the other areas reviewed previously, the
economic domain is the most fluctuating field when discussed in terms of detailed
activities. Husband and wife both show emphatically different role performances in
each area of activity in contrast to the other three role sectors analysed earlier. We
can scrutinise closely the role allocations in the stem family households. Those in
the nuclear family households are almost exactly similar with just minor variations
from the structural difference of family composition explained already. Extreme
fluctuation by sex is observed in each economic activity as shown in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5. Detailed Economic Activities
In The Stem Family Household By Region.
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First the activity of saving is mostly carried on by the housewife.
Conventionally the good housewife was expected to save something from the
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income earned in the main by her husband. However a meagre salary it was, a good
wife and mother was expected to lay something aside for the rainy days and
particularly for the educational fees of children entering a school of higher degree.
This was unavoidable with the high value placed on education but lacking of social
security provision from the government. As a result the housewife and mother
showed up as the best manager of the home economics to make tiny amounts of
money to grow to a round sum. The husband's role in savings reflects the general
socio-economic conditions. To accelerate the economic development of the nation,
the government launched a savings promotion policy from the late 70s when
almost compulsory savings were introduced which were deducted automatically
from salary. Only the balance of the salary was available to be handed over to the
housewife. This condition was no different whether the husband was a government
official or a private company employee, so the proportion of the savings activity by
a husband denotes nothing but the government interventionism. Children are the
second most significant family members in savings activity. The proportion is
particularly high among rural families. Living with parents, grown-up children,
single or married, could have saved what they earned untouched. Of course in the
traditional period the income was untouchedly handed over to parents. This was the
case at least until the 1970s, and used to be a source of calamity between the
mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law. However owing to the general economic
growth and to the expansion of individualism, adult children can save by
themselves what they have earned for their own sake so that children's role in the
savings activity is the second most significant. Sometimes the amount of the
children's saving is much bigger than that of their parents. The money saved is used
to fund the marriage of unmarried children or for the purchase of an independent
flat for married children. This is more common among rural adult children because
of the relative economic poverty in the rural areas. Having the poor as their parents,
the rural children have to rely more on their own money to marry or to be
independent from their parents.
Buying daily consumption goods is almost entirely the responsibility of the
housewife. That was the typical pattern of management in traditional home
economics and the activity has almost not changed at all in the process of
modernisation. A tiny change may be observed among urban husbands who show
up at the supermarket as a result of the sexual equality movement. In spite of the
small increase in the proportion of the husbands shopping, they are still viewed as a
petty fellow and unmanly men among present day Koreans both men and women.
In the rural areas parents-in-law show some participation but these are almost
mothers-in-law. This reflects the remains of the tradition when mother-in-law was
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the supreme manager of the home taking care of the keys of the economic
resources of the family. It is still not rare to find a married rural son, giving the
whole of his monthly salary not to his wife but to his parents. Hence the housewife
gets the living expenses from her parents-in-law. Over 10 per cent of rural parents
still enjoy this dominant management role of traditional society. It often creates
conflict between young married couples.
The breadwinning is primarily the responsibility of husbands. Husbands
have virtually total dominance over the main source of income. However the
housewives' participation in earning activities are never negligible. Roughly almost
one out of three housewives in urban areas and a high one out of three in rural
areas participates in economic activity outside the home. Due to the complexity of
farming, it is difficult to regard the statistics of actual participation to the economic
activity but considering the case, the proportion is significant enough to denote the
improvement of social status of women in rural and urban areas. The other major
change in the income domain is the decrease in the contribution from parents-in-
law, mostly of fathers-in-law in the stem family household. Fathers-in-law were
one of the major sources of earnings in traditional society. However in the process
of changes in the industrial structure and by the introduction of the retirement at
the age of 65 age limit, they will have retired from work the main source of
income, unless self-employed. As a result the father-in-law's position at home
declined with the loss of his income.
Lastly buying and selling the family house or flat is an area from which the
wife is almost totally excluded. It is only male family members, particularly the
husband who are involved. There are two components in the cultural determination
of this pattern. The first comes from the chip(house) idea which is deeply rooted in
traditional familism. The house was believed to be not simply a place of habitation
but the sacred container for its own family and its spirit. Male members were and
still are believed to be the symbol and representatives of their own chip. Whoever,
a wife or wife's parets, pays for the house it was almost always the male family
members who buys the house, at least manifestly. It was the last and most
important or even the only basis of self-esteem of the Korean man. The appearance
of his wife in bargaining for the house accounted to the loss of the masculinity of
husband. That is the reason women are almost excluded, even in present day
Korea, from buying and selling the family house or apartment. That is why fathers-
in-law play a great role in purchasing or buying the house or flat than among whole
of the role allocation reviewed up to now. The second reason for the exclusion of
female family members is a quite recent change rather than traditional one. To be
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precise the change came from the period of the Japanese annexation. Unusually
capable women was not rare in traditional society and they were not disgraced
unless they openly offended their husband's authority. However, the Japanese
government severely reduced women's status and prescribed women as legally and
customarily incapable persons. As a result, a wife could not make large
transactions. This custom still remains in present-day Korea to exclude a wife from
the purchase or sale of the family house or flat.
In general domestic economic activity is the area where the conventional
division of labour has changed least. The husband is still predominantly the
breadwinner and responsible for dealing with large sums of money while the wife
manages small sums. Her role is limited to the activity of small scale saving and
purchasing daily consumption goods.
To conclude this whole section, a few general points can be abstracted.
First, most aspects of the division of labour between husbands and wives is
structured to reveal the wife's dominance. The roles are allocated predominantly to
the wife from domestic duties to the children's upbringing and even in dealings
outside the domestic household. The situation looks like an improvement of
women's status compared with the traditional family but it is concerned only with
effort-taking or time-consuming or boring areas. A few but the most important
affairs, in terms of infrastructure, like buying and selling the family house and the
breadwinner role reserved for husband or male family members. That is the only
domain Korean men can maintain their dignity as husband to their wives, as father
to his children. Most other roles concerned with the home are overwhelmingly
dominated by the wife. The excuse husbands could give for their staying out of the
home, derives from the economic development policies of the last few, decades.
Both husband and wife have submitted to the loss of fatherhood and of
husbandhood, to gain economic prosperity. The situation is more bitter for wives in
nuclear families than among those living in stem family households, because they
are paying the price of having a life independent from their parents-in-law. If she is
sharing a same roof with her parents-in-law, a woman's burden of house chores or
dealing with outside bodies might be lessened. By having a home of her own,
however, she gets more work to do and possibly more stress from that than the
housewife of the stem family does. Lastly, the rural housewife has a more
traditional division of labour. She takes charge of more housework but is
concerned with less outside matters and likely to be involved in less economic
activity outside the domestic setting or the farm.
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The conventional type of division of labour by sex has been changed
drastically. However the situation brought more burden to wives than to husbands.
If there is one thing that has not changed in the process of modernisation, it is
emphatic division of labour. Role allocation is dichotomised by sex rather than
being harmonised or converging between the sexes. The main reason for this would
appear to be the socio-political orientation toward economic development of the
last a few decades.
6.1.2. Role Conflicts
In this section two sorts of role conflict are selectively discussed. First
conflicts between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law in the stem family will be
examined. They once were tightly demarcated by the relationship of dominance
and subordination in traditional society but has changed in the last decades of
modernisation. The next thing to examine is the role conflict arising among dual
career women who have been growing very rapidly in number in present day
Korea. 12
It is quite disputable if the conflict between mother-in-law and daughter-in-
law is role structured conflict in real sense or just a conflict. The daughter-in-law
finds her role obligations and expectations are changing while her mother-in-law is
slow to adopt this fact and this can create conflict between them. However it is not
exactly the role conflict what N. Gross noted, in the sense that each plays her role
without uncertainty or interference from the other roles in her own role-set but
rather a mere conflict between them arising from other sources like cultural and
ideological changes. Nevertheless there are a couple of reasons why the conflict is
being analysed under the title of role conflict. First there is no suitable terminology
to overcome ambiguity in distinguishing the conflict between mother-in-law and
daughter-in-law from the role conflict of N. Gross, in spite of the conflict quite
deeply in the family field at the moment. Next, in spite of both mothers-in-law and
daughters-in-law is being certain to deliver each of their concrete roles, they are
still not certain about their general status at home. Mothers-in-law like to maintain
the traditionally ascribed status of in-master at home regardless of the amount of
her contribution of physical labour, but they are not certain about their status that
must be recognised by other family members, particularly by daughters-in-law. By
the same logic, daughters-in-law are not sure if they are both nominally and
actually in-masters at home, in spite of their greater contribution in physical term.
No other family members are certain about who is the in-master at home. That is
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one of significant reasons why the stem family split into nuclear type family
households as reviewed in Chapter 4. If both mother-in-law and daughter-in-law
are not brave enough to disregard the in-masterhood, the alternative is having a
separate household. In spite of the conceptual ambiguity arising by analysing the
conflict between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law under the title of the role
conflict, the author included the discussion on the conflict between them in this
section for an editorial convenience giving stress to the fact that the conflict
between them arises at a pretext of in-master-hood.
6.1.2.1. Conflicts between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law
The excessive role allocation to the housewife in present day Korea might
bring about conflict betweenlamong family members. However the conflict
surprisingly looks quite mild except in the field of housework. Most gaps between
role expectation and role performance of each family member are below 5 per cent
and only rarely reach a maximum 8 per cent on average. However housework
shows quite a significant amount of gap between role performers and their
normative expectations. This conflict happens mainly between mother-in-law and
daughter-in-law.
As shown on Table 6.3, the situation can be reduced to a few points. First
the housewife in the nuclear family shows almost no significant difference between
the actual performer and the person being expected to deliver each activity. That is
to say the persons expected to do the housework generally coincide with the family
members who are actually performing it. The only exception is shown for the
activity of preparing soy and bean paste. Most housewives prepare those by herself
and are going to do that in the future as well. However a proportion of housewife
relies on supply from her mother-in-law or her natural mother but prefers to buy
and use the commercial soy and bean paste from the market. This is the point some
housewives feel in conflict with their mothers-in-law. However as most
housewives are proud of using home-made items, the conflict is relatively lessened.
Moreover the conflict she feels from the intervention of her mother-in-law is
recognised as trivial and the price of life independent from her parents-in-law.
In the stem family households, the role conflicts are complicated and more
bitter and wide spread than in the nuclear family households. First of all the most
decisive conflicts are implicit in the self-estimation of role performances. That is to
say, the amount of work the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law recognise each
other has done, is quite different.
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Table 6.3. Role Conflict Over Housework
Among
 Family Members In Stem Family Households'3
stem family: response from
her-in-law I dauhter-in-law
er
preparing meal:
	
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
wife	 98.7	 96.8
	husband	 0.1	 0.2
	daughter-in-law	 66.2	 76.4	 95.3	 90.9
	mother-in-law	 32.8	 23.2	 4.7	 1.8
	homemaid	 1.0	 0.4	 7.3	 1.2	 3.0
cleaning rooms:
	
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
wife	 96.0	 92.3
	husband	 0.6	 1.2
	daughter-in-law	 58.6	 69.0	 90.5	 88.0
	mother-in-law	 39.4	 28.6	 6.9	 1.8
	daughter	 1.5	 3.6	 2.0	 3.7
	individually	 2.0	 2.4	 1.1	 6.6	 1.4	 2.8
decoration and repairing flat:
	
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
wife	 26.4	 22.5
	husband	 52.7	 58.2	 60.8	 64.5	 56.5	 59.2
	daughter-in-law	 8.0	 9.5	 13.6	 12.1
	mother-in-law	 8.5
	father-in-law	 16.9	 14.9	 5.5
	so 	 4.8	 3.5	 6.7
	employee	 13.9	 17.4	 20.1	 18.6	 13.6	 11.6
cleaning cloths:
	
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
wife	 97.2	 90.0
	husband	 0.5	 1.0
	daughter-in-law	 65.5	 77.3	 93.1	 91.6
	mother-in-law	 33.0	 20.2	 4.7
	daughter	 1.5	 1.5	 1.6
	laundry	 1.5	 2.5	 2.2	 6.9	 0.8	 7.4
preparing soy and bean paste:
	
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
wife	 72.5	 80.1
	daughter-in-law	 28.1	 52.2	 54.5	 70.9
	mother-in-law	 68.5	 45.8	 42.9	 24.7	 11.4	 6.5
	 other	 8.6
	market	 3.4	 2.0	 2.6	 4.4	 7.5	 13.4
source: FAM89
per: performer, 	 exp: expected person to do
In other words the amount the mother-in-law is thinking she herself has performed,
is under-estimated by daughter-in-law. Similarly the daughter-in-laws' self-
estimation of what she has contributed is quite under-estimated by her mother-in-
law. Of course daughters-in-law take the lead in housework but the self-estimated
allocation between them shows too big a gap to reconcile. According to the
daughters-in-law's self-estimation, mothers-in-law are almost incapable of doing
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housework. However mothers-in-law themselves estimate they perform at least a
third of the housework. It is a source of discord between mothers-in-law and
daughters-in-law which can be explained in terms of contest for power in domestic
affairs. In a society where the strict sexual division of labour is prevalent, the
housewife role is likely to be the key role in which female members of the family
can establish their identity at home. That would explain why daughters-in-law
mostly excluded mothers-in-law from the expected general household
responsibilities as shown on the table. Mothers-in-law have a different concept of
household management from the one daughters-in-law recognise. If a young
daughter-in-law thinks of domestic housework in terms of physical labour,
mothers-in-laws give more stress to command and supervision. It would be natural
for mothers-in-law to think of themselves as a domestic responsibility while
daughters-in-law only judge them to be doing nothing but faultfinding or tittle-
tattling. Whatever the reason, there is a very wide gap between the seif-judgement
of mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law in their perceived role performances.
A further aspect of role conflict is the gap between role perfonnance and
role expectation. This is particularly tate for mothers-in-laws. In case of daughters-
in-law, there is almost no difference between their actual role performances and the
expected pattern of what they want to do. There is a slight preference for a greater
opportunity to hand over housework to employees by paying wages. However
mothers-in-law expect more to be done by daughters-in-law instead of by
themselves. They tend to feel they should be free from domestic work. In other
words most conflict arising in stem family households issue from the mother-in-
law. This does not necessarily mean mothers-in-law are narrow-minded. Rather it
denotes their efforts to keep to a traditional way of housekeeping. It is their desire
and their wish that daughters-in-law should be housekeepers. However in their
mother-in-law's eyes most young housewives are, neither skilful nor dedicated.
They are seen as giving more attention to their relationship with the husband or to
personal matters outside the household. Mothers-in-law think their daughters-in-
law should concentrate more on the family as a whole. This reflects a generation
gap concerning the ideal family life style.
There are two exceptions to the above account of role conflict in the stem
family household. First among domestic tasks, the one most likely to involve a
male family member, decorating and repairing the house or flat, shows almost no
role conflicts either between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law or between actual
and expected role performances. Secondly, preparing soy and bean paste is another
exception to the general pattern of role conflict between mothers-in-law and
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daughters-in-law. It is similar in the sense that both of them are inclined to
underestimate each other's performance and that daughters-in-law generally do not
like mothers-in-law to intervene. However it is also the activity daughters-in-law
are the most aware of mothers-in-law's activity, and it is the activity mothers-in-
law still like to perform with their own hands more than any other sort of
housework. This is because it directly represents keeping the older family tradition
and it concerns the preservation of the individual identity of their particular family
different from other families, with its unique taste of soy and bean paste. However
this does not mean role conflict is lessened. On the contrary it is the area over
which mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law are the most likely to clash. It is here
there is a greatest difference between the amount a daughter-in-law actually
performs and the amount she would like to do among the whole range of domestic
activities. Preparing soy and bean paste is the activity in which a daughter-in-law
most wants to take away the initiative from her mother-in-law. However it is the
activity mothers-in-law least like to be deprived of. Over all it is the areas where
both mother-in-law and daughter-in-law feel the worst role conflict.
With a few exceptions, role conflicts among female members of stem
family households are much greater and more bitter than those in nuclear family
households. In the stem family household the conflict originating from mothers-in-
law is more than that from daughters-in-law. The conflict comes from different
background values on the way of performing the domestic tasks. This conflict of
tradition and market values in the home is one of main reasons both daughters-in-
law and mothers-in-law prefer having an independent life instead of sharing the
same roof. It is anticipated such conflicts with increase as individualism expands
among the younger generations, as opportunism grow among housewives of both
generations, and as market influences upon ordinary household intensify.
6.1.2.2. Role conflict among dual career wives
As reviewed in the previous section, wives are taking charge of most roles
concerned with the home. Not only roles which conventionally belonged to female
members but even roles traditionally recognised as those of male family members
have been transferred to the wife in the modern household. The only
responsibilities remaining predominantly those of husbands are the management of
large sums and breadwinning. The responsibilities of the wife have become
disproportionate.
The only excuse husbands could have made for this was that they were
earning the household income. Of course this was due to the socio-economic
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situation. In order to achieve rapid national economic development and to compete
with other nations overtime work has been required. And irrespective whether
employed in a private company or a government organisation, husbands were
strongly expected to work quite often until mid-night.
If the demands of work accounted for the husband's low level of
participation in domestic affairs, the same might also be expected of a wife who
works outside. If a wife engages in a paid occupation, there is no reason she should
also take full responsibility for everything at home When the wife has outside
employment an equal division of labour between husband and wife at home might
be anticipated, or at least the proportion of family responsibilities dual career
women have taken should be less than that undertaken by the full-time housewives.
Figure 6.6. Role Allocation On Each Domestic Affairs
By Housewife's Economic Activity.
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Reality does not correspond to this hypothesis. No significant differences
are observed between the amount full-time housewives perform and that done by
dual career wives. In terms of total amount of labour, undertaken the circumstances
of dual career women' looks worse than that of the ordinary housewives.
Household spending is an obvious example of the demands on the dual career
woman. She must hurriedly go shopping for the preparation of the dinner meal as
soon as she leaves her office. And she must pay attention to savings for a rainy day
and so that children go on to higher education. As a result, the amount of time she
spends on income and expenditure for the family is more in total than that of full-
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time housewife. It is typically even far bigger than that of her husband. Under this
situation, the wife becomes the main leading household member both inside and
outside the home. The proportion of economic activity a husband contributes only
slightly exceeds a third of the dual career wife. The absolute domain exclusive to
the husband vanishes and conjugal conflict may be anticipated between the capable
woman and her dispirited husband.
Apart from economic, a dual career woman can feel stress arising from the
other areas of her domestic life. First there is almost no difference between the
employed wife and the full-time housewife in the time spent on housework. The
amount of assistance the employed wife gets from her husband or from her mother-
in-law or even from paid help is insignificant. Most husbands are still not liberal
enough to enter his own kitchen and share the chores by breaking the conventional
obsession against men doing women's work. At the same time, daughters-in-law do
not feel able to ask mothers-in-law to share chores that might tire the older woman.
Even hiring domestic help is not easy since the main reason for having a job is not
for self-development but to meet existing economic necessity. Women in
professional jobs are relatively more likely to be concerned to the development of
their own potential but the majority of women with non-professional jobs are
chiefly concerned to earn living expenses. If she hires a charwoman, the employed
housewife might find there was no profit in her working. That is the reason the
proportionate contribution from others in the households of employed women is
less than that among full-time housewives. The only alternative for the dual career
woman is being a superwoman. She takes on both breadwinning and running the
household as well.
The situation is not very different even in relation to looking after her
children. The main difference is that she can seek some help from her parents-in-
law. Due to conventional ideas about patrician and plebeian work, she could not
ask assistance from her parents-in-law with the housework but it is easier to ask
their help with the children. There are other socio-economic reasons for seeking the
help of parents-in-law. First there are not enough nurseries to provide for the needs
of employed women. At the same time the quality of provision has not been good
enough to satisfy employed mothers who are feeling some degree of guilt about the
care of their children. More significantly the registration fees are burdensome for
poor mothers. Naturally parents-in-law are the only alternative she can turn to to
care for her children during her absence at work. That is why parents-in-law appear
to make a greater contribution in the households of employed wives than among
full-time housewives. In spite of this, the amount of child care the employed
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women undertake is still never light compared to the full-time housewives. While
the reason why the housewives in nuclear family households do not turn for help
neither to their own parents nor to their parents-in-law in spite of their heavy
burden of childbearing is concerned to their preference to sweet home idea or
individualism. However burdensome the activities are, they-normally do not like to
have their status as the in-master at home ambiguous by allowing parents, mother-
in-law in particular interfere in her domain.
The dual burden of the employed women is not any less in the outside
responsibilities either. Activities like visiting relatives for congratulations or
condolences, attending parents' meeting at the children's school, or visiting public
offices etc., have not changed. Although all of these are recognised as
responsibilities o.f the husband too, they still also fall on wives regardless of their
economic activity. Of áourse it is in these areas that parents-in-law and particularly
husbands give most help to employed women rather than to full-time housewives.
However given the conventional ideas on the responsibilities of husbands, the
proportion of them the dual career wife has come to perform is a heavy burden. It
can create conflicts and contradiction with her husband, one of main issues arising
among feminists in present day Korea.
In spite of the totally unequal division of labour between the dual career
woman and her husband the conflict the wife concerned endures is not usually
decisive enough to overturn the status quo. The gap between the expectations of
the employed wife and her actual obligations surprisingly does not exceed 10 per
cent in any area of activity. Korean women endure the severe burden at home
because of the deeply entranced Confucian emphasis on familism and the strict
sexual division of labour.
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, a strict sexual division of labour was an
essential element in Confucian patriarchalism and has lasted until the present day.
Husbands ought to behave in a husband-like way, wives wifelike, and children
childrenly. To be specific, a husband was expected to work outside home to
maintain and enhance the prestige of his own family. Children were expected to
concentrate solely on learning so as to inherit the values handed down from
generation to generation. A good wife and wise mother was expected to take care
of the whole of the domestic affairs to allow her husband or children to feel totally
free from domestic matters so as to concentrate on their own responsibilities. Thus
the mother and wife had a strong image, not as a leader pursuing the major goals in
society, but as an assistant for male family members to do that on her behalf. The
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wife was required to believe in her husband's or children's social success as her
own success. A key to success was to invest in one person rather than in every one.
Her whole help was expected to be in the home. Sharing effort equally between
both him and her was believed stupid. These ideas still remain as an influence in
present day Korea. Naturally the employed woman is likely to feel guilty that she
can not concentrate solely on her traditional duty. Regardless of the reason for her
outside employment, she has been accustomed to feel ashamed about her lack of
dedication as mother to her children, as wife to her husband, and as daughter-in-
law to her parents-in-law. That is the reason she rarely feels any great conflict with
other family members since she is likely to share their perception of her family
members, in spite of the excessive demands placed by her working outside the
home.
In addition, traditionally a husband's success in life was applauded as a
direct reflection of his wife's efforts and was viewed as a success for his whole
family. The ultimate goal a husband pursues in society was making the family's
name followed by establishing his individual social position and personal
reputation rather than achieving economic resources becamse honour ass knger
than money does. That is why for the last a few decades Korean husbands have not
been reluctant to work late at night in spite of a meagre salary. The reason for a
dual career woman to work outside however is not usually far fame but to earn
living expenses. In the end it was to assist her husband that she worked rather than
for her own ambition. The fact that husband's dedication was respected by society
gave a significant value to her conjugal life. If the occupational activity of the
husband was basically oriented to goal-rationality (wert rational), that of the wife
was for means-rationality (zweck rational). In Parsonian terms the husband was
fulfilling an integrative function or latency function while his wife's employment
had an exclusively adaptation function for her own family. That is why dual career
women have not complained about their excessive role at home and that is why the
nation has enjoyed such rapid economic growth. Husbands paid the nation by
working hard to make their family's name, the wives by enduring the excessive
burden of their role at home.
While that was usual pattern in more traditionally oriented generations,
with the expansion of individualism some young wives began to question received
given ideas. They came to criticise the philosophy of Confucian familism and
sought equal opportunities both at work and at home. Thus from the point of view
of young employed wives the endurance of the wife is viewed an example of the
exploitation of women, rather than as of co-operation between couples with
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different but complimentary roles as earlier generations had thought. Unless an
equal division of labour is achieved at home, the statistical rise in women's
participation in the labour market can not lead to an improvement of their social
status. While the idea of the co-operative role division rather than traditional
Confucian exploitation still strongly persists, with the criticism raised by younger
generation, the conventional unequal division is likely to be improved as time
passes. How their condition changes depends on both cultural transitions and
socio-economic development including the size of the labour market.
6.2. THE POWER STRUCTURE
Authority is inherent in the structure of roles within the family and is
related to decision-making in family life. Power on the other hand refers to the way
in which husbands and wives actually deal with each other. For example,
sometimes a housewife is able to exercise almost no power on the allotment of
living expenses in spite of the fact that most of them are paid by herself. Vice
versa, a husband with little or no involvement in his children's upbringing can
exercise total authority in making decisions on such matters. In spite of still having
authority, however fathers may have less power in family life whilst a mother can
hold power in spite of pretending that father is king of her kingdom.'4
We shall examine three areas of decision-making in this section: the family
economy, the children's upbringing, and couple's external activities. The analysis is
based on 1,664 nuclear type of households and 275 stem family households from
FAM8 9.
Borrowing a frame of reference from Elizabeth Bott, the analysis of the
family distinguishes two different types of power structure: namely the segregated
role relationship on the one hand and joint role relationship on the other hand. In
the former each family member decides matters independently without consulting
with other family members, while the joint role relationship is defined as a
structure of decision-making through mutual consensus. In a word the terms are
intended to analyse a degree of collaboration or separateness among family
members in making decisions concerning to family life)5
To meet the purpose of the analysis, independent from the measures of the
previous section, a couple of questions were prepared in each area of decision-
making: family economy, children's upbringing, and a couple's external activities.
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On each question, several answers were arranged to choose among them: namely
decision-making absolutely by the husband, the couple in collaboration, by the
wife alone, by the parents alone, the couple and parents in collaboration, the couple
and children in collaboration, by the children alone, and others, etc. If an activity
was a collaborated decision-making between/among family members, it was a joint
role relationship and if under the one-sided decision-making of a family member or
a few members, a segregated role relationship. Of course it is hard, with this
measure, to observe exactly who is taking the initiative in making a decision on an
activity of each area. More accurate survey methods like depth-interview or
participation observation are needed to measure the subtle subject of which actual
family member has the power in decision-making, and they demand time, effort,
and finance. Regarding the difficulties, questions were prepared as above to
observe the broad atmosphere among family members in decision-making.
6.2.1. Economic Decision-making
Three areas of economic decision-making will be examined: the purchase
of the family house or flat, buying household furniture, and the amount of monthly
living expenses. As already reviewed in the previous section on the role
relationship, these activities are hard to be mixed into one category on the
discussion of who is the main performer. However the discussion below does not
focus on who is a performer but mainly on the process of decision-making. Of
course it can be misleading in the interpretation of power attributed to each family
members but is still useful in making sense of an overall trend.
As shown on the Figure 6.7, economic decision-making is a relatively
democratic process. Compared to the excessively dichotomised pattern of role
allocation reviewed in the previous section, the balance of power in this area is
quite egalitarian. This is the case more in urban areas than in the rural areas, arid
more among nuclear families than in stem family households. Thus the urban
nuclear family is the most egalitarian type and the rural stem family household the
most authoritative. The more urbanised and the more nuclear families increase, the
more egalitarian the type of family power structure becomes.
The degree of egalitarianism varies according to family types; the stem
family allows far more scope for the parents-in-law than the nuclear family does.
There are two exceptions to this general pattern. Firstly because rural stem families
are usually more traditional in terms of the hyo idea(filial piety), one would expect
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evidence of more power in the hands of parents-in-law than in urban families. The
amount of shared decision-making with parents-in-law in the rural stem family is
smaller than that in the urban stem family. This may be because the rural stem
family mostly engages in agriculture and farming in a relatively monotonous and
repetitive activity -with few occasions for asking each other's opinions. The other
exception is the extent of children's participation in the economic decisions in the
rural stem family household. The explanation probably lies in the greater
proportion of grown-up children than in other families which meant couples were
more likely to listen more to opinions from their children.
Figure 6.7. Economic Decision-making By Region And By Household
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However a good proportion of families are making decisions on the basis of
clearly dichotomised roles. This reflects the survival of traditional ideas of the
division of labour. The main feature of this pattern can be summarised under two
headings. First the wife has slightly more power in decision-making especially
among wives in nuclear family than in stem family households and more among
urban wives than among rural wives. As a result, an urban housewife in a nuclear
family household exercises almost twice the power in economic decision-making
compared with the rural housewife from a stem family household. This reflects the
heavy burden of her responsibilities reviewed in the previous section. Though it
may not be fully proportional to the excessive demands imposed on the dual career
wife, it has brought about some gain in her power of decision-making , though this
was in the form of the egalitarian type of decision-making. The second notable
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feature is the great preponderance of the type over the egalitarian style among rural
stem family households. This also reflects the greater average age of rural stem
families who prefer the traditional division of labour and decision-making.
In spite of such variations, economic decision-making is relatively
egalitarian. There is a slight increase in an employed wife's status as decision-
maker at home thanks to her economic role. However, the result has been an
egalitarian style of decision-making rather than a wife's total gain of power at home
which reflects the general trend towards married happiness in present day Korea.
6.2.2. Children's Affairs
Three areas of decision-making in relation to children are included:
planning the number of children, direction of home training, and choosing the high
school for the children to enter.
Traditionally decision-making relating to children was strictly patriarchal.
However it has come to show an almost egalitarian pattern reflecting the increase
in the performance of the housewife role described in the previous section. This is
even more marked than in economic decision-making. The degree of egalitarianism
shows almost no difference by the family pattern though it varies by region. Urban
families whether of the nuclear pattern or the stem pattern, are slightly more
democratic in making decisions relating to children than rural families are. This
derives from the higher average age of rural families and conversely, as urban
families are more exposed to a modern way of family life, they tend to follow a
more democratic pattern of decision-making.
The amount of influence children have is quite small considering that some
issues concern the children themselves. The decision on which high school
children are to enter, though it directly affects children themselves, is frequently
quite out of their hands and is made entirely by their parents. It is directly
connected to the prospects for getting a job and how successful s/he will be. Entry
to high school or to a better department in utilitarian terms is recognised as a matter
of family concern not an individual affair of the children's own because parents
identify their children's future with their own. There is the almost total exclusion of
parents-in-law from the decision-making in relation to the family's children. Of
course in the stem family there is more scope for influence by the paternal
grandparents than in the nuclear family. However the traditionally powerful
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position of parents-in-law, particularly of father-in-law, in the education of
children, has been significantly weakened. Their influence is even smaller than the
part they play in their grandchildren's upbringing. Their position at home has
changed from that of strict educator to simply a tender granny or grandpa or to one
merely auxiliary to the young couple's educational role. Rural husbands generally
have more time to engage in family affairs than busy urban salary men which is
why they are able to have more influence in decision-making on matters
concerning their children.
Figure 6.8. Decision-making In Relation To Children
By Region And By Family Patterns
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With only a few exceptions decision-making in matters concerning children
is very egalitarian. This reflects the increase in the involvement in all activities by
wives. However this has led to an egalitarian balance of power rather than a
matriarchal authoritative pattern of power mirroring the conventional father and
husband dominance in traditional society. However this egalitarianism is limited to
couples only and excluded parents-in-law and even the children directly concerned.
This is the case regardless of region and of family type. Present day Koreans are
more concerned with the improvement of their conjugal relationships than
reconciliation with their parents-in-law or the feelings of their children.
Chapter Six 232
6.2.3. Activities Outside The Family Household
In this section a husbands' selection or change of occupation and meeting
with his friend and wives' application for post-marital employment and going out
to meet her friends are examined.
According to Confucian tradition the stem family was sharply divided by
sex. A husband was called the out-master or out-partner and a wife the in-master or
in-partner. There should normally be pre-consent or permission if either was to
intervene in affairs belonging to the domain of the other. Observance of this
division was an expected virtue and recognised as of one of four supreme decorum
which should lubricate relationships among human beings.
Outside affairs such as employment or visiting friends was definitely
matters for husbands and. there was.iarely anything to conáern women outside the
household. Only a minority of women with some humble job could go out of doors
on their own. Even a short visit to friends next door was regarded as shameful and
irresponsible by her neighbours. Even a short outing for tea or a chat needed
permission. She could go out, wherever it was, and whatever work she had to do,
only with permission from the eldest female family member at home or otherwise
from her husband. Even then he might sometimes be scolded by his mother for
having intervened in the women's domain.
The situation has changed very drastically as shown in Figure 6.9.
Regardless of region or family pattern, the segregated type of role pattern is totally
dominant. Just under one out of three wives discusses her outside activities with
her husband and asks mutual-understanding(not permission). While just over half
the wives decide their outside activities by themselves with neither permission nor
understanding from their husbands. Rural wives in stem family households are
slightly less likely to make their own decisions. Traditional authority of the eldest
female member of the household or of a husband on deciding about the outside
activities of a wife, has almost vanished, especially that of a mother-in-law's.
Almost no wife asks her mother-in-law's permission for her outside activities, and
very rarely her husband either. Of course, rural husbands are slightly more
dominant than urban husbands, particularly those from rural stem families. As
already mentioned this reflects the relatively older age structure of rural stem
families. Thus older couples have more traditional ideas on the wife's outside
activities while urbanites have been more exposed to the ideas of the women's•
movement. The nuclear pattern of family is the result.
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Figure 6.9. Decision-making About Wives And Husbands Outside
Activities By Degree Of Conjugal Role Segregation
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It is important to explain the cause of such a huge change in the outside
activities of wives. The reason is basically from an emphasis on outside/inside
activities and the primary stress has moved to the fact of the housewife's own
affairs. In that sense there has been no change in the conventional idea of the strict
division of labour by sex. Thus there is still a strong disapproval of husbands who
intervene in women's affairs both among present day Korean men and women.
However it is only mothers-in-law who have totally lost their influence.
The same situation, in terms of keeping traditional ideas, is happening in
relation to husband's outside activities. A wife traditionally was never expected to
put her nose into the husband's outside activities. Even discussion was looked on as
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a sign of a spineless husband even by his own wife. Reflecting this tradition, most
husbands still make all the decisions on their own outside activities. This is more
true among rural husband regardless of family patterns. In other word the rural
families have a smaller proportion with joint conjugal role relationships while
urban families have more of them.
A change has occurred in decision-making concerning a husband's outside
activities. In other words, the proportion of joint decision-making regarding those
activities is greater than that for a wives' activities. This is because a husbands'
occupational activities are generally recognised as involving the family income.
Even chatting with friends or a social meeting after work is perceived to be
connected directly or indirectly to the domestic income; 'While a wife's activities
are perceived of as being a source of extra income, her social meetings are regarded
as of trivial importance, producing nothing but chat. Being identified as the main
income source, a husband's activities have more significance for the family than do
his wife's. Thus, husbands feel more responsible about their outside activities and
expect more understanding from their wife. That explains the more sharing style
observed among urban husbands. However, with more traditional views about
men's affairs, rural husbands, particularly from stem family households are less
egalitarian about making decisions about their outside activities. The influence of
parents is very small regardless of region or of family type, as in the case on the
wife's outside activities.
To sum up, in the process of modernisation, there has been a major shift
towards a more joint style of making decisions on family affairs of common
concern. This was an indirect reflection of the massively increased responsibilities
of wives. Taking charge of most of the role inSide the home and outside as well,
housewives have assumed a more significant share in family decision-making.
Individual activities are still the domain the least changed. Both husbands and
wives still maintain the idea of a strict division of labour by sex. Most husbands
believe their outside activities are their own affairs. Most wives object to their
husbands interfering in their own business. The situation is more true in rural, and
particularly rural stem family households. Both past and present influences are at
work in the minds of husbands and wives. In other words, both wife and husband
are seeking to modernise their pattern of decision-making to a more egalitarian
style on the one hand, and at the same time are trying to keep the traditional
division of labour by sex on the other. How they can harrnonise such a
contradiction depends on other social changes in the future. However, it is possible
to anticipate at least some more decrease in role segregation and some increase in
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sharing decision-making both on economic affairs, children's affairs, and the
couple's outside activities as well. This is possible due to the increase in the nuclear
family pattern. The trend presumably leads both wives and husbands to be more
attached to each other with an increase in the amount of discussion between the
couple more than amongst other family members. This trend would naturally lead
them to a more egalitarian style unless they are going to divorce.
In spite of these general trends, there are three groups which are excluded:
children, dual career housewives, and parents-in-law. Children may gain influence
relatively easily as time passes with the on-going trend to individualism or
modernisation among the younger generation. However, the other two groups,
particularly parents-in-law are total losers. In spite of the double burden imposed
on the employed housewives, their influence in the family is no greater than that of
the full-time housewife. Thus, in spite of the amount they contribute, dual career
women have no more power to make decisions on home affairs than other wives.
However, their position looks optimistic, owing to the general march of the
women's movement. Speed of the movement may be slow but steady and the end
of the turmel is foreseeable. Last but worst of all, parents-in-law, particularly
mothers-in-law are of generally declining significance in the modern Korean
family. They were the last generation devoted to traditional values. They were the
group who devoted themselves to the creation of the wealth of present day Korea.
However, they have gained nothing yet from the nation nor from their younger
generations. They were asked by the nation to maintain the traditional way of life
for the benefit of economic development both of the nation and of the individual
family. However, the only thing waiting for them in the end, having kept faith with
the nation, was the cold individualism of their daughter-in-law and of their
spiritless and henpecked son. Parents-in-law may be one of the first groups to be
considered the object of social policy in the near future.
PART III
PROBLEMS AND POLICY
FOR THE FAMILY
IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
Part III is a concluding remark comprising of two chapters. Chapter 7, first,
discusses how much the family has weakened or dissolved after the profound influence of
the modernisation of the last few decades: how much the divorce rate has increased and
would increase in the near future. Next, it examines how attitudes and values relating to
family life have changed in the process of the social change. It comprises of changing
attitudes and values relating to matrimony, to neo-familism, in the form of Saemaul
movement, which has emerged in response to the changing environment, and lastly to the
outcome of reconciliation, in the family law, of the traditional Confucianism and the newly
emerged feminism.
Finally Chapter 8 is to conclude the whole of the thesis. First, it summarises whole
discussions so far; what was the tradition, what has changed among them and what has
remained unchanged. Next, the chapter reviews how the society reacted, through social
policies or family policies, to the changing environment. And it discusses what sort of
family policies should be arranged to meet the huge variation and diversity of family life in
which the conventional values relating to the family do not work properly.
CHAPTER SEVEN
FAMILY DISSOLUTION AND
CHANGING VALUES
The discussion so far has concentrated on changes in the attributes of the
family and has not examined whether the family has been weakened or still retains
its original solidarity and how the family responded to the changes. This chapter
first examines how far the family has been undermined and how far concern about
it has grown among present day Koreans. Secondly, it considers changes in general
ideas about matrimony. Thirdly it discusses neo-familism having emerged in the
process of a programme of plaimed social change through the Saemaul movement,
which sought to mobilise traditional family values to improve the economic
effectiveness and social cohesion of rural communities. Lastly, it discusses a
reconciliation between Confucianism and feminism in the form of family law in
present day Korea. The family law reflects family values commonly shared among
present day Koreans. The change in family law demonstrates the confirmation of
yet unchanged traditional family values and the ideas in the family realm changed
during the modernisation.
7.1. FAMILY DISSOLUTION
Family dissolution can be the result either of divorce or separation on the
one hand or by the death of a partner on the other hand. Both have been changing
under the influence of modernisation throughout the last half century..
7.1.1. Changes In The Family Life Cycle
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In traditional society, the death of a partner was recognised as a very sad
event for an individual family but in general was accepted as part of the natural
way of life. It was perceived as no more than an individual event. It neither brought
about the dissolution of a family nor raised any social issue. Society was organised
on the stem family principle and as the family was comprised of a couple of
generations, the death of a partner did not necessarily lead to the disorganisation of
the family as a whole. It was just a reduction of the family size and the family kept
on functioning.1
This situation has changed afler a few decades of modernisation.
Modemisation weakened or at least modified the stem family principle as already
reviewed in Chapter 4. The change has resulted in the dissolution of the family for
those individuals who have lost their own partner and this is especially severe in
rural areas. To examine the situation, we must first consider the conceptual
differences between the cycle of the stem family and that of the nuclear family.
Figure 7.1. The Family Cycle In The West and Korea
<the nuclear family>
0
0<
<the stem or the extended family>
0 __	 __
I-stage	 Il-stage	 Ill-stage
ordinary cases
rare cases
\J-stage	 ..
S.
V-stag
First the cycle of the nuclear family is lineal and is single phased. The ideal
typical nuclear family in the West followed the unilineal process as shown in
Figure 7.1. An individual forms a family of procreation by marriage and then s/he
expands the size and the structure of the family by giving birth to children. Next
the family reduces to an empty-nest when the children leave home to marry or
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become independent, Eventually the family dissolved to an individual again by the
death of her/his partner.
Once dissolved, the individuals had no where to go unless they remarry.
Even this alternative is nothing but a temporary solution. Because the boundary of
the range of possible remarriage partners is generally limited to older individuals,
on average remarriage might end in much less time than first marriagea did. All in
all, on the death of a partner, the older individual confronts a total loss physically,
emotionally, and economically. That is one of the reasons why old age has been
one of the most pressing issues for welfare provision in nuclear family societies.2
That was one reason why the West developed the role of the Welfare State and was
first to develop social policies for the care of the old. Having gone too far with
individualism, society should have prepared some mechanism at institutional level
that could replace the role of the family. 3 Of course the author is not denying the
existence of home-care in the West, however the basic and heavy burdens of
provision still remain with the government.
Divorce has added to the increase of broken families and has also exposed
individuals to a range of depriving circumstances. 4 The increase in broken families
caused by divorce or by the death of a partner has been proportionally related to the
increase of the role of the State. As a result it has increased the financial burden on
the nation as a whole.
Traditionally there was a totally different situation in Korea. There was no
concept of family dissolution. As shown in Figure 7.1, the family cycle in
traditional society repeated a circular process. 5 It was basically different from the
unilineal and single phase process of the West. Roughly there were two types of
the family cycle. The first was the circulation through stages III IV - VI - III. It
was the most typical stem family pattern, and the most predominantly observed
pattern in the tradition. If a family adopted the extended pattern by having more
than the eldest son's family co-reside, it would pass through stage V as well,
though that was a very rare case. The family cycle starts from stage I when the rest
of the family apart from the eldest married sons were establishing an independent
family of procreation (pun-ga). However it progressed to the III stage and
eventually to the IV and VI stages. As a result there was no dissolution of the
family but it continued to expand or to reduce, in feedback, almost forever. That is
the reason why traditional society was called the stem family structure in spite of
the prevalence of nuclear pattern families. Statistical prevalence was a superficial
and temporary phenomenon. Of course it is possible to imagine a family failing in
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generational reproduction but nevertheless the family was rarely dissolved, thanks
to the adoption system. Few families were too poor or had too few relatives to
adopt a son and the case of failure of the adoption was extremely rare. Anyhow due
to the very fact of the stem principle family dissolution was scarcely thought of and
was rare in reality as well.
The structural characteristics of the unceasingly repeating family cycle had
provided a good deal of welfare for its members. 6 Individual events like divorce or
the loss of a partner, however sorrowful it might be, did not have a critical impact
on family functioning. Even if an elderly person lost their own partner, the
remaining members of the stem family could take care of them. The family did not
loose its status as a basic unit of a society and it still functioned as an intermediate
unit between individuals and the state. Concretely there were few old people
divorced, or children who suffered from significant deprivation economically, and
emotionally. The aged, with or without a partner, economically disabled or not, and
physically healthy or not, did not feel deprivation or loneliness so severely as to
think of suicide. This was due to the filial piety of the Confucian doctrine fused in
the stem family principle. Even the conjugal conflicts of younger couples were
diluted due to their relationships with the other family members. Conjugal love was
important but not critical enough for divorce to be a possibility. Both were too
much and too deeply connected to the other members under the same roof to waste
their time and effort focussing only on the relationship with their partner. To sum
up, the structure had the intrinsic function of stabilising the family and eventually
the society as a whole.
The family cycle has been affected by modernisation as other matrimonial
aspects of family life have been. 7 The cyclical continuity has been distorted by the
relaxation of the stem principle which has brought about an increae in family
dissolution both by loss of a partner and by divorce. With the weakening of the
conventional stem principle, the family has split into two or more small families of
a nuclear pattern. Thus the eldest son as well as another son could easily set up an
independent family. Of course, this would usually be with the consent of the
parents. They would be assured that the younger generation would reunite
immediately if the parents were in a severe situation like the loss of a partner or
suffering significant ill-health. In the sharp increase in the nuclear pattern family
cycle, they believed was for the benefit of modem couples pursuing conjugal
happiness.
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The changes in the stem principle brought complicated changes in attitudes
toward the aged parents. 8 As shown in Table 7.1, the changes can be summarised
in a few points. Filial piety is still widespread reflecting the persistence of the stem
family principle in present day Korea. However ideas about who should look after
the aged parents economically, physically, and emotionally have changed as the
stem principle has been moderated. First, filial duty to parents is not limited to the
eldest son only. It has been extended to other Sons or daughters as well, regardless
of their age hierarchy at home. The change proportionally reflects the breakdown
of the (eldest) son preference idea of the conventional familism of the past. As a
result the statistics show the biggest proportion in the TV-category referring to all
Sons and daughters together. The changing idea is more fashionable in urban areas
than in rural areas. However, the strict filial duty of traditional society is no longer
universal. One out of five people in the whole country believe parents should be
provided for by the welfare services or provided by themselves (category V, VI).
This directly reveals the extent to which the stem principle has been weakened.
Moreover the duty for all children can mean the duty of nobody. The boundary of
filial responsibility can be vague among children, and parents can be abandoned by
each child in turn.
Table 7.1. Who Should Look After The Aged Parents.9
erson most
_______ conort total	 I	 1	 11
1979	 whole	 100.0	 30.6	 22.2
1983	 whole	 100.0	 22.1	 21.7
1988	 whole	 100.0	 25.2	 17.8
	whole	 100.0	 18.3	 13.8
	urban 100.0 15.4	 12.1
rural	 100.0	 26.6	 18.8
1991	 15-19	 100.0	 12.0	 11.1
	
20-29	 100.0	 13.1	 13.6
	
30-39	 100.0	 15.0	 14.2
	
40-49	 100.0	 18.4	 14.2
	
50-59	 100.0	 26.5	 17.1
_____	 60+	 100.0	 38.6	 16.9
source: EPB, Social Statistics Survey(1990), P.28 8.
I: the eldest son, 	 II: all sons,	 III: daughters,
V: self-reliance, 	 VI: social welfare and others
The next change indicated in the table is the generation gap in expectations
about who should be the main person to look after old parents. The above
mentioned trend of the moderated stem principle, is disproportionate between
generations. The younger generation is far more likely to expect their parents to be
independent than they, the parents, actually would themselves like to do. The
younger generation is far more likely to think society should care for their parents
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than the parents are likely to expect social welfare to be provided for them.
Similarly, the younger generation is increasingly reluctant to take upon themselves
sole responsibility for looking after their parents. Just one out of six eldest sons
feels it is his duty to shoulder the burden alone. Most of them expect their siblings
to share their burden, while almost one out of two amongst the aged feel
comfortable only when they are cared for by their eldest son. This clearly can be
another cause for the aged parents ambiguous position in the family.
The table reveals that the moderated stem principle has left the elder
generations alienated to some degree.'° Their alienation from the conventional
family-care it may easily be supposed will increase. Apart from the amount of V,
VT categories, the boundary of the TV-category in vague, and there is a huge
difference of opinion according to the generation about the main source and
support for elderly parents. Whilst the elder generation spent their money for their
children's higher education, they saved no money for their own sake. They were the
group who predominantly contributed to the economic development of the nation.
Without the support of their families the nation is the only agent to take care of the
aged.
Families once separated are difficult to reunite physically and emotionally.
There have been roughly three points that hinder reunification. Once has been
enjoyed the pleasure of life independent from the parents-in-law, the wife of the
eldest son feels it would be very burdensome to share a small roof with them again.
She lacks the emotional intimacy in her relationshipwith them unlikewith her
natural parents, and would have to accept their assumed rights. Naturall y she
would wish to share the work with the wives of her husband's younger brothers.
From her point of view, all sons should have the same responsibility. However the
wife of her husband's younger brother is likely to claim she has riot married an
eldest son. She is likely to refuse to take the conventional responsibility of the
eldest son's family. In the process of disputes among sisters-in-law, most husbands
become a sandwich between parents and wife. A husband is lost between the
importance of married life and his filial duty to his parents. It is a sort of cultural
lag. He is not so brave as to resist the current fashion of the feminist movement.
The movement has struggled exclusively for the interest of young women only. It
confirms the statistics of Table 7.1. Parents may feel they are being treated like a
ball in a pingpong game. However the state is not ready to protect these parents
financially and socially. Eventually this led to a case of suicide of a parent in such
a situation 11 . It was just one case but the social shock the accident brought to every
family in Korea was stirring.
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The second barrier against reunification is the housing problem.' 2 The price
of housing has increased astonishingly. Unless the parents have enough money to
purchase a moderate sized house, reunification means further reducing the already
narrow living space available for the son's family. Of course it can be another
excuse for some sons and their families to stay with parents until they can buy their
own house. However, having once got moderate economic resources, they were
reluctant to share their house with their parents because the size of the house they
could buy was limited due to high housing costs.
The other hindrance to family reunification is the occupational mobility of
sons. It is impossible to ask a son and his family to give up his current job to rejoin
and look after his parents. The alternative is to have parents join the son's
household. However the parents find it as difficult to leave their ground to which
they are firmly attached emotionally, as their son's family is. As a result parents are
left alone with their friends who are also in the same situation as well.
Family dissolution as a result of changes in the family cycle is most
frequently observed among one person households in rural areas. The proportion of
broken families has sharply increased. According to FAM89, one person
households accounted for 9.1 per cent of households in the whole country (8.3 % in
the urban, 10.8 % in the rural). Among them more than one out of two rural single
household, and two out of nine urban single households consisted of the elderly.
Three quarters of the urban cases are due to divorce but four fifths of the rurai one
person households are due to the loss of a partner. Most of them have married
children staying somewhere in the cities. The rural areas suffer far more from
family dissolution and are far more subject to the weakness of the stem principle.
Of course, that does not mean, urban parents, widowed or not, are in a better
condition. Though the proportion of one person households is smaller, the
alienation the urban aged is suffering is much the same.
7.1.2. The Increase In The Divorce Rate
Family dissolution is also the result of divorce.' 3 In escaping from the stem
familial cycle, young couples might enjoy conjugal happiness but they are also
exposed to the aggravation of conjugal conflict. Unlike couples in stem families
there are no other adults except themselves who could perform the role of
mediator. In a sense they are locked in a small castle of just two extreme
alternatives allowed: happy married life or separation. No structural mechanisms
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are provided at home to reconcile even trivial conflicts between them. As a natural
result, the weakening of the stem familial cycle has brought about the increase in
the divorce rate as well. As Table 7.2. shows, the trend displays two distinct
periods: before and after the 1980s.
Table 7.2. The Growth Of The Divorce Rate
year	 I	 total cases of	 I	 divorce rate per
I marriages	 aivorces	 luuu persons I IUU marriages
1911	 5,621	 0.41
1920	 7,982	 0.47
1930	 8,894	 0.45
1970	 295,137	 11,615	 0.88	 3.94
1975	 283,610	 16,617	 1.26	 5.86
1980	 400,471	 23,150	 1.83	 5.78
1985	 362,767	 34,640	 2.86	 9.55
1989	 343.285	 45,039	 3.12	 13.12
source: EPB, Vital Registration Statistics
Even in the earlier three decades the divorce rate were never negligible.
Though the statistics show the lowest rate since the Japanese annexation of 1910
there was already a surprising increase even at that time. Considering that there
were almost no cases in traditional society on the one hand or the low rates of the
developed countries at that time on the other, the divorce rate was significant
enough. The rate far surpassed that of the United Kingdom of 0.1 persons per
thousand, and slightly that of the Netherlands at 0.4 persons in 1934. It was just
slightly lower than France with 0.5, Germany with 0.6, and Japan with 0.8 in the
same year' 4 . In comparision with these statistics, divorce in Korea was never a
negligible amount throughout the present century. Again considering the extremely
rare cases of divorce reported in the past, statistics are surprisingly high. Though
there was no specific law that prohibited divorce in traditional society, nevertheless
society almost never allowed divorce either by custom or by the strict application
of the Code. This was to preserve the family values as already discussed in Chapter
3. Unless a wife was recognised as unfilial to her parents-in-law, or unless she was
unfaithful to husband, traditional society almost never allowed divorce. Thus
already in 1910 the divorce statistics were amazingly high. Some explanation can
be derived from close scrutiny of the statistics. Among the divorces, four out of
five were due to cruel treatment or insult from a husband or husband!s family. Of
course these divorces was instigated from the woman's side and most of divorce in
the earlier decades were predominantly brought forward by women. This was a
reaction against the fossilised Confucian familism of the time. The statistics are an
indication of how women's life in traditional societies was deteriorating. The
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reaction was increased dramatically due to the introduction of divorce law quoted
from Japanese Civil Law during the annexation.
Since the middle of the 1 980s the divorce rate has shown a dramatically
increasing new trend. About one out of nine marriages by the late 1980s ended in
divorce. According to Vital Registration Statistics of EPB, over four out of five
cases of divorce were due to domestic differences. In addition, divorce petitions
were being issued equally from both husbands and wives. Suing for a divorce is no
longer mainly because of ill-treatment or from familial trouble like those of the
earlier period. More and more it was the result of very personal and even minor
disputes like disparity of characters.' 5 This is particularly true among the younger
generations still in their twenties or thirties. These changes reflect the
modernisation process following the deepening of individualism among younger
generations and the growth of women's economic potential. Tolerance and
forgiveness was an essential principle for the maintenance of traditional family life,
but no longer carries the same weight among younger generations. The meaning of
married life has shifted from generational reproduction to the pursuit of married
life. As a result when love no longer exists a couple no longer stays together. That
is why the average marriage duration of the young divorced in their twenties is
below one year since they prefer to divorce before a child is born. Compared to the
developed countries, the rate so far is still at a lower level but the speed of the
growth in breakdowns is very rapid.
Hardships arising from divorce fall mostly on the divorcee and on the
children.' 6 The divorced woman is deprived of an economic base after the
dissolution of the family. Of course women's economic participation has notably
increased but the increase is predominantly amongst unmarried women. Job
opportunities for a divofced woman after the empty period out of paid employment
due to matrimony, are very limited.
The difficulties to which children are exposed are as serious as those the
divorcee has to confront.' 7 Children are very fragile psychologically and
emotionally. They are the losers of the adults' love disputes. For the adults, if the
marriage was their choice then the divorce also is what they themselves have
chosen. Adults chose divorce looking for a better quality of life, however bitter the
choice might be. Children however are not allowed to participate in the adults'
discussions and they are the victims of their parents interests. Deeply influenced by
individualism or egoism, the adults are inclined to believe that children are able to
cope with their environment and have, as the adults have, their own way of coping.
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It may be true but their emotional injury is not something they had any choice
about. That is something no body and no state can compensate for.
Once protected under the stem family system in the past, the injured now
have nowhere to go. If divorce was a matter of a reduction of the family size in the
stem family, it now brings about a total breakdown fri the nuclear family. Even
though the stem principle is still alive in a different form in present day Korea, it is
not able to help in healing feuds between couples or in preventing divorce, because
however strong it may be, families are divided into nuclear families. Thus the
safety-valve mechanism has disappeared as a result of the physical separation. The
state is the only agent which can provide care for the divorcee or her children.
However present day Korea, in spite of the speedy growth of the last two decades,
is not economically strong enough to subsidise the divorced and their families. The
nation is still not rich enough to divert finances allocated for economic production
on an enlarged scale.
7.1.3. Prospect For Family Disorganisation
Family dissolution is the result of changes in the family cycle and the
increasing rate of divorce. The statistics may be anticipated to increase further in
the future. Of course the stem principle is still alive among present day Koreans but
no longer according to the traditional pattern. The reality however does not go side
by side with the principle. Table 7.1 demonstrates the ineffective functioning of the
modified stem principle. There is too deep a generation gap about who should be
the main person to take care of aged parents. These changing attitudes can produce
an increase in alienated parents and family dissolution. Moreover once divided by
the nuclear pattern, it is hardly possible to reunite families across the generations.
The elderly widow/er remains alone. Women's demands for their own conjugal life
rejecting their mother-in-law and opposing traditional familism continue to
increase more than ever before. Furthermore with the strong and wide diffusion of
individualism, the stem principle may be expected to be weaker in future. This
follows from the increase in the nuclear family pattern, followed by the isolation of
the widowed survivor of the death of a partner as in the West. Of course it depends
on the economic situation and housing supply in the future. If house prices are as
high as at the present day it will be hard for the young couple to get a home of their
own, and the alternative is sharing a roof with their parents. If the general
conditions of the nation worsens in the future, young couples can choose to live in
with the elder generation but those will be just temporary trends. The trend towards
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individualism followed by the increase in the dissolved family looks inevitable. Of
course no body knows yet how far these trends will go.
The increase in divorce is also influenced by the change in the stem
principle. Though accepting the stem principle, most young couples do not stay
physically with their parents generation and lack the safety-valve this may provide
to their conjugal feuds. If it makes them more easily accept family dissolution, then
as a result of the weakening of the stem principle, more divorce is anticipated.
The increase in the divorce rate also is related to changing values about
divorce. Of course most human behaviour cannot be separated from economic and
social conditions but it is also true that no social change can be possible without
changes in attitudes. Regardless of analysing which factor contributes more to a
change than another, it is still meaningful to examine the pattern of attitudes and
values for an anticipation of future trends.
Table 7.3. Opinion On Divorce By Age Cohorts
age	 total(r.N)	 opinion on divorce
cohort	 can	 mustn't	 no idea
total	 100.0(2826)	 41.9	 55.4	 2.4
-29	 l00.0( 588)	 57.0	 40.1	 2.9
30-39	 l00.0( 796)	 53.3	 43.7	 3.0
40-49	 l00.0( 584)	 38.0	 60.1	 1.9
50-59	 100.0(469)	 25.6	 72.7	 1.7
60+	 lOO.0( 389)	 21.3	 76.3	 2.3
source: FAM89
rN.: real number,
As shown in Table 7.3, viewed longitudinally, the probability of divorce
has sharply increased. The increase shows far more steeply in the age groups in
their thirties and younger. Divorce as an option is almost three times greater among
the younger group in comparision with the eldest group. The young generation in
their twenties and thirties is the baby-boom generation. They were brought up
under relatively economically wealthy conditions thanks to the economic
development of the last few decades. While they disregard the economic struggles
of their parents, they saw and hated their parents' home life. Unsatisfactory for their
parents, it was also destructive for the children. The only excuse was the pursuit of
economic prosperity. For the younger generation a loveless married life was
viewed as worse than divorce. Once believed a sort of evil, seeking divorce is no
longer recognised as an immoral attitude. Divorce may now be seen as a beneficial
alternative for the good of both. They no longer feel an obligation to continue
married life with someone when they have become disagreeable to one another.
That is one of the reasons for the sharp increase in divorce among younger
de
nj.
52.3
47.2
32.4
26.2
13.8
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childless couples. Side by side with changing attitudes toward divorce and the
weakening of the stem principle, disorganised families are anticipated to increase
in the ftiture.
7.2. CHANGING ATTITUDES AND VALUES
7.2.1. Matrimony
The increase in dissolved families reflects changes in conventional values
on matrimony.' 8 Married life itself has been devalued and there has been a growth
in the preference for the single life.
Present day Koreans increasingly have a negative attitude to family life
itself as shown on Table 7.4. Marriage used to be recognised as the greatest aim in
a woman's life. However it has lost its attraction among the young generation. If
men in traditional society were brought up to achieve the goal of high social status,
being married and having a family was the only goal for women. A girl missing the
chance of marriage felt ashamed of herself and was ridiculed socially. Social
pressure stressing familism in which reproduction was a core value was hard to go
against.
Table 7.4. Opinion On Living Alone Unmarried
age	 total (r.N) ______
cohort	 I
total	 100.0(2826)	 6.2
-29	 l00.0( 588)
	 5.6
30-39	 100.0( 796)	 6.6
40-49	 l00.0( 584)	 7.7
50-59	 100.0(469)	 5.5
60+	 100.0(389)	 4.9
of opinion on sin
'"'Iv
	
7.1	 27.6
	
7.7	 25.4
	
9.3	 26.5
	
6.5	 29.8
	
6.0	 27.4
	
8.2	 30.5
woman
V
7.7
8.4
20.0
31.1
38.7
d.k.
2.8
1.4
2.0
3.6
3.8
-1,.
Source: FAM89
r.N.: real number, d.k.: don't know
I. Single is much better then married life anyway.
II. Single is better only ifshe has economic base.
HI. It is personal affairs. IV. Married life is better than living alone.
V. One should marry anyway.
Now the younger generation has found there are too many socially attractive and
achievable things to do instead of burying oneself in a boring home. They have
come to think that living a single, unmarried life is much better than the loveless
married life their parents had. The myth of matrimony seems almost destroyed and
the desire for marriage has been weakened. Seeking to improve the individual
quality of life has come to be viewed as a much more honest and moral way of life.
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Reflecting the changing values the positive attitude to matrimony (V) has
dramatically decreased to one-fifth in one generation. Just under 9 per cent of the
younger generation still think of matrimony as an important event for a woman.
The statistics showing a preference for the single life, depending on economic
stability, has increased exactly fourfolds over the same period. As a result, almost
three out of five women(I,II) prefer an unmarried, single life. The younger
generation, it might be said, is inclined to prefer womanhood to wifehood. Of
course, these changing attitudes can cause an increase in the age at first marriage
among the younger generation on the one hand, while the changing attitude can
also give impetus to the increase in the divorce rate. Of course all this only exposes
women themselves, children and the elderly to the desolate condition of the social
welfare provision.
It is true that statistics calculated on the basis only of responses from
women may present a one-sided view of reality. Men can have more positive ideas
on matrimony. It is still widely recognised among present day Koreans that a man
should stabilise through happy marriage, if he is to be successful in his social and
occupational life. The idea that the wife is an assistant to his occupational life is
still prevalent. This in itself caused many women to feel married life was
essentially boring. However, men still feel in need of matrimony.' 9 Since marriage
is an event between two persons, statistics based on women's attitudes cannot be
totally nullified by any gap between them and men's attitudes. On the whole, these
statistics are a good basis for anticipating future matrimonial trends in Korea.
Table 7.5. Opinions Of Women On the Remarriage Of Men And Of Women
attributes	 If it is a man	 if it is a woman
I	 I	 II	 I	 III	 I	 I	 II	 I	 III
by age cohort;
	
-29	 11.1	 16.5	 72.4	 31.0	 18.5	 50.5
	30-39	 8.8	 14.9	 73.3	 36.7	 17.7	 45.6
	
40-49	 7.7	 15.2	 77.1	 45.0	 17.0	 38.0
	
50-59	 10.0	 12.4	 77.6	 47.3	 17.7	 35.0
	60+	 8.7	 14.7	 76.6	 42.9	 19.8	 37.3
by years of education;
	
-6	 9.0	 14.7	 76.3	 46.2	 17.6	 36.2
	7-12	 9.3	 15.0	 75.7	 35.2	 18.1	 46.7
	
13+	 10.7	 15.4	 63.9	 22.5	 20.8	 56.7
source: FAM89
I: It is better not to remarry.	 II: It is a personal affair. 	 III: It is better to marry.
Another Table 7.5 looks, at first glance, contradictory to the previous table.
Contrary to the negative views about marriage, attitudes to remarriage are very
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positive. This is not contradictory but tells of a different facet of the same idea of
family life. Two trends are observed in Table 7.5.
First, almost all the interviewees thought divorced men should remarry.
More than three out of four interviewees think it natural a man remarry after a
moderate period. The reason can be traced from two aspects but lead to the same
conclusion eventually. First, many Koreans still think occupational activity is a
man's main domain in life. If he is going to be successful in the field, there should
be an assistant at home to have him concentrate on his outside work. It is
recognised as impossible for men to have a successful occupational activity side by
side with trivial chores at home. On the other hand, the statistics reflect men's lack
of ability to do housework. Both men and women know how men have been
brought up and they both know he knows nothing about cooking, laundry,
childrearing, home economics etc. Men were brought up by their parents to
concentrate on study only. Educational activity was the only activity allowed for
boys. Gaining a good mark at school was the only desire of his parents. Naturally
for men divorced life has been more than frequently imagined to be chaotic in
terms of housekeeping. That is why men are recommended to re-marry by most
respondents. The statistics reflect conventional ideas on the strict sexual division of
labour, still deeply rooted among present day Koreans. However the trend is
slightly decreasing among the younger generation and the case is more true among
those exposed to higher levels of education.
Opinions on women's remarriage has almost reversed from a negative
attitude to a positive one.20
 If a woman was widowed or divorced, she was
expected to live alone un-remarried among the elder generation and this remains
true even among the group in their forties. The reason comes from two roots. First
it goes back to the remarriage prohibition law of the Chosn society. Remarriage
was prescribed as an immoral activity and the person concerned was severely
punished as well as each set of parents. The law was to prevent divorces that were
thought to jeopardise the family stability, while the law also sought to reinforce
one of the four supreme commandments of Confucius, that a good wife does not
serve two husbands for life. This was to prevent the sort of sexual demoralisation
observed at the end of Koryö dynasty, which served to legitimise its replacement of
the Chosn establishment. The tradition was strongly inherited by existing elder
generations. They viewed remarriage as immoral both individually and socially.
They were the generation brought up to disapprove of premarital love affairs, as a
husband and perfect virginity were the most valuable things they had ever had.
Consequently, they did not like themselves being treated as a sexual plaything by a
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would-be-husband through remarriage. The elder generation furthermore avoided
remarriage on account of the hardship of family life. They already knew how
boring married life had been. In spite of their efforts in childrearing, they were tired
of conventional family life lacking in love from the husband. Perhaps aroused by
the younger generation's voice, they have also come to realise that married love is
demanding for a woman as a human being. Naturally, they are quite reluctant to
remarry, unless they feel real love. For family life lacking in love, once is enough.
This attitude has changed very drastically among younger generations. The
group in their twenties and thirties shows the reverse preference for remarriage.
They vote more for remarriage in disproportion to their parents' generation. They
no longer think of remarriage as a matter of morality but just of love. They reject
the virginity idea imposed on women only. They know their father was not as
innocent as their mother was. If the ideology cannot be kept by both sides, there is
no reason it should remain on the women's side only. Naturally remarriage is a far
more moral choice than to have extra-marital affairs. That is why the younger
generations are positive about remarriage.
In spite of this dramatic change, the statistics for the negative attitude are
still big enough to maintain the conventional idea. About one out of three of the
younger generation in their twenties and thirties are opposed to remarriage. These
attitudes are transmitted from their mother's generation. They prefer to remain
alone instead of feeling subordinated to a second husband through remarriage.
They choose to be alone rather than have another marriage lacking love. Altogether
the statistics show a similar amount of aversion to conventional family life as those
in the previous Table 7.4. It is a revolt against traditional wifehood. It is a trend to
look for womanhood as a human being. They like to enjoy as much womanhood as
men have enjoyed their manhood in the past, and even in present day Korea.
Another attitude reduces the speed of family disorganisation and the desire
for womanhood, namely motherhood. Three out of four interviewees oppose
divorce due to the bad effect it might have on their children. (Table 7.6) The main
reason they would not divorce is due neither to economic difficulties nor to socially
negative attitudes about divorce nor to the religious teachings. The overwhelming
reason is because they cannot afford to make their children fatherless. The attitude
is, surprisingly, more prevalent among younger generations than among their
parents' generation. If a religious precept was more influential amongst the older
women, their daughters are more active in solving their own issues.
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Table 7.6. Opinion On The Reason Against Divorce
age	 reason divorce ought to be prevented
cohort	 total	 I	 I	 I	 II	 I	 III	 I	 IV
	
-29	 100.0	 78.8	 2.1	 2.1	 12.7	 4.2
	
30-39	 100.0	 86.2	 1.1	 1.7	 5.5	 5.5
	
40-49	 100.0	 79.1	 3.4	 2.9	 10.6	 4.0
	
50-59	 100.0	 69.2	 4.4	 3.5	 22.0	 0.9
	
60+	 100.0	 67.3	 3.7	 5.7	 22.9	 0.3
source: FAM89
I: for children's sake II: due to economic incapability of women
III: due to moral responsibility to parents IV: due to religious commandment
The most important lesson they learned from their parents was that they
themselves were their parents' pride, hope, and everything. They were brought up
to think mature adults did everything to benefit their children, however trivial it
might be. They almost never saw their parents leaving them alone to pursue their
own interests.
Fatherless children were ridiculed in the community and found it difficult to
marry awhen they grew up. This custom, good or bad, has been handed on to
survive deeply ingrained in present day Korea. Children without fathers were
believed to lack home training, to lack in moral virtues and to be spoiled. This is
another reason a woman is so reluctant to divorce when she has children, in spite of
the rapidly increasing preferrence for womanhood. There are two contradictory
values here. However, women are trying to reconcile the two ideas and devote their
efforts to fit and to love their husband not just for their own sake but for the benefit
of their children. However disagreeable a character her husband is, she tries to
create a good image of fatherhood for her children. They understand that love
within marriage, natural or hypocritical, may be the alpha and omega for children's
education.
To conclude, it is difficult to foresee how long motherhood will contribute
to keeping the family from dissolution or how motherhood can be reconciled to
desired femininity or'womanhood. Of course family dissolution would be much
more accelerated if women's divorced life was insured economically, or if society
induced married women to participate in economic and social activity. However, it
looks more likely to anticipate the rate of dissolution will, at least, slow down.
Concretely speaking, the number of marriages may decrease due to the aversion to
conventional familism. However, once married the family may be stabilised thanks
to the motherhood idea, deeply permeated among the women of the younger
generation. It looks more likely amongst the younger generation considering the
statistics of Table 7.6. Even if they felt an aversion to the husband they would put
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effort into solving the problem rather than easily choosing divorce. It is for the
benefit of their children. Society as a whole can expect to enjoy stabilisation thanks
to motherhood for the time being.
7.2.2. Neo-Familism: The Saemaul Movement
7.2.2.1. A brief introduction to the movement
Saemaul Undong, Korea's new community movement came into being in
the early 1 970s and aimed initially at improving the quality of life in the rural
areas. Two successful five-year development plans covering the period from 1962-
1971 had seen rapid strides in the urban areas, but with farmers in the countryside
lagging far behind. The avërage amount of income in the rural areas was far less
than that of simple workers in the urban areas in the latter half of the 1 960s. The
movement sought to remedy this situation and started the first experimental
projects in 1971. As part of a nation-wide campaign to promote better living
standards and a new work ethic among farmers, the guidelines for the Saemaul
movement were summed up in the slogan "diligence, self-help, and co-operation."
With about 35,000 village units involved, the movement over the past two decades
has been termed a remarkable success, and has made a dramatic contribution to the
living environment in rural areas. Soon afier its inauguration among the people in
the rural regions, efforts began to extend the movement to urban and industrial
sectors and various action programmes were started from the later 1970s.2'
From its start, the movement has been envisaged as a Thands-on" efThrt,
emphasising actual practice rather than words. For the first three years of the
movement (1971-1973), the project gave a priority to the improvement of the rural
environment. Soon, approximately 20 kinds of rural development projects were
undertaken in the drive to improve living conditions in the rural areas under the
Saemaul movement. These included an important village road expansion plan,
designed to improve access and accelerate the movement of people and goods. In
the past, village roads linked to local public roads were generally narrow and
winding and often without bridges. Under the Saemaul campaign, most of the
participating villages launched projects to straighten and widen the roads so
vehicular traffic could be handled more easily. Bridge construction was also under
taken, with about 65,000 built in the period between 1971 and 1975. As a result
motor vehicles, ox carts, push carts and motor tillers could reach the villages and
most isolated farmhouses except for those located on remote islands. Another
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project called for the renovation of farmhouse roofs. In 1971, more than 80 per cent
of the 2.5 million farmhouses across the country had rice-straw that had to be
replaced every winter season, a process calling for a great deal of work. As cement
tiles and slate became more available in the early 1970s, it was recognised that the
annual replacement of the thatch roofs was uneconomical as well as wearying.
Renovation programmes were carried out and by the end of 1977, almost 100 per
cent of the farmhouse roofs were of cement tile or slate construction. The
appearance of rural villages was altered, and there were some complaints that one
aspect of their traditional beauty had been lost. For the people who lived and
worked in the rural areas, however, the change was a practical one that saved
money and labour.22
Table 7.7. Comparison Of Agricultural Productivity In 1958
nation	 output	 hours of labour	 productivity
per unit area	 per 100 hours
Korea	 1.70	 180	 0.94 seom
Japan	 2.34	 183	 1.28 seom
U.S.A	 1.18	 4	 29.5 seom
source: The Agriculture Bank, Agricultural Year Boo/c, 1959.
seom: equivalent to 5.12 U.S. bushels.
While for the next three years (1974-1976) the movement emphasised
economic self-sufficiency to increase the level of income and agricultural
productivity. The productivity in the agricultural sector was very much lower than
in other countries. (Table 7.7) For example, there was the countrywide distrilution
of a newly developed, high yield rice that boosted production of that grain
dramatically during the mid-70s. In the period from 1971-1977, the national
average rice yield rose from 3.5 to 4.9 tons in polished rice per hectare. The
emphasis on co-operation in rural areas was carried over to rice production, and it
is quite common to see work teams made up of 20 to 30 farmers participating in a
joint endeavour. Usually the rice seedbed is made in one location for all members
instead of having individual seedbeds scattered in several localities. Also carried
out jointly is the grain variety selection, the work of growing healthy seedlings,
transplanting, application of fertiliser and insecticide, weeding, irrigation and
harvesting.23
The response of the farmers was greater than had been anticipated. In many
cases, villagers added their own capital goods and labour to the government
subsidies with the aim of quickly accomplishing the selected projects. With some
variations by region, approximately 10 per cent of the whole of project expenses
were paid for by government subsidies, 17 per cent by loan, and as much as 73 per
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cent by villagers themselves. (Table 7.8) Roughly 70 per cent of the villagers'
contribution was in the form of labour the remaining 30 per cent in cash or goods.24
Thus farmers' contribution was US$ 204 million out of the total of US$ 264 million
invested for the projects in 1974 only.25
Table 7.8. Trend Of Finances Invested For The Movement
	
1971	 1972	 1973	 1974
source of the invested finances (unit: thousand million won)
total	 12.2	 31.3	 98.4	 132.8
	subsidy from government	 4.1	 3.3	 21.5	 30.8
	contribution from villagers	 8.1	 28.0	 76.9	 102.0
investment proportion to each project (%)
total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
environment improvement	 100.0	 97.3	 81.0	 52.7
	increase of income & productivity	 -	 2.7	 19.0	 44.7
	education	 -	 -	 -	 2.6
source : Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Yearbook of Agrictziiure and Fiseiies V1€).
won : Korean currency
This undertaking was termed an outstanding success in what was described as a
'very active' manner and the movement has spread from its original rural
environment to include those from other walks of life. Using the same principles of
diligence, self-help, and co-operation, various action programmes have been
undertaken for city dwellers. Along with helping to clean and beautify the city
environment, there have been programmes to boost reforestation, preserve nature,
combat pollution and aid resort areas. To make the success of the movement sure,
there has been a continuous supply of qualified village movement leaders as a
result of institute training at village levels. January 1972, saw the entry of 150
village leaders, one from each county, into the Saemaul Leaders' Training Institute
as its first trainees. Since then local officials and many high-ranking officials from
the central government have received the same training with the goal of
heightening their understanding of local problems. The programme was extended
to include businessmen, university professors, judges, legislators, journalists,
religious leaders and others. In 1988 alone, a total of 21,000 leaders from various
social sectors went through the Saemaul training course. They included 13,024
village leaders as well as people from industrial plants and factories.26
7.2.2.2. The influence of family values on the Saemaul movement
A brief discussion of the family in rural areas is necessary if we are to
understand the influence of traditional family values on the success of the Saemaul
movement. Traditionally most villages were dominated by a single clan who
composed the majority, while only a few from different clans were included in the
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community. It was common to call a regional community by the surname of the
predominant clan instead of its official appellation. For example a village was
called Kim's village, another Park's village, or the other Chang's village so on.27
Thus the community boundary was almost identical with the kinship group and
local interest was very often the same as clan interest or family interest. This
homogeneity was loosened in the process of industrialisation particularly during
the 1 960s or 1 970s. Industrialisation accompanied by urbanisation induced a huge
number of rural families to move to the cities. 28 The result was a relative
weakening of the dominant local clan groups and a dispersion of power among the
several clan groups of the local community. 29 Each clan group or individual family
began to break up into its component parts. Thus decision-making for the
community which had been easy in the past became very difficult due to the
separation of individual families. It was no longer easy to reach a consensus among
several clan groups since none of them were numerically predominant in the local
community any more.
The migration of rural families also brought structural changes in the
community. If urbanisation weakened the clan homogeneity, the same influence
brought new and important homogenising influences on other aspects of the village
communities. The earliest migrants who left their rural areas were mostly the
poorest and families with no arabic land in the village. 30 Thus those who remained
were relatively wealthy and from the economically upper strata so that the gap
between the poorest and the richest remaining in the village became narrower than
before the migration. In addition, regardless of their relative wealth, those who
remained had as strong a desire to cast off their poverty of the time as those who
went away. Homogeneity of the local community was reinforced by the nation-
wide land reform of 1949 (execution from 1959). Before land reform, land and
wealth were extremely concentrated in the ownership of a minority so that trend
was a relationship of rule and subordination by the rich landowners over the
tenants. The land reform allowed tenant farmers to claim the right to land which
they had cultivated generation by generation at minimum price, and increased the
proportion of landed farmers or economically-middle-level farmers. 3 ' Thus the re-
distribution of land and wealth increased the potential for co-operation among
community residents. Homogeneity in the village was also increased because most
of the migrants were the younger generation who were inclined to prefer modem
values or were anti-traditionalists who felt pessimistic about the Confucian way of
living. 32 Thus those who remained shared relatively homogenous values in terms of
Confucianism reducing the possibility of value conflicts among the residents in the
local community.
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In spite of all this latent potential for development, the regional
communities were steeped in habits inherited both from tradition and the period of
Japanese aimexation. The rural areas stagnated as a result of conservative
resistance against any change, idleness during the winter of the farmers" slack
season accompanied with drinking and gambling, and over-emphasis of solidarity
among kinship members. The Saemaul movement was devised by President Park
who had grown up in the countryside rural area to combat these habits and to raise
a 'scientific attitude' in the rural areas. The movement aimed to get rid of bad habits
during the farmers' slack season, to economise on the traditional ceremonies of
marriage, funerals, and ancestral worship and to have clan groups recognise that
the community interest is prior to the familial or clan interest.33
To achieve this goal the conventional family values and the related customs
and ceremonies were revised. The movement tried to re-organise the internal
structure of the community on the basis of locality instead of the ties of
consanguinity or kinship. It aimed to promote an enthusiasm for one's native place
and a sense of common local identñy. The movement sought to induce the
scattered clan groups to recognise the importance of a common local interest and
pursue co-operation among them for the village's common good going beyond the
particularistic interest of each family or kinship group. Conventional virtues were
re-emphasised. Under Confucianism, men of high status or rich men were expected
to contribute for the benefit of the community. This value was reinforced when the
relatively rich family or dominant clans were dedicated more deeply to the
movement than any others and the movement leader was elected from among the
most devoted persons. Having moral authority, the leader was one of the most
respected in the village. To the rest of the residents the respect for authority,
individual diligence, and co-operation was reinforced and deviants were effectively
restricted by conventional sanctions like gossip, shame, or shunning etc. 34 Thus the
pattern of behaviour for the group was reinforced by conventional values to re-
integrate the scattered clans or families during modernisation but this time
homogeneity was sought in terms of local village identity rather than of familial or
clan ties.35
Based on the recognition of local homogeneity and co-operation among
village residents, the movement had each village enter constructive competitions
with other villages in terms of diligence and economic and environmental
achievement. Traditional society functioned on the basis of family competition,
this time the movement aimed at village competition. As a means to achieve the
goal of competition, the government categorised three different levels of villages in
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terms of environment improvement, economic achievement, and scientific
attitudes. Scientific attitude was operationally defined in terms of the simplified
marriage, funeral ceremony and ancestral worship procedures and the sweeping
away of over-drinking or gambling behaviour. Categorising the underdeveloped
villages (Kich'o-maul), the developing village (Chajo-maul), and developed village
(Charip-maul)36, the movement made a strategy to stimulate each village and each
member of the village to be competitive in achieving the highest level.
The results of the Saemaul movement were assessed by the Korean
committee of UNESCO in l979. The committee found that the movement was
successful in the sense that it could mobilise people nation-wide to participate
autonomously in the projects. Autonomy is deeply rooted in the Confucian family
tradition of Choson society. With a dominant clan group, the traditional local
community was strong in solidarity among the community members and very
exclusive against influence from outside.38 The central government mostly
appointed a figure with no local or familial connection to be the administrative
head of the community in order to prevent the decentralisation of local
government. Anyhow having no exact or abundant knowledge about the local
community, the newly designated governor had to rely on assistance from the
influential persons in the community. Thus the members of the governor's Cabinet
were appointed, following recommendation from the local influentials, from the
local community that was still composed mostly of the same clan group. As a result
the community was ruled autonomously by community members themselves rather
than by the officials from central government. The governor set out basic
guidelines only for projects from the central government and the local residents
carried them out. Thus, the best way for the governor to gain success in the
designated community was to minimise his role of intervention from the central
government and to transmit public opinion from the community to the government.
If the governor failed in this, his success in carrying out his programme during his
stay frequently met difficulty. Residents participated in the selection of projects,
formulation and execution of plans, and as already shown in Table 8.2 the
government's financial contribution was minimal and administrative intervention as
well was very limited. The government sometimes intervened in the process of
leadership election, perhaps when a rich man of no moral authority was elected and
the influence was indirect. Sometimes government sought to influence leaders from
the under-developed or developing villages to accelerate their projects and to
achieve a high level. Except for these indirect and partial interventions the
movement was run almost totally by the residents themselves. 39 The tradition of
autonomy which was inherited from the self-governing tradition in the local
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community by clan groups during Chosn society helped to make the movement
successful.
The second element in the success of the Saemaul movement was the
tradition of co-operation. Traditional society had a distinctive mutual co-operation
system of kye based on the strong bond between relatives and clan members. Kye
went beyond personal interests adhering to traditional principles regarding mutual
co-operation as a solemn duty. Kye, meaning agreement or bond, was a social
organisation based on the principle of mutual aid with a specific objective. All kye
collected dues and managed a fund and, depending on the objective and
programme, are classified into many kinds. One type is sangjogye, literally
meaning kye for a funeral. Traditionally, people prepared splendid funerals as
expressions of filial piety so they tended to be costly. The kye was organised by
those who had aged parents in order to provide for their funerals. To prepare for
this time, funds or rice were collected each month or annually to help each member
in return to defray the cost of the ceremony. In the kye, not only were there
monetary benefits, but the kye members all pitched in to carry the bier, to serve as
messengers, to dig the grave, etc. Village kye were characterised by the admission
of all villagers. It collected an agreed-upon sum of money from each family and
helped villagers through unexpected times of need, building bridges, digging wells,
or repairing facilities for the community. Sometimes the village kye raised funds
through collective work such as ture (co-operative farming). Even before the
establishment of the Saemaul movement the kye were based on mutual aid and co-
operation with each member performing his duties as if it were his own business.
As it was difficult to maintain if a member did not pay his dues or reneged on his
duty, solidarity was a must. Through such systems many families prospered and
many villages developed in the past.4°
This tradition persisted into modem Korea both in rural and urban areas.
Kye characterised by monetary interests became very popular among housewives in
cities particularly during the economic development of the 1 970s. Urban Jcye were
mostly organised to save small amounts of money or to prepare expensive modern
facilities. In fact they not only provided extra cash but also opportunities for
getting together, exchanging gossip and partying. While in the rural areas kye were
organised primarily among householders to pursue Saemaul movement. The
movement was able to make use of these traditions of mutual co-operation. The
result was revealed, as shown on Table 7.8, in the great local financial contribution
for the community development projects. Each village had registered their
community as a corporate organisation and prepared and managed common
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property that was contributed through kye and devoted their labour for the
developmental projects in the form of ture. The interest from the common property,
they invested for continued growth and development or sometimes used it for the
whole of the community members to travel, or for marriage, funeral, or ancestral
worship ceremonies of each family. The process reinforced solidarity among the
community members. The conventional kye was functional basically for the
familial ties or clan bond, but the Saemaul movement emphasised local community
solidarity.
The other element in the success of the movement was, ironically, familial
solidarity. Originally the movement was invented to extend the community
components beyond familial ties for integration of the village. However, the result
was disappointing, compared to the original anticipation. Most of the developed
villages including a village in tch'oix town who got the.
	 nt' c'i 'n YT
their achievement, attained high achievement thanks to co-operation based on
family solidarity. Brandt and Lee found three types of villages differentiated by
their level of co-operation and consec1uenty b'y their
	 o	 tNi'cit
movement. The first type of villages, in spite of huge migration during the
industrialisation of the 1 970s, was composed of one dominant clan group either of
yangban class or commoners. In the case of the most developed village in Ichon,
70 per cent of the households in the community belonged to a yangban clan group.
Another type of village was composed of a few clan groups co-existing with a
similar amount of influence on each other. The third type was totally mixed with
families of different clan groups and no clans were dominant in the number of
households or their influence. The class system had no influence at all in the
formulation of co-operation among community members. Whether yangban or
commoners, the level of success or failure in co-operation was identical. Next, the
movement was most successful when the local community was organised by a
predominant clan group. When a village was led by a leader from the dominant
clan group the co-operation among the village members was strongest and the rest
of the non-predominant families could co-ordinate in the development projects.
Local autonomy was greatest when there was constructive competition with other
communities in the race of development. The least developed villages were those
composed of a few clan groups but none of them predominant in the number of
households or level of their economic and social influence. Each clan group
competed to take the initiative of the movement, to monopolise the decision-
making for the benefit of their own clan interest and to obstruct the other clan
groups. As a result co-operation was difficult and development the most retarded.
Villages with no identifiable groupings depended on what sort of leader was
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elected. If a leader of high ability and moral authority was elected, co-operation as
good as in the village with one dominant clan group was achieved. The
achievement of a village where there was familial heterogeneity was directly
related to the level of self-sacrifice of the leader. Such a leader promoted a new
concept of the 'family spirit' based this time on local identity instead of blood ties,
and could re-integrate the community to compete with others. Interventionism from
the government was originally invented to foster this type of village solidarity and
inter-community competition.4'
The Saemaul movement was successful in promoting a healthy competition
among local communities to achieve higher standards of environmental or
economic development. The competition was most effective when the village was
internally integrated by autonomy and co-operation. Co-operation was best when
there was familial solidarity or at least 'familial identity' among community
components. Thus development was rather the result of the strong devotion of a
self-sacrificing leader or the collective effort of a clan group than of local solidarity
itself. The strong devotion to the primary group like the family rather than the
nominal ideology of pan-village development was an effective tool for the re-
integration of the whole of the nation. Particularistic values could be extended to
and integrated into the universalistic rational values for the benefit of development
of the nation. From this experience in the rural areas, the government applied the
same principle but this time more emphasis on 'familial spirit' and Confucian
leadership to urban areas as well from the late 1970s. The 'family spirit' permeated
into each small group of factories or companies of the whole nation. The small
groups sharing the same family identity among its members turned to a basic unit
to compete with other small groups in the same company or factory in achieving a
target imposed on each department or group. The successful solidarity among
members was possible first by a firm self identification as a family member and
next by the devotion of leaders in terms of the Confucian virtues. The family spirit,
expanded to the whole company level to compete with other companies in the
nation or other countries. 'The Hyundai Family', 'the Daewoo Family', 'the Goldstar
Family', etc. are a few examples of the extension of family ideology learned from
the Saemaul movement in the rural areas.
7.2.3. Changes In Family Law
7.2.3.1. The confrontation between tradition and human rights
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Changes in the law relating to the family have been the result of conflicts
and confrontation between traditional ideas or customs and changed ideas about the
family in the period of modernisation. Of course it is hard to say that laws exactly
reflect the spirit or trend of the time since they relate more to the normative level of
the society or what ought to be human behaviour. A law, in its detail, can
sometimes be far out of date or be ahead of the times. Nevertheless it is true that
laws generally move with the changes of the time and that trends of change can be
observable through the changes of the law. This is particularly the case if a law
belongs to customary laws like the civil law. 42 Korean family law belongs to the
civil law under the title of 'the law on relatives' and 'the law on inheritance' and has
been maintained on the basis of the common sense of the time with, of course,
variations or at different degrees. All in all the study of the law can give a rough
idea of the current trend of the family and the study of its changes demonstrate the
confrontation between traditional family values and the changed spirit of the
family.
The law relating to the family has changed as a result of the interaction
between two extremely opposing views. One party has adhered to the traditional
Confucian family values, believing the conventional family system ought at all
costs to be maintained to preserve social and individual morality and the welfare
mentally, physically and economically of individuals as a whole. The other party
has pursued individual freedom and rights, particularly the rights of women,
regardless of any fossilised tradition. They argued tradition cannot have precedence
over human rights and that tradition should be kept only within the boundary of the
natural rights of men inherited from god. They may be represented by women
organisations. The Confucianists focus on the moral decay of present day Korea
and the women on the social handicaps of women inherited from the past. The
former argue for a reinforcement of family values to cure current social problems;
the latter for Westernised individualism to protect individuals for a healthy family
in which no women suffer. Thus it was a confrontation between family values and
individualism.43
Since the 1970s two issues relating directly and indirectly to the family
have stirred up public sentiment in Korea. The two include the family law that is
going to soon be discussed in the next paragraph, and a criminal law to protect the
innocence of marriage.
First a criminal law prescribes adultery of a married man or woman and
pre-marital intercourse of an unmarried man a crime. Criminal punishment to the
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pre-marital intercourse applies to male only by a criminal complaint of woman side
who failed to marry him while the adultery by both sides of whose partner in
extramarital intercourse. The criminal law in both cases, in spite of its disobedience
against the constitutional principle, was originally established by an idea to protect
women who were believed socially disadvantaged. 44 In a word, the law was a sort
of symbol in the past denoting women's inability in society. However, interestingly
when the abolition of the laws was issued the objection was, ironically, from inside
women's organisations. A few of them approved of the abolition because the law
was a symbol of low status of women in the past, which stands against, in nominal
sense, the women liberation movement, but most of them objected to the abolition
due to de facto disadvantages deriving from the abolition under the present
situation where women's rights are not fully guaranteed economically, socially, and
legally. Women can take an economic initiative and divorce due to husband's
adultery under the current law.
Since the first establishment of the family law in l958, the two extremes
have shown frequent and constant confrontation and each has structured their
movement to win over public opinion except the above case on criminal law for the
purity of married life. First the women's organisations focused their argument
primarily on the abolition of the legal position of the head of the family 46 in which
the current law allowed the headship to male members only. The movement had
the strategy of changing the social and cultural atmosphere to abolish the law. At
the beginning of the 1980s, thanks to the progress of the feminist movement in
society, they moved their strategy to more concrete, practical, and organic demands
in the revision of family law. From the argument for a simple abolition of the
headship system, the women's organisations asked for the revision of the law on
the boundary of kinship, a wife's right to the shared property, the legal relationship
between stepparents and step-children etc. which could cause a subtle conflict of
economic interests for women. Other laws concerning women, like equality of job
opportunity, equal rewards, or public nursery provision were also proposed in
parallel. Thus the movement aimed at an organic improvement as far as women
were concerned of the social system as a whole. Corresponding to this changing
trend of demands, the subjects of concern have expanded more widely than ever
before. The main axis of the movement had been women from the middle class or
above and the movement was very frequently accused of frivolity due to the very
limited range of class and could not get much attention from public opinion.
1-lowever, the subjects expanded to include the problems of the urban poor, blue
collar workers, and farmers as well from the 1980s, and gradually the movement
has become firmly established with a wide range of supporters47
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Compared to the womens' organisations, the Confucianists' visible
foundations look quite weak. The 1985 Census calculated just 800 thousand in the
Confucian population which comprises 2 per cent of the total population of the
nation. 48
 The economic foundations of the Confucianists, most of which are land,
are quite poor which makes their educational projects difficult to maintain.
However they have two strong points in their favour for mobilisation of the
movement. First, they have an effective organisation culminating in &lng-gyun-
kwan university49 together with 232 local schools spread nation-wide. Besides this
the Confucianism Association has national networks permeating to the village level
of the nation. The association was reinforced by the Neo-classic movement of the
1970s when clan groups were being revitalised into inunjung associations (Refer to
Section 3.4.2 above). Under the basic guidance from Söng-gyun-kwan and in
connection with its local schools, the association has participated in the
preservation and reinforcement of Confucian virtues, cultures, and rituals, etc. The
next and best point for the Confucianists is the spread of the tradition among
present day Koreans. Despite the small number of people describing themselves as
Confucian, it is hard to find a Korean who does not behave on the basis of
Confucian values consciously or unconsciously in everyday life. Thus, if there is
only a small nucleus for the Confucian virtues, many Koreans are fellow travellers.
That is how the Confucianists were able to get statements of support from over two
million people during less than a month in their 1976 campaign against family law
revision, an amazingly quick and strong reaction to preserve the tradition.5°
It is hard to say which group has the greater influence and how much their
influence has contributed to changes in family law, since there is no consensus on
which parts of whose arguments are correct. However, putting aside who is correct
one thing is quite obvious: women are challenging the judicial and social system of
present day Korea but are a minority and have not gained enough public sympathy
to change the whole system in the realm of the family. The Confucianists, on the
other hand, are basically conservative in preserving and reinforcing the current
family law inherited from tradition and they have an effective majority of public
backing either by positive consent or by silence. Whilst Table 7.9 does not directly
show public opinion on family law or on the arguments of each group, at least it
gives an indirect or rough idea of how Koreans feel about the current family system
or family law. Although there is perhaps always a gap between the law and the real
condition of human life, the law reflects the feelings of ordinary people in a nation
and influences, in feedback, directly or indirectly to each member of society. Thus
if extreme issues do not arise in some realm of human life, the relevant law in
genera! tends to maintain at least the status quo. By the same logic, satisfaction or
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dissatisfaction with the human relationships in the family realm denotes at least
indirectly a reaction to the pressure of social institutions. If family law is against
human relationships within the family realm, the patterned behaviours in the family
which are internalised from the society can cause significant strains among family
members. Conversely if the relationships among family members do not show any
considerable conflicts, the principle ruling of the family as a whole can be said to
be deeply internalised by individuals. 51 Of course women's organisations can argue
that the silence or unconcern is a 'false consciousness' of the majority. However as
far as a society is ruled under democratic principles then numerical superiority is in
no way to be ignored. In so far as individuals are satisfied with their overall family
life, it is hard for challengers to gain support for their new arguments from them.
Table 7.9. Percentage Distribution Of Satisfaction Level With Family Life
total	 satisfied	 I	 I unsatisfied
II	 I	 III	 I	 IV	 I	 V
overall iamiiy Lire oy sex
	
total 100.0	 32.3	 9.6	 22.7	 57.1	 10.6	 8.8	 1.8
	
male 100.0	 35.8	 11.0	 24.8	 56.1	 8.1	 6.9	 1.2
	
female 100.0
	 29.6	 8.5	 21.1	 57.8	 12.6	 10.3	 2.3
overall family life by level of education;
	
pri 100.0	 23.8	 5.4	 18.4	 61.1	 15.0	 12.2	 2.9
rniddl	 100.0	 30.0	 8.7	 21.3	 60.5	 9.5	 8.0	 1.5
e
	
high 100.0	 39.3	 12.8	 26.5	 53.8	 7.0	 6.0	 0.9
	
univ 100.0	 56.0	 21.8	 34.2	 40.5	 3.6	 3.1	 0.4
financial situation;
	
total 100.0
	 14.5	 2.4	 12.1	 50.0	 35.5	 26.5	 9.0
	
male 100.0	 15.5	 2.4	 13.0	 51.4	 33.6	 25.6	 8.0
	
female 100.0
	 13.8	 2.4	 11.4	 38.8	 37.4	 27.6	 9.8
relationship with children;
	
total 100.0	 57.3	 25.2	 32.1	 35.9	 6.8	 5.6	 1.2
	
male 100.0	 58.4	 25.9	 32.5	 35.3	 6.3	 5.3	 0.9
	
female 100.0
	
56.4	 24.6	 31.9	 36.3	 7.2	 5.8	 1.4
relationship with parents
	
total 100.0	 41.2	 17.4	 23.8	 49.9	 8.9	 7.3	 1.6
	
male 100.0	 44.3	 18.9	 25.4	 48.5	 7.2	 6.0	 1.2
	
female 100.0	 38.3	 15.9	 22.4	 51.3	 10.4	 8.5	 1.9
relationship with spouse;
	
total 100.0	 54.5	 24.2	 30.2	 38.1	 7.4	 5.5	 1.9
	
male 100.0	 57.3	 26.0	 31.3	 37.5	 5.6	 3.9	 1.3
	
female 100.0	 51.8	 22.5	 29.2	 38.6	 9.6	 7.0	 2.6
source : EPB, Social Statistics Survey, 1988.
I : very satisfied, II: moderately satisfied, HI acceptable, IV : moderately unsatisfied,
V : very unsatisfied, pri : primary school graduates and under, middle middle school graduates,
high high school graduates, Univ : college, university graduates and over
Table 7.9 is from a social survey by EPB in 1988 when discussions on
family law revision of 1989 were at a peak in the whole of the nation and it shows
some of the trends in family life. First, a far bigger proportion of present day
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Koreans is satisfied with overall family life than is dissatisfied. Although more
than one out of two show a neutral attitude, there seems to be no strong ground to
seek rapid changes in current family law regarding the small proportion of the
dissatisfied. Of course the women's organisation can interpret the majority of
neutral attitude tacitly as standing for their side, but that majority is at least not one
to raise voices for the revision of family law. Second, the degree of dissatisfaction
among women is much greater than that among men. It reflects the fact that present
day women feel more strain from the current family system than men do. Thus
more women can accept the women's organisations' demand for law revision than
men do. Surprisingly, the degree of satisfaction is different depending on the
educational level of interviewees. The more educated the more satisfied family
members are with their overall family life and the less educated the more
dissatisfied they are. If the arguments of the women's movement were to convince
the public, those with a higher level of education should have felt more
inconvenience about the overall family life than those of lower class. However, the
intellectuals seem to be positively enjoying their current family life while the
women's organisations argue it has deteriorated as a result of sexual inequality. The
satisfaction gap by educational level can be due to the financial situation. As
shown in the same table present day Koreans feel the least satisfaction about the
financial situation of family life. The dissatisfaction came mainly from the
inequality of income distribution which was manifested in the housing issues in the
1980s. For the poor who are mostly less educated, it was almost impossible to have
their own house due to increasing housing prices. Thus the housing problem was
one of the worst things that made family life a problem and the less educated the
less income level and eventually the more dissatisfied about the economic
conditions of family life. 52 The dissatisfaction reduces the degree of satisfaction
with overall family life. In spite of negative attitude deriving from financial
difficulty, the human relationships among members show relatively a positive
reaction. Ordinary Koreans are satisfied with their relationships among family
members so it is quite implausible that they would ask for a revision of the law to
define relationships among family members. Of course relationships with parents
are relatively less satisfying than the relationship with others and the degree of
women's satisfaction with human relationships is less than that of men. However
the gaps are still not great enough to view current human relationships as very bad.
Thus as far as current Koreans are satisfied with their family life, they are hardly
likely to rise in opposing the current family law.
Chapter Seven 268
7.2.3.2. Changes in the family law
Korean family law is keeping traditional principles to the extent that people
are conservative and satisfied with family life, and the law has changed to the
extent that they are dissatisfied with the human relationships in family life. In other
words it has been a barometer showing the confrontation between the arguments
for tradition and human rights.
There are two main points at issue: the prohibition of marriage between
iongsöngdongbon (the same surname and the same place of origin) and the family
headship principle. The two principles have been frameworks for family law in
Korea inherited from tradition. 53 Confucianists are striving to maintain the
principles and the women's organisations are asking for their abolition. The
prohibition of marriage between persons of the same surname (tongs6ng) and the
same place of origin (tongbon) is inherited from traditional morality. Its aim was to
regulate sexual behaviour between the sexes and indirectly to reinforce other
moralities relating to sex and to re-confirm the group identity of a clan group.
1-lowever from the perspective of the women's movement the prohibition is
anachronistic in modern days. Medical reports stating that sexual intercourse who
are third cousins does not produce any harmful results eugenically, used to be
quoted by women's groups. Nevertheless, the principle, from the Confucianists'
view, was much more meaningful as a symbolic framework to keep morality of
society however out of date the principle is.
The next point in dispute was headship of the family. There were some
arguments about the historical legitimacy of the principle. The women's
organisations argue the principle was imposed from the Chosön Civil Proceedings
Act in 1911 by Japanese colonisation. The structure of the act was originally based
on the Japanese civil law established after the Meiji Restoration of Japan. Women,
particularly wives, are defined by the Act to have no legal rights. 54
 Confucianists
argue the principle was inherited from tradition to maintain primogeniture in the
stem family. The principle was needed to prescribe the rights and duty of the
inheritance of ancestral worship that is an essential practice of familism. Both
arguments are right in terms of historical legitimacy. Although traditional society
prescribed a strict rule of headship of family, society never stipulated that wives
were legally disqualified. Through the whole of the Confucian scripture society
emphasised the importance, at least nominally, of the conjugal relationship. The
conjugal relationship was not hierarchical but only the role distribution was
different and both were equal before law. However under Japanese colonisation,
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the conjugal relationship became hierarchical and a wife's status in the family
became even lower than that of sons. That is the reason why traditional Japanese,
in their classic essay Man-engsue praised the samurai who knifed to death his wife
for not bowing down upon her knee properly. 55 It was a symbolic story indicating
the status of the wife in the family and the custom persisted into modern Japan.
The Japanese colonial government imposed their civil law and Korean women's
juridical status was totally depreciated. Thus women are asking for the abolition of
the headship principle to liberate women with no legal rights to clear out the old-
fashioned idea of role distribution by sex which has determined the relatively
disadvantageous conditions for women in society. However, the Confucianists
oppose the loss of the headship principle from which they believe many other
moral virtues derive. The headship principle not only assures ancestral worship but
also reinforces hyo (filial piety) that is a moral issue which maintains inter-
generational relationships. The principle, they believe, can revitalise family values
under which many modern social problems can be remedied.
Unlike the prohibition of marriage between longsöngdongbon the family
headship produced several other issues between the two antagonists. First the
family law of 1958 gave parental authority after a divorce to the husband first,
regardless of his economic ability to bring up the children mentally, morally, and
physically. 56
 Unless a husband gives up his parental power the divorced wife has
no right guaranteed by law to bring up the children and traditionally husbands have
rarely given up this right. Both husband and wife struggle to get the parental right
but the Family Court, which gives priority to the husband according to the custom
inherited from tradition. That is one of the reasons why Korean wives have been so
reluctant to divorce. According to FAM89 data, over three out of four housewives
were not going to divorce for the benefit of children, even if the husbands
behaviour gave legal grounds for a divorce. Even if the divorce was due to his
misbehaviour, the law allowed parental rights to the husband first. The women's
organisations challenged this favouritism and asked that the importance of maternal
rights in the childrearing should have at least equal right.
The headship dispute gave rise to another issue on the boundary of kinship.
The family law quoted the boundary from the National Code of 1492. In the
section on funeral rites, the code prescribed the boundary of kinship by stipulating
who canlmust wear which mourning garment for how long according to the degree
(ch'on) of the kinship relationship. 57 Chn was originally a unit scale to measure
length in traditional Asian societies but was developed in traditional Korea to
denote the distance or nearness among kinship members. The nearer the smaller the
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number of ch'on, the more distant the bigger the number of ch'on. The conjugal
relation is zero ch'on in the sense husband and wife are of one flesh and spirit
during their married life but are nothing to each other when divorced. Children and
parents are in one ch'on relationship, while children themselves are in two ch'on
relationship each other. That is the basic scale to measure the boundary of near
relatives. For example an uncle is in a three chn relationship, the first cousin in
four ch'on, and a third cousin in eight chn, etc. The Code defined the nearer
kinship as composed of up to eight ch'on (third cousin) in patrilateral lines, four
ch'on (cousin) in matrilateral lines, eight ch'on in husband's line, and only parents-
in-law in the wife's lines. Relatives by marriage were confined to the boundary of
kinship. The women's organisations have asked to change the boundary equally to
four ch'on in both lines. For example if a cousin in eight chn relationship shelters
his relative, the criminal law cannot apply misprision of treason to the cousin in
Korea because the law can override the importance of family solidarity secured by
the higher rank law. However if a wife's brother harbours a criminal who is his
brother-in-law, the law applies a severe misprision of felony because they are not
in a kinship relationship in the current family law. The women's organisations
point out the brother-in-law has a much more intimate relationship emotionally
and in everyday communication than the third cousin in present day Korea. For
Confucianists, even if the women's argument sounds plausible, the generous
boundary to patrilateral lines is necessary to keep the stem principle that secures
the duty among patrilateral kin in terms of filial piety and ancestral worship.
There are three further points in dispute which are derived from the
headship principle but were not inherited from tradition but from the Japanese
annexation. First the family law did not recognise the domestic labour of a
housewife when she divorced. This legal prescription stemmed originally from the
Japanese legal system that passed over women's legal ability in silence. however a
housewife's legal rights over her contribution to the domestic labours was
stipulated in the article on divorce in the National Civil Code. If a family prospered
economically after a daughter-in-law became a member, she had a definite right not
to be divorced from her husband. Even if there was no accurate articles on the
calculation of her share when divorced, her contribution to the domestic activity
was significantly recognised by law. The prescription of women's lack of legal
rights during Japanese colonialism was also extended to the question of adoption.
Traditionally whenever there was an application for the adoption of a son, the
written consent of wife was compulsory as the traditional law viewed the wife
being in one flesh and spirit58 , and adoption without her consent was immoral
because it led to a weakening of family solidarity. however under the Japanese
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legal custom the authority in a family was absolutely the husband and the wife was
excluded from the family boundary and family law required no consent from a wife
for an adoption.
Lastly the women's organisations challenged the inheritance law. Family
law gave great priority to the eldest son leaving other sons, daughters, and
particularly a married daughter or wife in an extremely disadvantageous situation.
This principle mainly came from Japanese inheritance law prescribing total right to
the eldest son where the wife's legal status was nil!. In the National Code the
distribution of inheritance, exclusive of the common property for ancestral
worship, was equally assigned regardless of the birth order of children, sex, or
marriage. Moreover as a wife had a legal right to register property by her own
name, she was not as disadvantaged as traditional Japanese women were in terms
of inheritance distribution.59
All these traditional and non-traditional elements in the family law were
seen by women's organisations as hangovers from the patriarchy of Confucianism.
This attitude has been criticised by the Confucianists and even the genera! public
who still need some Confucian sentiments. Women were accused of having a point
in debunking the negative aspects of the past but in selfishly pursuing individual
rights only and were said to have no systematic moral vision for future society.
While the argument of the Confucianists was more concerned than the women's
groups with maintaining morality in a society suffering from new social problems,
such as the increase in divorce rates, adolescent problems, sexual misbehaviour,
etc., they sought to maintain non-traditional elements they once themselves
criticised as non-Confucian customs of barbarian Japan. They failed to show
alternatives to meet the needs of a speedily changing society particularly among the
young generations. Family law has changed under these situation and the result of
the legal change has gone almost parallel with the confrontation between the two
opposing groups. However the Confucianists have more established power and
have more support, at least numerically, amongst the public to whom the
Confucian values have traditionally been widespread.
Family law has changed three times: in February 1958 when the new code
was established, in December 1977, and December 1989 and ad hoc laws relating
to the family were enacted twice in 1978 and 1988 for one year each. The latest
change in 1989 which has been in force from the first of January 1991 was the
biggest, but the basic structure and nominal level of the law based on traditional
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principles has not changed but has only come to allow a number of utilitarian
benefits for wives or women.
Through the whole history of family law, nothing has changed in the
prohibition principle of marriage between tongsängdongbon. In spite of women's
groups' argument of there being no eugenic harm if a couple is in a relationship of
over eight ch'on (third) the prohibition law still seems to have more influence on
the everyday life of present day Koreans. It is observed in ordinary meetings
between youngsters. University freshmen have a custom of attending a group
meeting through the good offices of a friend. Once pairing is done, the first talk
most of the youngsters exchange is their name and bon (place of the origin). If a
pair recognise they are from tongsöngdongbon, they make no more progress in the
relationship. Marriage between persons of the same surname and the same place of
origin does not yet fit the moral sentiments even among the younger generations.
Moreover as Confucianists asserted the prohibition principle functions as a symbol
to maintain sexual morality in a society suffering from a rapid increase in social
problems. Thus there was no need for change for the minority at the expense of the
abolition of the moral framework of a nation. Instead the government executed an
ad hoc law giving relief to the minority concerned. The prohibition law does not
recognise either the couples nor the legality of births from them. Thus their
children were deemed illegitimate in a juridical sense and nominally registered as
an adopted child to some other family. The various disadvantages of the persons
concerned stemmed from the illegitimate status of the couples and their children.
The ad hoc law redefined the couples and their children as legitimate and in the
year 1978 the number of cases amounted to 4,223 an accumulation of decades.6°
The establishment of the 1958 family law was a copy of the civil law
imposed during the Japanese annexation and involved almost no change except
some minor but important changes for the benefit of women. 61 The law abolished
the articles on the housewife's legal position and prescribed that a wife and
daughters could also participate in the inheritance distribution. The law slightly
weakened the right of the head of a family and allowed wrongful behaviour
(adultery) of a husband as a just cause for divorce. Traditionally men's sexual
misbehaviour was generously recognised as a natural desire to have many offspring
while a woman's misbehaviour was seen to be like a vampire disgracing the family.
Under the new family law, a man's wrongful behaviour was defined as equally
weakening the integrity of marriage and the family.
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The next changes in the family law were in 1977 and trivial, leaving the
basic frameworks unchanged. Three clauses were notably changed. First the law
allowed a joint ownership of the property where ownership was vague between
couples but the law had till then recognised the property registered in the husband's
name as belonging to him however much the wife contributed to the property.
Second the law re-prescribed a joint responsibility of parental authority for children
after divorce from the former almost absolute power of husband. Third the law
changed the legal proportion of inheritance distribution which had been very
disadvantageous to the wife and daughters. This time the law allowed the same
weight of distribution to the eldest son and wife, and the rest of the children shared
equally, regardless of sex. However, married daughters were still disadvantaged in
the sense they were seen as belonging to another family after their marriage and the
proportion of their share remained worse than it had been in traditional society.62
The revision of the family law in 1989 was relatively the greatest change in
its range and degree. First and the most shocking, the headship principle was
changed. Formerly limited to the eldest son or the eldest grandson only, the
succession right to the family headship was opened to the rest of the Sons,
daughters, and even to the wife. Of course this is possible only when the eldest son
gives up his right to the headship; nevertheless the change is an epoch-making
change. The change proportionately reflects the weakening of the stem family
primogeniture principle. Of course more eldest sons still share their roof with their
parents, compared with other married sons or married daughters. However the
principle became very hard to maintain due to the high rate of regional or
occupational mobility among family members and it has become quite
commonplace to see a married non-eldest son or daughter living with their own
parents. Naturally the right of access to the headship also has been opened to them.
Next, many de facto rights and duties of the family head have been abolished.
Under the previous family law the head of a family had legally recognised powers
of announcement quasi-incompetence, the designation of dwelling place, and
power to order a separate family to his family members. All these rights and duties
have been abolished reflecting the increase of children's economic and social rights
in modern Korea. In traditional society where most income sources of each family
were from land, the headship could have a significant influence on the family
members but not in the present day in which income level of individuals are
measured mostly by their own ability and earning capacity. 63
The second area of the new revision is a wife's right to share her husband's
property in divorce cases. Of course a wife's legal ability derives from the
Chapter Seven 274
establishment of the family law of 1958, but she had no right to claim her share of
the property registered in her husband's name because the full-time housewife was
not recognised as having any income. Reflecting the changes in family life like the
increase in the nuclear family household and the improvement of the educational
level of women etc., family members recognised the economic values of the wife's
domestic labour. Thus the law allowed wives to claim their share of the property
increase after their marriage. As the law did not define the ratio of her share
clearly, the claims may cause disputes but it is more important, at the moment, to
give attention to the fact of joint ownership of the whole of a couple's property.64
The third change is an improvement in parental authority. The revision of
1977 prescribed joint authority over children after their divorce but the real priority
used to be on the husband's side. For the benefit of the maternal right, the law was
revised again to give parental power to the actual fosterer.65
Fourth, and amazingly, the law revised the boundary of kinship. The
previous law was defining the boundary upto the 8 ch'on (third cousin) of
patrilateral lines, 4 ch'on (full cousin) of matrilateral lines, 8 ch'on of husband's
line, and wife's parents only. The revised law stipulated the boundary upto the 8
ch'on of both patrilateral and matrilateral lines and 4 chn of both husband's and
wife's lines. Thus, the husband's kinship boundary has been narrowed, while
matrilateral and the wife's line has been considerably extended for the benefit of
sexual equality under the law. Originally the women's organisations asked a
standardisation of boundary upto 4 ch'on among all of the lines evenly, but due to
furious opposition from Confucianists and patrilateral sides, the boundary has been
extended in a standardised way.66
The last changes are in the legal proportion of inheritance an\ong family
members. According to the revised law in 1977, all children shared evenly
exclusive of married daughters assigning just 1/4 of the share of the other children
and 1/2 was additionally allotted to the eldest son as a share for ancestral worship.
However the law was changed reflecting the demands from women's groups. The
additional share for the successor to the family headship has been reduced to nil
with the condition that the succession is not compulsory, and all children share
evenly regardless of their birth order, sex, or whether married or not. Only the wife
is assigned to have an additional 1/2 of the children's amount. There is one further
change in the inheritance law. Previously the property in the name of a wife who
died without children, belonged to her husband only, even if she died within three
years of her marriage, and her parents had no right to the property most of which
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had been given by them. The revised law prescribes joint rights for a wife's parents
together with the husband if she dies within three years of married life.67
The rights of women or wives have improved as much as in other
developed countries in the West. The law revision has been focused on the defacto
improvement of women's legal status as a human being and economic rights as a
real member of a family. Flowever, in focusing mainly on women the revisions,
particularly of 1989, are showing some points of controversy. The status of some
family members has been marginalised. The room for conflict among kinship
members over property inheritance has been enlarged due to the expansion of the
kinship boundary. The newly included relatives from matrilateral lines or wife's
lines can intrude into a quarrel over an inheritance to ask for their share which
makes the partition of the estate very complicated and eventually makes the share
of wives themselves let alone those of their children reduced.
Second the revised law can reduce the status of elderly relatives and respect
of the older generation party because so many rights have been taken away from
the head of the family, making him a paper tiger. By changing the one-sided and
compulsory primogenitive succession to the headship the possibility none of
children would want to succeed to the almost unsubstantial headship arises. Thus,
the aged head of a family may assume even a low posture to his or her children.
Moreover, as expanding the boundaries of kinship lines, the once clear duty for
serving the aged in the patrilateral lines may become vague by serving too many
other kin in the new boundary of kinship. A system for the benefit of everyone may
frequently turn out to be for the benefit of none of them. Thus the revised law can
make the status of the aged very vague.
Another point of issue deriving from the revised law is the status of
children. A good example comes from a legal prescription on the relationship
between a step-parent and a step-child. In the previous family law, their
relationship was exactly that of a parent and a child, however it was down-graded
by marriage. The change was aimed to protect the property and right of remarried
women from the previous legal coercion of sharing her own contribution, in the
case of divorce, with step-children. However this time the law applies
disadvantageously to a step-child. As far as they are simply a relative to their step-
parent, it is difficult for them to have access to the joint property of their own
parent. The revised law is mostly criticised because it overlooks the position of the
elderly and children and that is why the women's demands have been frequently
criticised as self-centred.
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In spite of the great improvement in the legal status of women, the basic
framework of family law is almost unchanged. Its two basic axis of the law, to say,
the prohibition principle of marriage between tongsöngdongbon and family
headship principle are still alive in spite of the headship being quite weakened.
Thus family law is still strong in maintaining the traditional family values. The
Confucian sentiments on the importance of family values are too deeply entrenched
among the public either of the recognised Confucianists or non-Confucianists, or
even among women's groups consciously or unconsciously in everyday life. The
importance of family values which have contributed to revitalising national
consensus on economic development in the last few decades, and its moral
authority, emhasising the importance of each family as an agent to cope with
surging social problems like adolescent problems, divorce rate, ageing issues, and
problems coming from sexual openness, etc., are still attractive points for present
day Koreans, in spite of its shortcomings in hindering women's self-development in
the past. That is why conventional family law has kept its basic framework for
decades.
Though focusing on the customary attributes of the family law and the
normative level of family relationships, the law at least shows us a broad outline of
family life. The law is a crystallisation of the values commonly shared among
different social elements. The study of changes in family law revealed various
changes in the pattern of present day Korean family life and changes in traditional
family values among present day Koreans, however these sentiments are very
slowly being weakened meeting the demands for human rights, notably coming
from women. Thus the changes in family law have been a result of a confrontation
between tradition and human rights generated by the new tides arising from the
effects of social and economic modernisation.
ChAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
The first section of this chapter summarises the whole of the thesis so far.
The second section discusses social policies relating to family life in Korea: what
sort of family policies have been provided to meet the demand from groups being
marginalised in the process of social and family changes; how policy has
responded to the weakness or breakdown of traditional family values, and
eventually what sort of policies, in the family realm, are needed to meet the
demands from individual families and society as a whole.
8.1. SUMMARY
8.1.1. The Tradition
Family life in traditional Korean society was structured around three axes:
the ideas of chib, chongh5p, and hyo. In interaction with each other these ideas
established the essential framework within which traditional family patterns were
maintained and reinforced.
The chib was the basic unit for the integration of individuals within a
family and the mobilisation of each family within the wider society. The Chib
(family) was a compound concept comprising both the family itself, each and every
one of its members, and of the physical housing as well. The term was also used
more extensively to denote fellow clan members as well. The traditional society
was basically structured by this chlb. The inner structure of a chib was organised
along two principles: viz. the authoritarian relationship between generations and the
egalitarian relationships between a couple or among children. however defacto in
real life the chib was commonly characterised by the hierarchy between
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generations than by the horizontal relationships of the couple, or siblings. Each
individual chib was firmly integrated by the highly hierarchical relationship
between generations and this became a powerful bond against other family units.
Relations between different chibs were not hierarchical but scgmentarily
independent and exclusive with respect to other chibs. Thus the firmer the
solidarity within each family unit, the more it was prone to be defensive and
aggressive towards other units. Confrontation or competitiveness would be
intensified when it was bound to other important interests politically,
economically, or in honour. Although the hierarchical order inside a family was
very strict once he was out of his chib, there was no other group that could
influence the individual with different principles from those of his family values.
I-us behaviour could be liberal, egoistic or altruistic, or achievement-oriented
toward the larger society.
The munjung group was a social and external manifestation of the chib
idea. A niunjung was a clan group an aggregate of individual chib and functioning
as a secondary group at regional level. It was an integrated organisation bringing
together the demands from each small chib so as to achieve individual or
communal interests more effectively and to protect and maintain their collective
power. Thus the practical unit for practical or political purposes was more
frequently the munjung than the individual chib. The basic element that linked each
munjung member to the others was their consanguine relationship. The structure
was hierarchically organised by the rule of patrilineal primogeniture, however the
inner dynamics of the structure were quite democratic with each chib being
recognised as having its own independent identity. The territorial boundary was
also important in developing a consciousness of munjung identity extending
beyond chib loyalties. When they were geographically isolated and with
transportation underdeveloped, each munjung occupied and dominated a regional
community. Thus regional territory and the munjung boundary were almost
identical, notwithstanding that consanguine relationships were the foremost
element in composing each chib and the munjung of which they were constituent
elements.
Chongböp (prirnogeniture) was the organisational principle which served to
create and institutionalise the family headship as the centralising force of each
individual chib or munjung. The principle prescribed who can or can not be a head
of a chib and where the authority, in Weberian terms, of the chib was. The
principle stipulated that the duty and right to maintain a chib belonged to the head
of a family and the headship was ascribed, by birth, to the eldest son or the eldest
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grandson. Thus the eldest son remained in his family of orientation to inherit the
headship from his father and the rest of the sons left home after their marriages,
each to establish a separate family of procreation. The former family of orientation
being succeeded to by the eldest son is pon-ga, the latter new family of procreation
is pun-ga. The pon-ga of which the successor has been an eldest son, generation
after generation, was specifically called chong-ga-chib(the great head family).
Each chib either pon-ga or pun-ga was composed of a head, his wife, the eldest
son's family, the eldest grandson's family and so on. Thus the average number of
the family was not as big as we used to assume because the other sons used to
leave to set up their own family of procreation as soon as they married, so there
was not enough time for the number of family members to become large. Over an
extended period of time conjugal family units would predominate numerically until
each second or subsequent son's eldest sons married. Thus these conjugal family
units were in each generation a transitional form eventually conforming to the stem
family pattern, each to become another pon-ga from which the next pon-ga and
pun-ga would be reproduced like cell-division. That was the chong-bO idea or the
patrilateral primogeniture stem family.
Under the chong-bop principle the head of a family was the focal point of
each chib, pon-ga of pun-ga, and chong-ga-chib the centre of the whole clan group
niunjung. Of course the defacto power of a munjung group was not identical with
the power of the head of chong-ga-chib because a munjung was run by a dual
power structure. Frequently the substantial influence moving a munjung was in the
hands of others rather than the head of the leading chong-ga-chib. Nevertheless the
chong-ga-chib was the central point of a munjung and its representative to other
niunjung and the society at large. Even if the essential power lay with another
inunjung member, it was used not in his name but in the name of the head of the
leading chong-ga-chib. In practice the chong-ga-chib was an organisational symbol
rather than the substantial power of a munjung, and the prosperity of the clan group
was believed to be identical with the everlasting succession of the great head
family. The adoption system was developed to maintain the succession of the
headship. If there was no natural son, the nearest relative was adopted by the clan
group and he continued the ancestral worship inherited generation by generation.
Lastly filial piety to parents, the hyo idea, was the ideological axis for the
maintenance of the familial pattern of traditional society. It was a lubricant to the
chib and chongbp. Under the commonly shared belief with the virtue of hyo each
individual family and each inunjung was integrated and fortified against other units
and the virtue expanded to re-integrate the segmented chib or inunjung at societal
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level. Traditional Choson society made hyo the supreme value over all the other
Neo-Confucian virtues. This ethos served to solidify the hierarchical order within
each family. By emphasising the moral duty of devotion to superiors within the
family and the regional community, it was fundamental to social integration, since
a person dutiful to his parents would obey his ruler in society as well, and loyalty
as devotion to a family would, automatically, be extended to the level of kin, local
community, and nation.
To conclude, Choson society pursued the hyo ethos to make ancestral
worship a manifestation of the supreme virtue of all virtues. The best filial piety to
the ancestor was crystallised in the effort to maintain the perpetuity and purity of
the genealogical line. From this stemmed the eldest son preference idea on the one
hand and the adoption system on the other hand, all of which are brought together
in the chib and the chongbp principle. The extreme effort to maintain a
genealogical line coincided with the chongböp idea giving primacy to the eldest
son and the family values which put the individual dub interest above all other
interests. Marriage was regulated by an extreme incest taboo and class endogamy.
Marriage between even extremely remote cousin a thousand times removed was
prohibited. The prohibition extended to marriage between tongscYng-dongbon, i.e.
persons of the same surname and the same place of origin who had the same
ancestor hundreds or even thousands years ago. Women's rights in particular were
severely restricted as the rigorous pursuit of traditional Confucian ideas fossilised
in a rigid traditionalism.
8.1.2. What Has Changed
Since the mid 1950s Korea has undergone rapid industrialisation,
urbanisation, and Westernisation and, undeniably this modernisation was made
possible only by active grass-roots participation. Nevertheless government
intervention was the major factor in social change and was responsible for the fast
rate of change. The speed of industrialisation followed both by the growth of living
standards and the economic development of the nation was unprecedentedly
dramatic. Industrialisation led to inter-regional migration as people sought jobs in
the cities with the result of over-crowding in the urban areas. The scale and speed
of the rural emigration to the cities left the rural areas depopulated and the urban
areas with many social problems. The influence of modernisation was not limited
to the material or economic realms but led to a preference for Western life styles
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particularly among the younger generations. Westernisation, with its emphasis on
the importance of individual rights and the pursuit of individual interests slowly
replaced the former strong moral belief in more collective values. Ironically the
basis of this pursuit of individual rights was the economic development made
possible not by individualism, but by an ethos which had stressed the collective
interest.
The family and cultural and social areas relating to it were not excluded
from the influence of modernisation. Many things have changed during the last half
century of rapid social change including the demography of the family, kinship
boundaries, marriage and family dissolution, role distribution and power, and many
other aspects of family life.
The most immediately obvious demographic change has been the rapid
reduction in family size. The average size of the ordinary household was 3.7
persons according to Census data in 1990. The number is even smaller than that in
traditional society when most ordinary families had not enough time to have a large
number of members due to the stem principle that prescribed establishment of a
separate family of procreation as soon as sons other than the eldest married. The
sharp decrease in size came primarily out of a decrease in the fertility rate. The
total fertility rate decreased to 1.6 by 1989.
Nuclear family households have noticeably increased and those according
to FAM89 data of the stern pattern have dwindled to below 15 per cent. This is less
than half the proportion of stem family households in early 19th century Chosn
society. The increase in nuclear families and tl1e decrease in stem family
households is mainly due to the high rate of inter-regional migration in pursuit of
employment. According to a KIPH report (1986) over three out of five persons
experienced long-term migration which takes over a year throughout the nation in
1943-1983 and among them over one out of two men migrated because of
employment. The migration of the eldest son and his family split the stem family
into two households of the nuclear pattern. Conflict between the generations, in
particular between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law was also a dicisive factor
which tended to split stem-type families into two households. Urbanisation not
only decreased the number of stem pattern households but also increased the
number of one person households and those with an atypical pattern. Particularly
the increase in one person households partly reflects the increase in individual
living standards and partly a change in values so that persons began to prefer
having their own separate household for the benefit of personal privacy. Thus
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households began to separate out into one person households and ordinary
households comprising just own family members. Atypical households have also
increased as a result of urbanisation but also because of oilier trends like the
increase in the divorce rate. Thus households of a diversity of types of composition
such as a single parent and children, grandparents and grand children, three or four
generation families without intermediate generations, and couples with brothers or
sisters of either of them etc. have all increased.
Demographic changes in the family brought about other subsequent
changes, both positive and negative, in the population or economic fields. First the
decrease in the fertility rate changed the age structure from the underdeveloped
pyramidal pattern to the diamond style typical of economically developed
countries. The per capita income increased notably, the unemployment rate
declined as prospects of employment in the future improved with the reduction in
the labour supply. At the same time the financial burden of educational investment
for the school-aged population has been reduced while the quality of the
investment increased.
However this demographic change provoked negative results as well. The
enthusiasm for family planning brought about an unbalanced sex ratio with the
predominance of boys among the population below 15 years old which will make
pairing conditions a problem in future marriage markets. This is anticipated to
cause serious adolescent problems in the near future. The rapid decrease in the
fertility rate accompanied by the increase in the average life expectancy are also
causing a rapid ageing in the population structure. Apart from the burden to the
social security for the aged which this represents, many other social problems can
be foreseen in the near future like the necessary expansion of medical facilities, and
job opportunities for the elderly which may reduce opportunities for youth etc. Of
course it may encourage the development of industry oriented towards the older
worker that may add a positive advantage to the industrial sector of the nation.
Nevertheless, more problems are foreseen economically, socially, and politically.
Lastly, the changes in family pattern such as the increase in nuclear
families, one person households, and atypical patterns, has brought about a sharp
increase in the number of separate households. The rate of the increase far
exceeded that of population growth and has led to a severe housing problem in
present day Korea particularly in the urban areas. housing supply in the last few
decades has been unable to satisfy the increase in the number of households and the
situation has been aggravated by the growing concentration of rural population in
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the cities. The unequal distribution of income, particularly since the late 1970s, has
made the situation still worse as speculation in real estate, has made it far more
difficult for urban poor families to have their own flat than ever before.
Modernisation has also had an impact on kinship relations. Interaction with
patrilateral relatives, particularly third and more remote cousins has been reduced
while there has been an increase in frequency of contact with other realtives. The
role of wife's relatives has noticeably increased so that a woman's frequency of
contact with a cousin in the patrilateral line is now less than the wife's brothers or
sisters who were not perceived as a relative at all in traditional society. This trend
has been reflected in the revision of family law in 1989 and the juridical boundary
of kinship has been defined equally upto 4 ch'on (full cousin) both of husband's
and wife's side, and 8 ch'on (third cousin) in both patrilateral and matrilateral lines.
(Refer to Figure 8.1)
Figure 8.1.; Calculation Of Number Of Ch'on
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Marriage has also changed. Concubinage has even been prohibited by law.
Class endogarny has declined with the growing emphasis on individual charater
and the reduction in the perceived importance of family background. In traditional
society, decision-making about adult children's marriages was in the hands of their
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parents and children were obliged to marry at a very early age. This has drastically
changed. The unmarried rate has sharply increased, and the age at first marriage
has risen considerably. Decision-making has moved to the persons concerned and
young people no longer feel marriage to be urgent thanks to the general increase in
living standards, the increase in educational level, and the increase in job
opportunities for women in particular. These changes in marriage, directly or
indirectly have led to an increase in women's participation in society which in short
term created both an unemployment problem and a decline in the fertility rate
which in the long term has threw the improved job prospects in the labour market
for those seeking employment by reducing the potentially competitive labour
supply.
Changes in the life cycle of women have also come about during
modernisation. The prolongation of women's post-childcare lives has resulted from
the extension of life expectancy thanks to the improvement of medical services and
the growth of individual living standards as well as from changes in fertility
behaviour among the younger generation who tend to have a small number of
children as soon as they marry. These changes brought about subsequent changes
for example in the availability of women to join the labour force and this has
intensified the competition for jobs. Social policies related to women have had to
keep pace with women's new status in society.
Women's roles in the family have also been affected by the process of
modernisation. Quite apart from those household tasks or child care that
traditionally belonged to the housewife, even the outside activities representing a
family which in traditional society were monopolised by men, have been left to the
wife. Dual career women have had to become superwomen managing everything in
family life.
This change provoked several issues socially and individually. The
changing distribution of roles between husband and wife in some cases created a
sexual-identity problem for their Sons becoming girlish or at least unisexual due to
a lack of influence from the father.' Second the over-burden of housework
particularly among dual career wives increased dissatisfaction with family life and
generated an increased demand for social facilities for their children left alone
during their time out at work. The increased role of wives matches to a relative
decrease in the role expectation for the elderly in family life. In traditional society
all of the activities inside the family were supervised and controlled by the eldest
women but given the currently prevailing egalitarian ideas, their position has been
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so reduced as to undermine the traditional hyo idea. Children remain inactive
subjects and have no distinctive role except doing their school work. All these
changes have thrown up new issues for the labour market, social policies, and even
family law which has been revised to meet the increased role of women in the
home and outside.
Modernisation has also affected family dissolution. The divorce rate is not
as high as other developed countries like Japan or Western countries. On the other
hand however, the facts suggest that the rate will rise in the near future, to match
those in other countries. During the last few decades, particularly in the 1980s, the
increase has been very sharp among the younger generation. The weakness of the
stem family has deprived young couples of an institutional mechanism to reduce
the conjugal conflicts occurring. As most households consist of couples and
children only, they concentrate on their own affairs which while everything goes
well may be congenial, but is far more serious and destructive when their
relationship comes under stress. The modern emphasis on individual rights, in
contrast with the older generation's Confucian stress on common prospeity or the
common good, contributed to an increase in the divorce rate. The increase in
family dissolution has begun to demand social policies for the divorced and their
children and at the same time the growth of atypical family patterns has produced
other social issues relating to adolescent problems.2
8.1.3. Continuities
In spite of various changes in family life, the three traditional principles
have not yet totally disappeared. The chib idea is still strong among present day
Koreans. Of course the attributes or orientations of the idea are not exactly the
same as the traditional one but, within an externally different social environment,
the chib idea is alive enough to exert a continuing influence both in the family and
society. The traditional munjung (sub-clan) group has changed its organisational
principle and enlarged the boundary of membership to encompass far wider
membership of the whole of the clan group under the name of chongch 'inhoe. The
new clan group undertakes similar activities of inter-clan competition but in a more
open and more widely beneficial way than before.
This was revealed in a sharp increase in the chokbo (genealogy) publication
rate from 1980s. Genealogy publication reflects a changed idea about the clan
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boundary and a rise in demands for sexual equality etc. It is a mechanism to
reinforce integration among the members within the newly expanded boundary.
The best example of a social movement successfully activated by the conventional
chib idea was the Saemaul (New Village) movement. This movement was
motivating unprecedented development in the national economy, and was able to
achieve its objectives through co-operation between clan groups within a
neighbouring region. It was an example where the chib idea was realised through a
constructive competition. However, there is another example in which the same
idea has functioned negatively in present day Korea. The idea of chib entails of an
enthusiasm for family housing and even its land as well. Each family aspires to
have their own independent house rather than a semi-detached one or an apartment
flat as those do not guarantee their own independent space or their own ground and
it encourages them to have a bigger and more luxurious one than other families.
Competition for the limited housing stock provoked a drastic rise in housing prices
leaving poor urban families less and less likely to get their own flat. Over-
enthusiasm for the housing caused capital flow into real estate sometimes with
negative effects on investment in the national economy. Investment in the housing
sector more than tripled, from 1.5 per cent of the GNP to 5.2 per cent over the
period between the first five-year plan (1962-1966) and the fifth five-year plan
(1982-1986). 3 The chib idea of children as the mechanism to reproduce the family
and to realise parents' dearest wishes, has not changed even among the younger
generation. In traditional society hyo was another token of solidarity between
generations. The higher the degree of hyo in the society, the more enthusiasm and
sacrifice for their children was expected of parents as well. These sentiments still
help in preventing family dissolution in the present day. Of course the divorce rate
is rising sharply among the younger generations but most of them divorce before
they have children. Once they have a baby, husband or wife rarely consider divorce
however egoistic each of them are and no couple dares to think of divorce at the
risk of losing their children. That is why almost all the disputes at the Family Court
have been to take charge of custody of the children regardless of expense 4 and why
most family re-unions have been for the benefit of the children. (Refer to Table 7.6
in Chapter 7)
Elements of the stem family persist although it has been much weakened.
Of course most present day Korean families live in a nuclear family household but
there are still definite ties between generations living apart. Whilst these no longer
emphasise the position of (he eldest son. All sons or daughters regardless of birth
order position maintain emotionally, economically and physically a frequent
relationship with their parents. As soon as parents are in difficulties, they are ready
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to return to the original household even sharing a roof with parents when
necessary. These strong sentiments and the chib idea have eased the economic
development of the country. development would have been impossible without
sacrifice on the part of urban mothers and rural sisters during the last a few
decades. The mothers endowed their children with education rather than land or
money as in traditional society with the money she earned from lodgers. Rural
sisters working in the urban factories also sent their earnings back to rural homes to
provide their brothers with a higher education. They strove almost competitively to
have their children or brothers educated more than others in other families
reflecting the continuing strength of family loyalties and the chib idea. The
traditional stem family was, in a sense, a mechanism for role allocation between
the sexes. The roles of a wife and husband were very definite and are still clearly
differntiated among contemporary couples. Wives have taken over many roles
which once belonged exclusively to the husband. Outside activities like visiting
public offices or attending relatives' for formal congratulation or condolences are
good examples of wives' newly assumed responsibilities. In spite of the expansion
of the wife's role in and outside the home, the changes do not mean an abolition of
role differentiation itself but just a changed contents of the separate roles.
1-lusbands are attached to their work place but a wife typically has a non-work
place orientation including home affairs. Reflecting the traditional idea of role
differentiation, a husband now tends to think occupational activities are the most
important realm for men as economic earner or in the eyes of other families. Thus
they rarely like to engage in what are seen as trivial things which now belong to the
sphere of a wife whether in traditional society they belong to him or to her. This
dedication to work contributed to the development of the national economy. A
husband was proud of his occupation and his wife was also proud of herself as the
supporter never blaming her husband staying night after night at hi work place
leaving his own family at home. These attitudes reflect the Confucian virtues of
forbearance for women and sincerity in men. Husbands identification with their
work place and the strict role differentiation so that he was freed from home
responsibilities, helped factories and companies achieve unprecedented economic
growth. Despite an egalitarian trend in relation to some responsibilities for
children, de facto most duties relating to home affairs are strictly dichotomised by
sex. Thus men exercise total authority for large amounts of property like real estate
and still act on behalf of their families on such matters while the wife has her own
realm relating to smaller expenditure and she acts wholly without intervention from
her husband.
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Clan endogamy prohibiting the marriage between tongsöngdongbon (same
surname and same place of origin) is still strictly kept in the present day with the
effect of a form of ad hoc law. This could create some difficulty in the marriage
market when the group aged under 15 years old amongst whom there is a serious
imbalance with sex ratio, grows up in the near future. The idea of narrowing the
mate boundary can cause serious problems in marriage as a result of the restriction
of choice. I Jowever as the Confucianists enthusiastically asserted, it may reduce
the possibility of a breakdown of sexual morality. The traditional rule is basically
against the idea of love affairs as an individual right overcoming the barriers of age
difference, regional or nationality boundary etc., which can easily go beyond to
justify illegal affairs as well like pre-marital or extra-marital intercourse, etc. In
fact the prohibition philosophy was not limited to clan exogamy but extended to
most sexual morality. It was a sort of moral symbol for the exercise of moderation
in sexual behaviour, to prevent intemperate behaviour like extra- and pre-marital
intercourse that eventually could dissolve the family itself. Traditionally society
allowed concubinage or prostitution for the benefit of men but the prohibition
principle continues in the present to discourage any relaxation of sexual tnorality
and preserve class endogamy. Of course as the class boundaries have weakened,
there is not strict class endogamy either but a strong propinquity is observed in
marriage in terms of the educational or occupational level of marriage partners.
Education has been more important in measuring the suitability of
prospective partners due to the traditionally inherited enthusiasm under
Confucianism. Education guaranteed economic wealth and social standing as much
now as in the past. Together with this modified class system, the current scarcity of
potential bride-grooms has produced an abnormal marriage custom. In order to
match a daughter to a suitable would-be-groom whose educational and
occupational background may be thought to ensure her a better life, parents
compete with other parents in the amount of wedding gifts they can offer to him
and his family. Gifts sometimes amount to a luxurious apartment flat, a car, or
offices for the son-in-law to work in. Parents and their daughters who cannot
participate in this extravagant competition suffer a degree of relative deprivation
provoking a number of social issues. This custom is now begining to disappear to
transmit to bride scarcity phenomenon in the near future. (Refer to Section 5.2.2. of
Chapter 5.)
Hyo also still persists in various patterns in present day family life. Having
a strong affection for their parents, either living under the same roof with parents or
not, children have continued to provide for their parents physically, economically,
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and emotionally. Thanks to the children's filial piety the government could save the
finances for welfare to invest in economic reproduction. Hyo was observed in the
marriage process as well. Although the final choice of partner is that of the persons
concerned themselves, out of respect for their parents they have them participate in
the match-making process. That is why match-makers are still prevalent in present
day Korea. This has both negative and positive aspects. Match-makers could
manipulate the excessive competition between the parents concerned so as to earn
more reward for themselves and if the situation did not develop as the match-maker
intended the relationship between the couple can be broken off through her
trickery. Nevertheless it had a positive side in matching couples from a similar life
style and living standards which contribute for a more stable married life.
It may be argued that there have been more losers than winners as a result
of these new developments in the family system. Although many traditional
elements have been changed or broken down, there is still not an apparent
consensus commonly shared among present day Koreans about how the family
ought to be in the future. So far the abolition or revision of distortions that have
been mostly thought of as belonging to tradition has not led to any vision of what
the family should be like in the future. The groups who sought to change the
tradition are not winners in real sense. Of course the individualism associated with
modernisation or Westernisation in deeply instilled among the younger generations
and in womens'organisations. however it has not yet gained full legitimacy and
there is a lack of consensus at societal level about new tendencies in the family.5
The rapid modernisation of the last few decades has thrown more shadow
than light on the family. In the process of social change, men have lost as much as
women claim they lost in the past in terms of human rights. Of col.4rse what the
man has lost is not identical with what woman did but he also was serious in his
social life. If the society gave serious problems to women in faniily life, it gave the
same amount of problems to men in social life. Men were almost deprived of
family life to their work place. That is one of the reason an improvement of labour
condition, holidays and work hours in particular, was claimed with the same
importance as an increase of salary in the trade union movement in the late 1 980s.
Eventually there was no significant difference in perceiving the level of satisfaction
with family life as shown in Table 8.1 though men are slightly more positive about
the family life in general. 6
 To say both men are almost similarly suffered if it was
sufferring and similarly enjoyed if it was enjoyable either in family life or
occupational life at least in perception of ordinary person in spite men have been
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told, from perspective of some of social groups, more benefitted from the given
social system.
Table 8.1. Level Of Satisfaction On Overall Family Life
I	 total	 I	 Satisfied	 Acceptable	 Unsati
total	 100.0	 36.0
	
52.8	 11.2
husband	 100.0	 39.4
	
51.5	 9.1
wife	 100.0	 33.2
	
53.8	 13.0
source: SIlK (1992), p.309.
The older generation contributed to the economic development of the
nation and the individual family with their devotion to Confucian family values.
After their sacrifices for the benefit of their family and the nation they now find
nothing is left for them and they, in some sense, are in even a worse situation than
their own parents' generation. They lost most of their rights as head of a family and
they have become no more than toothless tigers as children are no longer afraid of
their fathers as a head of family. They have also lost their role of family manager
and become simply a supporter to a younger daughter-in-law or son. They can no
longer afford to order the younger generation about, instead they dare only venture
an opinion studying the younger generations' faces whom they themselves brought
up. Outside activities are now monopolised by the younger daughter-in-law and the
elderly are alienated inside and outside family life. The aged are no longer ascribed
meaningful roles through which they can find their identity. The modification of
the stem family also means that although they are in constant contact with their
own children, most of them do not share the same roof with them. This separated
residential life has weakened their welfare once guaranteed by living together. As
they get older they need more attention from their children not only regarding their
physical health but also with regard to their economic level and emotional
satisfaction. However, as they are living apart from children their immediate needs
are difficult to fulfill. In addition, government welfare agencies are not developed
enough to pay attention to them. Filled with the ideas of hyo, they were sincere in
serving their parents' generation, and sacrificed to pass on what they earned for the
benefit of the younger generations in the form of education, and for the benefit of
national development.
Of course there are a few important things the aged gained. Rising living
stadard partly thanks to urbanisation and partly to the income earned by their
working daughter-in-law have improved their living conditions and material
comfort, have improved their health and have extended their life expectancy. While
their responsibilities to their families which, in feedback, gave a total authority in
"I
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the past, are less which means they too have more freedom to development a wider
range of qualities in their relationships with members of their families and their
children and grandchildren in particular.
Non-authoritarian relationships for some people are a positive gain for both
sides not only for those who were formerly subordinate. All these examples are
true but to a minority group. At least three out of five aged people have no money
to use for themselves for the extended life expectancy. 7 More significantly most of
them are still relatively too much oriented to traditional virtues of a dignified head
of a family to enjoy the non-authoritarian relationship which a minority of their
generation and their sons' generation are enjoying. It is difficult to see which way
of life is more pleasant and valueable. But at least one thing seems true, that most
aged people are surrounded by a cultural atmosphere on human relationship of
which they do not approve. To say the non-authoritarian atmosphere of the society
drives the aged to emotional alienation. To sum up, they have few rewards either
from their children who have a greater commitment to individualism than to hyo, or
from the state which is still committed to the logic of development.
Children have also lost out in the modern family. Of course they have
benefitted from both education, most valuable in present day Korea and from the
economic prosperity resulting from economic growth in the individual family and
the nation as a whole. Agaion more important is the improved quality of
relationships with parents and others in the non-authoritarian modern family.
Nevertheless their position as an important axis of the traditional family has shrunk
to a mere component in everyday family life. They were an institutional symbol of
the family but now the axis of the family has moved to couples and to the couples'
interest at the expense of the interests of children. In other word the main axis of a
family is moving from the relationship of parents and children to that of husband
and wife. It is to be expected that the situation would turn worse if children are in a
step-family and will sharply increase in the near future. In the step-family, the
child's position has been downgraded in relation to his/her step parent and creates
the need for a special mechanism to protect his/her juridical rights. The evidence is
observed in the revision of inheritance section of family law. Present day children
are prescribed to get less share of inheritance from their parents than their step-
mother or step-father is going to get.
The women's movement has often accused men of upholding patriarchy in
the traditional Confucian family but husbands themselves were victims of the same
social system. They sacrificed much of their own personality and freedom as
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individuals under the prevailing family value just as women did. Of course men
were the main beneficiaries and women the main losers, but all of them were in a
similar situation in the sense that both served to sustain and reinforce the
Confucian system and were deprived of their human rights in the process. Men
have suffered in the modernisation process as well. They worked by day and night
in order to provide educational fees for their children and to enable their family to
prosper economically as well as to contribute to the economic development of the
nation. Working like machines, they missed out on family life and even the
fatherhood of their children. They had little time to take care of their children as a
father, or to relate to other members as a son or a husband. Although wives blame
husbands for indifference, they have been made scape-goats for the economic
development of the society. Growing up under economically prosperious
conditions and with their modern individualistic values, children tend not to
recognise the sacrifices they made. They easily forget their parents guaranteed that.
Perhaps it is a time to think about fatherhood lost during modernisation but those
fathers under the Confucian virtues of devotion and silence, are still silent about
what they went through.
Women on the whole seem having gained many things they have claimed
relating to their social and familial status in family law, family life and social life
generally. However it is just a relative and superficial view and it is difficult to say
if they are winners in a real sense. Their defacto status was not as disadvantaged in
traditional society as many now believe. What they have struggled against was not
wholly Confucian tradition but the legacy of Colonial annexation. In the process of
modernisation, many obligations and responsibilities, new or conventional, have
fallen upon women as husbands spent little time in the households but instead were
in their workplace working hard day and night. Women's devotion at htme was the
other side of the same contribution made by husbands to the economic
development of the nation. Nevertheless, their devotion has not been
acknowledged as much as their husband's was. Their effort was sometimes
recognised as meagre in the court when they demand reparation for injury or sue
for a divorce in particular.
To conclude, the modernisation of the past half a century was a collective
movement to cast off the long standing poverty of the nation. The social change
was successful in as much as it was collectivistic and was sustained by the familial
tradition. However, as worthwhile as the economic development was there has
been a price to pay. Too many members in the society have been hurt in the
process of social change and it may be time to ask if traditional family values that
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contributed economic growth can contribute again to cure the individual sufferring
and growing social problems.
8.2 FAMILY POLICY
8.2.1. Social Security And Family Policy
A short review on the state of social security in the nation might be helpful
in understanding overall family policy in Korea. 8 Social security and social welfare
have progressed in line with the socio-economic development of the nation. Living
standards have improved markedly due to the rapid economic growth of the 1970s.
At the same time, this fast growth and industrialisation have given rise to an
assortment of social problems such as extreme income gaps and a widespread
imbalance of development among regions and industries. The deterioration of
socio-economic conditions featuring price spirals, economic slow-down and
growing unemployment, prompted by the 1973 and subsequent oil shocks, added
further to the need for broad welfare programmes.
With the successful implementation of five five-year economic
development plans, demands for welfare programmes and expansion of
employment opportunities have risen in many sectors. The imbalance in income
distribution has brought about the realisation that the problem of poverty needs to
be addressed, and this has led to the establishment of a social security which has
sought to create a balance between economic and social development. In this
direction, the medical aid and insurance systems began expanding in 1977, and the
National Pension Law, enacted in 1986, has also bccn enforced beginning in 1988.
Social welfare policies have concentrated on the relief of those unable to support
themselves due to old age, disability and other causes.
Table 8.2. State Of Social Security Programmes
Programmes	 I	 Scope	 I	 Coverage	 I Beneficiary
1. Social Insurance
a. Medical insurance I Workers in workshops with I Disease, injury, birth I	 20,777,000
b. Industrial accident
compensation
insurance
c. National pension
5 or more employees,
public officials, private
school teachers
Workers in workshops with
5 or more employees
(102,744 workshops)
All citizens
death
Disease, injury,
disability, death
Old age, disability
death
6,107,000
4,323,697
d. Special profession
pension
e. Seamen's insurance
f. Severance
allowance systerr
2. Public Relief;
a. Subsistence care
Care at home
Care Residential
Care of the needy
b. Medical care
c. Veterans assistance
Old age, disability
death
Old age, disability
death
Severance allowance
798,000
Food, fuel,
educational
expenses,
medicine
Food, fuel, education,
medicine, funeral
318,000
75,000
Food, fuel, medicine,	 1,917,000
education
Disease, injury	 4,290,000
Subsistence,	 132,000
medicine, etc.
74,287
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Public officials, military
servicemen, private
school teachers
Seamen
Workers in workshops with
10 or more employees
Persons, as defined by Law
on Subsistence Care
Persons accommodated at
social welfare facilities
under Law on Subsistence
Care
Persons with low incomes,
as prescribed by Law on
Subsistence Care
Economically incapable
persons, needy persons,
and persons in residential
accommodation
as defined by Law on
Subsistence Care,
persons subject to
veterans assistance, etc.
Wounded veterans and
policemen, bereaved
families of fallen
servicemen and
policemen,those who had
rendered outstanding
contribution to the
nation's independence,
defectors from North
Korea etc.
3. Social Welfare Service
Care at 580 facilities 	 Persons in residential 	 Subsistence,
accommodation for the 	 medicine, etc.
aged, physically
handicapped persons,
children welfare, etc.
4. Disaster Relief
	 Victims of disasters	 Enie	 relief.
source: quoted from KOIS, A Handbook of Korea, p.468-469.
The social security system in Korea was effectively institutionalised by the
Social Security Law enacted in 1963. It consists of three major elements: the social
insurance programme, the public relief programme, and social welfare
programmes. Programmes undertaken and planned as of August 1991 are listed in
Table 8.2.
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First of all, one of the most important elements of the social insurance
program is medical insurance. The law on medical insurance was enacted as early
as in 1963. However, its implementation took place later in the 1970's after several
revisions. 10
 Medical insurance was first introduced for industrial workers of large
firms in 1977, and since then gradually expanded to smaller firms. As of 1988, a
total of 5,279,000 persons in 154 industrial establishments and their 11,000,000
dependants were benefiting from the medical insurance service. Public officials and
employees of private schools were also covered by medical insurance in 1978. In
1980 coverage was extended to the dependants of career military servicemen. In
addition there were six compulsory community group medical insurance societies
established in 1981 as pilot projects for those living within designated regions who
were not eligible for other types of medical insurance. With the implementation of
medical insurance for regional populations more than 90 per cent of the people
were covered under some type of policy.
The medical insurance system was operated on a three-tier basis - industrial
establishments, regional medical societies, and the insurance for public pfficials
and employees of private schools. 1-lowever the medical insurance system
expanded step by step by 1991 to cover almost the entire population. At that time,
the medical insurance managerial system was integrated, industrial establishment
insurance was expanded in scope to cover workshops employing five or more
workers from 1988, and community insurance was expanded to every region to
cover the total population by medical insurance by 1991. The medical institutions
participating in medical insurance programmes numbered 18,462 across the
country, including 213 general hospitals, 351 hospitals, 5 dental hospitals, 8,267
clinics, 3,036 dental clinics, and 541 maternity clinics. Since 1981, two herbal
hospitals have participated in the medical insurance programmes on an
experimental basis to determine the role of herbal medicine in the medical
insurance system.
Along with medical insurance, the government has also run the medical aid
program for low-income families, veterans, disaster victims, and government-
designated "human cultural properties." 1 ' Under the medical care program, the
government bears the entire medical expenses of economically incapable persons.
For those in low-income brackets, the state provides for all out-patient expenses
and half of the in-patient charges, the remaining half being paid from the Medical
Aid Fund on an instalment basis. Funds have been established through the medical
care programme, within the provinces and six major cities to be disbursed by city,
county and ward goveriments. The government bears 80 per cent of the Medical
Chapter Eight 296
Care Fund and provincial administrations the remaining 20 per cent. For the
effective implementation of medical care, the country has been divided into 57
clinical zones with a total of 6,071 medical institutions designated for the program
- 5,068 public or private primary medical institutions (health centres and clinics),
452 secondary institutions (hospitals and some clinics) and 11 tertiary institutions
(general hospitals). As a result, the number of the medical aid beneficiaries has
steadily increased since 1977, covering 5.8 per cent of the total population, and it
doubled in 1986. Before 1977 Koreans, the poor in particular, were living in a
medical vacuum period. The average number of treatment days per patient as well
has been increasing steadily.' 2 1-lowever, as shown on Table 8.3, medical aid
service coverage began to decline from 1987 as medical insurance was expanded.
The service coverage of the medical aid programme has been relatively low since
then thanks to the general rise of living standard of individual families.
Table 8.3. The Number Of Medical Insurance Beneficiaries And Medical Aid
Beneficiaries
year	 meuicai insurance	 mewcai aid
	
number of	 service	 number of
	
service
	
beneficiaries	 coverace	 beneficiaries	 covéra^
1977	 3,202,981	 8.8	 2,095,251	 5.8
1980	 9,226,365	 24.2	 2,141,690	 5.6
1985	 17,994,913	 44.1	 3,258,769	 7.9
1986	 19,360,822	 47.0	 4,386,000	 10.5
1987	 21,257,464	 51.1	 4,386,000	 10.4
1988	 28,906,359	 68.9	 4,290,000	 10.2
1989	 39,922,389	 94.2	 4,246,000	 10.0
1990	 40,180,023	 93.7	 3,930,389	 9.2
1991	 40,800,123	 94.3	 2,878,684	 6.7
source: Korea Medical Insurance Corporation, Medical Insurance Statistical Yearbook
The public relief system has been sought out by the Livelihood Protection
Act which was enacted in 1961. It provides assistance for the two categories of
persons stipulated by the Act: those who are incapable of making any income and
those who have low incomes. The former includes those of 65 years and over,
children aged under 18, and those disabled due to injury, mental derangement and
physical handicaps, all of whom do not have any economic supporter. The
magistrate of the county or mayor gives a list of them to the Ministry of Health and
Social Affairs. The needy families are counted by magistrates or mayors excluding
those in home care and instituional care but including those without employment,
single parent households, school leaves without ajob etc. They are defined by the
amount of average monthly income per person. The ceiling set for income relief
eligibility is an average of 110,000 won (equivalent to 88 UK pounds) per person
in 1993. This was 46,000 won (equivalent to 31 UK pounds) in 1987. The
minimum living expenses for an urban household of three persons was 581,975
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won (equivalent to 416 UK pounds) in 1989' s, so the ceiling is still quite low.
However, those being in the category but healthy enough to work are excluded
from the livelihood protection.
As shown in Table 8.4, the proportion of persons who are provided for at
home or in residentiasl care remained about the same allowing for the increase in
the total population. The number of people on low-incomes doubled and the numer
of eligible households grew more than two and half-fold during the period from
1972 to 1991. This is not because the total number of low-income people
increased, but because the government allocated more budget to the public
assistance program for low-income families. The low income household In other
words, although the number of persons in need has declined with increasing
economic growth, the number receiving care remains relatively about the same
because the income ceiling for those eligible for public relief has been raised.
Table 8.4. Persons Under The Livelihood Protection
year	 Livelihood Protection
Home care	 Institutional	 Low-income
individuals I households	 care	 individuals (%)	 I households
1972	 283,000	 -	 -	 957,859(2.8)	 185,992
1975	 330,000	 -	 55,838	 903,872(2.6)	 179,339
1980	 282,000	 -	 47,000	 1,500,056(3.9)	 .329,682
1985	 282,000	 -	 63,150	 1,928,000(4.7)	 471,393
1986	 283,650	 -	 70,900	 1,819,000(4.4)	 -
1987	 295,000	 -	 74,650	 1,984,000(4.8)	 -
1988	 318,294	 177,231	 75,020	 1,916,757(4.6)	 -
1989	 340,595	 179,260	 79,000	 1,932,935(4.6)	 493,359
1990	 339,423	 188,568	 81,383	 1,835,385(4.3)	 488,134
1991	 338,168	 177,983	 81,556	 1,826,421(4.2)	 493,620
source: MOHASA, Yearbook of Health and Social Statistics
percentage to total population. (Percentage of individuals are almost identical with that of
households.)
- : unavailable
The standard of provision at home or in residential care has gradually been
improved and it will account for 70 per cent of the minimum required living cost in
rural areas and 75 per cent in urban areas by 1995. The effectiveness of public care
will be increased by targetting the greatest need according to regional and
household composition factors. The entire amount of the minimum required living
cost is to be provided for those in residential accommodation. To encourage self-
help among the needy, cash loans of 500,000 won (equivalent to 401 UK pounds in
1993) to 1,000,000 won 14 are on offer to about 183,000 households or half of the
total of poor families. The loans are repayable over five to six months at an annual
interest of 5 per cent with a grace period of one year. Recipients are selected by
44
66
90
92
150
167
I children's houses
u,zvJ"-)
6,944(-)
8,491(-)
1 1,281(-)
9,326(-)
1 2,759(-)
13,13 1 (-)
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mayors of county commissioners at the recommendation of township heads. In
addition, there were plans to provide four to 24 months of vocational to about
4,500 young people from poor families. After such training, jobs were to be
arranged for them through local labour offices.
Medical care is provided for those in the low-income bracket: military
veterans, disaster victims and government-designated "human cultural properties"
and the state bears the entire medical expenses of economically disable persons.
Under the Military Relief Programmes, public assistance is extended to about
149,544 families of dead or disabled veterans and 2,303 families of those who have
rendered meritorious services to the nation. Aid includes compensation in cash,
educational aid for children and vocational training. In addition, soft-term loans are
provided for the homeless for use in building, purchasing or renting houses.
Recipients of such loans numbered 4,400 in 1985. The homeless are also given
priority in the distribution of public housing. A total of 352,244 wounded military
veterans still receive full medical care at veterans' hospitals, and the disabled
veterans are supplied with various complementary services.15
Table 8.5. Social Welfare Institutions And Residents In The Institutions
year	 I Homes for the
residents(%1) I
1965	 42
	
2,567(0.2 1)
1970	 44
	
2,383(0.20)
1975	 45
	
2,441(0.20)
1980	 48
	
3,158(0.22)
1985	 67
	
5,059(0.29)
1990	 89
	
6,409(0.30)
1991	 106
	
6,822(0.30)
year	 maternal & child welfare	 womens vocational
instituti	 number of guide
on	 hholds(%i) centre 	 residei
1965	 37	 1,126(0.28)	 29	 1,333
1970	 34	 945(0.16)	 34	 2,451
1975	 34	 1,025(0.16)	 31	 2,672(15.3)
1980	 33	 872(0.12)	 24	 2,136(20.5)
1985	 34	 956(0.11)	 23	 1,211(11.5)
1990	 37	 879(0.10)	 22	 1,172(14.7)
1991	 38	 829(0.09)	 22	 1,152(14.3)
source: EPB, Szinvnary of Budge for Fiscal Year.
percentage to the population aged 65 and over.
%2 : percentage to all the mentally handicapped (unavailable)
percentage to single parent households
percentage to the number of ruined women in brothel.
percentage to the child population under 15 years old.
	
I	 resident(%5)
	
543	 67,144(0.53)
	
533	 54,899(0.41)
	
385	 38,452(0.29)
	
314	 27,907(0.22)
	
290	 28,187(0.23)
	
287	 26,368(0.24)
	
288	 24,997(0.23)
Institutions for the
handicanned
Along with the social insurance, and public relief programmes, there are
residential and other social welfare institutions such as homes for the aged,
in each y
1991
100.0
(1489.6)
32.3
26.4
3.1
22.4
5.6
10.4
1992
100.0
(1922.4)
35.0
30.0
2.5
17.1
4.3
11.0
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institutes for the handicapped, maternal and cl1ild welfare institutions, and women's
vocational guidance centres. As shown on Table 8.5, there has been a great
increase in the number of homes for the aged and their inmates which seems to be
mainly due to the ageing of population and the decline of the stem family.
However regarding the increase in the number of the total aged population the
proportion of the provision for the elderly has not increased so noticeably. The
number of the institutions for the handicapped and their inmates increased up to
1980. The abrupt fluctuation in 1985 is due to the changes in the classification:
those in mental hospitals were excluded. While the number of single mother
households accommodated in the institution also has steadily declined. Until 1965
many of the inmates were widows and their children of the Korean war but since
then they are comprised of unwed mothers and those separated by divorce or
separation. In spite the number of them are increasing rapidly, the inmates in the
institution have declined. On the other hand the inmates in the women's vocational
centre are mostly ruined women and reliable data are unavailable except relating to
those in a particular brothel. The provoision for them has gradually declined.
Lastly the number of children's homes and their inmates have continuously
declined over the past two and half decades. The changes are regarded firstly as a
consequence of socio-economic development since the I 960s and secondly the
number of orphaned children of the Korean war, has declined by their natural
growth into adults or by adoption, abroad or at home. That is the reason the
statistics after 1970 have sharply declined. The Korean war ended in 1953 and the
orphans were 17 years old or more by 1970. The institutions accommodated them
until their 18-year-old legal age ceiling. The further decline after 1970 is due to, in
addition to socio-econornic development, a decline in birth rate and in the stern
pattern families.
Table 8.6. Trend Of Budget For Social Welfare Services % (100 million won)
target of
	
distribution
the service	 1987 I	 1988
(real sum)	 (421.6)	 (515.6)	 (724.3)
child	 27.2	 27.4	 22.4
elderly	 8.7	 8.9	 9.6
women	 11.5	 8.7	 3.2
disabled	 39.5	 41.9	 40.8
homeless	 6.5	 6.9	 8.9
others	 6.6	 6.5	 15.2
source: EPB, Sum rnay of Budget for Fiscal Year.
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The major emphasis of social welfare policy has been on children, the
disabled, the elderly and women who need special care.(Refer to Table 8.6) In
1991 a total of about 25 thousand children were accommodated in 288 children's
homes throughout the country. In addition there were 6,901 households headed by
children with a total number of 14,416 children. With 12 vocational training
facilities the government has increased public support for child welfare funding.
There are job-placement campaigns to help older children become self-supporting.
The government has also provided subsidies for living and educational expenses of
children who are heads of households. Counselling for children was provided by
380 counsellors at child guidance centres nation-wide. A nation-wide network for
finding missing children was set up in 1986. Despite the traditional value placed on
blood relationships in family succession, it has been the policy of both
governmental and private organisations to encourage adoption by Korean families
rather than allowing children to be adopted by foreigners.
Table 8.7. Trend of Adoption Abroad and Domestic
year	 total	 abroad	 domestic
real No.	 per cent	 real No. I per cent	 real No. j per cent
1965	 653	 100.0	 451	 69.1	 202	 30.9
1970	 2,467	 100.0	 1,932	 78.3	 535	 21.7
1975	 6,954	 100.0	 5,077	 73.0	 1,877	 27.0
1980	 7,801	 100.0	 4,144	 53.1	 3,657	 46.9
1985	 11,692	 100.0	 8,837	 75.6	 2,855	 24.4
1990	 6,079	 100.0	 4,191	 68.9	 1,888	 31.1
source: MOl-IASA, Health and Society (1991).
In 1988, there were almost 915 thousand persons (2.2. per cent of the total
population) of the disabled and among them at least one out of ten were needy
disabled persons, of whom 11,762 (just 12.3 per cent of the needy disabled) were
accommodated at 120 residential homes.' 6 With the enactment of the Disabled
Welfare Law in 1981 a welfare system for the disabled has been established,
medical rehabilitation programmes strengthened and welfare centres for the
disabled expanded.
The National Rehabilitation Centre was constructed in 1985 and now is in
operation. The government also has taken over from the Red Cross, the programme
to provide such things as artificial limbs, hearing aids and wheelchairs for the
disabled poor. While most disabled are under home care to support their families is
given. 1-lowever, the support to the families of the disabled is limited to needy
family only and the level of income ceilings set for income relief eligibility or the
amount of the benefit is exactly same as those under Livelihood Protection Law.
To compensate meagre support to the families of the disabled, the government
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enhanced indirect support to the families by promoting the employed disabled.
Government authorities have joined with the private sector to ensure that the
disabled have a fair opportunity to reach their full potential and the government's
Directive on the Promotion of the Employment of the Disabled in 1977 was
designed to encourage industries to employ the disabled. At the private level, the
Korean Society for Rehabilitation of the Disabled conducts various programmes to
train the disabled and get them jobs. To promote equal opportunities for disabled
persons, restrictive provisions in existing laws have been amended. Public facilities
for the disabled have been expanded.
There were over 2.2 million persons aged 65 or over in 1992, or 5.2 per
cent of the total population and it is projected by EPB to increase to 6.4 per cent by
the year 2000 and to 11.4 per cent in 2020. As for the welfare of the elderly, major
emphasis has been placed on increasing respect for senior citizens. Schools and the
mass media have been drafted into the cause and a week designated to honour the
elderly. The government annually honours filial sons and daughters-in-law and
typical traditional families as a way to encourage time-honoured values. A system
was introduced in 1980 in which people aged 65 or older can use some public
facilities free of charge and others at a discount. These include public
transportation, parks and public baths. In addition free health examinations have
been given to the elderly since 1983 in accordance with the Aged Welfare Law.
The government is going to place more emphasis on the establishment of facilities
to take care of the physical and mental needs of the elderly rather than just relying
on residential facilities. The number and types of nursing homes are going to be
increased.
Of course, the provision is critically meagre compared to the .developed
countries like United Kingdom in particular. The UK, in spite of having a far
bigger proportion of elderly, which amounted 15.7 per cent of the total population
in 1991,17 arranged far various social services in depth. Except for the services
mentioned above, provision of meals in the home, sitters-in, night attendants and
laundary services as well as day centres, luncheon clubs and recreational facilities
etc. are included. Alarm systems have been developed to help elderly people obtain
help in an emergency. Also in some areas 'good neighbour' and visiting services are
arranged by the local authority or a voluntary organisation.' 8 To sum up, compared
to the social services in UK or other developed countries, the Korean government
has made policy orientation to the projects demanding a smaller amount of finance
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Welfare programs for women are aimed at female heads of families,
homeless women, unmarried mothers, women working at entertainment places and
other needy women. Support for maternal and child welfare facilities has been
strengthened as well as support for vocational training programs for young girls
who run away from home, unmarried mothers and other needy women. There are
273 counsellors throughout the country who provide guidance for women working
in entertainment places and runaways. There are also vocational training facilities
where such women can stay and receive professional training and moral education.
The Korean Women's Development Institute was established in 1983 with strong
government support and is aimed at promoting women's welfare through research
on women's problems and training programmes. Together with the National
Committee on Women's Policy under the Prime Minister's office, which
systematically and comprehensively reviews government policies affecting women,
the Women's Development Institute places a leading role in promoting and
enhancing the status of women.19
Table 8.8. Expenditures Structure Of The Central Government
Expenditure	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1992
	total in percentage	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
	
(real sum in billion won)	 (49)	 (172)	 (759)	 (1465)	 (3017)	 (4608)
general administration 	 5.9	 15.9	 11.1	 3.2	 3.2	 3.5
security	 5.9	 4.1	 4.6	 5.0	 5.4	 5.4
defence	 20.7	 27.1	 30.2	 27.2	 23.7	 20.1
education	 15.2	 13.1	 15.1	 16.9	 16.3	 17.4
health	 0.9	 1.0	 1.9	 1.5	 2.7	 2.3
social security welfare 	 5.1	 4.4	 3.5	 5.3	 7.3	 7.6
housing, community devel. 	 -	 1.2	 2.2	 5.2	 7.7	 8.2
culture	 -	 0.8	 0.7	 1.0	 0.4	 0.5
economic affairs	 25.2	 30.3	 23.8	 21.1	 21.6	 24.6
others	 21.1	 2.2	 6.9	 12.4	 11.7	 10.4
source: EPB, Summary of Budget for Fiscal Year.
Table 8.9. Trend Of Expenditure On Social Security	 billion won (%)
year	 nditure	 on social security 	 ratio
	
social	 public relief	 welfare	 to
	
insurance	 service	 GNP
1970	 26.1(100.0)	 14.5(55.5)
1975	 87.0(100.0)	 36.2(41.6)
1980	 610.7(100.0)	 402.6(65.9)
1985	 1676.6(100.0)	 1277.3(76.2)
1990	 2016.4(100.0)	 1659.1(82.3)
1991	 2605.2(100.0)	 2205.6(84.7)
1992	 3176.2(100.0)	 2728.1(85.9)
source: EPB, Summary of Budget for Fiscal Year.
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The scope of social security programmes has expanded steadily reflecting
increased demand resulting from the changes in social patterns brought about by
industrialisation, urbanisation, and by changed social values.
To examine the quality of social security programmes, we can review the
expenditure structure of Korean central government. The absolute amount of
expenditure allocated to social security has increased reflecting both an increased
size of total expenditure of the central government and the increased size of the
national economy. Expenditure on social security as a percentage of the total
budget has remained almost unchanged for the last two decades. As shown on
Table 8.8, expenditure on social security programmes is low compared to that of
other developing countries like 'I'aiwan, Singapore, or hong Kong or the 26 per
cent of UK20. Compared to the dramatic economic growth of the last two decades,
investment in social security programmes has remained underdeveloped. There are
many examples of underdeveloped condition of social security in Korea. Provision
for the elderly is just one example of them. Concretely, the UK has provided about
5 per cent of the total elderly population with institutional accomodation in 1991
while Korea just 0.3 per cent at the same period. Also, coverage of most social
services are below standard level. This contributed to industrial unrest among
workers in the late 1980s. As shown in Table 8.9, the absolute amount of
expenditure for social security has increased in every section and in total but the
increase was almost solely for social insurance and medical insurance in particular.
As a result the level of expenditure on social welfare services is too meagre to
justify the claim that Korea has developed a social security system in the real
meaning of the term.
Family policy comprises just a minor part of this underdeveloped social
security system. The state has adopted a negative attitude of "home care first, social
security next" in order to have child and adolescent problems, women's issues, and
elderly problems solved within the family. The negative policy was pursued so as
to invest the whole of the national resources of human power or materials on
economic development. Measures for the redistribution of wealth were discouraged
as antithetical to the growth of the national economy. As a result, active measures
to support self-reliance of families, to protect families from social changes have not
been provided but instead the responsibility has been placed on individual families.
So far, family policy of worth mentioning has hardly been in Korea. Of
course there are the Livelihood Protection Act or the Child Protection Law as
family-allied policies. However, the laws relate only to individuals isolated from
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families rather than to families in need of special care. It is true that family policy
deals with problems emerging from family changes but it has failed in managing
the whole of a family organically as a unit. It has divided members of family into
children, adolescents, women, or elderly etc. and dealt separately with them group
by group. Of course those are important targets of family welfare but they are
neither all nor the whole of the subject of policy. Above all, even if welfare policy
can deal with the problems of every sort of individual family member, a
consideration of their relevance to the families of which they are part has been
neglected. Welfare programmes have been delivered according to the needs of each
individual family member isolated from their own family and there was no
overview of the problem for the family as a whole. Therefore residential
accommodation has been much more predominant than home care in family
support. As a result, family policies sometimes separated individuals from their
families and provoked family dissolution instead of integrating them more
effectually within their family.
Family policy has been extremely selective and residual. Public relief to
low-income families under the Livelihood Protection Act is offered to an extremely
limited number of vulnerable cases with a minimum amount of materia' support.
Family policy on an range of enormous family-related social problems prevailing
in present day Korea is virtually non-existent. Old people neglected by their
family; abandoned children; erratic adolescents; physical ill-treatment of spouses,
children, or the weak; family desertion phenomena; the increase in single parent
families, lone mother families in particular; the increasing pressure of poverty
resulting from various disasters or accidents; chronically inadequate environments
for children, education, residence etc. are practicailly ignored. Besides these
particular problems, there are problems of overburdening housework for dual
career women, of various socio-cultural obstacles against the employment of
married women, and there is no social mechanism to tackle problems like the
illness, death or divorce of a spouse, and defenceless women who cannot escape
from status decline, poverty, or emotional deprivation. These represent present
condition of family policy in Korea.
8.2.2. Conclusion : A Direction For Future Family Policy
There are innumerable actual, urgent, and complex issues family policy
should handle: ageing issues, adolescent problems, divorce, family poverty,
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violence, sexual abuse, increases in illegitimate sexual behaviour, the weakness of
the filial piety idea, homelessness, dual career women, the extremely skewed role
distribution, the lack of home training, housing problems, etc. which have caused
heated debates throughout the last couple of decades. However, all these problems
can be summarised under four headings: generational conflicts, womens issues, the
changing sex ratio, and the re-unification of the nation. The first two are urgent
issues which in Korea we are confronting at the moment, the latter two are issues
from which we are going to suffer most seriously in the near future. Family policy
could be expected to help in present day Korea by re-formulating or reinforcing the
relationship between parents and children, which is one of the main axes
structuring the family, as well as the relationship between couples and the
relationship between the adult generations. These are social attributes in the sense
that the breakdown of the relationships is connected to social disorder. Whatever
conjugal pattern a family adopts, and whatever lineage system a family follows, the
relationship between parents and children must be strong enough to maintain the
social consensus or at least to slow down its weakening. This does not mean a
revival of past patriarchal relationships but in order to sustain social integration and
continuity, the generational relationship should not be damaged in the nuclear
family, the stem family, the single family, or the step-family.
Under this proposition, family policy could simultaneously tackle both
ageing issues and children's issues in terms of reinforcing the parent-children
relationship. For instance, the tradition of filial piety could be reinforced and its
practice insured as an institution. However, this time it would be in a different
form, neither patriarchal nor authoritative but equally distributed to both the
mother's side and father's side and more democratic and humanistic between
parents and children. Many alternatives can be suggested to upgrade individual
status of present day old people at home and their social status more widely. First
of all, breaking from, conventional policy orientation, family policy should provide
more independent housing for elderly people. Of course family policy can support
or enhance the meagre number of both statutory and voluntary bodies which help
the elderly to live at home when they choose, and increase the number of social
workers giving advice and domestic help, providing meals or laundry services etc.
as well as day centre or recreational facilities. A wide range of aids should be
arranged for those elderly people with difficulties in hearing and eyesight. In other
ways, family policy can also encourage housing associations and private builders
to provide homes designed for elderly people, those in poor health in particular.
Above all these arrangements, economic benefit for the needy elderly is one of the
most urgent targets for family policy. Considering that, according to Social
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Indicators In Korea by EPB (1992), three out of five Koreans through all age
cohorts have no economic provision for their old-age, it is easily seen how bitter
the condition of the present elderly aged over 65 is. Under this condition it is
hardly possible to expect a healthy relationship between elderly parents and their
adult children. Of course the government launched a pension system but the
eligible beneficiaries are a relative minority with a moderate economic background.
Most elderly people are without either the pension system or personal insurance
yet. So the easist way, at the moment, to support the elderly in economic
difficulties is old people's benefit.
On the other hand family policy should encourage families to recover their
educational role for their children which has been almost entirely transfered to
school teachers training children for examinations rather than in humanitarian
education. If the father has become a working machine, children have become
studying machines. Family policy in co-operation with other education, social, and
culture policies, can reform the education system which can help children be free
from 'exam hell' so as to have them think of the real meaning of being educated in
terms of a sound relationship among family or community members. It can also
motivate parents, fathers in particular, to spend more time strengthening their
relationships in sound and healthy ways with their children, by promoting the
importance of family life and parent-children relationships through the mass media
or through flexible working conditions to help them spend more time at home.
Family policy should also deal with a number of issues relating to women.
The issues are by-products of the contradiction and conflict between tradition and
socio-econornic change. However the source of the conflicts can be abstracted into
three elements: the deterioration of women's status during the Japanese annexation,
the expansion of the national economy requiring women's participation, and the
overburdened distribution of domestic roles for women at home. Whichever source
they are from, womens issues are movements to ask for an equal right as a human
being equal to those of a husband or of a boy on the one hand and movements to
search for individual rights as a woman rather than as a mother on the other hand.
These issues are quite subtly intermingled, sometimes confirming existing family
values but sometimes contradicting them. The equality movement should be
backed up by family policy or related social policies. The unequal distribution of
power at home has exerted negative influences in many realms.
Experiencing Japanese totalitarianism during the annexation, Koreans were
habituated to regarding women as unequal beings. Children who grew up looking
Chapter Eight 307
at their mother totally subordinated to father have learned to see women as
subservient, weak, or at best a sexual object, and the logic of subordination at home
has expanded to accept as natural women's subordination in society. This has been
usual in groups in their middle age or over. However, younger generations and
feminists began to raise questions about their mother's subordination. Without a
sound reorganisation of power between a couple, harmonisation among family
members is hardly possible, and without that it will hardly be possible to see
children growing healthy and society sound. Therefore equalisation is a way to
recover traditional virtues lost for decades between couples and to normalise
family functions in a more humanitarian context. Of course equal rights should be
applied to equal opportunities for jobs and equal wages for equal labour regardless
of sex as far as the economy needs women to participate in the labour market for
the dvelopment of the nation.
At the same, time demands for individual rights or womenhood are quite
subtle and raise contentious issues. The source of conflict comes mainly from the
frustrated status of women at home and the diminished recognition of theyafue of
family life. During the rapid industrialisation, the family was recognised as merely
a place to rest, the place the niother does all sorts of routine and humble matters to
serve the father who has come back from his place of work. Domestic affairs were
treated as an obscure occupational activity and the last thing to be given any
attention. In a word family life was recognised as totally isolated from society.
Naturally, a mother's status was degraded, and the father's upgraded, and as a
consequence, well-educated women in younger generations began to feel distaste
for and irritation against domestic life, and many rushed to have a job outside the
home. It was a sort of fashion of the times rather than a sincere search for a
development of individual potentiality. Naturally a full-time housewife of high
education was perceived as an incompetent or failed woman. The trend brought
about an increase in the number of families with husband and wife both working.
In order to cope with this phenomenon family policy must deliver three
approaches. First the value of household tasks should be re-estimated to counter
negative attitudes against domestic life. Raising the proportion of money
maintenance payments after divorce would be an example and a reasonable
calculation of compensation for injury to a full-time housewife another. In any case
family policies should be prepared to have both men and women recognise
household responsibilities are as or even more valuable than occupational activities
outside the home. Secondly channels must be arranged between family and society
to break the assumption that the family is no more than a place solely for emotional
rest and and to have the family take back part of those functions totally transferred
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to society. For example, its educational function should be reinforced so as to
emphasise home training, or the religious function developed to enable the family
to run more smoothly spiritually. At the same time, part of the industrial structure
must be revised to meet demands from married women. Most industries are
structured to require the full-time participation of employees and that makes the
family of dual career women suffer various problems; from child rearing to
intensive relationships with relatives, etc. So industrial structures should be
diversified so that women can participate in economic activity as a side job or part-
time job, which allows them to co-ordinate both household responsibilities and
occupational activity. Lastly the amount of earning of families where both husband
and wife are working should be balanced, through taxation policy, with that of the
full-time housewife's family. The taxation system should allow couples to decide
between family loss and the economic rewards of both working. As a consequence
working in double harness should not be directly connected to economic prosperity
but only to the development of individual potential and to a contribution to the
nation. Of course there would need to be two measures. First working in double
harness among poor families must be excluded from the taxation policy second
there must be a cultural and cognitive shift from the conventional idea on role
distribution. Society should be changed so as to accept a husband working at home
as natural. All in all, the individual rights of a husband or wife as a woman/man
should be insured as far as parenthood is working soundly.
The next issues family policy will have to tackle are various foreseeable
social problems arising from the change in the sex ratio and the consequences of
re-unification when that is eventually achieved. First the changing sex ratio is
anticipated to cause various social problems: an extreme imbalance in the marriage
market, the risk of youth who fail to pair turning to violence, breakdown of sexual
morality etc. To slow down the problems, family policy should seek to break many
prohibitions in marriage customs. Age differences, social class, and educational
level which have been preconditions of pairing among Koreans should be mitigated
to widen the marriage boundary, and the prohibition rule which has significantly
narrowed the marriage market must be softened to reduce the number of the youth
who fail to pair. Instead sexual morality after marriage should be reinforced
through mass communication to insure the stabilisation of married life while pre-
marital intercourse may be tolerated. Of course policies to meet sexually
transmitted disease would have to be supplemented to prevent national health
decaying due to sexual liberation. Development of far more positive and
comprehensive policies is needed to have youths formulate their self-identity
through occupational and social activities rather than love affairs or to encourage
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them go abroad to create new types of activities. That could prevent youth turning
to violence but, of course, a new and relavent philosophy or ideology should be
reformulated and this would require the emergence of new and constructive
cultural leadership which is hard to contrive or predict.
Re-unification of the peninsula could cause both positive and negative
effects for family life. Families from the North having been under communist
ideology, seem to have achieved sexual equality between husband and wife to a
considerable extent, and women have become relatively autonomous and
independent social beings in managing household affairs compared to the South
brides burdening themselves with incredible marriage expenses. 2 ' By adopting and
encouraging the North's custom in terms of marriage expense or other practices,
family policy can remedy regrettable marriage customs that have caused severe
social deprivation among poor Southern families. Of course if the policy fails in
remedying the custom, poor families' alienation might expand to the mostly poor
North as well and so deepen social conflict.
The most serious problem anticipated from the reunification is an increase
in the number of poor families, needing a huge amount of family welfare finance.
The Northern family, which on average is relatively poorer than the families of the
South, could move to the South for a promising job, and might cause an increase in
the poor urban families, leaving behind the aged or the weak who could not
accompany the migration. Koreans already have experienced what sort of problems
can occur from the experience of the migration of the l960s and 1970s but this
time they would be bigger in size. Even the nightmares of housing problem, health
problems, and poverty, etc. among the poor migrant families have not been sorted
out yet. After re-unification the social problems of migration would cause far
deeper conflicts in range and in depth to jeopardise social integration. Various
family policies in co-operation with other social, economic, cultural, and political
policies are needed to mitigate the expected migration, to soften the economic gulf
between the North and the South, etc. Of course encouraging youth in the seriously
restricted marriage market to devote themselves to a reconstruction of the North's
national economy could be an example of family policy. Regarding the anticipated
problems from re-unification and the sex ratio, the essence of family policy should
be oriented to encouragement of enterprise, progress, development, and open-
minded toward new situations, and the world.
There are several traditional patterns which have remained unchanged
during the modernisation of the last few decades. Family policy-makers should not
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miss harmonising for the successful completion of their policies. There are five
characteristics to consider: the hyo idea and the traditional devotion to children, the
nostalgia for family solidarity, ideas about role allocation, traditional sexual
morality, and the co-operative street committee.
First whichever pattern of household a family may compose, a strong
devotion between parents and children remains even now. Of course the hyo should
not be limited to patrilineal lines only as was usual, but should be expanded to the
wife's line as well, and the traditional devotion to children should remain as a
family focus but also expand to include all children of the other families and the
nation. With sound devotion to and from parents and children, regardless of
whether they are sharing a same household or not, there would be a basic strategy
to reduce generational conflicts and the social alienation prevailing in the society at
the moment.
Secondly, family policy can encourage families in a nostalgia for family
solidarity in cultivating a new cultural and ideological movement. Of course which
sort of solidarity would be encouraged depends on how present day families
respond to that. Coming from the late 1970s, a new type of clan association
emerged in great numbers and genealogy books were very rapidly published . Al
these trends reflect a crisis in self-identity and denotes a nostalgia for a strong
solidarity among human beings. Family policy should graft them to a new social
solidarity, this time it should not be narrow-minded as was in the traditional society
but be a healthy competition in creating national consensus in the realm of family
life.
Thirdly, contemporary Koreans are showing a strict role distribution among
family members even now, and the strictness has tended to increase conflicts
among them. However one important idea inherent in strict role distribution is a
reflection of a social pressure to be true to one's duty. Family policy should
sublimate the sense of responsibility whilst eliminating authoritative and exclusive
elements from the strict role distribution custom. Whichever role a person is in, and
whichever sex the person is, a strong commitment to fulfil their responsibility
should be grafted into social and economic development programmes in the future.
Fourthly, family policy must preserve and extend the traditional strong
sense of morality to prevent the nation from the anticipated moral disorder that
would rage due to the changing sex ratio and surplus of unattached males. Of
course some morality like (lie prohibition principle between the persons of the
same surname and same origin, can worsen problems of pairing and as
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consequence serve to damage moral sense as well. Therefore the principle should
be revised to relax the boundary of pairing. With this exception Confucian moral
on sexual behaviour could be re-viewed to prevent possible unhappy events in
marrage life. Of course in order for the policy to be successful, other associated
policies to encourage the youths to participate in areas other than love affairs must
be arranged.
Lastly family policy should make use of the street committees
(pansanghoe) that have been used for a couple of decades to formulate consensus
for economic development, which originated from a Confucian tactic for grouping
several families to meet for taxation collection or group work for the regional
community etc. Of course the mechanism would not be exactly the same as the
previous street committee that has been identified as a government agent to compel
one-sided economic policies or to maintain the political hegemony or political
interest of a particular group. Nevertheless there should be a mediating or
secondary grouping between individual families and society. The mediating
function in traditional society was fulfilled by clan groups. However we, already
have seen the family easily used to become community focussed when it was
mediated by the consanguinal secondary group and moreover, various elements of
modern society would not allow the kinship group to dominate within the same
regional boundary due to occupational, educational, and social mobility. The
alternative is to organise individual families within each locality. The mechanism
would not be one-sided or compulsory as before but reciprocal and more
autonomous in mediating between them and society. Through this mechanism
various social values of concern to the family or the society as a whole could be
renewed, revised, and enforced to reduce various social problems, like violence,
either among adolescents or among adults, unfilial piety, abuse, etc. and enhance
local welfare in positively caring for many distressed families, the disabled, and the
aged etc. To meet the need, family policy should support an increase in the number
of voluntary organisations and the enhancement of their function.
To conclude, whatever family policy may be, if it is going to be successful,
it should be based on a sound consensus among people, and it should be
autonomous and reciprocal to ensure positive participation from both people and
the nation. And a healthy atmosphere of altruism is needed. As Durkheim argued in
his study of suicide, unhealthily strict altruism demanding too serious a sacrifice
for individuals to cope with, can cause malfunction of social integration. 1-lowever
without altruistic values prevailing in society, no great achievement is possible:
devotion for children, for the aged, for each family member, for society, and
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eventually for world peace instead of pursuing private individual interests only.
Whichever side-effects come from the trend and however severe they are, society
can survive in as far as it is going to contribute to the common good. It is what
Koreans have experienced during the modernisation of the last few decades. Self-
centredness is widespread everywhere: family members, friends, foes, society,
spiritual activities, material products, etc. Naturally as far as a person searches for
his or her own self-identity from an egoistic point of view, s/he only loses too
many important things and finally achieves only alienation from the person and
from society. Family policy can contribute to fostering social atmosphere, casting
off from egoism to reach a sound consensus on a society for all.
